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1. SETTING THE STAGE FOR PHD RESEARCH
The aim of this chapter is to provide the motivation for this Ph.D. research topic, together with 
the necessary clarifications on its objectives. Six elements are discussed in this chapter. First, the 
research problem is briefly introduced. The literature review presented in the second and third 
sections, regarding problems and solutions in development is used to establish broader ground 
for this research. Similarly, literature review of network theory in the fourth section suggests to 
elaborating on the appropriate ways to approach, examine and resolve our research problem. In 
addition, the Vietnam context is introduced in a fifth section in order to understand a specific 
context of the problems of development. In the final section, the central research question and 
the associated research objectives and research relevancies are defined. This section also 
outlines the structure of the thesis, by introducing its key components and how these 
interrelate. 
1.1. Introduction of the research problem 
For many social science researchers a paradox is a fascinating study area. My research interest is 
derived from one of the most “painful” paradoxes of contemporary development: involuntary 
resettlement as an adverse impact from progression. This paradox in development was first 
discussed by Escobar (1997) in his critique on “The making and unmaking of development”, and 
was heavily based on the works of Cernea and his colleagues in the series of displacement 
literature emerging during 1980s - 1990s, which emphasise the adverse impacts of displacement 
resulting from “inevitable and necessarily progressive routes” (Escobar 1997: 86) to 
modernization. In this process, national or regional long-term interest may be in conflict with the 
interests of groups or individuals who are immediately and adversely affected (Shihata 1993: 
55). Consequently, there is growing resistance of would be-resettlers in many developing 
countries and unwillingness to accept a “solution” that may lower or even wipe out their living 
standards (Cernea 1993, Oliver Smith 1991). In response to this, a search for “the means of 
reconciling the two sets of conflicting interests” (Shihata 1993: 55) has become an ambitious 
project of interested scholars and practitioners. 
However, in the contemporary literature of displacement, there are surprisingly few publications 
on public- private collaboration in combating the “impoverishment risks” or “the most difficult 
sacrifices in the name of development” as mentioned above. Instead, governments are often 
perceived to bear primary responsibility. They appear to be the most suited actors for 
ameliorating the adverse consequences of displacement and for handling interest mediation 
between different interest groups by providing legal frameworks, policy instruments and 
development tools (Cernea 1993). The role of the private sectors has been largely overlooked in 
this field in spite of their recognized role in sustainable development at project level (Asmal 
2004, Brown 2004, Schmidheiny 2004, Cernea 1993, 1997, 2000 and Oliver-Smith 1996).  
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Our literature review, illustrated in Figure 1 below, presents the current knowledge of our 
research topic. It provides the context of our proposed study, and enables conceptual 
understanding of our research and suggests theoretical and methodological approaches to 
resolve our research problem.  
Figure 1: The formulation of research problem based on literature review 
 
By clarifying the relationship between the problem and its associated solutions in sustainable 
development (SD), the literature review presents an argument that leads to the description of 
the proposed study which focuses on the public private partnership (PPP) as a solution for the 
development problems of involuntary resettlement (IR) and social conflicts. The research 
problem, illustrated by a specific case in Vietnam is elaborated based on its component issues, 
identified under the network perspectives. 
1.2. Problem of development 
This section aims to review IR as a critical phenomenon in the development context. Particularly, 
the social conflicts viewed as the negative impacts of IR appear to be the major problem that 
needs to be solved under the sustainable governance perspective.   
Development as problem 
Development as solution 
Practice of PPP in IR 
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Partnership and private actor’s role 
Involuntary 
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1.2.1. Involuntary resettlement (IR) 
IR is described in the literature as development-induced displacement, forced-displacement or 
forced-resettlement (Cernea 1993, 1996, 1997, 2000; McDowell 1996, 2002 and De Wet 2001) 
while compulsory land conversion (Hung Vo1 2009) is defined as a “development project” which 
results in unavoidable resettlement. In cases of IR, the affected people have no option, but to 
rebuild their lives, incomes and asset bases elsewhere (WB OP122).  
IR, viewed as the sixth social dimension of sustainable development, has gained importance in 
the development literature due to (i) a world-wide concern over adverse environmental and 
social costs of large infrastructure projects and; (ii) the well-organized and well publicized 
resistance movements against IR in many countries (Asthana 1996). The number of studies on 
displacement has steadily increased since the 1980s - the 1980s are seen as a decade of 
displacement (Clark 2000: 3). The majority of scholars and practitioners interested in the study 
of the adverse impacts of displacement view displacement as “the most difficult sacrifice in the 
name of development” (Ibid.). “When people are displaced, production systems may be 
dismantled, kinship groupings disrupted, and long-established residential settlements 
disorganized. Many jobs and assets are lost. Health care tends to deteriorate. Links between 
producers and customers are often severed, and local labour markets are disrupted” (WB 1994a 
cited in Cernea 1999).  
In discussing the side-effects of IR, for Dwivedi (2002: 712-713) the resettlement literature 
encompasses two broad categories. The first category is represented by scholars who consider 
displacement as the inevitable and unintended outcome of development and who search for 
effective ways for designing and handling resettlement as well as minimizing the adverse 
impacts of displacement through appropriate legal, managerial and policy frameworks. The 
second category is represented by action-research scholars, who believe that displacement and 
resettlement is a failure of development and who promote the investigation of new approaches 
towards development.  
We align our research with the first category, the representatives of which are Cernea (1993), 
McDowell (1960, Behura & Nayak (1993), Shihata (1993), Parasuraman (1996), De Wet (2001) 
and Downing (2002). These authors produced contributions to the literature on understanding 
the adverse impacts of involuntary resettlement, which they labelled as a man-made crisis 
(Behura & Nayak 1993); a shock in livelihoods (McDowell 1996 and Downing 2002 and Cernea 
1993), and impoverishment risks (Cernea & McDowell 1997 & 2000). However, issues of 
legitimacy such as rights, governance and negotiation remain largely unaddressed in the 
literature (Cernea 1993: 3-4). 
Another gap in part of the literature on IR is a lack of focus on rational problem-solving in a 
national context with public-private involvement. First, anthropological and sociological studies 
have problematized IR as a social problem, and explore and analyse the adverse impacts of 
                                                          
1
 Hung Vo is the former Vice-minister of MONRE 
2
 The World Bank Operational Policies (OP) 4.12 (2001) 
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development rather than focusing on solutions. Although there is some attention to finding 
solutions via adapted legal and policy frameworks, the rational economic aspects of 
resettlement such as financial resources, economic activities for livelihood rehabilitation or 
economic rent approach in benefit sharing had received less attention (Cernea 1999). Second 
empirical studies have drawn attention to the huge national involuntary resettlement projects 
initiated by big international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and ADB for the 
development of publicly-used infrastructure such as dams, power plants, and highways which 
are subjected to international norms and advanced policies. However, there has been little 
discussion and few empirical studies on the national and regional involuntary resettlement 
projects with commercial purposes, which are subjected to national policies and investment of 
private actors.  
1.2.2. Social conflict 
Social conflict refers to “interactions of interdependent people who see their goals as 
incompatible, and who believe the “other” people are interfering with their efforts to satisfy 
their interests or values” (WCD 2000: v). Social conflict is subjected to inter-disciplinary studies 
and has became of research interest of varied scholars from different fields, including sociology, 
psychology, psychiatry, economy and political science (Fink 1968: 412).  
Social conflicts in IR are often understood as resistance, tensions and conflict (Oliver Smith 
1996), resistance and hostility (Cernea 1988 in Oliver Smith 1996), complaints and petitions 
(Hung Vo 2009), complaint, grievance, disputes (VDR 2010 and IFC 19983) or controversies such 
as denunciations, complaints, disputes and petitions (Kim 2009). 
In theory, conflicts can be viewed as positive or negative (Coy & Woehrle 2000). Specifically, 
conflicts can be useful as a means of stimulating engagement and creativity. Meanwhile, if a 
conflict is handled ineffectively, it can become destructive (Deutsch 1973 in WCD 2000, Coser 
1956 and Simmel 1955). Explicitly, a social conflict in involuntary resettlement if often regarded 
as negative and subjected to mediation and mitigation (WCD 2000). 
As such, social conflicts are multi-dimensional and must be categorized (Kriesberg et al 1989). In 
line with our research approach, we focus on the recent literature in regards to the classification 
of conflicts between different organisations and groups at implementation level, and preferably 
in the field of IR. Indeed, Moore (1996) followed by Gunawan (2004) and Hansen (2012) 
elaborated on the dynamics of conflicts, and in the process identified three types of conflicts, 
classified in accordance to their level and intensity: latent conflicts, emerging conflict and 
manifest conflict. According to Gunawan (2004: 33) manifest conflict infers an active and 
ongoing dispute, while a latent conflict can be described as “a conflict that has not surfaced yet”. 
Gunawan further emphasized that in contrast to a latent conflict which is viewed as at the level 
of “attitude”, emerging conflicts are about to erupt or to have at least reached the level of 
“behaviour” (2004: 33). 
                                                          
3
 Retrieved from https://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/Publications_Handbook_DoingBetterBusiness 
in 2010 
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Moore (1996) recognised five types of conflicts subjected to mediation: interest conflicts; 
structural conflicts; value conflicts; relationship conflicts; and data conflicts. The mediation 
framework elaborated by Moore (1996) has, since its proposal, gained wide-spread usage for 
conflict analysis schemes in large dam projects (WCD 2000).  
Social conflict appeared as an inevitable attribute of all social structures, epitomised in the 
following statement “where there are human beings organized in social structures, there will be 
conflict” (Coy& Woehrle 2000: 1). Oliver Smith (1991) went even further by looking at resistance 
as “certain features of human cognition and adaptation to change” (Marris 1975 quoted in Oliver 
Smith 1991: 134). Consequently, resistance or hostility to the idea of resettlement are not 
unusual and have been characterized as “normal” and “expected” (Cernea 1988 quoted in Oliver 
Smith 1996: 134, WCD 2000).  
However, this argument, to some extent, leads to minimizing the conflict issue in IR, or to 
neglect the needs to investigate the root-cause sources of conflicts. Social conflicts in IR derive 
from “the feeling of powerlessness […] towards the changes” (Oliver Smith 1996: 134); unequal 
distribution of cost and benefits, disparities in social and economic power and performance of 
specific implementation institutions (WCD 2000, Parasuraman 1996, Cernea 1993 and Behura & 
Nayak 1993). Meanwhile, the above mentioned scholars, including (Wicklin III 2009, Asthana 
1996, Cernea 1996, 1997...) emphasized that the problems arising from policy environment such 
as the inadequate legal framework and policy making principles (methods) can be the root-
causes of social conflicts in IR. Ultimately, the sources of conflict mainly derive from the 
discontent of resettlement and support policies in Vietnam, such as improper resettlement 
policies, low compensation price and the lack of job & income generation measures (VDR 2010: 
48; Hung Vo 2009).  
In line with the perspective of the conflict resolution scholars-practitioners, conflict resolution 
infers complex interference, which comes in the form of conflict transformation, conflict 
resolution, conflict management and conflict containment (Hansen 2012: 34). In simple terms, 
the solution implies that a problem exists and that (conflicting) parties will work toward solving 
this problem. The management aspect implies that (conflicting) parties will balance the 
challenges related to a conflict over an extended period of time, while the containment aspect 
implies that (conflicting) parties’ behaviours will be mitigated and will not spread (Lederach 
2003, Miall 2004 in Hansen 2012: 33). In addition, Hansen 2004 suggested conflict 
transformation, which can subsume the goals of the said solution-management and containment 
measures in a sense that conflict transformation aims on reducing or eliminating injustice and 
violence as well as enhancing the capacity of the conflicting parties to non-violently and 
constructively address their present conflicts or resolve their conflicts in the future.   
Connecting the social conflict literature to the IR literature, we can identify vari’ous approaches 
to tackle the conflict problem, which address the key aspects of conflicts, such as policy making, 
production and democratic outcomes, benefit sharing as well as the necessary involvement of 
the private actor. More specifically, social conflict resolution in the context of IR suggests 
changes in policy making perspectives, addressing the economic aspects of resettlement (Cernea 
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2008, Cernea 1999 and Cernea & Guggenheim 1993), the effectiveness of managerial 
frameworks which should be based on the root-cause analysis of the adverse impacts (WB OP 
12, McDowell 1996 & 2002, Asthana 1996 and Shihata 1993), the improvement of the 
performance at implementation level (Wet 2001), and participation and consultation as 
prerequisite conditions in preparation and implementation phases of resettlement projects 
(WCD 2000;  WB OP 12). 
Also private actors can take up a role in conflict mitigation. The literature refers to principles of 
benefit sharing, the ethical consideration for economic rent4 and proactive participation in 
problem solving (Cernea 2008, Jenkins 2004, Shama 2003, Hamann 2003 and Wicklin 1999). 
Notably, Brinkerhoff (2002), employing the network perspective to study conflict mediation in 
large dam resettlement projects, has revealed that a partnership can be viewed as a social 
network mediator for solving conflicts in IR. 
In the following sections we discuss in more detail the role of the private actor and how the PPP 
emerged as a new form of governance and as solution in sustainable development. 
1.3. Solution of development  
The aim of this section is to review the most relevant literature works which have been found 
useful for our research. First, we refine the concept of sustainable development and its main 
approaches. Second, we discuss new forms of governance and the emerging role of the private 
sector from different perspectives. Third, we conclude the section by analyzing the role and 
features of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in sustainable governance. 
1.3.1. Sustainable development (SD) 
The mainstream concept defined in the Bruntland report (Brundtland: 1987) describes 
sustainable development as “development which meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs". However, the concept 
of sustainable development is understood and interpreted in various forms depending on 
different development approaches comprising economic, environmental, and social dimensions 
(Quinn & Snell 2008 and Asmal 2004). The economic approach aims at maximizing income while 
maintaining a constant or increasing stock of capital; the ecological approach focuses on 
maintaining the resilience and robustness of biological and physical systems; and the socio-
cultural approach studies aim to maintain social and cultural systems (Munasinghe 1993 quoted 
in Rogers et al 2008: 23-42).  We are particularly interested in the last approach, which employs 
the human-centric perspective: “Sustainable economic development is directly concerned with 
increasing the standards of living of the poor, which can be measured in terms of increased food, 
real income, education, health care, water supply, sanitation, and only indirectly concerned with 
economic growth at the aggregate” (Barbier 1987, quoted in Rogers et al 2008: 42).  
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 Part of project-generated benefits return to the PAPs and PACs (Wicklin 1999). 
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More critically, numerous scholars and practitioners sharing the same “human centred” point of 
view such as  and Johnston (1994) and the authors of The post-development reader (1997) -
Escobar (1997), Illich (1997), Rahnema & Bawtree (1997) have highlighted the tensions between 
economic development and the people being considered as the victims of this process. This 
point is linked to our previous discussion (1.2) on IR and its adverse impacts. The turning point of 
sustainable development was recognized at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD in 2001) (in Dijk & Pfisterer 2009) by introducing new solutions for SD. The Summit 
encompassed two important messages: sustainable development is no longer the concern of 
environmentalists but everybody; and the promotion of partnerships and multi-sectoral 
governance should be the key approach for sustainable development (Rogers et al. 2008 and 
Witte et al.  2003). 
1.3.2. New form of governance and emerging role of private sector 
Global governance is defined by the acknowledgement of increased participation of non-state 
actors5, such as international agencies, civil societies groups and Trans-National Corporations 
(TNCs). The rise of the predominant role of the private sector derives from a proposition that the 
nation-state has become “too small to cope with the problems facing the world today” (Elsig & 
Amalric 2008; Reed & Reed 2006). The potential benefits from the engagement of the private 
sector are: combating negative consequences of development such as social imbalance and 
environmental degradation (Schmidheiny 2004 and Brown 2004), remedying the lack of 
expertise and budgetary means (Osborne 2000); and improving governance in developing 
countries (Elsig & Amalric 2008). 
However, the understanding of motivations of the private sector participation differs depending 
on various perspectives of sustainable development studies - whether it is post-modern, ethical 
or economical (Windsor 2006).  
First, from a post modernist or de-constructivist perspective, private sector participation is 
perceived as a “response” of the private actor to the criticism on the basis of their alleged 
harmful behaviour. Apparently, certain aspects of business activities have been criticized as 
threats to sustainable development. In other words, the negative impacts of development and 
modernization towards sustainability have resulted from business and production practice 
(Yergin 2004, Utting 2002, Escobar 1997 and Johnston 1994). Consequently, the responsibility of 
the private sector is to mitigate the impacts of their practice and to take steps to improve 
environmental management, develop corporate philanthropy and tackle different social 
exclusion issues (Warhurst 2005).  
Second, the private sector participation is perceived as a “moral imperative” of businesses under 
the name of corporate ethics, environmental friendliness, social responsibility and sustainability 
(Warhurst 2005 and Scaroni 2004) and focuses on the “right things to achieve in a good society” 
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(Garriga & Mele´ 2004: 63-64). In this sense, simply “doing no harm” is no longer sufficient for 
business actors (Warhurst 2005:166). 
Third, private sector participation is perceived as “self-interested”, complying with the “core 
nature” of the for-profit business sector. In this view, there are win-win benefits between ethical 
businesses and business growth (Stern & Seligmann 2004). The contribution of the private sector 
or corporate social responsibility (CSR) is treated as “strategic investment in moral reputation 
and market opportunities and lobby government to obtain corporate benefits and avoid 
corporate costs” (Windsor 2006: 106).  
1.3.3. Public Private Partnership 
Public Private Partnership concepts 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been the object of public policy studies all over the world 
since the 1980s (Osborne 2000, Carroll & Steane 2000, Rosenau 1999, Liner 1999, Walzer & 
Jacobs 1998 and Coleman 1989). Partnerships are found in the nature of global public policy 
networks, network management, co-operative management regimes, interactive or co-operative 
environment management, voluntary cross-sectoral collaborations, environmental NGOs-
business or collaborative partnerships or green alliance, to name but a few (Biermann et al. 
2007: 2). Partnerships conceptually vary and are diverse on multi-level and multi-relational 
dimensions.  
Osborne (2000), by reviewing the shared boundaries between various PPPs literature works, 
underlined a “divergence” in PPPs which makes a unified body of PPP theory unlikely. He 
distinguished five important literature works, namely: theoretical literature on the nature of 
organization collaboration and institutional paradigm (Huxham and Vangen 1996, Singh et al. 
1991, Di Maggio and Powell 1988; Benson 1975); public management literature focusing on 
contractual relationships and cost efficiency (Williamson 1988; Osborne 1997); community-
development literature (Oakly 1991), empirical literature describing the process and impact of 
PPPs upon the provision of local service of upon the development of the local community (Taylor 
1997), and public governance perspective within network theory (Kickert 1997 and Kooiman 
1993). The latter two seem most relevant to our empirical study of PPP, in that we empirically 
focus on the provision of services to a local community, drawing upon components of 
network theories.   
In this research, we start by adopting a simple concept that a partnership means “to work or act 
together” and PPP means “a cooperation among people or organizations in the public or private 
sector for mutual benefit” (Holland 1984 in McQuaid 2000:11). Various definitions of a 
partnership highlight certain key features such as: the voluntary nature of relationships, the wide 
range of participants, resources sharing and long-time scales. As a result, Osborne (2000) stated 
that PPPs are significantly network-based (see also Elsig & Amalric, 2008: 392) (see more 1.4.2).  
The rationale for choosing PPP derives from the recognition of its advantages in terms of 
resources availability, effectiveness, efficiency, legitimacy, transparency and accountability etc. 
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(Osborne 2000). In particular, Linder (1999: 42 & 43) clarified the usages of PPPs based on the 
understanding of their intended purpose and significance. Accordingly, he distinguishes six 
types of PPP:  
- Partnership as a management reform, where a partnership is promoted as an innovative tool 
that will change the way government functions, largely by tapping into the discipline of the 
market; 
- Partnership as a problem conversion, which can be viewed as a variation on the 
management reform which aims to present  a “universal fix” for most problems in need of 
public service delivery;  
- Partnership as morality generation, where a partnership can be viewed as a vehicle for 
bringing government closer to market - for instance by giving a chance of ownership to as 
many people as possible; Partnership as risk shifting in a response to the fiscal constraints of 
the government; 
- Partnership as re-structuring public service; 
- Partnership as power sharing in regards to business and government, which is most 
widespread, promoting empowerment in the regulatory matters where control has been, 
traditionally, nested with the government.  
In our research, we approach PPP as a phenomenon to fix the problem of public service delivery 
in compulsory land conversion. The private actors bring their expertise and capital in order to 
seek profit based on the joint-activities with the public actors, who remain in charge for the land 
conversion process. Meanwhile, PPP can be used as the principal means of obtaining sustainable 
development in the context where sustainability appears to coincide with commercial viability of 
the private actors (Linder 1999: 44). 
PPP in sustainable development  
Since PPPs with business were recognized as central mechanisms to achieving the WSSD goals 
(Biermann et al. 2007, Stern & Seligmann 2004 and Reed & Reed 2006, 2009), the relationship 
between PPPs and sustainable development has been increasingly investigated by many 
researchers. To understand the nature of PPPs in sustainable development, Utting & Zammit 
(2009), and Utting (2005 & 2002) highlighted the philanthropic dimension of PPPs. In this sense, 
we view partnership as “collaboration among business, non-profit organization and government 
in which risks, resources and skills are shared in projects that benefit each partner as well as the 
community” (Stratton 1989 in McQuaid 2000: 11), provided that the outcomes of PPP run 
beyond the benefit of participants.  
Also Reed & Reed (2009), focus on the ethical dimension in PPPs. Of the four types of PPP they 
identified, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is increasingly addressed in the SD literature as a 
mechanism of private contribution to SD (Utting & Zammit 2009, Reed & Reed 2009: 11 and Elsig 
& Amalric 2008, 2006); the other types are the Neo-liberal or conventional business PPP; the 
Corporate Accountability (CA); and the Social Economy.  
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1.4. Network theory 
The section presents network theory, encompassing the concept, classification and the Dutch 
school, which seems to be relevant to our research approach. The section ends with a reflection 
on PPP in view of network theory.  
1.4.1. Concept 
The concept of a network is differently understood (Kickert et al. 1997). Also Wachhaus (2008, 
2009), having various in-depth study of network in public administration underlines a lack of 
“coherent body” in policy networks studies. Network concepts have become increasingly 
popular among public administration scholars (Agranoff & Mc Guire 2001b; Imperial 2005 and 
O'Toole 1997). According to Wachhaus (2008 & 2009), they were welcomed as being part of a 
new paradigm of public administration (Goerdel 2006, Raab & Milward 2003), and have been 
seen as a catalyst in transforming our notions of governance (Goodsell 2006, Sørensen 2006, 
Peters & Pierre 1998 and Rhodes 1999 & 1997). Wachhaus (2009) further highlights that 
network theories have offered new approaches to aid understanding policy processes (Bressers 
& O'Toole 1998, Marsh 1998, and Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999) and have given rise to the 
introduction of new tools for the analysis of organizations (Cross & Cummings 2004).  
Based on the convergence of surveyed literature, Wachhaus (2008: 152) elaborated on a 
“minimal definition”, as a set of the following attributes: 
“[…] networks are structures or relationships that exhibit complexity: they may merely be 
complicated, spanning organizational and institutional boundaries and involving many actors 
simultaneously pursuing multiple agendas [...}. They proceed from a position of interdependence, 
where no actor can successfully pursue a go-alone strategy. Networks facilitate interaction 
among participants for the exchange of information and resources so that, collectively, a 
common goal may be pursued”.   
The minimal definition fits with what the Dutch network scholars (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, 
Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan 1997) have been focussing their research on. 
In the Dutch school, differing from for instance the interest intermediation school identified by 
Börzel, scholars use the concept of a policy network to “indicate patterns of relations between 
inter-dependent actors involved in the process of public policy making” (Kickert et al. 1997: 6). In 
their approach the policy process is the main focus of policy network analysis. 
For Dutch scholars, the strength of a policy network derives from its theoretical roots in policy 
science, which focuses on the analysis of the public policy process, but also in political science 
and organizational theory, which provide directions on the distribution of power and 
dependencies and on organizational features and inter-organizational relations (Kickert et al. 
1997: 1). As a result, the work of the Dutch network school is characterized by i) a strong 
relationship with theory highlighting interdependencies between actors; ii) a provision of 
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analytical tools for exploring network structure, actors, and dependencies; and iii) a framework 
to reflect upon policy-making and governance (Kickert et al. 1997: 8-10). 
1.4.2. Public Private Partnership as a type of network 
We found that in spite of numerous claims on the ambiguity of the PPP concept as stated above, 
the network approach to PPPs have been widely used, especially by Dutch scholars, for a broad 
range of PPP studies (Eshuis and Klijn 2012: 9). Also other scholars, such as Koch and Buser 
(2006: 548) have claimed that “PPP can be understood as networks, since PPPs are composed 
with usually more than two and often a range of public, hybrid and private players”. Various 
authors have also emphasized the mutually-added values of PPP by pointing out that “a 
partnership will bring about benefits otherwise not achievable, or difficult to achieve” (Carroll & 
Steane 2000: 38) and that PPPs are “able to develop a product with characteristics that would 
not have been available without PPP” (Klijn & Teisman 2003:137). 
Under the same heading of PPP, still many different forms of PPP can be found, and the concept 
of PPP therefore has different meanings in different concrete contexts. Further, PPP are used in 
different ways by different governments, and in different countries (Eshuis & Klijn 2012:76-78). 
Viewing PPP as a governance strategy, Klijn and Teisman (in Osborne 2000: 85-86) distinguish 
between contracting-out versus a partnership. Contracting-out is characterized by a principal-
agent relationship in which the public actor defines the problem and provides the specifications 
of the solution, while a partnership is based on joint decision-making and production. 
Furthermore, contracting-out aims to increase the efficiency of a production process, whereas a 
partnership focuses on the effectiveness. Our research will focus on the second type of PPP 
(partnership).  
1.5. Vietnam: the context of the involuntary resettlement problem 
This section presents an overview of the IR policy and practice in Vietnam. We believe that the 
focus on a specific segment of the population will help to narrow down our research topic as 
well as to formulate a clear and concise research question.  
1.5.1. General introduction 
Vietnam is characterized as a transitional economy, where the conversion of agricultural land is 
an indispensable requirement of the development process (WB 2011). Indeed, successive 
policies of the Vietnamese government in the domain of economic reform and modernization 
have helped Vietnam to become one of the world’s fastest growing economies. Between 1990 
and 2010, the Vietnamese economy achieved an average annual growth rate of 7.3 percent and 
the poverty rate has fallen from 58 percent in 1993 to 15.9 percent in 2007 (VDR 2012, De Wit et 
al. 2012). Particularly, since the 1980s, the land management reform that made substantial 
increases in production turned Vietnam into the third largest exporter of rice (VDR 2011). Within 
less than 20 years since the Doi Moi was launched, Vietnam has transformed itself from a 
centrally planned economy to a market oriented economy and from an extremely poor country 
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to a lower-middle income country with GDP per capita of USD 1,334 in 2010 and USD 1,755 
in 20126. 
The transition of Vietnam also represents a further step of its development by realizing 
industrialization and modern economy. Land policy and land management are critical in this 
transition period. In order to meet the Vietnam Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
decrease the existing 70 percent of agricultural area to 50 percent by 2020, Vietnam focuses 
on the transformation of thousands of hectares of agricultural land to non-agricultural use 
(Hung Vo 2009).  
1.5.2. Involuntary resettlement policies in Vietnam 
In Vietnam, the land policies in general and the land conversion policies in particular are 
characterized by the government ideology of public ownership of land on the one hand, and by 
the continuous changes under the impacts of international donors on the other. 
To understand land policy and land management including the land conversion mechanism in 
Vietnam, it is useful to begin with the key ideology stated in the Vietnamese Constitution, which 
has shaped the “public attitude about access to, control over, and use of land” (McPherson 
2012: 138). Indeed, the Constitution, defining “public ownership”7 over land gives right to 
manage all land to the State, who represents the ownership of the entire people. As a result, the 
terms of “land conversion” or “compulsory land conversion” or “land takings” (Kim 2009) often 
used in policy frameworks in Vietnam refer to the transformation of land for one purpose to 
another; and ownership is implicitly understood as governmental instead of private/personal 
land users.  
In recent years, the revised government policies on compensation, assistance and relocation 
have improved significantly under the pressure of the international donors such as the World 
Bank, the ADB, and the DANIDA, who set forth prerequisite conditions, in line with strict 
international-standard policies for the ODA-funded infrastructure investment projects (Pham 
et al. 2013). 
The basic legal framework for land conversion lies with the Land Laws (1987), which have been 
revised over time (1993, 2003) with additional clauses relating to land acquisition (1998, 2001). 
Particularly, the developments in resettlement, support and compensation policies are guided by 
Decree 197/2004; Decree 84/2007 and Decree 69/2009 (see Box 1 in this section). 
The analysis shows that policies of the Government of Vietnam (GoV) have become more 
consistent with the Donors’ policies of IR8. 
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 Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD in May 2012 
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 Stated in Provision 17- Vietnamese Constitution  
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In particular, land administration including monitoring and supervision is improved, and the 
guarantee for benefits of affected land users has been taken into account.  
Box 1: The development of compensation, support and resettlement policies in Vietnam 
Decree No. 17/2003/ND-CP in 2003 promulgates the regulation on the exercise of democracy in communes, including 
requirements for consultation with and the participation of people in communes; 
Decree No. 197/2004/ND-CP, on compensation, rehabilitation and resettlement in the event of land recovery by the 
State; 
Decree No. 84/2007/ND-CP in 2007 - supplementary stipulations on issue of land used right certificate (LURC), land 
acquisition, land use right implementation, procedure of compensation, assistance in the event of land recovery by 
the state and grievance redress;  
Decree 69/2009/ND-CP is amended so that it elaborates on land use, cost of land, land recovery, compensation and 
resettlement. This Decree offers assistance to severely affected households, especially households which need to be 
relocated or to lose agricultural land. Circular 14/2009/TT-BTNMT in 2009 provides guidance on the implementation 
details of compensation, resettlement and resettlement assistance, process of land acquisition, land allocation and 
land leasing. 
(Summary from WB 2011 and Hung Vo 2009). 
Nevertheless, the legal framework of the compensation, support and resettlement policies still 
lacks specific clauses tailored for vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, poverty reduction, 
gender equity, to name a few.  
1.5.3. The two mechanisms in land conversion in Vietnam 
Officially, regulations on compensation and resettlement were properly defined since the third 
revised Land Laws 2003. The discrepancy between the two land conversion mechanisms - 
voluntary and compulsory land conversion mechanisms introduced in the policy framework 
attracts considerable attention in public policy debates. 
Compulsory land conversion, i.e., the land recovery mechanism by the State is applied to the 
projects, which acquire land for national and public purposes - example are the FDI projects, the 
ODA projects as well as private business projects with a special economic investment under big 
capital. Under the compulsory land conversion mechanism, the land prices are stipulated by the 
Provincial People Committee (PPC) and must be based on the market prices of land, while the 
relevant state authorities at the provincial or district levels, depending on the scope of projects, 
are responsible for the implementation of compensation, support and resettlement. Thus, the 
ongoing debate focuses on the projects with political and social purposes and the projects with a 
commercial purpose (for making profit of only the investors) which are defined by the same land 
policy framework. In the meantime, the concept of “special economic investment projects with a 
high investment capital” (Hung Vo 2009) appears ambiguous to implementation practitioners. 
The voluntary land conversion mechanism which encourages negotiation principles between the 
investors and the affected stakeholders is used for the implementation of investment projects by 
domestic investors that are not subjected to compulsory land conversion.  
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The two mechanisms are distinct in a sense that the prices for land compensation can be 
negotiable in the latter mechanism, while the prices are imposed and fixed in the former. 
However, in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC), many investors used voluntary land conversion prices 
prior to 2004 and have continued to use it even for the cases where compulsory land conversion 
rules would apply. The city leaders applied a market oriented approach to land and land 
compensation is determined in accordance with the market price of land based on a land price 
assessment supplied by the price evaluation service organizations (Hung Vo 2009). 
The analysis (Hung Vo2009, WB 2011) as stated in Table 1 presents the strength and weakness of 
the two mechanisms from the international donors’ perspectives, who instigated further 
improvements of the forthcoming land Law Revision, in order to tackle social conflicts in 
compulsory land conversion.  
Table 1: The strengths and weaknesses of the two existing land acquisition mechanisms in 
Vietnam 
 Compulsory Voluntary 
Rationale 
Stronger authority to shorten land acquisition 
process (with good administration 
mechanism). 
Shorter land acquisition process upon successful 
negotiations. 
Benefit sharing between investors and land users. 
Minimized complaint and social stability on the 
basis of successful negotiation. 
Simplified administrative procedures and 
manpower. 
Suitable to market-oriented owing to dynamic 
negotiations. 
Ability to select financially capable investors 
instead of land speculators. 
Critiques 
High priority to the interests of investors than 
the interests of affected people. 
Complicated administrative procedures. 
Bureaucracy of administrative system. 
Possibility of corruption and abuse. 
Lack of participation of professional price 
verification institutions to define 
appropriate market prices. 
Additional cost for investors, needed to lobby 
community development initiatives. 
Increased complaint and resistance. 
Absence of legal measures to deal with resistance 
in the following cases: 
Lack of cooperation with investors. 
Request for too high prices that investors cannot 
afford 
 This is a critical problem that made a majority of 
investors to propose the application of 
involuntary mechanism for land acquisition. 
 (Compiled from WB 2011 and Hung Vo 2009). 
The voluntary land conversion mechanism takes advantage of the market-oriented mechanism 
which enables the simplification of administrative procedures and conflict mitigation, as well as 
it ensures mutual benefits for the investors (in terms of transaction costs) and the affected 
people (in term of benefit sharing). However, since the involvement of the authorities is likely 
 
 
29 
 
undermined in the process, the market-based negotiation can be driven to a blockage due to 
high demanding on compensation rates from the land users (Kim 2009). 
In particular, Table 1 demonstrates a great deal of controversies represented by the compulsory 
nature of the mechanism, in terms of complicated administrative procedures, inadequate 
compensation prices, possible corruptions and increased complaints and grievances. Notably, 
these critiques in combination with the status of complaints and grievances discussed in the 
latter section draw our attention to the group of the private projects with a commercial purpose 
which are subjected to the compulsory land conversion mechanism. Although the mechanism 
gives a higher priority to the interests of investors than the interests of the affected people, 
additional costs are also incurred by the private investors. This infers that the private investors 
are constrained with policy implementation and do not benefit from the initiatives of the 
compulsory mechanism.  
1.5.4. Institutional arrangement for implementation of compulsory land conversion 
In Vietnam, the state actors are found to be key players in land administration and land 
management. The state actors also determine the conditions of effective and sustainable use of 
land, while the roles of other stakeholders are fairly unrecognized (VDR 2011).  
Indeed, the administration of land fully belongs to state agencies, delegated at provincial level. 
The management of land is effectively allocated to the Department of Natural Resources and 
Environment (DONRE), and land is administered by different levels of authorities. In particular, 
these highly hierarchical governmental agencies are responsible for the implementation of 
compulsory land conversion. At district level, the Board of Compensation, Support and 
Resettlement (BCSR) is appointed as the executive body by the District People Committee to 
handle administrative procedures on land recovery for specific investment projects. Although 
the operational cost of BCSR is subsidized by a governmental budget, the BCSR has gradually 
evolved to take shape of a public service provider which is self-maintained through service 
charges or fees from the investors.  
Currently, in order to market the land compensation service, the Provincial People Committee 
has established the Land Development Agency (LDA), which is a public service organisation 
(private or state-owned) responsible for land recovery and the management of recovered land 
as well as for land transfer to investors. As this model is still in infancy, it has not yet been 
clarified whether the LDA is a public service organization, a state owned or non-state owned 
enterprise (WB 2011). However, the functions of the LDAs have gradually paved the way to the 
foundation of a professional land management mechanism, which is in favour of a land market 
allocation system in Vietnam.  
According to some recent studies (Wells Dang 2013, McPherson 2012, De Wit et al. 2012, WB 
2011, Kim 2011 and Hung Vo 2009) the problems of poor performance of the state authorized 
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agencies for the process of compulsory land conversion demonstrates the weakness of both the 
policy framework and the management system in Vietnam.  
First, there is a lack of “explicit guidance over who (especially which state agency) has to do 
what” as well as a lack of adequate schedules and feasible plans on how to allocate and use land 
efficiently, equitably and sustainably (McPherson 2012: 138).  
Second, there is still a significant gap between policy provisions, even though it is much 
improved to meet the international standards, and the practice of implementation deriving from 
the limited capacity and accountability of local state agencies. 
Third, complete decentralisation provides local authorities, particularly the Provincial People 
Committee with greater power in land management without a clear accountability (De Wit et al. 
2012 and VDR 2011) in the sense that there is a lack of an effective and independent monitoring 
mechanism to supervise the performance of the local authorities and the delegated bodies. The 
supervision and reporting are made upon the existing hierarchical administrative system. 
1.5.5. The practice of compensation, economic rehabilitation and resettlement in 
Vietnam 
Under our observation, the striking problems found in the practice of implementation of 
compensation, support and resettlement in Vietnam stem from the failure of economic 
restoration on the one hand and from the increased complaints and grievances in terms of 
compensation prices and the administrative procedures on the other.  
The failure of the implementation of the economic restoration and social safeguards activities 
In Vietnam, the revised policy framework defined in Decree 84 and re-emphasized in Decree 69 
captures important features of involuntary resettlement by determining compulsory land 
conversion as a more complex process, comprising “compensation, support and resettlement”. 
Policy revisions in Decrees 84/2007 and 69/2009 allow the process of implementation for land 
acquisition, assistance and resettlement with a greater level of support to severely affected 
people by land acquisition for economic development, especially for people losing productive 
lands. In these Decrees there are also provisions (for instance, Provisions 20, 22 and 23 of Decree 
69) which require assistance to vulnerable groups such as poor households, households who are 
eligible to social policy of the Government, Vietnam Heroic Mothers, to name a few. 
However, there is limited evidence as to how effective are these provisions in practice. The 
problems of income generation and impoverishment risks of the PAPs and PACs are critically 
debated in the public media and the policy making bodies, such as the National Assembly. As 
shown in the recent reports (WB 2011, VDR 2011, and VDR 2010) and studies (Wells Dang 2013, 
McPherson 2012 and Hung Vo 2009), the root-cause reasons for the mentioned problems 
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derives from policy vagueness as well as the limited awareness of the implementation 
practitioners.  
Indeed, it is found that precise understanding of economic restoration and social safeguards 
provisions are virtually non-existent during implementation, given that appropriate measures 
are often interpreted as “good practice” rather than “compulsory”. Thus, the modes of 
assistance are not clearly stated in the undertaken provisions, which can come in two forms - “in 
kind” (non-monetary) or “in cash” (monetary).  
Additionally, there is a misconception about resettlement among state agencies and project 
developers. Many project developers view resettlements only as relocation sites, housing and 
accompanied infrastructure while the attention on the re-construction of people’s lives is 
somewhat overlooked. Further, the value of entitlements and package benefits are claimed to 
be too limited in order to meet the critical needs required for generation of effective economic 
restoration activities. 
Furthermore, the two processes of displacement and economic rehabilitation tend to be closely 
integrated without distinctive measures for each process. Practice shows that majority of land 
conversion projects favour those which combine economic restoration and other social 
safeguard entitlements into cash compensation packages, whereas the implementation of 
economic restoration programs including job creation and vocational training is often pro-forma 
(Hung Vo 2009). For example, the Economic Restoration Fund namely 156 established in 2007 by 
Ho Chi Minh City aimed to support resettled people in job placement and vocational training, but 
it had to be suspended in 2011. This practice shows failure of the government in regards to 
mobilization of funding from land developers as well as the ineffective use of the funds.   
Social conflicts in land conversion in Vietnam 
The status of social conflicts in land conversion in Vietnam is presented in the WB Report of 
2011, based on the survey results conducted by the MONRE in 2005.  
According to this report, the majority of complaints and queries were mainly related to 
“improper execution of land compensation and resettlement” (accounted for 70 percent of all 
administrative complaints) and to land price (accounted for 70 percent of all complaints on land 
compensation and resettlement). The report also referred to voluntary land conversion as 
“clearly regulated and procedurally simple” (WB 2011: 4); while the implementation of 
compulsory land conversion remains uneven. 
There are no further official reports on complaint statistics in spite of an increased number of 
complaints and grievances on the compulsory land mechanism, the nature of which is getting 
more complicated and diverse. The evidence about social conflicts in land conversion is mainly 
reported by variety of media channels.  
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The sources of social conflicts in involuntary land conversion in Vietnam vary, rooting from policy 
framework, implementation performance, limitation of awareness and disparity between 
affected people and project beneficiaries, viewed here as private investors and the government. 
At first, the government contradicts itself on the issues of policy and practice of compulsory land 
compensation. The market value of land is defined and imposed by the provincial governments, 
(Decrees 87 and 69), however studies show that compensation prices reach only 50-70 percent 
of market prices in Ha Noi, and a similar effect has been observed in other provinces in the North 
(WB 2011: 20).  
Secondly, according to the point of view provided by responsible agencies, the complaints on 
administration procedures regarding land compulsory conversion have resulted from a poor 
performance of local agencies, responsible for land recovery. Indeed, non-compliance with 
government policy guidelines has occurred during the processes of land acquisition, assistance 
and resettlement. For example, the ground clearance decisions are promulgated without official 
decisions on land recovery, Demarcation Measurement Surveys (DMS) have taken place without 
providing PAPs with a prior notice of land acquisition, planning and schedule, land recovery is 
carried out without a prior relocation arrangement and land recovery decisions are issued by 
unauthorized entities, to name a few. 
Thirdly, in many cases people do not abide by the land administrative decision due to a 
misinterpretation of laws and policies in regards to complaint and denunciation procedures. 
There is a consensus that the number of complaints and denunciations in the period between 
2008 and 2011 had increased, but up to half of these are the "false accusations”9 (Tan, P.V. 2008 
resulted from the complainers’ lack of policy understanding. As a result, complaints and 
denunciations are prolonged, negatively impacting the progress of land conversion as well as 
social and political stability during policy implementation. 
Finally, the dissatisfaction of the affected people with the level of benefit sharing resulted in 
resistance to land acquisition on the one hand. Negotiation basics (of voluntary resettlement) 
are in favour of affected people, but have been proven problematic for the authorities and 
private investors due to increased demands from the affected people, on the other. In other 
words, as explained by Kim (2009:25) “the disparity between compensation levels and private 
profits and government revenue” could be the main source of conflicts (conflict of interests, 
different perceptions). Consequently, conflicts between actors (state, investors, affected people) 
in both voluntary and compulsory land conversion projects negatively influence the investment 
progress of private companies, as well as cause delays of the targeted development progress of 
the local governments, raising critical demands for further refinements of the policy. 
                                                          
9
 Half of complaints are false accusation: Retrieved from    
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2012/05/120501_land_complaints_viet.shtml  in May 2012 
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This discussion ends by providing typical evidence on the manifestation of social conflicts in 
compulsory land conversion (see Table 2). The evidence demonstrates that if the social conflicts 
are not properly resolved, prolonged resistance and potentially, violence would occur in the 
practice of land conversion. 
Table 2: Resisting cases in compulsory land conversion in Vietnam 
 Year(s) Land acquisition impacts Problems 
Thu Thoa district, 
Long An province 
2003-2005 
1760 ha acquired from 616 
households for waste treatment 
facility, but the acquired land 
area was actually distributed to 
174 local officials instead.  
Treatment facility never constructed. The 
Government Inspectorate investigated 
the case in 2009.  
EcoPark city, Van 
Giang district, 
Hung Yen 
province 
2004- 2013 
4,900 farming households from 3 
communes affected by 
allocation of 500 ha for 
residential development.  
Most households have accepted 
compensation; 1,000 remaining 
households were forcibly removed by 
3,000 security forces in April 2012.  
Tien Lang district, 
Hai Phong 
2009-2012 
Doan Van Vuon and his family 
received eviction notices from 
district authorities from a 40ha 
farm with the reason given that 
the lease had expired.  
The case achieved national prominence 
in early 2012 when Mr. Vuon fought 
back against the army and police 
seeking to evict him. Both he and local 
officials are facing criminal charges.  
Dong Anh district, 
Hanoi 
2004 
400 villagers protesting the 
seizure of land for a golf course 
built by Thai investors near the 
Hanoi airport.  
Protestors threw gasoline bombs at the 
police in attempt to block ground 
breaking for golf course. Villagers 
received modest compensation and 
the course was constructed anyway.  
(Compiled from Wells Dang 2013) 
1.5.6. The Public Private Partnership in land conversion in Vietnam 
This section presents the PPP in land conversion in Vietnam, which was poorly investigated by 
recent studies. Before delving deeper into this matter, the general concept of the PPP is 
presented, together with explanations as to how this concept is alternatively understood in 
Vietnam.  
In general, the PPP in Vietnam results from the rise of the private sector economy, which has 
become the main driving force for the national economy (Culas & Van Suu 2010 and VDR 2007 & 
2009). In particular, the private sector enterprises have started formalizing and expanding, in a 
process that caught speed after the 2000 and they account now for 33 percent of the value of 
production in manufacturing (De Wit et al. 2012 and VDR 2009).  
PPP in Vietnam 
In Vietnam, PPP is understood as a new governing tool in regards to institutional arrangements 
for financial relationships between public and private actors (CIEM 2006).  
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On the one hand, PPP is officially understood as a scheme of private infrastructure investments 
which have been institutionalized and legitimated under governmental regulations. The 
relationship between public and private investors in PPP is mainly in the form of principal-agent 
commitment or contracting-out. The Vietnamese government aims to replace the BOT (Build, 
Operation and Transfer)10, BTO (Build, Transfer and Operation) and BT (Build and Transfer) by 
the standard PPP-models regulated by government decision in order to increase the total private 
sector contribution from 50 percent to 60 percent towards basic infrastructure with a focus on 
transport, electricity, water and environment (Manh Duong 2010 in Dinh & Van Eynde 2013 and 
VDR 2007). Besides, the government also calls for private investments on other fields of public 
service, such as medical examination and treatment11.  
On the other hand, the partnership between public and private actors can also be understood in 
a broader sense provided that the state allows private investment (or co- investment) in services 
or public works of the state (CIEM 2006). Using this broad concept, the PPP can be also found in 
the field of sustainable development, especially in the field of power and clean development 
mechanisms (CDM) such as renewable energy, waste treatment and deforestation (Dinh & Van 
Eynde 2013 and VDR 2007). 
Moreover, as a result of the national public administration reforms (PAR) during the 1990s, a call 
for “socialization” or, “public service supply socialization” tendency has attracted greater 
participation of the private actors and non-state actors in public service (CIEM 2006). This infers 
that the government is allowing “the private and other non-state actors to take part in the 
provision of services” which have been traditionally and legally handled by state administrative 
entities (ACUÑA-Alfaro 2009:79). The socialization of public service has resulted in some 
improvements in education, health care, cultural activities and tourism (Painter 2003: 260, 
ACUÑA-Alfaro 2009: 79, 161). 
In more recent years, PPP and private actor participation are becoming increasingly recognized 
to be contributors towards robust governance arrangements which encourage 
commercialization, efficiency and transparency in the relationship between the government and 
its shareholders (VDR 2012:42).  
PPP in land conversion in Vietnam 
Based on our observations, the PPP approaches in land conversion in Vietnam can be found in 
the forms of land conversion service provision, the partnership between private land developers 
and local governments for local infrastructure development, and in the greater involvement of 
the private actors in economic restoration and benefit sharing under the impacts the ODA - 
granted projects. 
                                                          
10
 Author: Private investors can build infrastructure under certain favourable conditions and charge a tariff agreed 
with the State for the use of that infrastructure for an agreed period of time.  
11
 Retrieved from http://ven.vn/open-door-for-ppp-investment-attraction_t77c341n24850tn.aspx in May 2012 
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The first form of PPP in land conversion takes place in land conversion service provision which 
replaces the conventional functions of the provincial or district Board of Compensation, Support 
and Resettlement (BCSR). This derives from the improvement in institutional arrangements for 
land conversion implementation with new forms of participation and new actors; provided that 
land conversion is gradually transferred to professional service providers - both public and 
private (see 1.5.4). Thus, land conversion service providers can alternatively be the Land 
Development Agency (LDA), or other state - owned companies such as the Southern Centre for 
Consulting and Price Assessment Services of the Ministry of Finance and the Centre for Price 
Assessment of the Ho Chi Minh City Department of Finance or private consultation companies 
(Hung Vo 2009).  
The second form of PPP in land conversion mainly takes place in the voluntary land conversion 
mechanism. As a result of decentralisation and in line with a local master plan and socio-
development strategies, local authorities, having authority over land use, negotiate with private 
developers to invest on land which will be subsequently used for urban facilities, such as 
commercial centres, markets and living quarters. The private developers build infrastructure for 
urban services in the areas comprising direct negotiation for land conversion with the tenure 
owners (Kim 2009). Moreover, in the practice of land conversion, which is often subjected to 
voluntary or negotiable mechanisms, there is an absence of transparent accountability of land 
developers (both public and private) in this field. A great deal of criticism stems from the fact 
that land developers have greatly benefited from acquiring land, especially during the peaks of 
market land prices in the first decade of 21th century. In particular, some land conversion 
projects are allowed to acquire land under the compulsory mechanism even though the projects 
are commercial, such as the Ecopark project in Van Giang district, Hung Yen province (see Table 
2: Resisting cases in compulsory land conversion in Vietnam). 
The third form of PPP in land conversion projects takes the form of a noticeable and increased 
involvement of the private sector as an actor and beneficiary in the implementation of 
compulsory land conversion (De Wit et al. 2012 and VDR 2011, WB 2011). 
It was observed that the implementation of livelihood rehabilitation programs and other social 
safeguards policies takes place with government or ODA - granted resettlement projects for big 
hydro-power plants or industrial zones in Vietnam such as the Son La Hydropower plant, Trung 
Son hydro-power plant and the Nghi Son and Vung Ang industrial zones. In addition, some forms 
of benefit sharing take place in private business projects such as the Vincom project, which 
offered a share of equity to the PAPs (Cernea 2008) or the Nui Phao resettlement project for 
mining operations, which greatly endeavoured to provide income generation and job creation 
for the PAPs12.  
                                                          
12
 Based on the media information and personal observation by author 
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This practice reveals a critical question on the degree of involvement of the government and the 
private investors during the implementation process, so that both sides mutually benefit.    
In terms of research, this phenomenon has been very rarely studied. With this in mind, our 
special attention during the course of this research has been to identify this type of PPP in the 
practice of policy implementation of private business resettlement projects under the 
compulsory land conversion mechanism.  
Arguably, since the compulsory land conversion mechanism is still applicable for projects with a 
commercial purpose, the implementation process should attract a greater involvement of 
private investors in order to realise the benefit sharing principles. This practice needs to be 
further explored.  
1.6. Justification for the research 
The previous sections have presented the problem of development, embodied by IR and social 
conflicts and illustrated in a specific context of Vietnam. The previous sections have also 
introduced a new form of governance with the emerging role of the private actors as a solution 
to the problems of development. The sections also review the network approach as the state of 
the art approach to understand the network - based instrumental solutions of the PPP.  
Accordingly, this section discusses the main research agenda regarding PPP in IR and its 
contribution to social conflict resolutions, and its position in this research project. 
1.6.1. General research agenda 
A number of strands have been identified to help formulate our research agenda and highlight 
the research objectives and their relevance.  
Given the diversity of issues around the PPP, such as IR and conflict resolution in a specific 
context of a developing country, these strands engage a broad spectrum of academic disciplines 
and the activities associated with them will be cross-disciplinary. 
To be more specific, in the development of the key analytical and temporal aspects of PPP as a 
solution to IR, our discussion is organized around the following dimensions:  
- Mapping of the relevant concepts; 
- Development of an adequate methodological and analytical approach; 
- Understanding the context: Vietnam, IR and social conflict in IR in Vietnam; 
- Understanding PPP of IR in Vietnam: the actors, PPP structure, activities and results; 
- Exploring of the relationship between PPP results and conflict resolution.  
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The mapping of the relevant concepts aims to guide our development of variables and (possible) 
hypotheses. A concept is an image or symbolic representation of an abstract idea which is highly 
subjective and is differently understood from person to person (Kumar 1999). We consider 
broad efforts to conceptualize the field of involuntary resettlement (IR), public and private 
partnership, new ways of classifying social conflicts and state of the art approaches to the study 
of PPP - and network theory is one of those. 
Understanding the context means to engage our research to the specific context of IR in 
Vietnam. The selected context for this study is “compulsory land conversion” (Hung Vo 2009) in 
Vietnam, particularly in resettlement and compensation projects. There are two levels of context 
to be described: the national level and the local/ project level. At the national level, we mainly 
rely on the mapping of policy environment, the institutional setting and the governing issues of 
land conversion in Vietnam. At the project level, we use secondary sources of the project profiles 
(data), associated documents as well as our own field study.  
Understanding the PPP in IR in Vietnam infers the understanding of all structural processes and 
result elements of PPP, including the actors and their characteristics. The areas of understanding 
PPP processes can be found in mainstream network studies. Klijn stated that “… analyzing policy 
processes from a network perspective means that the analyst focuses on the relations between 
actors, their interdependences and the way these patterns and interdependences influence the 
policy process” (Klijn 1997). Accordingly, the dimensions of the institutional characteristics - 
comprising actors, patterns of interactions, rules (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004); the process activities 
(Bryson et al. 2006) under the influence of institutional characteristics; and the results of the 
interaction between actors are examined.  
Exploring the relationship between PPP results and conflict resolution means to analyse the way 
PPP can directly or indirectly contribute to conflict resolution in IR. According to Brinkerhoff 
(2002: 1282), experience in the studied case can provide support to the theoretical assumptions 
that a partnership may be an effective means towards structuring of conflict resolutions in IR.  
1.6.2. The positions and relevance of this research project 
In general, initial motivation of this research lies with the desire to fill a knowledge gap with 
regards to the collaboration between public and private in the particular context of involuntary 
resettlement. This initial motivation is further supported by my aspiration of seeking alternative 
approaches for the mitigation of social conflicts in involuntary resettlement in Vietnam.  
In accordance with the research agenda discussed in the previous sections, this research has 
four objectives: 
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- The first objective endeavours to describe the PPP process of a particular IR project in 
Vietnam in a systematic way. To achieve this, PPP is viewed as a type of network and is 
analyzed based on the network theory;  
- The second objective relates to the analysis of the relationship between PPP results and 
conflict resolutions in IR in Vietnam; 
- The third objective aims to develop an adequate analytical framework based on the 
network theory, encompassing a number of appropriate factors that help understand 
the PPP structure, its process and results; 
- The fourth objective aims to determine an appropriate methodology which will enable 
presentation of research objectives in the most insightful way as well as to explore the 
sensitive problems of conflict in IR.  
The objectives of this research are of both empirical and practical relevance: 
First, this research presents a qualitative study on the insights of PPPs in IR, which is still absent 
or rare in the contemporary development literature. Indeed, IR scholars (Cernea 1993, 1996, 
1999, 2008, McDowell 1996 & 2002, Downing 2002, De Wet 2001, Wicklin III 1999, Asthana 
1996, Parasuraman 1996, Behura & Nayak 1993 and Shihata 1993,) have been encouraged to 
further their research activities on resettlement with development (RwD), with an emphasis on 
good practice where the gains and not just the pains of development must be shared 
(Cernea 1999). 
The second objective is driven by the statement of McQuaid (2000), who said that the 
theoretical basis for understanding and analyzing partnership remains poorly developed. This 
research works aims to develop a holistic analytical framework, based on the network theory in 
combination with other theoretical insights (such as IR and sustainable development) to help to 
understand the complexity as well as the dynamics of PPP in IR. 
Third, the analysis of PPP results, with a particular emphasis on the identification of the added-
values or the synergy of PPP in sustainable development, as advocated by Dijk & Pfisterer 2009, 
is an appropriate approach for the exploration of the relationship between PPP and conflict 
resolution. 
Fourth, our research also demonstrates a specific policy issue - IR in Vietnam, as a window 
through which one can examine bigger issues, such as cultural differentiation, democratic 
legitimacy, legislation environment as well as the dynamics of economic and social problems. 
Through examination of the PPP potential, particularly the role of the private sector in conflict 
mitigation in the field of IR, the research outcomes suggest further qualitative and quantitative 
studies. 
Finally, the practical relevance of this research is significant. According to McLaughlin & Osborne 
(2000: 324), PPP can influence policy making as well as being a product of it. This infers a desire 
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of PPP studies to have an impact on policy making. Indeed, this research is particularly 
meaningful in the contemporary context of Vietnam. In recent years, the Vietnamese 
government has adopted the international perspective to improve the compulsory land 
conversion measures by easing administrative procedures and adapting principles of consensus 
of benefit sharing between the involved parties (WB 2011). Thus, it is essential for the policy 
makers to have rich empirical study results with regard to how this principle is adopted in 
practice and how it resolves the problems of social conflicts in IR. At a higher level, this research 
may be applicable to future conflict resolution over global public policy issues. 
1.6.3. The research question 
The formulation of the research question is guided by the fact that there exists little research on 
the topic of PPP in IR (Yin 2009 and Creswell 2003). Employing the qualitative approach, the 
main research activities are centred towards the exploration of the PPP process as a new form of 
governance and its possible contributions to social conflict resolution, particularly in the context 
of IR in Vietnam. Accordingly, the research question guiding this exploration can be divided into 
several research sub-questions: (i) PPP process; (ii) the relationship between the PPP process 
and the conflict resolution in the IR in the perspective of Vietnam. 
Table 3: The Research Question 
RQ 
How do (or in which way) PPP contribute to social conflict mitigation in involuntary resettlement in 
Vietnam? 
Sub-RQ1 How does PPP function in IR project? 
Sub-RQ1a What are the structure and characteristics of PPP in IR project? 
Sub-RQ1b What are the contents of PPP and how are the collaboration building processes in IR? 
Sub- RQ1c What are the results of PPP in IR?  
Sub-RQ2 What are the relationship between PPP results and conflict resolution? 
The central focus will be put on Sub-RQ1, addressing the descriptive analysis of the PPP process 
in IR. There are three steps to portray this process: Sub-RQ1a is concentrated on the description 
of PPP input with its structure and institutional characteristics. Sub RQ1b deals with the PPP 
throughput - such as the content of PPP and the collaboration building processes under the 
influence of the identified input factors. Sub RQ1c identifies the results of the PPP process. 
Sub-RQ2 relies upon the results of Sub-RQ1 in order to examine how PPP contributes to conflict 
resolution by developing the hypothesis that conflict resolution can be the output and the 
outcome of a PPP process. In order to do that a thorough understanding of social conflicts arising 
in involuntary resettlement (IR) will need to be gained. 
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1.6.4. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter presents general introduction, including 
the research problem, the research objectives, the significance and the research question. The 
analytical framework is constructed in the second chapter. The third chapter presents the details 
of research design, encompassing the strategy, the methodology, case selections, and 
techniques as well the safeguard measures for the quality of the research. This chapter also 
precisely describes the field activities, the ethical issues and the position of the researcher. The 
fourth chapter introduces the studied case. The fifth chapter reports the case study analysis as a 
result of the adoption of the particular analytical framework. The sixth chapter concludes this 
research work by answering the research questions as a reflection of the empirical findings. This 
chapter also presents reflections on the analytical framework, policy implications and contains 
suggestions for further research as a result of the analytical insights gained during the course of 
this research. 
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2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Our framework is developed for the analysis, exploration and evaluation of a variety of actors 
and the interactions of a complex PPP process.   
We first discuss the relevant background needed for the composition of our proposed 
framework. For this we draw upon a model that is in use for the evaluation of the planning and 
management of PPPs in sustainable development; a framework on cross-sector collaboration, 
and concepts used in network analysis.  
2.1. Background 
The initial premise for our framework is a design for evaluating the planning and management of 
PPPs in sustainable development. Next, a collaboration building framework seems to be helpful 
for development of our analytical design. 
Framework for evaluating the planning and management of PPPs in sustainable development 
As stated in our introductory Chapter (1.3), at the WSSD organized in 2002, governments were 
encouraged to launch new partnerships between state, businesses and civil society. The 
objective of the WSSD partnership was twofold. First, it aimed to contribute to capacity building 
by complying with food safety regulations. Second, attention was drawn to strengthening 
structures and awareness towards contributions to sustainable development, not only with 
respect to economic issues, but also to social and ecological issues (Dijk & Pfisterer 2009). A logic 
frame (also known as a Project Framework) was used as a tool for planning, monitoring and 
evaluating development projects, focusing on key components of a project in a clear, concise, 
logical and systematic way. As a result, in order to meet the increasing demands of the 
evaluation of effectiveness of WSSD Partnership projects in developing countries, the Expert 
Centre of Sustainable Business and Development Cooperation (ECSAD)13 issued 
recommendations regarding the analytical framework of PPP in sustainable development.  
The analytical framework is based on the premise that most partnerships have comparable 
processes. Basically, the partnership process consists of four stages: (i) input; (ii) throughput; (iii) 
output and; (iv) outcome; and has two evaluative dimensions: (v) efficiency and (vi) effectiveness 
(Van Tulder 2010 and Dijk & Pfisterer 2009). In what follows we shall simplify these into three 
stages: input, throughput, and output, and prioritize the evaluative dimension of effectiveness 
over that of efficiency. Under output, which we understand as results, our research question 
addresses both the direct outputs, also called production results of the PPP in terms of service 
delivery, as the less tangible outcomes, which will comprise process results and regime results. 
                                                          
13
 The Expert Centre for Sustainable Business and Development Cooperation (ECSAD) is a network of institutions: 
Sustainable Development Center (Maastricht School of Management); Amsterdam Graduate Business School 
(University of Amsterdam); Rotterdam School of Management (Erasmus University Rotterdam); European Institute for 
Business Ethics (Nyenrode University) and Wageningen University and Research Centre. The complementary skills and 
expertises of the network increase the knowledge of the role and functioning of international and local business in 
promoting economic growth and sustainable Development in countries in transition.  
For more information see: http://www.ecsad.nl 
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In general, we found this analytical framework to be appropriate as a point of departure in order 
to construct key elements of our analytical framework, which addresses our research questions. 
First, the framework is helpful to portray PPP in a sustainable development environment, aligned 
with our main research question, in a systematic and visual way, by sharing our understanding 
about PPP (i) input; (ii) throughput and; (iii) output. Second, the analysis of PPP results, with a 
particular emphasis on the identification of the added-values of PPP in sustainable development 
as advocated by Dijk & Pfisterer (2009) is an appropriate approach in the exploration of the 
relationship between PPP and conflict resolution, which is dealt with in our second research 
question.  
Cross-sector collaboration analytical framework 
Categorizing and organizing the current literature works on collaboration, Bryson et al. (2006) 
presented a framework for the understanding processes and structures of cross-sector 
collaboration.  
In this framework, Bryson et al. (2006) particularly emphasized that initial conditions, which 
include the general environment in which collaborations are embedded, and other specific and 
immediate preconditions affect the formation of collaboration, for instance, the notion of 
sector failure.  
The process components emphasize six aspects: forging the initial agreement, building 
leadership, building legitimacy, building trust, managing conflict, and planning. The structural 
components include membership, structural configuration, and governance structure. According 
to this framework, the constraints affecting collaboration include collaboration type, power 
imbalances, and competing institutional logics.  
We will make use of this collaboration framework for understanding the throughput of PPPs 
under the following aspects: Forging initial agreement; Leadership building; Legitimacy building; 
Trust building; Managing conflict; and Planning. 
PPP analytical framework under network perspective 
As stated above, this research is basically informed by network theory. In the light of network 
perspectives, we rely on the process analysis scheme suggested by Klijn (1997) who stated that 
“… analyzing policy processes from a network perspective means that the analyst focuses on the 
relations between actors, their interdependences and the way these patterns and 
interdependences influence the policy process” (Klijn 1997). In addition, Koppenjan & Klijn 
(2004: 74) and Klijn (2008) further elaborate on the structural elements for network study, based 
on the level of dynamics between institutional and process factors. In their point of view, actors 
and their characteristics are viewed to be process characteristics, which are distinct from the 
institutional elements of rules, patterns and perceptions, which change less rapidly than other 
elements. Consequently, they separate actor analysis and network structure analysis (Klijn 2008: 
18). However, in our analytical framework, we want to allocate the actors and their 
characteristics as well as PPP structure elements as input of the policy process. This will be then 
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used as the basis for the exploration of the influence of those factors during the process of 
collaboration, which are viewed as a combination of descriptive levels of a collaboration process 
suggested by Bryson et al. (2006) and Voets (2008). In addition, O’Toole et al. (in Kickert et al. 
1997: 140-145), while studying the implementation processes in network, suggested to 
specifically break down the given network into separate but related functional sub-networks, in 
which  it is necessary to determine the scope of work carried out by the public and private actor.  
Finally, we will explore the output of the PPP process as well as the influence of institutional and 
process factors to the results of PPP, including the issue of conflict resolutions. We demonstrate 
our theoretical framework based on the aggregation of various approaches (see Table 4) to 
understand PPP in Table 5, which will be more specifically elaborated in the following sections. 
Table 4: Aggregation for a comprehensive analytical framework for PPP 
Sources 
Planning and 
management of PPP in 
sustainable development 
Cross-sector 
collaboration 
analytical framework 
PPP as a network 
Represented by  Dijk & Pfisterer (2009) Bryson et al. (2006) 
Dutch scholars (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004; Kickert et al. 1997, Klijn 
2008) 
Aggregation for an 
analytical 
framework for PPP 
in the studied case 
PPP logical analytical 
framework (input - 
throughput - output) 
Collaboration building 
processes 
Actor analytical elements 
Network analytical elements 
Influencing factors to PPP process. 
 
Table 5: PPP process model 
Model Component Descriptive level Analytical level 
Input 
PPP structure 
Actors’ characteristics 
Interaction Patterns, Rules, Goals 
Resources, Dependencies 
Power, Perceptions 
The influence of institutional 
characteristics/position/ culture 
Distinctive nature between public and 
private actors 
Throughput 
Content 
Collaboration building 
- PPP content 
- Forging initial agreement; 
Leadership building; Legitimacy 
building; Trust building; 
Managing conflict; Planning 
Influence of input factors (resources 
perceptions, incentives, goals) 
Output 
Production results 
Process results 
Regimes 
-  Participant/ organization level 
- Network level 
- Community level 
Influence of input and throughput 
in relationship with conflict resolution 
Added- values synergy 
2.2. Public Private Partnership input elements 
The importance of structural (or institutional) characteristics of a network is highlighted by 
certain network scholars, such as Kickert et al. (1997), Koppenjan & Klijn (2004), Mandell and 
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Steelman (2003 in Mandell & Kearst 2007) who base this importance on the fact that the 
structural factors influence the effectiveness of a network. Considering the contours of networks 
as institutions, Koppenjan & Klijn (2004: 74) discuss the institutional characteristics as rules and 
interaction patterns. Besides, input factors can be interpreted from the nature of means (both 
material, such as money and immaterial, such as knowledge) and conditions encompassing their 
motives, goals and resources under/ by which the partners enter the partnership (Van Tulder 
2010, Dijk & Pfisterer 2009). Accordingly, our design for this section also comprises the mapping 
of the actors’ resources and interdependencies, and their perceptions, viewed as important 
explanatory factors of the structural characteristics of the given PPP. 
2.2.1. Interaction patterns 
Mandell & Kearst (2007: 575) have drawn our research attention by stating that much of the 
literature does not make a distinction among different types of networks and their purposes, 
which is a result of academic tendency to treat networks as fully undifferentiated. This, however, 
imposes a necessity to understand collaborative networks based on the way actors build and 
maintain relationships.  
According to Kickert et al. (1997) and Koppenjan & Klijn (2004), interaction patterns refer to 
“stability in contacts”. They further explain that networks emerge because actors begin 
interacting and making (to an extent) stable patterns of relations.  
Interaction patterns can be considered to lie with the intensity of interactions that determine 
which actors have most contact with the other; or to lie with the intensity and variety of 
interactions that provide information on the degree of importance of the actors and their 
positions in the network (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 70). According to Benson (1978) and Aldrich 
(1979) in Kickert et al. (1997: 21), interaction patterns can also be mapped through resource 
dependency or through strategies used by organizations to cope with interdependency, but also 
to control the necessary flow of resources.  
Various interaction patterns can be used to determine the types of coordination among actors, 
or in other words- types of networks. Particularly, Dahl and Lindbom (1953 in Kickert et al. 1997: 
44) distinguish four principle forms of coordination, namely polyarchy, hierarchy, negotiation 
and market. Polyarchy refers to forms of democratic representation, whereas hierarchy denotes 
central coordination which can be found in bureaucratic organizations. In market situations, it is 
the market mechanism that causes individuals to form their behavior towards each other. 
Coordination implies interactions, where actors adapt their individual strategies to those of 
other parties (Sharpf 1978 in Kickert et al. 1997: 44). Alternatively, Mandell & Kearst (2007: 557), 
on the basis of the linkages between actors and the modes of interactions, differentiate three 
types of networks: cooperative, coordinative and collaborative. Cooperative networks imply 
exchange of information or expertise. This type of network is characterized by loose and 
infrequent linkages and low levels of relationship intensity among its members, who remain 
independent and may interact with each other only when necessary. Coordinative networks are 
focused on the need to integrate activities with many other actors, who remain independent but 
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are willing to make changes in order to provide a more efficient way of delivering their individual 
services. Collaborative networks focus on the ability to build strong linkages and new types of 
relationships so as to develop innovative solutions based on interdependencies among actors. 
In our analysis, we shall investigate interaction patterns by observing the policy frameworks, and 
the specification of linkages between actors. We assume that the tight or loose linkage amongst 
actors under different activities may result in different sub-networks. 
Table 6: Implications for empirical observation of interaction patterns 
Input element Characteristics Observations Assumption 
Interaction 
patterns 
Interaction patterns 
refer to “stability 
in contacts”; and 
lie with intensity 
of interactions 
 
Policy framework, 
institutional 
arrangements, 
observation of 
linkages between 
actors  
Types of networks are differentiated by interaction 
patterns, which in turn are determined by forms 
of coordination or the linkage between actors; 
The tight or loose linkages among actors in different 
policy problems may result in different types of 
(sub)-networks  
2.2.2. Rules 
Rules are institutional characteristics, which define the structure of a partnership/ network. 
Rules in a network are formed in order to keep the actors committed to collective actions and to 
structure the behavior of actors (Ostrom 1990 in Kickert et al. 1997: 43, and Sharpf 1997).  
Rules are also made and changed by the same actors during the interactions (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004: 76 & 215). In other words, PPP structures or PPP patterns of interactions are determined 
and consolidated by rule re-formation and rule making during the collaboration process. 
The concept of rules can be interpreted under the institutional perspectives (within 
organization) and the network perspectives (between organizations). Under the institutional 
perspectives, rules regulate behaviors of actors. Under the network perspectives presented by 
Koppenjan & Klijn (2004: 72-75), rules define: Who belongs to the network; Position of actors; 
Identity different actors and; Criteria of good products. 
In a partnership, depending on different objectives or domains, rules may be formal (consciously 
created) or informal (produced together during the course of interactions) (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004: 72-75). The formal structure of a partnership may range from legally binding contracts, 
unenforceable public agreements, or general agreements to collaborate. It can also be in forms 
of various arrangements or sets of rules such as cooperative agreements, contracts, joint 
ventures or regulations (Kickert et al. 1997). Informal structure, which in McQuaid’s point of 
view is more common than a formal partnership, covers “informal working agreements between 
agencies” (2000: 15- 16).  
Ostrom (1986) introduced a scheme of seven types of rules to distinguish a variety of rules which 
are position rules, boundary rules, scope rules, authority rules, aggregation rules, information 
rules and pay-off rules. The scheme shows explicit rules of the games between actors as well as 
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aims to understand the functioning of a network (Voets 2008: 55). However, the scheme by 
Ostrom (1986) is criticized by Koppenjan and Klijn (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, 2006 and Klijn 
2001, 1996) on the basis that there is a lack of actor’s identity and professional standards in the 
network analysis. Based on the distinction between the constituting and regulating rules, they 
recommended a typology of arena rules and interaction rules (see Table 7). 
Table 7: Adopted types of rules in a network 
Type of rules Description Aspect 
Arena rules 
(constituting 
rules):  
 
Rules that define the nature 
of a social practice  
Three subsets specify the position, reality and reward rules;  
Position rules refer to positions and competences of the actors;  
Reality rules (or product rules) refer to required standards for 
actors in terms of information, service, products and behaviors; 
Reward rules refer to rewards for behavior, which can be in form 
of subsidy rules or payoff-rules. 
Interaction 
rules 
(regulating 
rules) 
 
Interaction rules have a 
procedural character and 
inform actors what is and 
what is not allowed in a 
network. 
Rules that regulate access to playing in the network (entry rule). 
Rules that regulate the mode of interaction between actors 
(interaction rules). 
(Based on Klijn 1996 in Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 81 and Klijn 2001: 140 and Klijn & Koppenjan 
2006) 
Arena rules, having the nature of constitutional rules, are viewed as a yardstick to determine the 
nature of the network and arena in which they operate. They specify position rule, reality (or 
product) rule and rewards (or pay-off) rules. Interaction rules have a procedural character and 
inform actors what is and what is not allowed in a network. Interaction rules are exercised within 
the context of arena rules. In the interaction rules, two subsets of interaction rules are 
distinguished: entry rule and interaction rules. It was underlined by the Dutch scholar that rules 
can be formal and informal, which are equally important in the network (Kiln & Koppenjan 2006 
and Kiln 2001).  
Classification of rules results from a combination of institutional theories and network theory, 
which focuses on rules that establish the identity of actors and their professional standards. The 
use of this framework provides certain advantages. At first, we can understand the features of 
the rule-regulated behavior of actors in an organizational system (in our case a multi-layer public 
system) and a sub-network institutional system. Secondly, we can understand the characteristics 
of “social” rules in sub-networks, which are not necessarily natural laws: they are rules that 
define network settings as a social reality.  
Thus, it is found that the typology of rules introduced by the Dutch scholars is closely embedded 
to a policy network, encompassing policy content and the actors involved to realize the policy 
content. For instance, Klijn (2001) analyzed the Dutch housing policy, viewed as network rule 
which specifies the position rules of the actors involved, the subsidiary rules for the stakeholders 
such as the new dwellings (not necessary the actors) as well as the description of the service and 
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criteria (product rules) which the Dutch housing policy provided. The interaction mapping was 
developed to identify different interaction patterns between various actors as well as to 
distinguish different clusters or sub-networks in the Dutch housing policy. Klijn underlined the 
composition and working methods while referring to interaction rules. Since our framework 
treats interaction patterns and the actors, their characteristics and positions in the network (see 
our next section 2.3.3) separately as input elements, we will focus on the dynamics of rules and 
the influence of rules in the network. To this extent, we can build on the following assumptions:  
First, rules are the necessary conditions for action but are continuously evolving during the 
course of interactions by both public and private actors. Rules are changed or modified in order 
to access outcomes and products, to influence perceptions and for problem solving (Klijn & 
Koppenjan 2006: 152). Furthermore, during interactions, rules can be consciously broken, (Klijn 
2001) if not considered appropriate.  
Second, “the nature of rules influences decision making in networks [...]” (Klijn 2001: 158). We 
assume a certain influence of rules in relation to cooperative behavior, accountability, trust 
building and conflict management... For instance, imperfect rules can potentially influence the 
collaboration process. On the one hand, the vagueness of rules provides more freedom in policy 
implementation, while intrinsically contradictory rules result in non-compliance or the breaking 
of rules, on the other (March & Olsen 1989: 21-38 in Kickert et al. 1997: 42).  
Third, providing that rules are related to actors’ competences, rules are closely linked to the 
power of actors in a network (Klijn 2001: 139). This may explain a fact that the actors have little 
concern about sanctions on uncooperative behavior because they (actors) are indispensable to a 
large degree (Klijn and Teisman 2003). In other words, the actors are highly interdependent and 
cannot be replaced by other actors in the policy process. 
Table 8: Implications for empirical observation of rules 
Input 
element 
Characteristics Observations Assumption 
Rules Arena rules is viewed as a 
yardstick to determine the 
nature of the network: 
Position rules; 
Reality rules; 
Reward rules; 
Interaction rules, having a 
procedural character, 
enable understanding of 
the relationship between 
actors; 
Entry rules; 
Interactions rules; 
Rules can be formal and 
informal. 
Observed content of policies / 
agreements/ contracts (to understand 
reality rule). 
Observed institutional arrangements/ 
regulations and actor constellation in 
the practice (to understand position 
rules and entry rules). 
Observed incentives schemes or 
entitlements (benefit) (to understand 
reward/ pay-off / subsidiary rules). 
Observed decision making mechanisms/ 
administrative procedures/ contracts 
and agreement (to understand 
interactions rules). 
Observed specific cases of tensions and 
conflicts and the resolutions. 
Rules are related to 
actors’ competences, 
rules are closely linked 
to the power of actors 
in a network. 
Rules can be changed and 
modified during 
interactions; 
More rules can be 
created during 
interactions as problem 
solving. 
Rules can influence 
processes and results 
(rule vagueness, 
imperfect rules; 
changes of rules). 
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2.2.3. Goals 
Under our observation, the notion of separate goals in a network is over-emphasized, while 
common goals, aim, purposes are downplayed in the network literature.  
In joint actions, actors do not need to agree on goals in order to act collectively. Partners in a 
collective structure share spare time and energy, but they need not to share visions, aspiration 
or intentions (McQuaid 2000). When joining a PPP, actors adhere to their own institutional 
norms and values and their own institutional goals. In other words, the rationale (or the goal) of 
each actor in joining a partnership is to seek for sufficient resources and power to achieve their 
own (organizational) goals. For instance, in the policy implementation for land conversion, public 
actors pursue legitimacy, access and democracy in the policy process on the one hand, and 
budget enrichment on the other, whereas the investors pursue their business goals, which is 
profit making by acquiring land for business development. Hence, as a joint action begins to 
form, the members of the partnership converge first on common means, not on common goals 
(Weick 1979 in Kickert et al. 1997: 87) or “a common purpose or avert common threats” (Kickert 
et al. 1997:9).  
However, the network scholars agree that some degree of mutual goal in the network should be 
strategically adopted. Accordingly, the sharing of goals is interpreted as “creating a minimum 
consensus in order to facilitate collective decision making and joint action” (Kickert et al. 1997:9) 
or, as highlighted by Agranoff (1986 in Kickert et al. 1997: 86), as a “win-win process, or trade off 
goals” where the minimum agreement can provide integrative, multi-beneficial solutions. In 
addition, in Kickert et al. (1997: 172), the mutual goal adaptation is referred to as “strategic” in 
the communication process, during which objectives are mutually adapted. 
McQuaid’s (2000) presents that a lack of clear aims and goals causes the failure of a partnership. 
Some partnerships have agreed on broad aims, but their detailed goals are unclear or the goals 
can be interpreted differently by different partners. Unclear goals often lead to a 
misunderstanding, lack of coordination and a possible conflict between partners. Ostrom (1990) 
also implicitly referred to the need for some sort of common objectives between groups in 
collective action, by pointing out that the prerequisite for effective institutions is the ability (of 
the groups) to solve a common set of problems.  
Although public and private systems display their own distinct values and features, some 
common goals can become a means to achieve institutional/ organizational goals, which can be 
in the forms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Furthermore, we argue that CSR can no 
longer be a means to achieve goals but it can be attached to private institutional norms and 
added as a value, as referred by various advocates of partnerships in sustainable development 
(Utting & Zammit 2008, Garriga & Melé 2004). 
Other scholars also support the above argument, which states that businesses usually have a 
predominantly commercial perspective in a PPP but are not always focused on profits. PPP could 
be a strategy of the private actor to develop market credibility by being associated with the 
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government, or to have political motives such as gaining an “insider” position in policy processes, 
working to achieve policy outcomes favorable to businesses (Carroll & Steane 2000: 51). 
Table 9: Implications for empirical observation of PPP goals 
Input 
element 
Characteristics Observations Assumption 
Goals PPP goals refer to 
common purposes, 
common means of 
actors;  
Each PPP actor has 
organizational goals.  
Observed policy 
objectives; and 
observed project 
objectives; 
Identification of goals 
stated by actors. 
Common (shared) goals are found to be important 
for PPP success; 
Organizational goals of the public actors sometime 
dominate PPP goals in the project. 
2.2.4. Multi actor and multi-level actor 
A network approach requires an adequate mapping of actors involved in the network. Actors can 
refer to aggregate organizations (firm or government), organizational units (department, 
agency), or to individuals (manager) (Voets 2008: 49). The actors in the network can be public, 
private and voluntary actors (Rhodes 1991, Frances et al. 1991). As far as our research questions 
are concerned, we focus on public and business actors joining PPPs14. We do not intend to study 
actors as individuals; rather, the actors in our study are organizations. In our study, public actors 
are the government and governmental organizations, authorities (Bruijn & Ringeling in Kickert et 
al. 2007: 160) and functional organizations (Klijn & Teisman 2003) at all levels.  
Private actors are “organizations, the major aim of which is to generate profits for their own” 
(McQuaid 2000: 19). The private actors in PPP, as identified by Carroll & Steane (2000:48), cover 
many types of organizations with different motives and resources. These are not only business 
firms who are interested in profit making but also the ones whose major concern lies with 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) (see 1.3.3). 
However, such actors (non-profit and supplementary) can be subjected to a certain level of 
further analysis in order to gain a better understanding of the performance of the studied 
network (Voets 2008:49).  
According to Eshuis & Klijn (2012: 11), governance processes can no longer be managed by 
governmental actors alone. Government critically depends on an increasing number of actors in 
the formation and realization of public policy. To realize their goals, governmental organizations 
and other stakeholders need to motivate other parties to participate and invest in the 
governance processes. 
According to O’Toole et al. (in Koppenjan & Klijn 2004), a formal institutional arrangement often 
involves fewer actors than it is found in the practice of policy implementation. He pointed out at 
the complexity of sub-networks or coalitions in the absence of a single implementation structure 
                                                          
14
 The policy processes should be best explained at the bottom level. O’Toole in Klijn et al 1997) said something about 
local context. Subjects were asked to go more for understanding of the street - level actors (district and communal). 
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in the policy process, especially at local level. In their earlier study, O’Toole et al. (in Kickert et al. 
1997: 140) and Scharpf (1997: 55) argued that there are a number of sub-networks (or 
coalitions) through different sets of actors drawn from different levels of the government and 
from different phases of the policy process. They further added that despite having distinctive 
arrays of actors, those separated sub-networks are interlinked. O’Toole et al. (in Kickert et al. 
1997: 143-144) specifically pointed out at the involvements of multilevel actors in a local 
implementation network, which comprises governmental and societal actors “from the same 
(horizontal) and higher (vertical) levels of action”. The involvements of the actors from higher 
levels can twofold: first, it can be in the form of policy formulation including allocation of 
resources, authorities, rules and procedures; second, it can be in the form of active participation 
in different phases of implementation (se also Teisman & Klijn 2003, Klijn & Teisman 2002 and 
Kickert et al. 1997). 
The complexity of actor constellation and multi level actors require a thorough actor mapping, 
relevant to the policy network.  
Table 10: Implications for empirical observation of actors 
Input element Characteristics Observations Assumptions 
Multi and 
Multi layer 
actors  
Actors in implementation differ from 
actors in institutional arrangement. 
Actor constellation is different in sub-
networks at the implementation level. 
Public actors are separate multi-layer 
actors. 
Institutional 
arrangements in 
policies and 
being observed 
in practice. 
 
Mismatch of actor arrangements in 
policy and practice. 
Third party does not constitute 
actors of PPP but is necessary to 
analyze in order to gain an 
understanding of PPP. 
2.2.5. Resource dependencies 
Resource dependency is a central concept of inter-organizational theory, which is one of the 
theoretical roots of the network theory. It stands for the exchange processes between 
organizations, whereby organizations acquire necessary resources from other organizations for 
goal achievement or survival, since no organization can generate all the necessary resources on 
its own (Kickert et al. 1997:21). We firsts consider the type of resources, and second, the 
resource interdependencies between actors. 
Resources 
In general, resources include a whole range of formal and informal means which network parties 
possess in order to achieve their objectives. The resources are understood as (...) formal 
competencies and decision making powers, some of which are clearly identifiable as resources, 
such as money, human resources; (...) but also less tangible resources, such as, as authority, 
legitimacy, strategic capability, mobilization power and the alike (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 46).  
Resources are thus classified in five types by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004), namely financial 
capacities, production capacities, competences, knowledge and legitimacy. The public and 
private actors have their own resources specified by their institutional features and the legal 
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mandates. The resources, however, are not equally or steadily distributed among state actors 
even though they are from the same institutional background. In addition, every actor has 
different types of resources, depending on which (sub) network it participates (Koppenjan & 
Klijn 2004 and Kickert et al. 1997). 
Financial capacities refer to the ability to provide funding by giving or lending money (Voets 
2008: 38). Financial resources can be provided by both public and private actors. Financial 
resources of private actors can be observed through investment capital, annual/ quarterly/ 
monthly budget plans and expenses, but also by the commitment to afford non-production 
activity expenses (such as corporate social responsibility). The financial capacity of the 
government at the implementation level can be identified through the annual budget and plans 
for national, provincial and local programs. In comparison to financial capability of the private 
actor, the government/ public actor budget is more stable and endurable despite the fact that 
capital flow is considerably more limited and constrained.  
Financial resources are viewed to be important in problem solving, such as in addressing 
organizational costs to solve complex problems (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 144), and in budget 
limitations and reduction of government funding (Voets 2008:38). In most of PPP models 
summarized by Dutch scholars, government actors want to achieve added value in cooperation 
with private actors by “a more efficient form of financing” as well a greater deal of involvement 
of private finances in public deliveries (Eshuis & Klijn 2012: 76-77). 
Notably, financial resources in involuntary resettlement projects including additional 
compensation for restoring income and livelihoods are of essential importance, which determine 
the success or failure of the projects (Cernea 2008, 1999 &1997, Chris De Wet 2001 and Van 
Wicklin lll 1999). 
Production resources refer to the availability of means held by public and private actors that 
actively produce outcomes, both material and immaterial. These can be personnel, products and 
services (Aldrich 1972 in Voets 2008: 38), but it can also be ownership of land for urban 
generation, equipment, know-how or specific technology for problem solving (Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004). 
Competences or formal authority refer to the ability to decide, regulate, grant or prohibit certain 
activities or behavior. This is a typical governmental resource (Voets 2008:38). Bruijn & Ringeling 
(in Kickert et al. 1997: 154) elaborated on the resources of governmental organizations, 
encompassing unilateral instruments (legislation and regulations) or violence, the legitimate use 
of which remains the monopoly of the state.  
Knowledge refers to all kinds of information (Aldrich 1972 in Voets 2008:39). It is emphasized 
that knowledge is not only explicit in all types of documents, but it can be implicit as experience 
and expertise (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004: 145). Local knowledge is important in development, 
particularly in terms of local economic rehabilitation in resettlement projects (Cernea 1996, 
Behura and Nayak 1993; Cernea and Guggenheim 1993).  
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Legitimacy is a vague resource, and with complex meanings. Particularly, in the literature on 
partnerships, the distinction between input legitimacy and output legitimacy is frequently 
employed. According to Bexell & Mörth, (2010: 12-15), input legitimacy is understood as 
“government by the people”; and output legitimacy is understood as “government for the 
people”. Accordingly, the former can include democratic procedures, legal standing, expertise 
and moral authority and the latter primarily refers to goal achievement (or capacity building). 
Thus, being as an input factor of PPP, legitimacy in this section means input legitimacy. 
Legitimacy resources elaborated here refer to the ability of the actors to participate or be 
represented in the network in regards to both the scope and quality of participation and 
representation. Voets (2008: 39) stated that both public and private actors can have sources of 
legitimacy that are relevant for proper functioning of a network. Particularly, legitimacy derives 
from the fact that public actors are part of the formal governmental institutions, representing 
democratic values and the interest of the citizens. Legitimacy of the private actors can lie in their 
access to decision making, and their control over investment and right to ask for accountable 
scrutiny of the government (Bexell & Mörth 2010). 
In line with the above elaboration, the compulsory nature of land conversion itself denotes a 
lack of input legitimacy, where the legitimacy of the farmers stemming from land use rights15 is 
undermined. It raises a critical subject in our exploration whether public and private actors 
possess input legitimacy to carry out compulsory land conversion in Vietnam? In addition, it is 
questionable whether the root cause of conflicts and resistance in the studied areas derive from 
the poor participation of the stakeholders and the lack of representation of their interest in the 
land conversion mechanism as stated earlier in 1.5. 
Table 11: Implications for empirical observation of resources 
Input 
element 
Characteristics Observations Assumption 
Resources  
Resources can be categorized as financial 
capacities, production capacities, 
competences, knowledge and 
legitimacy; 
 The resources, are not equally or steadily 
distributed among state actors; 
Every actor has different types of 
resources, depending on which (sub) 
network it participates; 
Public actor is a “special actor”, possessing 
special resources. 
Policy mandates/ 
agreements/ contracts; 
Administrative procedures; 
Organizational structures of 
the actors, their 
institutional background, 
facility and capability 
(investment capital, 
personnel structure, 
education, scope of work); 
Tensions and workload of the 
actors. 
Lack of input legitimacy 
in compulsory land 
conversion; 
Inadequate resources 
distribution; 
Financial resource is 
important in IR, as 
being able to 
generate other types 
of resources. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Not the ownership of land as land belongs to the government ownership (The Constitution 1993 - revised 2013). 
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Interdependencies  
Dependency is a precondition for networks, or in other words, networks develop and exist 
because of the interdependency between actors (Kickert et al. 1997: 31). Interdependencies 
cause interactions between actors, which create and sustain patterns. Indeed, PPP is formed on 
the principle of resources being shared between public and private actors. In practice, the 
interdependencies can be portrayed in various dimensions, between and within organizations. 
The number of types of interdependencies originally proposed by Thompson (1967) and Scharpf 
(1978) and further enriched by various authors such as Koppenjan & Klijn (2004), Voets (2008), 
enables an in-depth examination of interdependencies from different dimensions.  
Thompson’s classification of interdependencies is based on coordination methods within an 
organization and it includes pooled interdependence, serial/ sequential interdependence and 
reciprocal interdependence. However, Voets (2008) argued that those types of 
interdependencies can be used for the analysis of inter-governmental interdependences 
(between organizations) shows as Table 12 below. 
Table 12: Three types of interdependencies 
Pooled 
interdependence  
Each part renders a discrete contribution to the whole and each is supported by the whole 
although the parts do not interact in any direct way... they are interdependent in the sense that 
unless each performs adequately, the total organization is jeopardized. 
Serial/ sequential 
interdependence 
The output of one part is the input of another (...). Direct interdependence can be pinpointed 
between them; the order of that interdependence can be specified... and is not symmetrical 
(there is an order). 
Reciprocal 
interdependence 
Refers to situation in which the outputs of each part become inputs for the other. (There is a 
symmetry). 
(Voets 2008: 41, based on Thompson 1967 and Staudenmayer 1997) 
Accordingly, pooled interdependence requires standardization in the rules and operating 
procedures, whereas the coordination methods for the other two interdependencies are 
somewhat more flexible. Sequential interdependence is managed through mildly adaptive 
planning and scheduling, while reciprocally interdependent departments are managed through 
constant information sharing and mutual adjustments.  
Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) enriched Scharpf’s (1978) idea by mapping the most relevant resources 
for a given problem situation by with the assessment of the degree of substitutability of the 
actors in order to identify critical actors in the network Table 13. The critical owners are those 
who possess the resources which are important to the problem owners. In the meantime, it is 
important to identify “dedicated actors” or “non-dedicated actors” in a policy network to 
understand how the resources are used. The dependency of other parties is not only influenced 
by the resources they own, but by their subjective involvement to solve the problem and their 
willingness to use their resources (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 146). This notion is critically linked to 
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the problem perception. If an actor is clearly aware of the costs and benefits he can make a 
choice to become either a dedicated or non-dedicated actor. 
Table 13: Typology of dependency relations between actors               
Actors 
Level of importance of 
resources 
Degree of 
replaceability 
Level of Dependency:  
Low - Medium/ High 
Critical actor?   
Yes/ No 
Actor 1     
Actor 2     
Actor N     
(Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 146) 
Thus, the Koppenjan & Klijn’s scheme is found to be useful to understand the linkage between 
the actor’s characteristics, such as the resources, perceptions and goals, by which problem can 
be identified in a particular policy context. 
In this research, interdependencies are examined not only between the public and the private 
actors but also between the public actors themselves. As discussed in 2.2.1 and 2.2.4, multi-layer 
public actors belong to their own (governmental) institutional system, where they have to 
comply with existing procedures as well as with the embedded institutional norms and values 
(see also Klijn and Teisman 2002, 2003). Hierarchy in a public administrative system results in 
interdependencies between different levels of public actors. First, there are pooled and 
serial/sequential interdependences between different levels and different dimensions of state 
actors. Second, the state actors are sequentially linked in a cycle of policy making, where the 
outputs of some actors are the inputs of other actors.  
In summary, interdependencies largely result from a legislation-institutional framework, which 
defines actor competencies, procedural authorities, financial and fiscal capability, on the one 
hand. In spite of our research focus being on the public-private partnership; it is necessary to 
further investigate the interdependencies between the multi layer public actors, which 
essentially influence the given PPP process, on the other.  
Finally, it is argued that the resource dependencies, as mentioned above, will provide the 
rationale for the collaboration between public and private actors. In the meantime, the level and 
type of resource dependencies define the features or patterns of collaborations between public 
and private actors. 
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Table 14: Implications for empirical observation of dependencies 
Input element Characteristics Observations Assumptions 
Dependencies  Dependencies can be 
understood in view of 
inter-dependencies 
between actors to 
understand the 
coordination methods 
(interaction patterns) in 
the network; 
Dependencies can be 
measured in terms of 
the degree of 
replaceability and the 
levels of importance to 
identify (non) critical 
actors in the network. 
Observed  legislation-
institutional framework; 
norms and regulation; 
administrative procedures 
and decision making 
mechanisms (formal and 
informal);  
Level of importance, 
replaceability and 
dependencies evaluated by 
the actors about their 
partners; 
Tensions/ Conflict/ complaint 
cases. 
Public administration system is 
dominated by pooled and 
sequential interdependencies; 
Dependencies of the public and 
private actors to a third party 
need to be examined; 
Interdependencies, and rule 
settings and resources are 
interrelated; 
Accordingly, critical actors can be 
characterized by high degree of 
replaceability as a result of a lack 
of resources or vague rule 
settings and problem of 
perceptions. 
2.2.6. Power 
Power is a capacity to occupy, to hold, and to make use of a strategic position (Stone 1988: 83 in 
Voets 2008: 45). This section discusses various forms of power, sources of power, and how 
power is exercised by the actors in a network setting. Our discussion of power does not address 
public and private actors only. Instead, the discussion is extended to cover larger groups of PAPs 
who are relevant to the use of power of public and private actors and are subjected to PPP. The 
reason for this lies with our secondary research question which is related to conflict resolution as 
a PPP outcome. Thus, some theoretical insights are used to guide our exploration on how the 
use of power may influence resolutions of conflicts in compulsory land conversion. 
Sources of power 
Power is defined as a central concept in the resource dependency model and is connected with 
the possession of resources or with the asymmetry of the dependency relations between actors 
(Crozier & Friedberg 1980 in Kickert et al. 1997: 21, Scharpf 1978).   
Although the power and the resources of one’s actor are related, the concept of power should 
be understood not only in terms of possession of resources, but also in terms of the use of 
resources. This point of view is supported by Hendriks (2009) and Lukes (1974), who state that 
the concepts of power are closely linked to how power is used and for what purpose. 
Forms of power 
According to Hendriks (2009: 173) summary, there are two types of power: coercive (“power 
over”) and generative forms of power (“power with” or sometimes “power to”).  
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“Power over” occurs when the powerful exert control or domination over the powerless for a 
desired outcome. “Power over” is sometimes referred to as coercion where an actor (or set of 
actors) uses force or threat of sanction to pursue own interests only.  
Generative power is used for the mutual gain of the relationship to help the network function 
effectively. In other words, more generative forms of power can inspire actors to engage in 
collective thinking and obtain mutual gain. 
Power over or coercive power 
Power over or coercive power is often discussed by the Dutch scholars in regards to the power of 
the governmental organizations, and is closely related to the possession of resources.  
Coercive power of the governmental organization is linked to formal authority and control, 
which define their status to be “special” (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004). Indeed, central government 
can force local governments to take certain actions and, more broadly, governments have 
coercive power to force private actors to or not to take certain actions (Voets 2008: 45). For 
example, as a purchaser of land, the public sector is unique because in certain situations it can 
push through a sale even when the owner does not wish to sell. Particularly, the government 
owns special or unilateral instruments, which are not limited to legislations and regulations, but 
can be in the form of violence to impose their coercive power (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 155). 
Consequently, we argue that since the legislative, executive and judicial powers are not discrete, 
the chances of an abuse of power are great by the governmental organizations, while, at the 
same time the coercive nature of the power of the governmental organizations can become an 
unjustified source of criticism and resistance (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004). 
Besides, power over or coercive power is also viewed as “hindrance power” of various actors, 
which is not necessarily related to the coercive character of the governmental organizations in a 
network setting. Rather it is related to various actors who want to make their objections known 
through hearings and appeal procedures” (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 168). Alternatively, coercion 
can be used by the oppressed in their collective fight against injustices. As the result, power over 
or coercion are viewed as necessary components of a well-functioning democracy (Mansbridge 
1996 in Hendriks 2009: 178). 
Moreover, some scholars repeatedly draw our attention on the veto power or hindrance power 
in a network setting. The importance of the resources that actors possess gives them power in 
the network. However, even the less powerful actors often have some veto power to block 
decisions (Scharpf 1978 in Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Particularly, hindrance power is used when 
the actors of importance and irreplaceable resources, can block the creation of a solution strived 
for by the others (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). It means that all actors have a certain form of veto 
power. Therefore, the outcomes of projects cannot be reached without a certain cooperation of 
various actors (Klijn & Teisman 2000:89).  
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Finally, Lukes (1974), by distinguishing three dimensions of “power over” suggests empirical 
observations of the coercive power as follows:  
The first dimension refers to the direct domination of A over B in an observable conflict arena. 
There are clear winners and losers in a bargaining or decision-making process.  
The second dimension is a more indirect form of power over and comes in the form where A 
manipulates the rules of the game so that B does what A wants. According to Lukes, this is 
manipulative power, which concentrates on the “behind the scene” activities, through which 
already powerful groups manipulate the decision-making agenda. The purposes of exercising 
power vary. However, in our studied case, we assume that since the power of the private 
investor over land is limited in regards to decision making and mobilization, the private actor will 
struggle for more power and influence over the decision making and mobilization process by 
using their financial and production resources.  
The third dimension refers to more subtle forms of control and domination, which can be 
exerted by A through observable and/or physiological means. It lies with the use of symbols, 
myths and narratives to manipulatively influence B’s reality, including how he/she perceives 
his/her own wants and the inequalities around him/her. Eshuis and Klijn (2012), in their recent 
discussion on branding in Governance and Public Management, elaborate on the strategy of the 
government and political groups to exercise their power through the uses of media to increase 
branding upon the inception of new programs or initiatives. This strategy can manipulatively 
create convergence in perceptions in the public which can enable the government to 
exercise its power.  
Generative forms of power (“power with” or sometimes “power to”) 
Generative power is used for the mutual gain of the relationship in order to help the network 
function effectively. In other words, more generative forms of power can inspire actors to 
engage in collective thinking and have mutual gain (Hendriks 2009: 173). Similarly, in network 
studies, in contrast to the hindrance power mentioned above, “realization power” can be viewed 
as one of the generative forms of power. According to Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 47), realization 
power is often used when the actors want to realize a solution by investing in a joint process of 
problem solving.  
According to Hendriks (2009), generative power is a community-based conception of power. It is 
neither related to domination or a repressive force nor to giving or demanding; instead “owner 
with” is positive and creative and suggests the notion of empowerment and participation. 
Hendriks (2009) also emphasized a tendency that most (micro) deliberative procedures are 
designed to shift the debate from “power over” to “power with” when people engage in a free, 
non-coercive form of communication. We argue that the reliance on communicative/ generative 
power of the public sphere is sometimes utopian, especially in critical problem situations such as 
compulsory land conversion. 
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Formal power and informal power  
O’Toole (in Kickert et al. 1997: 52), elaborating on the complex network at implementation level, 
stresses the acknowledgement of informal power relations, which, in his view influence formal 
policy. This can be a form of hidden power or manipulative power pointed out by Lukes (1974). 
Consequently, informal power influences the guidelines and the rules in the network that 
regulate interaction and participation. O’Toole (1997) even concluded that in many processes in 
a network, a “formal” policy does not exist; rather, various actors are pursuing their own policy 
or strategy.  
Power distribution  
The final discussion in this section is about power distribution which results in power asymmetry 
or unequal power. Unequal power exists in most partnerships (McQuaid 2000: 23). Unequal 
power results from the fact that a partnership may be more important to one partner than to 
the other(s) or one partner can coerce or mandate the others. According to McQuaid (2000), it is 
not necessary for all partners to have equal power. In many cases, equal power between 
partners would lead to difficulties in making appropriate decisions.  
We assume that unequal power may influence the outcomes of a partnership. Furthermore, we 
argue that the use of power (or in other words, the power mechanism) of the actors critically 
influences the PPP process and its outcomes. 
Thus, in general, power rests with those who have control over resources, and that can be quite 
centralized as it is in the case of Vietnam. Accordingly, the higher levels tend to dominate policy 
implementation at lower levels, who in turn have the “greatest understanding as to what is 
relevant and effective” (McQuaid 2000: 23). As a result, the progress of decision-making for 
problem solving at lower levels as well as the effectiveness of the decisions imposed by the 
higher levels remains questionable.   
Table 15: Implications for empirical observation of power 
Input 
element 
Characteristics Observations Assumptions 
Power  Power and resources are 
closely related; 
Power is defined and 
classified in the way it is 
used and by the purpose 
of the actors such as 
coercive power (power 
over) veto power and 
hindrance power, power 
with and power to. 
 
Policy framework and 
regulations; 
Observed decision 
making mechanisms 
and possible trade-
offs;  
Observed impacts of 
the use of additional 
resources; 
Tensions between the 
actors, resistance 
cases. 
Power can be manipulated by the use of resources, 
given that power can be shifted from one actor 
to another; 
Unequal power (power symmetry) exists in most 
partnerships; 
Coercion by government can be subjected to 
criticism and resistance; 
Non-coercive form of power being generative 
power (power with/ power to) or power sharing 
can be used for problem solving in network; 
Informal power (in forms of hidden power or 
manipulative) can be predominant in network. 
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2.2.7. Perception 
Perception is defined as “an image through which the complex and ambiguous world which 
surrounds actors can be made to make sense of and be acted upon” (Kickert et al. 1997: 82); or 
simply, “perceptions can be applied to the way actors define problems” (ibid).  
Perceptions are viewed by network advocates as (i) important roles in interactions’ processes 
within network policies (Termeer & Koppenjan 1997), (ii) crucial factors associated with 
institutional and strategic barriers in a public - private collaboration (Teisman & Klijn 2003) and 
(iii) root-causes of uncertainties in a network (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004). In addition, in spite of 
the fact that perceptions are “stable and difficult to change” (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997: 79), 
perceptions can be managed and justified during a collaboration process and can be viewed as 
outcomes of a process (ibid. 86-88), or shared and converged as results of intensive interactions 
(Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 72). 
With regards to the concerns of how perceptions are managed in joint-actions, it needs to be 
stated that some perceptions are unnecessary, undesirable and doomed to fail. Perceptions vary 
and exist on (i) problem formulations, (ii) problem solutions, and on the (iii) measures to 
evaluate problems and solutions (Kickert et al. 1997: 87, Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 48).  
The dynamics of perceptions require appropriate measures to observe and understand the 
nature of perceptions in a given network. Some measures have implicitly and explicitly been 
elaborated by Dutch scholars in their various studies about PPP in the Netherlands (Koppenjan, 
Klijn, Kickert & Teisman 1997, 1999, 2002, 2003 and 2004) as follows: 
First, it is necessary to understand the institutional background and to identify the institutional 
value of the public and private actors. Indeed, the perceptions of public and private actors are 
significantly rooted in their institutional background or in other words, in the organizational 
perceptions and values (see 2.2.3). 
From the various case studies of PPPs in practice of the above mentioned Dutch scholars, we 
understand that the institutional background is the distinct point of departure between public 
and private characteristics. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) in their discussion on network 
management, present their concerns about the uncertainty of different institutional 
backgrounds, which may influence the quality of the collaboration processes. According to 
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004), the actors’ characteristics such as perceptions, objectives and 
interests as well as behavior during interactions are influenced or guided by the tasks, rules and 
language of their own organization, their own administrative level and their own network (see 
also Teisman & Klijn 2003 and Klijn and Teisman 2002).  
Second, the nature of perceptions derives not only from the institutional background of the 
actors, but also from a strategic choice of the actors. We will therefore explore the nature of 
perceptions through our observation of specific strategies of public and private actors in 
collaboration interactions. Notably, the strategic choice of the actors is influenced by their 
specific positions in the network (Klijn & Teisman 2003).  
Thus, positions of the public actors at both individual and organizational levels define own goals 
and interests, and they also influence their perceptions, their choices and their strategies in the 
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network. At the individual level, the perceptions of state officials vary depending on their 
assigned positions and the level of authority they possess at different levels of the political and 
administrative system. At the organizational level, the endorsed functions of an organization in 
the network and hierarchy define the degree to which public actors should be politically 
responsible for the outcomes of the network. 
For example, public actors including politicians or high ranking officials may choose a “minimal 
and secured” strategy. First, they tend not to join a network, and want to impose their ideas and 
goals on other social actors. Second, they may decide to perform their tasks since there is no 
conflict between effectiveness and legitimacy; notably, public actors and authorities often 
choose legitimacy over effectiveness. Another example is that of a dual role of the authorities. 
On the one hand, they are the actors trying to maximize their own interests; on the other hand, 
they have to fulfill the central function of value allocation in society (Kickert et al. 1997). 
In general, the public actor is in favour of hierarchical mechanisms despite the fact that they may 
not be appropriate to achieve its goals. Therefore, in a network, the government and politicians 
tend to adhere to the formal procedures based on principles of hierarchy (Teisman & Klijn 2003, 
Klijn and Teisman 2002 and Kickert et al. 1997). Meanwhile, public performance should be 
assessed in terms of reduction of conflict within society and the building of consensus.   
As stated above, the transitional context of the Public Administration Reform (PAR) in Vietnam is 
characterized by a contradicting scenario, with a high level of decentralization of the provincial 
government only, while power is not really transferred to the lower (district, communal) levels, 
which are still subjected to a strict hierarchy (VDR 2010). Hence, public actors (especially at the 
lower levels-being the district and communal) tend to resist the formal legislative and 
administrative system, which is no longer appropriate, especially in the field of compulsory land 
conversion (1.4). Nevertheless, public actors also purposely make use of the legislative and 
administrative system, which is their “special” and most important resource to exercise their 
(coercive) power over other partners. 
Table 16: Implications for empirical observation of actors’ perceptions 
Input 
element 
Characteristics Observations Assumptions 
Perception  
 
Perceptions vary and exist on (i) 
problem formulations, (ii) problem 
solutions, and on the (iii) measures 
to evaluate problems and 
solutions; 
Perceptions are determined by  
institutional background/ and 
positions of actors in network 
Perceptions demonstrate goals 
(objectives), strategies of the 
actors;  
Perceptions are constructed and 
reconstructed in network. 
Observed perspectives over 
PPP, objectives, interests 
and strategies stated by the 
actors; 
Observed choices and 
solutions for problem 
solving - especially in terms 
of conflict resolutions 
(specific cases);  
Observed tensions and 
constraints during 
collaboration. 
Perceptions can be distinct 
between public and 
private actors and 
between public actors in 
different positions in the 
network; 
Public actors including 
politicians or high 
ranking officials may 
choose a “minimal and 
secured” strategy. 
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2.3. Public Private Partnership throughput elements 
In this section, we focus on the PPP network in view of understanding its process. In the 
language of partnership studies, it is the “throughput” where one can explore the actual 
dynamism and the implementation process of collaboration (Van Tulder 2010). PPP throughput 
is two-dimensional, and each dimension focuses on a specific aspect of the process. The first 
throughput dimension focuses on the content of activities within which partners work towards 
the partnership objectives. The second throughput dimension refers to collaboration activities 
(Bryson et al. 2006), which include the influence of the structural features upon the PPP 
activities (Klijn 1997).  
2.3.1. Public Private Partnership content 
The substance or content of PPP derives from the determined goals of the main objectives of the 
PPP establishment (see 2.2.3). The partnership objectives encompass some sort of value-added 
activities of private sectors who take up principal roles in the PPP schemes (Elsig & Amalric 2008, 
Reed & Reed 2006, Schmidheiny 2004, Brown 2004, European Commission 200316, Osborne 
2000  and ECSAD17) (see more 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). 
It is challenging to determine the scope of activities carried out by public and private actors at 
the implementation level of a policy process (O’Toole et al. in Kickert et al. 1997). In order to 
overcome this difficulty, plausible approaches are suggested in the literature. First, we can 
identify the key actions to answer the question “what activities are carried out?” in the 
collaboration process, based on the elaboration of PPP goals and objectives. Notably, these 
activities should be drawn from the basic form of joint-actions (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
Second, we can break down the given network into separate but related functional sub-
networks as suggested by O’Tool et al. (in Kickert et al. 1997: 140-145) so that the activities can 
be observed in a more transparent way.  
We should be aware of the dynamics of the process not only because of the actor constellation 
but also because the actors’ preferences change in the course of interactions, and that policy 
processes in the network are “unpredictable and complex”. Moreover, actors often cannot know 
in advance which outcomes are likely to occur and what targets they can meet during the 
process (Kickert et al. 1997: 32). Indeed, the PPP activities are influenced by input elements, 
such as the inappropriate allocation of authority and political positions (Kickert et al. 1997: 161), 
or the change of rules and legislative environment (Bryson et al. 2006). 
 
                                                          
16
 Retrieved form http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/ppp_en.pdf in May 2012 
17
 Retrieved form http://www.fifty.ipa.edu.sa/conf/customcontrols/paperworkflash/Content/pdf/m5/en/11.pdf in 
May 2012 
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Table 17: Implications for empirical observation of PPP content 
Process 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observation Assumptions 
Content of 
PPP 
PPP content derives 
from PPP goals 
and objectives; 
Implementation 
processes can be 
divided in sub-
networks. 
Policy framework, 
agreements and 
assignment for 
responsibilities of 
partners for each 
programs; 
Observe scope of joint- 
activities  
Specific programs carried 
out by the actors. 
Value-added activities are used as a means for 
problem solving in partnership; 
PPP in SD is characterized by added- value 
activities;   
 PPP activities are subjected to be 
“unpredictable and complex” during the 
course of interactions, since they are 
constrained by the inappropriate allocation 
of authority and political positions, the 
change of rules and legislative environment. 
2.3.2. Collaboration building activities 
Collaborative activities focusing on the forging of the initial agreement, building leadership, 
building legitimacy, building trust, managing conflict and planning are seen as crucial 
components of a collaboration building process (Bryson et al. 2006), which we will 
consecutively address.  
A number of factors, which cause the failure of collective actions, can be found in the literature. 
The pertinent influencing factors can be institutional characteristics - the perceptions, the rules 
and the power, to name a few (Bryson et al. 2006, Teisman & Klijn 2002, 2003 and Kickert & 
Koppenjan 1997).   
2.3.2.1. Forging initial agreement 
According to Bryson (2006) forging an initial agreement is viewed as a foundation for a 
collaboration setting between the actors. This can be understood as the early stage of network 
formation. The forging of an initial agreement results from the formation process (Koppenjan 
2005), which is characterized by project features and the legal environment where the project 
operates. Thus, this process is dominated by the government/ public actors who have special 
authority and legislation resources to associate policies, mandate and assignments. To this 
extent, under the formal forms of the initial agreement, there might be an absence of a 
negotiation process, where public and private actors are subjected to specific policy objectives.  
As such, the initial agreement can be formal in forms of the broad purpose, mandate, 
commitment of resources, designation of formal leadership, description of members and 
decision-making structures. There are also informal forms of agreements between actors with 
regards to the composition, mission and process of collaboration.  
Advantages of formal forms of agreement are emphasized in order to ensure accountability of 
participants. Meanwhile, the content of initial agreements, which can influence the outcome 
policy formation and implementation, is viewed to be of importance as well. Forging initial 
agreement can be viewed as a rule setting process, originated from the policy environment and 
 
 
63 
 
subject to modification by negotiation between actors. Hence, the initial agreement can be 
influenced by power and competences of the actors in the network (Bryson et al. 2006 and Klijn 
2001). In addition, triggering the initial agreement can be modified as a result of the 
management strategy of the actors (Klijn & Koppenjan 2006). This can be improved in the forms 
of policy revision, additional policies, decisions, annexes or new assignments, to name but a few. 
Table 18: Implications for empirical observation of triggering initial agreement 
 Process 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Forging initial 
agreements 
 
The forging of an initial 
agreement results 
from the formal policy 
making process, 
project features and 
the legal environment. 
Observed policy framework 
(institutional arrangements, 
decision making mechanisms). 
Observed mutual negotiation 
and revised agreements and 
contracts during 
implementation. 
Initial agreements are dominated by 
the government / public actors. 
Initial agreement can be influenced 
by power and competences;  
Initial agreements are subject to 
modification under the actors’ 
strategy. 
2.3.2.2. Building leadership 
Concept 
There are many ways to define leadership, depending on the purpose to be served. According to 
Bass & Bass (2009), the concept of leadership is evolving and expanding. The analysis of 
leadership is often attached to organizational studies, emphasizing the individual capacity of a 
leader or a manager (Bass & Bass 2009, Stogdill 1950). A broad definition, as recommended by 
Bass & Bass (2009), has offered a democratic and liberal approach of organizational leadership, 
which is viewed as directing the attention of other members to goals and the path to achieve 
them. With this broad definition, any member of the group can exhibit some degree of 
leadership with a flexibility of membership.  
Agranoff & McGuire (2001), while presenting the nature of network management research, have 
emphasized the differences of managing/ leading capacities in network settings and in a single 
organization.  
In comparison to the studies on leadership within organizations, there are certain leadership 
scholars who focus on inter-organizational leaderships. Bryson & Crosby (2005) as well as certain 
Dutch network scholars have contributed to the understanding of leadership in network settings. 
Indeed, leadership can be reflected in the roles of managers in “managing a complex network” 
(Kickert et al. 1997); or as a “lead organization” in collaborative structures and processes 
(Huxham & Vangen 2000); or a collaborative leadership for the common good in a so-called 
“shared power-world” (Bryson & Crosby 2005); or even in a form of self- managing work teams 
under the waves of “leading workers to lead themselves” (Manz & Sims 1987 in Huxham & 
Vangen 2000). In these approaches, leadership is understood as a new form of leadership which 
aims at “inspiring and mobilizing others to undertake collective actions in the pursuit of the 
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common good” (Bryson & Crosby 2005). Alternatively, the convergence of various 
conceptualizations of leadership can lead to a basic understanding that leadership is a process, 
act or influence that in certain ways gets people to do something (Bass & Bass 2009: 24). 
Leadership is viewed as controversial and complex, comprising formal and informal leadership as 
well as individual and collective leadership. Notably, the mainstream leadership research is often 
viewed in the role of individual leaders or managers (Bass & Bass 2009, Neubert & Taggar 2004, 
Kickert et al. 1997 and Stogdill 1950). We are more interested in viewing collective leadership 
instead of analyzing a particular leader. This approach has been suggested by Huxham & Vangen 
(2000: 1161) by stating that “the collaboration context also opens up the possibility of 
considering organizations rather than individuals as leaders”. Here, leadership can be viewed in 
form of a “lead organization”. At the empirical level, Crosby & Bryson (2005: 183), in their study 
of leadership capabilities in the African - American Men Project, have found that leadership 
capacities are not exercised by one or only few individuals, rather they are exercised by many 
people and even groups or organizations over a long course of a policy change effort. 
Kickert & Koppenjan (1997:20) assumed that the results of network management are 
determined by the capacity of the actors to demonstrate leadership in interactions. They further 
claimed that leadership in a network relies on the performance/capabilities and the power of 
the representatives of actors/ organisation in the network.   
Formal and informal leadership  
There are two forms of leadership - formal and informal leadership. Formal leadership positions 
might include co-chairs of steering committees, coordinators or project directors. In a PPP, 
formal leadership is often appointed in the initial agreements which are in the forms of policy 
mandates, assignments or contracts between public and private actors (Kickert & Koppenjan 
1997: 20). However, since the representatives of actors are those who are also the leaders of 
their own organizations, their representative performance in the PPP can be constrained by the 
individual leadership roles in their own organizations (Huxham & Vangen 2005 and Stogdill 
1950). Consequently, public and private leaders, in a PPP will focus on their own organisational 
goals. In the language of networks, the collaboration settings cannot be based on the central 
authority (Arganoff and McGuide 2003).  
Informal leadership often emerges in a real collaboration context, where formal leadership has 
already been set up. According to Neubert and Taggar (2004: 177) and their research on the 
moderating role of gender in informal leadership, informal leadership status can be determined 
by performing important roles or making a valued contribution.   
Leadership and power 
According to Bass & Bass (2009) leadership is a type of power relationship. Several researchers 
have acknowledged the importance of power relations in understanding leadership. In view of 
Bass & Bass (2009), leadership is an effort to create and maintain power over others or it is 
considered to be a matter of imposing the will of the leader and inducing obedience. Recently, 
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leadership has come to be seen more as consulting and shared decision-making (Bass & Bass 
2009) or in the form of a group decision approach in a network (Agranoff & McGuire 2001). 
According to Crosby & Bryson (2005), collaborative leadership consists of the design and the use 
of formal (and informal) forums, arena and courts; the navigation of the main settings to foster 
policy change; the effective navigation of the policy change cycle and the exercise of leadership 
capabilities. 
In practice, the leadership role may remain ambiguous between organizations during the 
collaboration process. To overcome this, as well as to understand the core nature of leadership 
building, Bryson et al. (2006) distinguished between the champion and sponsor leadership, 
which were also referred to as network champion and network promoter by Voets (2008). 
Hence, the sponsor position basically endorses authority and access to legal resources to enable 
project implementation. The champion position focuses intently on keeping the collaboration 
going and enabling the goal attainment in the project (Voets 2008, Bryson et al. 2006).  
Since leadership is related to power, Bryson et al. (2006) referring to the two key leadership 
roles, point out that the actors who have considerable prestige, authority and access to 
resources can take leadership. Due to the dynamics of those factors at various stages of policy 
implementation or project development, leadership may be removed from one party and passed 
to another party. 
Table 19: Implications for empirical observation of leadership building 
 Process 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Leadership 
building  
 
Leadership can be 
formal and 
informal; individual 
and collective 
leadership; 
Leadership can be 
reflected in the role 
of a “lead 
organization”. 
 
Observed policy mandates; 
assignment, agreements 
and (functional) reports 
Observed performance of 
the lead organisations;  
Observed decision making 
mechanisms;  
Observed collaborative 
meetings; observed 
problem solving 
capability. 
Divergence of goals influence collaborative 
leadership building;  
Leadership and power are related; 
Informal leadership can be determined by 
performing an important role or making a 
valued contribution; 
 Sponsor position endorses authority and 
access to legal resources to enable the 
project implementation; 
 Champion position focuses on keeping the 
collaboration going and enabling the goal 
attainment in the project.  
2.3.2.3. Building legitimacy 
Suchman (1995: 574) has provided an inclusive and broad-based definition of legitimacy as 
follows: “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions”. From this definition, we can find the important role of social audience to accept 
or recognize the desire and appropriateness of a given collaboration. In the meantime, 
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legitimacy can be enriched by influencing perceptions of social audience, which can be 
generated and managed through branding activities (Klijn et al. 2012, Eshuis and Klijn 2012).  
Since the input legitimacy resources were discussed in 2.2.5, the study on the legitimacy building 
process should focus on how legitimacy is maintained by member-actors (Human & Provan 
2000). Hence, legitimacy refers to the status and credibility of the network (Bexell & Mörth 
2010).  
At operational level, the legitimacy building process is driven by various strategies of the actors 
in joint-actions. For instance, the government actors tend to increase consultation and 
participation (Van Damme & Brans 2012) as well as to promote representation in decision 
making (Bexell & Mörth 2010). As a result, the legitimacy building process is influenced by 
organizational membership of the actors in the network. In addition, Klijn & Eshuis (2012) point 
at the importance of branding activities of public and private sectors. Place branding involves 
influencing people's ideas by forging particular emotional and psychological associations with a 
place. The instrument to enhance branding can be in the forms of various events and festivals 
and the use of media and advertisement. According to Klijn et al. (2012), although the private 
actors take greater advantage in marketing activities, branding is increasingly employed at public 
sector levels. 
With regards to the factors that influence the legitimacy building process, Bruijn & Ringeling 
(1997: 153-5) claim that the special status of the public actor with unilateral instruments can 
undermine its legitimacy on the one hand, and that the ineffective public sector performance 
also undermines legitimacy in the way that the public sector suffers an increasing loss of 
credibility if it repeatedly fails to achieve its targets, on the other.  
In regards to the branding activities, the Dutch scholars claim that different actors may have 
different perceptions about the aims, strategies, and target groups of place marketing 
campaigns (Eshuis et al. 2013).  
Table 20: Implications for empirical observation of legitimacy building 
Process 
element 
Characteristics 
Empirical 
observations 
Assumptions 
Legitimacy 
building  
Legitimacy refers to the 
status and credibility of the 
network which can be 
generated and managed 
through the increase of 
consultation and 
participation and through 
branding activities; 
Legitimacy building means 
to ensure effective 
performance.  
Observed branding 
activities; 
Observed conflict 
resolutions; 
Observed quality 
performance 
management.  
 
PPP actors have own legitimacy building 
strategies in the network, aiming at 
increasing their own legitimacy in the 
network; 
Different actors may have different 
perceptions about the aims, strategies, and 
target groups of branding activities; 
Private actors take greater advantage from 
marketing activities; 
Status and capability of public actors 
influence legitimacy building. 
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2.3.2.4. Building trust 
Trust is understood as interpersonal behaviour, confidence in organizational competence and 
expected performance, a common bond and a sense of good will, but also as a perception of 
good intention of other actors. There is an important notion that trust is regarded as a “stable” 
perception of other actors in the collaboration network. Trust can be built, maintained and 
enhanced by sharing information and knowledge, demonstrating competency and good 
intentions. Trust only develops slowly but can disappear rapidly (Edwards and Phan 2013: 50, 
Chen & Graddy 2005 in Bryson et al. 2006: 48, and Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 83-7, 230-3). 
In view of collaboration building, Zhang & Huxham (2009) advised to employ the “trust building 
loop” in order to explore how a trust-based relationship is started in collaboration. Accordingly, 
the “trust building loop” encompasses the sequence of two factors. First, it is related to the 
understanding of the formation of expectations about the future of the collaboration, which will 
be based either on a reputation or past behaviour, or on more formal contracts and agreements. 
Second, it is related to the willingness to take risks when there is enough trust and that partners 
are prepared to take this risk in order to initiate the collaboration (Huxham & Vangen 2000: 
1171, Huxham 2003: 409; Zhang and Huxham 2009: 189). According to Huxham and Vangen 
(2005, 2003), the general features of collaborative contexts which have a sustaining impact on 
the trust building loop are in the form of constantly changing dynamics of collaboration and the 
power imbalances between actors as well as the need for nurturing and a continuous effort to 
sustain trust. 
Our empirical study on trust building in a collaboration process should include the degree of 
communication, mutual interactions, information and knowledge sharing as stated above. 
In view of practitioners’ comments on trust and trust related issues, Huxham and Vangen (2003) 
argue that mistrust can derive from the perceptions over the relationship between control and 
performance in collaboration. Meanwhile, our research is concerned with trust building with the 
group of stakeholders, who are subject to collaboration activities. Accordingly, trust building 
should include the degree of communication and information sharing, demonstrating 
competency and good intentions. To this extent, some elements of trust building and legitimacy 
building overlap.  
Table 21: Implications for empirical observation of trust building 
Process 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Trust 
building  
The “trust building loop” refers to the positive 
expectations about the future of the 
collaboration, as well the willingness to take 
risks to initiate the collaboration; 
Trust building refers to sharing information and 
knowledge, demonstrating competency and 
good intentions; 
In view of collaboration, trust building refers to 
mutual communication, information and risk 
sharing. 
Observed history 
(timelines) of 
collaboration; 
Perceptions stated by 
the stakeholders; 
Observed tensions, 
constraints and 
conflicts during 
collaboration. 
The factors that 
influence trust building 
are the power 
imbalances between 
actors as well as the 
lack of effort to sustain 
trust (lack of 
commitment), or 
mistrust derives from 
perceptions of the 
actors. 
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2.3.2.5. Managing conflict 
[Social] conflict refers to the “interactions of inter-dependent people who see their goals as 
incompatible, and who believe the “other” side is interfering with their efforts to satisfy their 
interests or values” (WCD 2000: v). 
In this section, we only discuss conflict in collaboration or, as elaborated by Kriesberg et al. 
(1989), we will focus on inter-organizational conflicts in the network.  
Conflict is common and frequent in collaboration, and results from differences in perceptions, 
goals, strategies and unequal power between public and private actors (Bryson et al. 2006, 
Koppenjan & Klijn 2004 and Kickert et al. 1997). This standpoint is supported by Hardy and 
Phillips (1998), who, in their study of collaboration and conflict in the UK refugee system, 
present evidence on critical conflicts of interests between stakeholders, in combination with 
unequal powers shared among them. They provided an example of a practical problem in which 
collaboration may be used as a means for powerful organisations to protect their own interests 
and disadvantage the less powerful ones. 
Some network scholars claimed that conflicts of interests should not be too great in 
collaboration because a joint action assumes convergence of interests (Kickert et al.  1997: 56). 
Meanwhile, Ostrom (1990) and Burton (1996 in Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 201) pointed out that 
conflicts over knowledge, solutions, directions and methods are crucial in a network. Indeed, 
interactions between distinctive actors - public and private can clash due to the logic of the 
market, the logic of the bureaucracy and the logic of the democracy employed by different 
actors (Bryson et al. 2006).  
In regards to conflict management, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 223) pointed out that conflict 
regulations can be arranged by actors prior to the conflict, which could be in the form of 
agreements, contracts or regulations, or even, informal in the nature of norms, code of conducts 
and customs/habits. Since conflicts occur among partnerships, rules can be developed or 
modified under the influence of conflicts. In addition, based on Scharpf’s point of view (1978), 
Kickert et al. (1997) claimed that since interests are defined by actors themselves, the solution 
should be directed towards influencing interest definitions, which can be viewed as “managing 
perceptions” in the network. Moreover, many partnership advocates claim that working and 
acting together itself is a “response” to a conflict as it results in reduced uncertainty, resources 
acquisition, and problem solving (Osborne 2000, Hardy & Phillips 1998 and Kickert et al. 1997).  
Nevertheless, we claim that conflicts of interest are rarely solved completely; instead, they imply 
the need for modification into win-win situations between public and private actors by the use 
of exchange of resources and compromises. Conflicts which are regarded as value, structural and 
relationship conflicts, which are potentially caused by institutional and cultural differences 
between the public and private actors (see 2.2.3 and 2.2.7) cannot always be solved through 
intensive cooperation and communication (Koppenjan 2005: 142). Deriving from the notion of 
institutional and ideological origins of perceptions, it can be assumed that the influencing 
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process during joint-actions may become “dialogues of the deaf” since actors are not always 
capable of or willing to adapt their perceptions (Kickert et al. 1997: 80). 
Table 22: Implications for empirical observation of managing conflict 
Process 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Managing 
conflict   
Managing conflict in collaboration means 
to resolve conflicts caused by different 
perceptions, goals, strategies and 
unequal power between public and 
private actors; 
(Value-based) conflicts over knowledge, 
solutions, directions and methods are 
more crucial than interest-based 
conflict. 
Conflict management refers to prior 
formal and informal rules, creation of 
new rules, communication and 
cooperation and perception 
management. 
Conflict provisions stated in 
agreements; Observed 
norms and code of 
conducts during 
collaborations; Observed 
decision making process;  
Observed perceptions over 
difficult problems and 
solutions;  
Observed specific problem 
solving cases. 
Distinctive perceptions 
over problems and 
solutions between 
public and private 
actors; 
Conflict in 
collaboration solved 
by adaption of 
perceptions, goals 
on the win-win basis 
(but not completely 
resolved). 
 
2.3.2.6. Planning 
According to Crosby & Bryson (2005), the planning process in collaboration is different from 
planning in a hierarchical order. In collaborative planning, due to the difficulty of imposing a 
rigidly structured sequence on the partners in collaboration, the planning process should be a 
shared arrangement. 
Collaborative planning can be viewed in the form of two different and sequential planning 
approaches: development of problem definitions and solutions, which follows a political 
decision-making as the first approach, and adaptation and implementation of a proposal, which 
follows a rational planning model as the second approach.  
Political decision making involves various members in information collection, identification of 
issues and goals setting - ultimately resulting in politically accepted policies and programs.  
Rational planning is used to recast those clearly defined goal policies and programs into 
“technically and administratively workable goals, policies, programs and actions”. In our 
research, the main focus is the second planning model since our observation of the PPP is at the 
policy implementation level. Meanwhile, decision making and planning in Vietnam is highly 
decentralized to the provincial level (UNDP Vietnam 2001 & WB 2010), we therefore will also 
examine political planning at the provincial level which may take place as a result of the 
collaborative interactions between the public and private actors. 
Mintzberg & Waters (1985) recommended two different dimensions of collaborative planning - 
deliberate and emergent approaches. Deliberate planning focuses on careful articulation of 
missions, goals, roles and responsibilities, phases or steps, including the implementation and 
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formal control measures. Three conditions to recognize deliberate planning were recommended 
by Mintzberg & Waters (1985). The precise intension of the organisations is to be accepted by 
the leaders and subjected to some sorts of control. In addition, deliberate planning should be 
realized specifically as planned as well as subjected to close supervision.  
Emergent planning often takes place during the course of “implementation” when a clear 
understanding of missions, goals, roles and action steps emerge as a result of changes of the 
dynamics in a broader network of stakeholders, in order words “translation into collective 
action” (Bryson et al. 2006: 48, Mintzberg & Waters 1985: 260). In particular, the emergent 
approach was employed to respond to an evolving reality. Mintzberg & Waters (1985) 
emphasized an absence of intension in the emergent approach, given that an action cannot be 
emergent if it is explicitly planned.  Mintzberg & Waters (1985) and followed by Bryson et al. 
(2006) concluded that: “deliberate” or formal planning takes place more often when 
collaboration is mandated, while “emergent” planning takes place more often when 
collaboration is not mandated. 
Empirical studies show that joint decision making and planning is often constrained in the 
project because public actors try to force the partnership to follow traditional procedures. For 
example, Teisman & Klijn (2002: 198) revealed in their study of the Rotterdam harbour that 
there was limited joint decision-making and continuity in cooperation because a change from 
unilateral to joint decision-making could not take place immediately in the partnership.  
As planning has not been well developed in network management research (Agranoff & McGuire 
2001), there is limited guidance on how collaborative planning can be examined at the empirical 
level. Some suggestions can be found by examining a number of documents and master plans 
which are subject to control during implementation. In the meantime emergent planning can be 
observed through collaborative meetings for problem solving, correspondences and agreements 
during project implementation (Teisman & Klijn 2002). 
Table 23: Implications for empirical observation of planning 
Process 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Planning   There are different levels 
of planning: Political 
decision making and  
rational planning;  
There are two dimensions 
of collaborative 
planning: deliberate 
and emergent 
strategies. 
Observed methodology of master 
planning; 
Study of agreements/ plans 
signed by both parties; 
Observed planning procedures 
during collaborative meetings; 
Observed decision making 
mechanisms, revised policies 
and renewed policy - making 
mechanisms. 
Deliberate planning takes place more 
often when collaboration is 
mandated (SN1), while emergent 
planning takes place more often 
when collaboration is not 
mandated (SN2); 
Collaborative planning is constrained 
by hierarchal order; 
Emergent planning takes place more 
often at the implementation level. 
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2.4. Public Private Partnership output elements 
Network evaluation can be threefold, as it encompasses input evaluation, process evaluation 
and outcome evaluation (Murray in Osborne 2000). In this section, we break up the outcome 
evaluation into output and outcome evaluation of a PPP network, following conventions in the 
literature. In our eventual analysis, following our logic scheme, we will discuss both these output 
and outcome under the single heading output, and refer to them as results.  
Conventionally, outputs refer to the quantity and quality of a produced service. Outcomes then 
not only encompass the formal effectiveness of a service, but also its impact embracing both 
positive and negative side effects (Boyne 2002:18). Further, while outputs are often viewed to 
be the most straightforward and least controversial elements of performance (Boyne 2002:17), 
outcomes are more difficult to assess. In addition, Provan & Milwards (2001: 415) claim that 
assessing the effectiveness of a network is more complex than evaluating a single organization.   
Developing a framework of identification of PPP output and outcome 
Convergence of the performance and network literature suggests a multi-dimensional and multi-
level approach towards understanding the output and outcome of a PPP network (see Figure 2).  
Mandell & Keast (2007: 576) critically emphasizing the collaborative nature of a network, 
proposed a need to build a two step-evaluation process for collaborative networks that 
separates the relationship building aspect from the attainment of tangible, conventional 
outcomes. This means that while traditional evaluation measures focus on goal attainment or 
tasks/activities accomplishment, specific attributes of collaborative building efforts (such as 
democratic quality) and other added values (such as foundation for new types of relationship 
among a network or a new network) should also take place in the framework of a collaborative 
network evaluation. Voets (2008) enriched Mandell & Keast’s standpoint by announcing that the 
results of a policy network need not only be recognized based on production performance with 
clear attainment goals, which scales with effectiveness and efficiency, but also on the process 
and regime performance. This means that PPP can produce impacts/results during the “process 
performance” in terms of a democratic quality of a network, or in the form of “regime 
performance” where the capacity and resources of participants can be consolidated and 
enriched.  
The above standpoint appears suitable for our PPP observation in the Throughput section (2.3), 
which distinguishes two aspects in PPP processes: the PPP substance including specific goal-
oriented activities on the one hand and the collaboration (relationship) building on the other.  As 
a result, there are two aspects that we will examine. In the first aspect, we will evaluate the goal 
attainment or tasks accomplishment, viewed as production results, while the second aspect is in 
regards to the specific attributes of the collaborative building processes, which can be viewed as 
a form of process results. 
In addition, Mandell & Keast (2007) and Voets (2008) proposed that the robustness of the 
network should be considered as another dimension for the evaluation, which Voets termed 
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“regime evaluation”. Giving that the PPP in involuntary resettlement projects is still in infancy as 
we mentioned in our introductory chapter, it is necessary to examine whether this new form of 
governance can survive and become a governmental instrument in policy implementation. 
In regards to the level of analyses of PPP output and outcome, some suggestions have been 
derived from the evaluation of public sector performance.  
Kickert & Koppenjan (2004) emphasized that the evaluation of public management should 
include not only the functions of the government but also the relations between the government 
and its citizens. Voets (2008) further suggested using parts of the framework for evaluation of 
public organisational networks developed by Provan & Milward (2001) to evaluate policy 
networks. Since key stakeholders and their interests are very diverse (Provan & Milward 2001) 
and multi-level (Jacobs in Osborne 2000: 224), the question of “effectiveness for whom” (Voets 
2008: 777) needs to be specifically clarified, particularly in the PPP network where the involved 
public actors are one of the key players.  
Accordingly, network performance can be assessed at three levels: the level of the participant/ 
organization; the level of the network and the level of the community. It is necessary to 
emphasize that although stakeholder groups are conceptually unique, in practice they overlap in 
such a way that the outputs that satisfy one group can, at least partially, satisfy another group. 
However, at the same time, network effectiveness at one level does not ensure effectiveness at 
the other two levels (Provan & Milward 2001: 421). This assumption might be of relevance in the 
compulsory land conversion domain. Land acquisition can become an output of the PPP process, 
while, at the same time it can also negatively impact the project-affected people (PAPs) who are 
forced to displace. Typically, the PPP process in land conversion comprises implementation of 
compensation, support and resettlement policies, the outcomes of which can mitigate negative 
impacts of displacement (see 1.3). 
Figure 2: PPP result analytical scheme based on the analytical sequence of PPP process 
 
In our research, we will particularly focus our observation on the benefits offered to the 
community, provided that the outputs of the PPP run beyond the benefits of the participants as 
emphasized by McQuaid and Jacobs (2000) in their discussion of the concept of PPP (in Osborne 
Throughput Outputs 
Collaboration 
building 
Production results PPP activities 
Process results 
Organization 
Robustness and resilience (evaluate only at 
the network level) 
Network Organizational 
Goals / PPP 
goals 
Input 
Community 
 
 
73 
 
2000: 11 & 224). This approach can thus contribute to answer our secondary research question 
regarding a possible contribution of PPP in conflict resolutions. 
Beside, Bryson et al. (2006: 50-51) suggested to evaluate collaborative results. This includes 
public value, which is viewed as “mutual gain” that meets expectations of the actors when 
joining a collaboration network, and is the value which cannot be created in the absence of the 
collaboration. Collaborative results further include second and third order effects, next to first 
order effects. When studying results for conflict resolution, we should indeed look at not only 
the “speaking or statistical figures”, that is first order effects, but also at the second order 
effects, such as the generation of social capital and trust, and at third order positive effects, such 
as for instance the suggestion of other innovative approaches for conflict resolution. Similarly, 
the failure of a PPP process may be related to a low production performance, but its positive 
impacts may come in the form of the experiences of new partnerships, coordination and joint 
actions, which may take effect at later stages. 
Eventually, in our research, it is the ambition to uncover the relationship between the input, 
throughput and output, which we assume to be closely related (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: The influence of input and process factors to output of PPP 
 
(Based on Huxham & Vangen in Osborne 2000) 
Analysing the factors that influence the outputs of PPP, Huxham & Vangen (2000) pointed out to 
a number of institutional and process elements that have to be liaised by those aiming for 
positive results. They found that problems with the negotiation process for collaborative aims to 
be the result of the divergence of organisational purposes - these problems result in a lack of 
consensus in negotiation and planning, vagueness in the initial agreement as well as a lower 
commitment effort towards collective actions and they also potentially cause a danger of 
irreconcilable differences between actors. In addition, the clash of different languages and 
cultures, which are often viewed as organizational procedures, norms and values, are likely to 
hinder the progress of decision making through a lack of mutual understanding and frustration. 
Moreover, the problem of power relationship, such as power imbalance and disempowerment 
can hamper cooperation or trust building (Huxham & Vangen in Osborne 2000: 293-308). Similar 
findings are elaborated by Dutch scholars (Klijn & Teisman 2003 and Teisman & Klijn 2002). 
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Finally, there is an increasing concern regarding the reliability of network performance 
evaluation. Various scholars raised critical questions such as “who performs evaluation” (Voets 
2008, Mandel & Keast 2007, Murray in Osborne 2000) and what methodology is used to ensure 
credibility of the evaluation results. We, to some extent, have answered these questions in our 
methodology chapter. The participatory evaluation approach allows us to employ different 
sources which are not only based on our own observation and interviews, but also based on the 
monitoring documents or the internal audit reports where the actor evaluate themselves, which 
is allowed by participant observation methods; and the external audit reports - where the 
evaluation is carried out by the third party (Mandel & Keast 2007: 588-9).  
2.4.1. Production results 
In our research, production results refer to the effectiveness of the PPP, being interpreted as 
“the achievement of formal objectives of services” in both quantity and quality (Boyne 2002:19). 
The evaluation of production results therefore examines the task oriented relationship between 
input and output in terms of getting things done (Gestel et al. 2012:158). As discussed, 
production results should be viewed at organisation level, network level and community level.  
Production results at network level  
At network level, the degree of task accomplishment and the level of satisfaction of stakeholders 
can be used as salient indicators in the measure of production performance of the network.  
First, according to Scharpf (1978), supported by Osborne (2000) goals attainment is the criterion 
used to determine the success or failure of interactions within networks. In contrast, Dutch 
scholars claim that goal attainment is not an appropriate criterion for evaluating networks. 
However, they supported the idea that goal attainment and problem solving can be an 
appropriate measure on operational level, where clearly formulated goals and problems are 
addressed. In particular, some other scholars in Osborne (2000) emphasized that the focus of 
network evaluation ought to be on the range of actual services provided by the network.  
Second, to evaluate the results of the network, Dutch scholars (Kickert et al. 1997, Gestel et al. 
2012) recommended the “ex post satisfying” criterion referring to the level of satisfaction of the 
participants in the network. Besides, while some scholars suggest that the production results can 
be a number of participants involved in a network (Boyne 2002, Provan & Milward 2001), some 
other claimed that public value should be viewed as an important element of the production 
results at network level (Bryson et al. 2006). 
As discussed in section 2.2.2 (PPP goals), interactions within the network are “strategic” - goals 
are not given but sought, in which case goals or aspirations are put forward in this 
communication process, during which objectives are mutually adapted (Kickert et al. 1997). 
Accordingly, based on the attainment of the shared (mutual) goals, the various goals of each 
network participant will be achieved (Provan & Milwards 2001). 
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Thus at implementation level, some evaluators in Murray (2000) advised that the project results, 
viewed as the production results at network level should be evaluated at the first step because 
only projects (or programmes) have sufficiently specific and measureable objectives. A next step 
of evaluation is to interpret how the project results meant to contribute to the overall missions 
of an organisation (or network, or communities). 
Production results at organization level 
According to Provan & Milwards (2001: 420-2), although network and community level 
outcomes are valid ways of evaluating a network, networks can contribute significantly to 
organization-level outcomes. Indeed, network members have their own goals and incentives to 
join a network (2.2.2 and 2.2.7), which is related to “the survival of their own agency”.  
In particular, the rationale for the public actor in networks is mostly referred at community level. 
It means that public organizations are most effective when they enhance the capacity of 
organizations to solve problems and to serve clients (Kickert & Koppenjan 1997: 3). In addition, 
the quality of the task accomplishments in public sector encompass the fair distribution of 
outputs in the given policy issues instead of efficiency in terms of “cost per unit of output” 
(Boyne 2002). 
For private, for-profit actors, goals attainment can be examined by using the cost-effective 
management analysis of the organization - their efficiency and their share (or can be viewed as 
public value) of those network outputs and outcomes that are viewed as typically important for 
the private actor (Bryson et al. 2006). In regards to the efficiency of the network, the problem of 
high costs for the participants while joining a network as revealed by Voets (2008) and McQuaid 
(2000: 20) is worth to be examined at empirical level, especially from the private actor’s 
perspective.  
According to Provan & Milwards (2001: 420-2), the network and organisational results are inter-
related in the sense that the network results can contribute significantly to organizational 
results, and, conversely, the success of network members is critical to overall network 
effectiveness.  
Production results at community level  
Provan & Milwards (2001: 416), as community-based network advocates, point out to the 
importance of a necessary contribution to communities even though they (communities) are not 
(formal) members of the network. They argue that “at the broadest level of analysis, community-
based networks which involve public organisations must be judged by the contribution they 
make to the communities they are trying to serve” (Ibid. 417). They also suggest that network 
effectiveness can be best evaluated by first assessing the aggregate results of the population of 
clients being served by the network, and second, by examining the overall expenses used to 
serve that client group within a given community. Since the process of PPP in our research 
comprises relocation and rehabilitation activities for the affected people in the community, we 
need to examine whether output can be viewed as first-order effects in this sense. 
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Table 24: Implications for empirical observation of production results 
Output element Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Production 
results 
At network level 
Production results of network refer the 
degree of task accomplishments of the 
actual services provides by the network; 
Production results of network refer the public 
value (the outcome that cannot be created 
in the absence of the PPP). 
The observed results of 
the actual service 
(activities) provided by 
the network;  
Understanding of the level 
of satisfaction of the 
participants, as an 
indicator. 
Public value defines 
the degree of success 
of a network. 
 
At organization level 
Network members have their own goals and 
incentives to join a network; 
The goals of the public actors are often 
ambiguous; 
The goals of the public actor lay at community 
level. 
Public actors: observed 
results of problem 
solving and serving 
clients (production and 
distribution of goods and 
service);  
Private actor: observed 
results in terms of 
effectiveness and 
efficiency (Cost - 
effective management 
analysis). 
Network and 
organisational 
outcomes are inter-
related; 
High costs in joining 
network; 
The impacts of input 
and process factors 
(Figure 3). 
 At community level 
Outcomes of PPP run beyond the benefits of 
the participants; 
The outcomes that satisfy one group can, at 
least partially, satisfy another group. 
Observed results of the 
clients being served by 
the network 
Observed overall 
expenses used to serve 
the client group. 
Public and private 
actors generate their 
organisational goals 
through satisfaction 
of community goals. 
2.4.2. Process results / democratic results of the PPP 
A framework for assessing democratic results of PPP can be built upon/ from the network 
process performance literature. Process performance concerns the actual cooperation in the 
partnership and the way in which “the product” of the policy network (…) is realized (Van Gestel 
et al. 2012: 158). As networks are always multi-actor settings envisaged to achieve public goals, 
process performance will be specifically viewed in close relation to the collaboration building 
process (2.3.2). 
In this research, results of the collaboration process are explored by considering three values of 
democratic quality: legitimacy, accountability and accordance as proposed by Skelcher & Sullivan 
(2008). As claimed by Boyne (2002), democratic results should be viewed as one of the necessary 
dimensions of a holistic framework for evaluation of public service, next to the quantity and 
quality of the outputs, the efficiency, and responsiveness. 
2.4.2.1. Legitimacy 
The evaluation of the legitimacy of PPP, particularly in the sustainable development domain is 
necessary to rest on two dimensions: input or democratic legitimacy and output legitimacy 
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(Bexell & Mörth 2010: 12). As stated in 2.2.5 and 2.3.2.3, input legitimacy is viewed as an 
important resource of the actors in a network. This section focuses on output legitimacy as an 
important element of democratic value. We rely on the holistic insights on the relationship 
between democracy and PPP, elaborated by Bexell & Mörthin their publication entitled 
“Democracy and PPPs in Global Governance” (2010).  
According to Bexell & Mörth (2010: 15), in a partnership, output legitimacy can be understood as 
“government for people” in the sense that a partnership would gain legitimacy through problem 
solving and capacity building by achieving the goals or (the effectiveness) that citizens 
collectively considered most important. As a result, output legitimacy is also viewed as 
performance - based legitimacy by obtaining goal achievements or increasing problem -
solving capacity.  
Deriving from a notion that the distinction between input legitimacy as being “government by 
the people” and outputs being “government for the people”, is sometimes impossible to make 
(Bexell & Mörth 2010), we argue that output legitimacy can be generated by improvements of 
input legitimacy. Hence, the input legitimacy sources being democratic procedures, legal 
standing, expertise and moral authority, public and media acknowledgement (being viewed as 
social audience) can be enriched as a result of PPP in order to increase the capacity of the 
stakeholders to participate and be represented in a network. Indeed, Human and Provan (2000: 
328) proposed a holistic approach to examine the legitimacy process which should focus on both 
issues: (i) how legitimacy is established and how legitimacy is maintained (see 2.3.2.3) and; (ii) 
how output legitimacy must be produced through this process. For example, the legitimacy of a 
network can be viewed starting from its formation, early growth, the emergence of legitimacy 
deficiencies, and finally sustainment or demise. As a result, we develop sequences of the 
legitimacy status development process in a network based on the convergence of the above 
standpoints (see Figure 4: The relationship between input - throughput - output legitimacy). 
The legitimacy assessment indicators, suggested by Bryson (2006) and Human & Provan (2000) 
can be in the form of (improved) administrative procedures or (improved) legal assignments; or 
in the form of greater commitment of network members towards joint actions or better public 
acknowledgements in regards to network identity, degree of trust and communication among 
network members. In other words, as illustrated in Figure 4 by re-visiting the same indicators of 
input legitimacy, we can examine how the input legitimacy has been improved as a result of the 
collaboration building process. 
At organisation level, output legitimacy can be measured by the level of actors’ involvement, i.e. 
the increased (or decreased) level of representation in the decision-making procedures (Voets et 
al. 2008). Legitimacy assessment at this level is performed on a subjective perspective implying 
that (policy) legitimacy is linked to subjective evaluation by different individuals or organisations 
(Van Damme & Brans 2011). 
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At network level, Human and Provan’s (2000) suggest to examine the legitimacy of a given 
network in three dimensions which critically refers to the status and credibility of a network (we 
will come back to these dimensions in 2.4.3 - Regime):  
- The given network is recognized as an entity by both insiders and outsiders. First, 
network members find themselves as part of the network and are committed to 
network-level goals. Second, the network can be established by administrative 
procedures or legal assignments or other informal public acknowledgements; 
- The given network can attract cognitive support, commitments and resources from 
internal and external groups so that it can be sustained in a viable inter-organizational 
form; 
- The interactions in the given network encourage trust building and free communication 
among members18. 
At community level, Provan & Milward (2001-417) view legitimacy in the form of the advantage 
of the network that “allows for the provision of a broad range of services that collectively 
address the full needs of clients”. In support of this argument, Schaferhoff (2009: 465 in Dinh & 
Eynde 2013) suggests that the increased level of participation of those who are affected by 
decisions in the decision making process in the network, adds advantages of legitimacy. This 
point is added by McQuaid (2000: 21) who emphasized that direct participation of the local 
community provides a greater real impact than the representative democracy of central and 
local government during policy implementation.  
Figure 4: The relationship between input - throughput - output legitimacy 
 
(Based on Vandamme & Brans: 2012, Klijn et al. 2012, Human & Provan 2000, and Bexell & 
Mörth: 2010) 
With regards to the factors that influence output legitimacy in a network, the ineffective public 
sector performance also undermines legitimacy in the way that the public sector suffers an 
increasing loss of credibility if it repeatedly fails to achieve its targets (Bruijn & Ringeling in 
                                                          
18
 Bryson et al. 2006: 47; Human & Provan 2000: 328-9. 
Throughput legitimacy  Output legitimacy 
To exercise participation and 
representation in joint- decision 
making/ planning/ negotiation/ 
consultation/ and conflict 
management; 
 Branding activities (use of media and 
information disclosure to influence 
perception); 
Improve credibility by improving 
quality of performance. 
 
Capacity to participate and represent 
(legal form of authorization); scope 
and quality of participation and 
representation; 
Public and media perception/ 
acknowledgement (as informal 
legitimacy…). 
 
Performance-based legitimacy: goal 
attainments/ meeting the critical needs/ 
increase problem solving capacity   to 
increase input legitimacy: higher degree 
of involvement; more (formal) 
representation; increase of credibility by 
more internal and external support; 
More public and media acknowledgement 
(as informal legitimacy…). 
How legitimacy is maintained? How much legitimacy is enriched/                      
or changed? 
How legitimacy is established? 
Input legitimacy  
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Kickert et al. 1997: 154-5) (see more 2.3.2.3). In addition, the input factors, such as the 
representativeness in a partnership, can also influence output legitimacy in a sense that a limited 
representation of the stakeholders can lead to limited output legitimacy (Jonsson in Bexell and 
Mörth 2010: 167-190). 
Table 25: Implications for empirical observation of output legitimacy 
Output 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Output 
legitimacy  
 
Output legitimacy is 
viewed as 
performance -based 
legitimacy  by 
obtaining goal 
achievements or 
increasing problem-
solving capacity; 
Output legitimacy can 
be generated by the 
improvement of the 
input legitimacy. 
 
At organization level:  
Understanding the degree of involvement in 
joint-decision making;  
Understanding the degree of public and media 
acknowledgement. 
Ineffective public actor 
performance 
undermines 
legitimacy. 
At network level
19
: Understanding the network 
credibility: acknowledgement by insiders and 
outsiders (single entity; trust and 
communication; attracting internal and external 
support etc.)  
See Regime assessment/ 
quality of relationship - 
2.4.3. 
At community level:  
Observed task accomplishments (production 
results) or the advantages of the network  in 
response  to the needs of communities;  
Understanding problem solving capacity: 
increase of input legitimacy sources (more 
formal rights, more representation and 
participation than in the legal framework). 
Output legitimacy refers 
to the improvement of 
input legitimacy;  
High cost to sustain 
involvement of 
network members. 
2.4.2.2. Accountability 
One of the most important democratic values is accountability. Bovens (2005: 185) defined 
accountability based on the aggregation of different thoughts as follows: accountability is “a 
relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain or to justify his or her conduct to 
some significant other”. The forms of such obligations can be formal or informal. We found that 
the network literature is interested in the critical question: “accountable to whom?” which is 
particularly suited to our multi-level dimensional study in the output analytical framework. 
Hence, it is important to distinguish accountability in two aspects, namely giving accounts and 
being held accountable (Voets et al.  2008: 780).  
First, to give account means that the policy network needs to give account to its members as 
well to the network. Bovens (2005) and Keohane (2006) (in Dinh & Eynde 2013), referring to 
organizational accountability or internal accountability infer “giving account” as a means by 
which the members are responsible to their network and their parent organizations. This type of 
accountability can be examined at the organisation and network levels. To this extent, we have 
to examine whether the institutional settings or mechanisms are available to manage 
accountability in the network, such as sanctions, rewards, agreements and membership 
                                                          
19
 Overlap to regime - to some extent. 
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commitments (in form of openness and responsiveness), to name but a few. The review of the 
recent studies (Hung Vo 2009, VDR 2010, Edwards & Phan 2013) on the public administrative 
system in VN points out at certain limitations in public performance due to a lack of the effective 
accountability mechanism of the public actors. In contrast, a more formal management structure 
of the private actors, primarily foreign enterprises, encourages internal accountability by 
sanctions and rewards (Edwards & Phan 2013). 
Second, Keohane (2006:79 in Dinh & Eynde 2013) referring to “external accountability”, 
emphasized that organizations are to be held accountable not to those who delegated power to 
them, but to those affected by their actions. This type of accountability can be examined at the 
community level. To some extent, we can understand the link between internal accountability of 
public administration organizations and external accountability to the communities groups in a 
sense that if public officials do not give account to their clients - the community groups, then 
they are viewed as unaccountable to their organisational goals, and vice versa. 
Bexell and Mörth (2010: 15) suggest important criteria to evaluate accountability, such as the 
level of transparency, access to information as well as the availability of sanctions of some form. 
At community level, Steets (2005: 12 in Dinh & Eynde2013) emphasizing the importance of 
access to information, argues that decision makers can only be held accountable if accurate 
information on the governance processes is available to the public. In addition, public immediate 
supervision and control should be institutionalized as an oversight body system, being elected 
and supervised by people (VDR 2010). Particularly, the evaluation criterion of accountability is 
defined on the basis of the specific context of Vietnam where the most critical issues of being 
held accountable emerge in the form of anticorruption, hierarchical accountability 
(bureaucracy), access to information and the capacity of participation (VDR 2012, 2011 & 2010). 
Table 26: Implications for empirical observation of accountability 
Output 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Accountability  Accountability mechanisms of 
the organisations and 
network, viewed as internal 
accountability are 
institutional settings, which 
define the degree of 
transparency, sanctions/ 
rewards as well as 
membership commitment. 
At organisation level and  
network level 
Understanding the degree of 
membership commitments 
(openness and 
responsiveness); 
Observed sanctions/ rewards 
system/ mechanism of the 
organisation or network. 
Formal forms of rules, tasks, 
sanctions and rewards influence 
the accountability of actors; 
Lack of the accountability 
mechanism of the public actor;  
Formal management structure of 
the private actors, primarily 
foreign enterprises, encourages 
internal accountability. 
 At community level, 
accountability mechanism, 
viewed as external 
accountability for public 
immediate supervision and 
control is institutionalized in 
form of civil society and 
elected bodies. 
At community level  
Understanding the degree of 
transparency, anti 
corruption;  
Observed access to 
information;  
  Observed Performance of 
the oversight bodies (civil 
society, elected 
organizations). 
Internal accountability sanctions 
mechanism influences the 
results of external 
accountability; 
The limited roles of oversight 
bodies affect external 
accountability. 
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2.4.2.3. Accordance 
Voets et al. (2008) proposed the definition of accordance as “about asking and expressing 
consent for a decision or action by the policy network”. He further points out that accordance 
covers at least three criteria: issues offered for consent, mechanisms to give consent and the 
status of consent. To an extent, consent is engaged to a formal accountability mechanism which 
can be defined by policy and procedures as well as through other institutionalized organizations 
(Skelcher 2005). Therefore, this dimension overlaps with some aspects of the previously 
mentioned democratic values, such as legitimacy and accountability (2.4.2.1 and 2.4.2.2). At the 
network level, the process of giving consent takes place during the joint-planning and decision-
making mechanism processes (2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.6). Furthermore, in our study, it is not necessary 
to evaluate accordance at the organization level since it is clearly hierarchical within an (public or 
private) organization. 
As a result, apart from the network level, this section focuses more on the accordance issues at 
community level, exploring the mechanisms of giving consent, the quality (issues) of consent and 
the status of consent in the compulsory land conversion domain.  
The review of the literature on involuntary resettlement in combination with the study of the 
context of Vietnam (1.5) shows a need to understand the status of consent and the veto power 
in giving consent, which can be useful to understand the main drivers of the conflicts and 
resistance situation in compulsory land conversion projects. Accordingly, this point comes close 
to addressing our second research question on conflict resolution and the approaches as to how 
the conflicts could be settled in our studied case. Indeed, the dimension of compulsory land 
conversion in Vietnam, was discussed in the introduction, with a provision that the compulsory 
nature gave little space for giving consent, which resulted in alternative ways to achieve 
consensus, being resistance, violence and demonstrations. Some other ways of achieving 
agreements can be found from literature in the forms of critical debates, public hearings, and 
lobbying (Skelcher 2005: 93). 
Regarding the issues offered for consent, it is necessary to examine “What is up for discussion?” 
and how much the addressed issues tackle the most critical concerns of the stakeholders 
(Skelcher 2005 & Voets 2008). 
In order to get more insights on the mechanism of giving consent, it is necessary to explore the 
channels of giving consent found in practice, and or how much are the presented mechanisms 
applicable. Who can participate? Do they have equal opportunity to access? Particularly, the 
review of compulsory land conversion in Vietnam shows that giving consent takes place in 
informal forms of resistance mechanisms. Complaints to higher levels20, demonstrations and 
                                                          
20
 It is considered to be informal as in not in line with the administrative procedures that the complainers should send 
their complaint letters to the immediate levels (communal/ district) prior submitting to higher levels (WB 2010 & 
2011). 
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even violence were found to be frequent modes of giving consent (Table 2: Resisting cases in 
compulsory land conversion in Vietnam in 1.5). 
Table 27: Implications for empirical observation of accordance 
Output 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Accordance Accordance covers 
three criteria: 
issues offered for 
consent, 
mechanisms to give 
consent and the 
status of consent. 
 Giving consent can 
be critical debates, 
public hearings, 
lobbying and public 
demonstration. 
At network level 
Observed issues for discussion between public 
and private actors; 
Observed joint-decision making mechanisms. 
The impact of consent 
may cause constraints 
and blockage in joint-
decision making. 
At community level
21
   
Observed issues being  discussed or disclosed to 
the communities; 
Observed cases of (not) consent; 
Observed mechanisms of giving consent: The 
ways to access information; The way to archive 
agreements?  
Understanding the degree of participation in 
decision making: Who can participate? Do they 
have equal opportunity to access? 
Giving consent can take 
place in form of 
resistance in IR The 
various informal 
mechanisms of giving 
consent can be 
employed if formal 
giving consent 
mechanism is no 
longer adequate. 
2.4.3. Regimes results 
Regime performance is understood as the way policy networks become more robust and 
resilient and how they become part of the government (Voets et al. 2008). The assessment of 
the PPP regime performance is viewed as important in this research. Giving that the PPP in the 
involuntary resettlement projects is still in infancy (as we mentioned in the introduction 
chapter), it is necessary to examine whether this new form of governance can become robust 
and resilient to survive and become a foundation for new types of relationships in this network 
or a new type of network.  
Voets et al. 2008 pointed out three criteria to access the robustness and resilience of a network, 
namely membership, network institutionalization, and the quality of a relationship.  
2.4.3.1. Membership 
Membership (Boyne 2002, Provan & Milward 2001) refers to a number of members in a 
network, their commitment, behaviour and contribution to the network. In general, regime 
performance would improve with membership because the network can involve more resources 
owing to the increased number of its members. However, the PPP regime is found to be 
incoherent (or even conflicting) with regards to production results in spite of the increased 
participation and membership in the network. Mandell & Keast (2007: 580) report a low degree 
of effectiveness and efficiency in self-governance modes in spite of a high degree of involvement 
                                                          
21
 This observation overlaps with the observation of legitimacy and accountability as shown in table 25 & 26. 
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of its members; or in some cases “an actor might even... (…) hamper a policy network to function 
properly” (Voets et al. 2008: 782). Having the same concerns, Provan & Milward (2001: 418) 
emphasize the role of core members in ensuring the efficiency of the network and advise that 
political advantages of large networks need to be recognized. This becomes even more critical 
for PPPs in economic development, where the members of a network due their own internal 
dynamics, appear to constantly restructure and revise their memberships (Jacobs in Osborne 
2000: 221). Particularly, in Voets opinion (2006), network provide opportunities for capacity 
building, in which resilience and robustness are aggregated through the improvement and 
consolidation of capacity and resources of the participant members. Thus, members are 
“trained” during collaborative interactions through an expanded skill base and exposure to new 
processes and concepts.  
2.4.3.2. Institutionalization 
Network institutionalization or network structure ensures the persistence and endurance of the 
network. The level of institutionalization of a network determines its position in the government, 
or whether it is able to survive as a viable form of social organization or in other words, as a 
replica model of collaboration (Provan & Milward 2001). The level of institutionalization can be 
evaluated through the analysis of policies, administration procedures, agreements and 
regulations and investments by the government. Various scholars view institutional position, 
network structure and network administration as important aspects of regime performance, 
which can increase government’s robustness, attract more actors and resources and, ultimately, 
increase production performance (Voets et al. 2008, Provan & Milward, Klijn & Teisman 1997).  
In addition, it is not uncommon that even without a proper administrative arrangement or 
formal institutionalization, the network can still be a good example and the model can be 
replicated in various policy implementations. McQuaid (2000:21) points out that a network can 
survive as informal if it succeeds in building local confidence, minimizes the risk for partners and 
enables local capacity building. 
2.4.3.3. Quality of relationship 
The third criterion of regime performance lies with the assessment of the quality of the 
relationship between actors (Voets et al. 2008). This is done by measuring the degree of linkages 
among its members including the commitment to collective actions (Mandell & Keast 2007: 583), 
or the strength of the relationships between and among network members, including the 
number/ density and a multiplicity of relations (Provan & Milwards 2001, Voets 2008). The 
quality of a relationship can also be measured through the level of responsiveness, mutual 
understanding, greater confidence and trust between actors (McQuaid 2000: 20). Clearly, the 
quality of a relationship has been to some extent, sufficiently reflected in the collaboration 
building process (trust building) (2.3.2.4). In this regard, according to Van Garsse & Verhoest 
(2007), followed on by Van Gestel et al. (2010), different types of trust can be active in PPPs as 
the result of trust building. The first type of trust is competence - based trust. This type of trust 
means that partners need to have positive expectations of the other partner’s capabilities to 
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deliver what is stated in the contract (Van Gestel et at 2010: 17) or to perform its role in the 
alliance (Muthusamy & White 2005 in Van Garsse & Verhoest 2007). The second type of trust 
can be character-based trust, which can be called goodwill trust. This is about one’s good faith, 
good intentions, and integrity (Das and Teng 2001 in Van Garsse & Verhoest 2007: 13). 
In summary, the evaluation of PPP should be built upon the evaluation of the PPP production 
and democratic results, deriving from the fact that the robustness and resilience of PPP should 
be based on the (positive) PPP outcomes.  
Table 28: Implications for empirical observation of regime 
Output 
element 
Characteristics Empirical observations Assumptions 
Regime  Regime performance depends 
on   expanding formal and 
informal membership, 
network institutionalization, 
and quality of relationship; 
Capacity building adds to the 
resilience and robustness of 
the network are aggregated; 
Institutionalization refers 
capability to attract more 
actors and resources (more 
investment); or capacity to 
produce replica models; 
Quality of relations refers the 
results of trust building in 
collaboration. 
 
 Understanding the degree of 
commitments of the 
members of PPP; 
 Observed production of new 
capabilities and resources 
or consolidation of the 
existing capacity and 
resources of the participant 
members; 
Observed new or revised 
rules, additional policies and 
mechanisms); 
Understanding the 
commitment to joint 
actions, the level of 
responsiveness, mutual 
understanding and 
confidence between 
participant actors. 
Vulnerability of membership, capacity 
of the core participants and political 
advantages are the influencing 
factors of a PPP regime; 
Public actors become more dependent 
on the private actors; 
Informal forms of (PPP) take place 
without formal institutionalization; 
the network can still be robust and 
resilient; 
Different types of trust can be active 
in PPPs as the result of trust 
building: competence - based trust 
and character-based trust/ goodwill 
trust. 
 
In this chapter, an analytical framework was drawn upon logic scheme, collaboration building 
literature and network analysis to identify conceptual building blocks for approaching the nature 
and, functioning and results of PPP. As a result, the key PPP elements are clearly defined to 
guide the empirical observations, which are enlightened by some assumptions from literature. 
Thus methodological guidance in the subsequent chapter is designed to adopt this analytical 
framework as well as to present modes of empirical observations, and a way to shed light on 
possible assumptions.  
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
… Learning the craft of how to plan, draft, write, develop, revise and rethink a thesis, and to finish 
it on time and to the standard required, is too important and too often mishandled… (Dunleavy 
2003: xi). 
Methodology is “a comprehensive, organized, systematic and disciplined approach to a 
problem”22and should include, inter alia, the appropriate techniques for achieving the various 
objectives of the research. (Mike Powell 2000). 
This chapter presents the research methodology employed in the research work of this thesis. 
The majority of this chapter deals with the objectives and techniques, but we also reflect on the 
word “appropriate” as mentioned in one of the quotes above. In this chapter, we describe the 
research process in detail in relation to the development of our research objectives in the 
evolving studied case.   
It also compares and contrasts the methods used in our research, presenting how qualitative 
interviews, focus groups, participant observation, and field notes offer a perspective on the PPP 
process and the respective outcomes.  
We start with a discussion of research strategies, followed by a demonstration of how our choice 
of research strategies is well-suited to answer the research questions. Then, we describe the 
methods of data gathering, which assist the development of our research findings and, finally we 
present a discussion of methods for data analysis. At all of the above stages, we offer a pertinent 
explanation of my working conditions related to the project work, as well as the rationale for the 
particular combination of my working conditions and the research methodology. In addition, we 
elaborate on some safeguard measures to improve the quality of the research and how to make 
it coherent with ethics viewed to be critical in modern research activities.  
We end the chapter by stating limitations of our research and the possible compromises 
between our research ambitions and research practice. The limitations and compromises relate 
to the particularities of research topic and to the present research conditions in Vietnam.  
3.1. Research strategy 
3.1.1. Qualitative research 
We endeavour to ensure that the research problem and the research approach should be 
matched (Creswell 2003). The primary goals of this research are to contribute the knowledge gap 
about the collaboration between public and private partners in the context of compulsory land 
conversion projects. Such approach is still very rare in the contemporary development literature. 
We therefore consider the qualitative research approach to be the most appropriate (Creswell 
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 Retrieved from http://www.iadb.org/exr/english/POLICIES/participate/sec7.htm in May 2012 
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2003: 22). Through our examination of the PPP performance and particularly the role of the 
private sector in conflict mitigation in the field of land conversion, the qualitative research 
outcomes may aspire further studies (qualitative or quantitative) on  various and diverse 
dimensions of  the PPP process23.  
3.1.2. Interpretative 
We advocate the interpretative approach, which is innately embedded in our research question, 
where we mainly rely on the interpretation of data. Qualitative research is fundamentally 
interpretative, which is in contrast to the positivist approach favoured in natural sciences 
(Neuman 2007 & Cresswell 2003). 
Our research subject is human social life, which, as referred by Neuman (2007: 43) is based on 
the ideas, beliefs and perceptions that people hold in reality. As such, interpretive researchers 
tend to favour qualitative data because they believe that qualitative data can more accurately 
capture the fluid processes of social reality (2007:43).  
As a result, our interpretive approach is realized through corresponding methods of data 
collection and analysis, which best describe and capture the depth of the empirical world. We 
will state more details in the following sections. 
3.1.3. Case study 
Yin (1981: 59) pointed out that “as a research strategy, the distinguishing characteristics of the 
case study are that it attempts to examine: (i) a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life 
context, especially when (ii) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”.  
By employing the qualitative approach, our main research activities are to simply investigate the 
phenomenon of compulsory land conversion. Thus, we focus on a specific coordination 
mechanism between public and private actors in a particular context of a transitional economy 
such as the one in Vietnam. Therefore, case studies will be most compatible with this research 
approach. 
Yin (2009:4) further pointed out that the case study method will be relevant for answering 
“how” questions on the contemporary phenomena as well as for allowing an in-depth 
description of certain social phenomena. In line with the above mentioned suggestions, our case 
study is defined as exploratory and descriptive in order to provide rich and reliable empirical 
resources on the PPP’s process, about which little is known in the practice of land conversion in 
Vietnam. As a result, the outcome of such exploratory and descriptive processes will be used to 
develop ideas for further qualitative and quantitative studies.  
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 See chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion. 
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3.1.4. Single case design 
According to Yin (1994), case study research can be denoted by both single and multiple case 
designs. We initially planned for a multiple case study research design as it is “stronger and more 
worthy” (Yin 1994: 24), providing better explanations and more reliable  data with greater 
confidence than a single-case design (Miles & Huberman 1994 in Dubois & Gadde 2002: 557; 
2012: 2, Yin 1994 and Eisenhardt 1989). We stated in our research proposal (2009) that we 
would examine one case in great detail by increasing the number of observations in the case 
that we know very well, namely the Nui Phao mining project. Our strategy was to use a second 
case to consolidate our findings of the previous (first) case under the replication logic suggested 
by Yin (2010: 54, 61). Therefore, a “supplementary” case would be carefully selected on the basis 
of the preliminary results from the first case. We suggested selecting a non-PPP model in the 
same geographical location in order to identify the “differences” associated with PPP compared 
to the traditional mode of implementing land conversion in Vietnam. 
However, the practice of our case study in Vietnam in the recent years (2011-2013) has 
influenced and modified our choice. We reverted to the single case study due to the 
characteristics of the case itself and the benefits of a single case study. We explain the reasons 
of this new strategy in the sections below. 
3.1.4.1. The evolving case and limited access to conflict investigation  
As stated earlier, we chose the Nui Phao project to be the main case study. At the time of our 
preliminary field investigation (2010), the process of land conversion had been re-activated by a 
new owner after a year of suspension due to the global and national financial crisis. Just after 
one year of its re-activation (July 2010- October 2011), the land conversion process had been 
carried out with clear results. Accordingly, 96 percent of the land was acquired for project 
development without any significant conflicts or complaints between the investor and the local 
Project Affected People (PAPs). Being familiar with the project in the past, we were allowed to 
continue the qualitative fieldwork in the project during the first half of 2011. The project is 
viewed by both the investor and authorities (with pride) as a “show case” model, or in other 
word as “best practice” in land conversion and mining operations. As we will argue here, we 
based our research propositions on both the theoretical concepts and the preliminary 
observations of the project results. 
Unfortunately, from the last quarter of 2011, at the onset of the construction works on the 
project areas which had already been compensated, the Project Affected Persons (PAPs) began 
re-acquiring their land in order to gain more benefits from the investor by demanding a revision 
of the compensation prices and other compensation packages. The provincial and local 
authorities, as well as the investor, had to establish an on-site task force group for Complaint 
Resolution, which received hundreds of letters of complaints and requests from the PAPs. 
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In addition, in a broader national context, from 2011 onwards, the media and public recognized 
and reflected on a massive nation-wide support of the resistance to the compulsory land 
mechanism (see 1.5.5). The debate on the legal framework of land conversion and its 
implementation had by that time become more critical than before24. Consequently, “outsiders” 
such as researchers, media and NGOs... were no longer welcome to the Nui Phao project and to 
any other land conversion projects in Vietnam. 
The project encountered a challenging time in 2012, arising from the consolidation of the land 
conversion procedures and the economic interest of PAPs. Nevertheless, 99.8 percent of 
resettlement and compensation work was successfully completed by early 2013. 
For the purpose of our present research case, this evolving  environment, in combination with 
the contextual dynamics, have made the achievement of research objectives even more 
challenging, but at the same time, more interesting too. In spite of the active contributions of 
the investor, there was a boom in the number of conflicts in the present PPP, which, in our 
opinion presents a paradox in a collaborative doctrine since PPPs were supposed to minimize 
conflicts, not lead to a boom in conflicts. 
As a result, the methodology and the research focus had to be re-examined, so that they became 
more in-depth but also more time consuming, in spite of the field activities conducted earlier. 
Compared to the original research design, there are now more variables to be examined. For 
instance, the relationship between the PPP and conflict resolution became more apparent after 
the creation of the task force for Complaint Resolution and needed to be re-assessed. Next, the 
exploratory approach required harder efforts to uncover the nature of PPP process in the 
domain of land conversion. Moreover, we needed to seek a legitimate access in order to 
continue our investigation and to be intimate to the case by participant observation (see our 
next section 3.3.3). Participant observation is a time consuming process, and, consequently, we 
have been unable to access the case in a timely fashion, as we originally planned. As a result of 
the conflicting nature of the primary case, the time-consuming conditions of investigating an 
evolving case, and the denial of access to the secondary case, replicating the case findings with a 
second case proved not feasible (see Table 29). 
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 As a result from our summary from newspapers and other public media during 2011, 2012 and 2013 
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Table 29: The evolving case and the research focus re-orientation 
Timeline 
Before 2009 
(2006-2009) 
2010 -  2011 2012- mid 2013 
Mid - 2013 
onward 
Case 
development  
Project preparation 
(administration 
procedures and 
construction of 
relocation sites; 
economic 
restoration and 
information 
disclosure); 
Partial land acquisition 
based on advance 
of compensation 
payment. 
Land acquisition, -
Administrative 
procedures: 
Compensation 
payment and 
liquidation (from 
advance);  
Construction; 
Conflict boom. 
Conflict/ complaint 
resolution including 
win- win negotiations; 
Consolidate 
administrative 
procedures; 
Consolidate economic 
restoration activities; 
Construction. 
Majority of 
complaints 
have been 
resolved;  
Complete land 
acquisition - 
phase I; 
Extend project 
areas; 
Start 
operations. 
Research          
re-orientation 
Participatory 
approach/ research 
formulation. 
Research design based 
on previous 
experience and 
information;  
Qualitative Fieldwork; 
More focus on 
interviews, FG and 
GD about 
perceptions/ goals/ 
strategies and social 
capital. 
More variables to be 
examined                         
(inter-dependencies, 
power relations and the 
substance of PPP in 
land conversion);  
Explicitly evaluate public 
private performance in 
conflict resolution; 
Participant Observation. 
No more 
adaption. 
3.1.4.2. The benefits of a single case study  
In the previous sections, we elaborated on the appropriateness for our choice of a single case 
study (complexity and rich data) and we also commented on our selected methods of study (a 
combination of ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation). In this section, we further 
discuss our rationale for choosing the single case design based on the ongoing intellectual 
(academic) debates on the choice between a single case study and multiple case-studies, taking 
into account the specific prerequisites for a single case design that makes our choice rational. 
According to Yin (1984:48) the evidence from multiple cases is often considered more 
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as more robust. “In addition, Eisenhardt 
(1991: 620 in Dubbois and Gadde 2013:2) claims that multiple cases are a powerful means to 
create theory because they permit replication and extension among individual cases”.  
In contrast to the above standpoint, Dubois & Gadde’s and other advocates for qualitative 
studies, relying on single case research, firmly claim that extensive single case descriptions 
“would make it possible to take the rich context surrounding the cases into consideration” and 
“a single case can be a very powerful example” (Siggelkow 2007: 20, Langley 1999: 699 in 
Dubbois & Gadde 2013: 2).  
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We agree with Dubois and Gadde (2002 & 2013) that the choice should not be between single 
and multiple cases. Instead, it would be more important to enable the “empirical richness” and 
potential analytical power for a studied case.   
First, it has been suggested that in many cases, it is better to examine one case in great detail, 
rather than to increase the number of lightly examined cases because extensive single case 
descriptions would make it possible to take the rich context surrounding the case into 
consideration. In the words of Dyer and Wilkins (1991 in Dubois & Gadde 2013:2) “deep case 
studies” would be more revealing than “surface case studies”. This is in line with the important 
mission of case studies that “emphasize the rich real-world context in which the phenomenon 
occurs” (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007: 25). Ultimately, the careful study of a single case (...) 
leads researchers to see new theoretical relationships and question old ones (Dyer and Wilkins 
1991: 614 in Dubois & Gadde 2013:2).  
Second, both “better constructs” and “better stories” are proposed as prerequisites to advocate 
“deep case studies” with empirical richness rather than “surface case studies” (Dubois & Gadde 
2013: 2). The main characteristic of this approach is a continuous movement between an empiri-
cal world and a model world. During this process, the research issues and the analytical 
framework are successively reoriented when they are not in accord with the empirical world 
(Dubois & Gadde, 2002: 554). 
On the one hand, this approach is viewed as a powerful means to explore the insights of a single 
case with rich data because it requires the researchers to “constantly go back and forth from one 
type of research activity to another and between empirical observations and theory” (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002: 555). Further, this research approach lends itself easily to the ethnography and 
participant observation methods in a sense that it offers “the intertwined activities in the 
research process” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002: 555), in the form of data collection and data analysis 
(Jorgensen 1989: 107). We will further discuss the implications of this approach in the sections 
on data collection and data analysis. We will now provide insights as to why our approach can be 
considered as semi-deductive. 
3.1.5. Semi-deductive approach 
In spite of the tendency to classify our research process as qualitative research, our research 
process can also be characterized as semi-deductive, due to the fact that we commence the 
research work with theoretical propositions (Agranoff 2007 in Voets 2008: 64). Yin (2012:35) 
claims that theory development should be part of the design phase, whether the ensuing case 
study’s purpose is to develop or test theory (see also Johnston, Leach and Liu 1999).  
Thus, we prepare our theoretical chapter with related propositions prior to data collection in 
order to allow us to improve the explanatory power of theories. However, our theoretical 
framework and related theories can be viewed as heuristic tools to investigate, describe, and 
eventually explain the case, rather than to test the theory. This is referred to as a “tight” and 
“pre-structured” framework in the literature (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
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Nevertheless, we are aware of the risks of relying on a certain framework in that it could “blind” 
the researchers to important and distinct features of the case or even cause misinterpretation of 
local informants’ perceptions (Miles & Huberman 1994:16). To address this issue we employ the 
dynamics of the “abductive” approach suggested by Dubois and Gadde (2002, 2013) to treat the 
analytical framework in the way that it can be reoriented when it is not in agreement with 
the empirical. 
3.2. Case selection 
Case selection is a critical issue in any type of case research (Yin 2010). However, we note that 
the questions of sampling often seem to receive less attention in methodological discussions 
than the questions related to how data are collected or analyzed (Curtis et al. 2000: 1001).  
Our case was selected before research formulation due to my previous working experience on 
the case. Our research proposal with preliminary propositions has been prepared from my 
intensive observations of the Nui Phao project since 2006. During the review of the relevant 
literature, we found that is not uncommon that “the case selects the researcher” in a sense that 
interesting empirical observations can provide opportunities for identification of exciting 
research phenomena (Dubois & Gadde 2013). Alvesson and Sandberg (2011: 266 in Dubois & 
Gadde 2013: 4) also assume that empirical findings play a major role in the formulation of a 
study (…). Interestingly, there is a wealth of experience from the advocates of participant 
observation and ethnography who mention their previous involvements with a case, before 
setting the research problem prior to the setting of participant observation (see Rambo 1987, 
Kotarba 1987, 1980 & 1983 in Jorgensen 1989:310, Hayano 1982 and Adler 1981). 
In terms of case selection principles, Stake (1994) distinguished between intrinsic casework 
(where the case is pre-specified, not chosen, because a particular case is the focus of the 
research question); and instrumental or collective casework, requiring one or more cases to be 
chosen from a number of possible alternatives in order to explore a research theme. Thus, our 
case work belongs to the first case, i.e. intrinsic casework. Nevertheless, according to Flyvbjerg 
(2006) it can be argued that since our case denotes certain aspects of the research question, 
then one should not be too concerned with the principles of case selection. 
3.3. Data collection techniques 
3.3.1. Secondary sources 
Besides the empirical data collected directly from the fieldwork, the quantitative and statistical 
data from other sources are also to be used in this research work.  
Secondary sources comprise published and unpublished documents, related to the given field. 
This research theme is multi-dimensional and it embraces a broad variety of published and 
unpublished documents, ranging from international to national and local/ project levels. 
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The secondary data are used for various comparison purposes as well as for our research 
phenomenon (PPP and land conversion) of the study site in the context of the country as a 
whole. We are interested not only in national but also in international scholarly articles 
about the PPP and land issues in Vietnam in order  to understand the patterns, 
interactions, evaluations, and the changes of those over time from different (national and 
international) perspectives. 
In general, the main secondary sources that we use are (see Documentation for review):  
- Documents supplied by public and governmental organizations (from different levels of 
central to local organizations, such as: General Statistical Office, Provincial, District and 
Communal documents, reports, etc.); 
- Documents provided by the third parties such as international organizations, audit, 
newspaper articles (World Bank); 
- The company (NPM) documents and report. 
The documents listed above have been widely used in our research. However, as the secondary 
sources were collected for a different purpose from ours, we need to be apprehensive when 
using them, taking into account the different features of the data (Yin 2009). For example, the 
sources (where the original data came from), location (does it cover the right geographical 
location that we are looking at), time of publications, and recent socio-economic changes in 
Vietnam are the typical criteria that we use in the assessment of secondary data.  
During data collection, we have encountered several problems. Here are some examples. 
We noted that there are surprisingly few documents on other land conversion projects in the 
districts and the province due to poor record keeping on the one hand, and the denial of public 
use of documents on the other hand. 
Although we were particularly looking for the documents produced by governmental authorities 
at both provincial and local levels, the result of this search ended in a disappointment. The 
documents obtained in this way were often too general, lacked comprehensive baseline figures, 
were available mainly in the template form and lacked coherent statistics between different 
levels and different timelines.  
The above problems have, to some extent influenced the quality of assessment and comparison 
of the results in this research work, in particular the investigation of the impact of the PPP in 
regards to the status of conflicts, needed for comparison with other land conversion projects in 
the similar contexts (we will explain more in the following chapters). 
3.3.2. Ethnographic fieldwork 
This research work aims to collect data by the ethnographic fieldwork method which is viewed to 
be the most appropriate way to study people and institutions in their “real-life context” or daily 
situations (Yin 2009: 83; Neuman 2007: 278). Fieldwork is exploratory in nature and requires a 
variety of methods and techniques to ensure integrity of the data (Fetterman 1989: 18, 42). We 
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particularly put a great deal of emphasis on the quality of our fieldwork to ensure the reliability 
of the present research work. Therefore, we have employed qualitative interviews, focus group 
discussions and participant observation in the later stage. These activities are described in more 
details in the followings sections. Besides, we have also used some statistical data and reports25 
addressing certain issues on the information disclosure status in the project in order to provide a 
comparison with our observations, as well as to increase the credibility of our arguments (Patton 
1999: 1193).  
Besides, our confidence in the quality of our fieldwork in Vietnam is derived from more than 15 
years of my personal experience in carrying out participatory fieldworks in Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia26. We understand that in general case studies, and in ethnographic fieldwork in 
particular, the qualifications, experience and skills of investigators are significantly important to 
the quality of the qualitative study (Patton 1999, Atkinson & Hammersley 1994, Jorgensen 1989 
and Yin 1984). 
3.3.3. Participant observation 
Participant observation is a method in which “an observer takes part in daily activities, rituals, 
interactions, and events of the people being studied as one of the means of learning tacit 
aspects of their cultures” (Dewalt & Wayland 1998: 260). 
Participant observation is an appropriate methodology for studies of almost every aspect of 
human existence; in particular, it is viewed as an essential element of a qualitative study of a 
phenomenon which is little known or unusual, a study of exploratory or descriptive nature or a 
study aimed at generating theoretical interpretations (Yin 1984-2009, Neuman 2007, Dewalt et 
al. 1998, Marshall & Rossman 1995; Atkinson & Hammersley 1994 and Jorgensen 1989), but also 
of many other cases which are best characterized by a single case design (Atkinson & 
Hammersley 1994: 248 and Jorgensen 1989). 
Thus, as stated in Table 29 (The evolving case and the research focus re-orientation) participant 
observation was employed in the second stage of our fieldwork (2012 and 2013), focusing on the 
public-private collaboration activities as well as the (re)evaluation of the PPP results, particularly 
in terms of conflict resolution in the NP project. The key informants in our research were the 
executive groups, such as the public authorities and functional departments and the company. 
Hence, the position of the insider appears to be essential to understand the insights of the 
organizations, associated with their daily communications, correspondences and reporting and 
planning activities, as well as the core of the PPP in the project. 
Our approach is not uncommon since the core nature of participant observation focuses on the 
importance of human existence from the standpoints of insiders (Znaniecki 1934 & Spradley 
                                                          
25
 See Documentation for review. 
26
 The following projects involved my field research experience and skills “Sustainable Livelihood in Southeast Asia: a 
Grassroots - Informed to Food Security” (3 years); “Grassroots Democracy and Participatory budgeting” (2 years); 
“Empowerment for workers and Trade Union in Vietnam”(3 years); Water Supply and Rural Sanitation for the Red 
River Delta Program (2 years). 
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1980 in Jorgensen 1989: 14). Various ethnographers have conducted their research work in this 
way; examples being where a researcher held a position of a formal or informal member of an 
organization or a community (Adler 1981; Rambo 1987; Hayano 1982 & Kotarba 1987, 1980, 
1983 in Jorgensen 1989:310; Gamst 1977; Applebaum 1981, Pilcher 1972, Maanen 1973, 1977, 1979, 
1982, or Donald Roy 1952-9, Dalton 1959, and Burawoy 1979 in Schawartzman 1993:31 & 52). 
3.4. Fieldwork activities 
Our field activities consisted of data gathering through casual conversations, in-depth, informal 
and unstructured interviews, group discussions, structured interviews and also by questionnaire 
surveys (Jorgensen 1989:22). Nevertheless as in any case, starting a field investigation should be 
arranged well in advance.  
3.4.1. Getting into the field 
Classical ethnography fieldwork generally lasts from six months to two years (Fetterman 
1989:18). As stated in Table 29 (The evolving case and the research focus re-orientation), we 
commenced out qualitative fieldwork in the Nui Phao project in 2010. However, the field 
activities in the project were officially conducted during the first half of 2011, and participant 
observation took place from early 2012 till June 2013, during our consultation contract with Nui 
Phao mining company (NPM) signed. Since our research work focuses on a public and private 
collaboration and includes the investigation of characteristics of public and private actors, our 
fieldwork, to some extent characterizes the ethnography in organizations, at work (work studies) 
or in the industry as mentioned by Johnson (1990) & Schawartzman (1993).  
Box 2: How did I get the consultation contract and my main consultation tasks? 
Having been in a successful position as the consultant for the implementation of PCDP, CDP and ERPs in the project, 
involving work on institutional arrangements and capacity building for local staff (2005-2008), I was offered 
permanent employment by NP. However, due to my employment with a research institute, I became involved with 
the project under the short-term and part-time consultation contracts. My return to the project for the fieldwork of 
my PhD was welcomed by the company as well as the local stakeholders. However, conflict resolution, which is the 
subject of my research, has become very sensitive during the conflict stages of the project, due to high project 
tensions and the concerns about public media involvement. 
I found that my inputs can be helpful to the project and the PAPs in regards to the conflict resolutions since I have 
spent a great deal of time and made great efforts to understand policy environment, the capacity of the executive 
organizations, the root-cause sources of social conflicts in the project as well as the perceptions of the PAPs. Due to 
my understanding of the matter, I was offered a consultation contract. In line with the contract, our tasks were to 
implement and consolidate the implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), which comprises 
administrative arrangements for displacement, relocation and economic rehabilitation activities as well as the 
implementation of the PCDP, including complaint resolution.   
“... Particularly, we expect you to monitor the performance of the task force group for complaint resolution, pushing up 
the process of negotiations and agreements with the PAPs as well as enhancing the cooperation between the company 
and the local authorities, and the functional department to maximize the effectiveness of the complaint resolution...” - 
asked by the CEO of the Masan Resources (quote 1). 
“...It was unexpected that the PAPs stopped the project construction...The most important tasks for the company and 
the local authority now are to resolve their complaints and listen to their expectations so we can continue with the 
project activities... I think you can join us to solve the problem as you have experience about the project and the people, 
since we need a comprehensive view to identify the root-cause problems...” said by the district leader (quote 2). 
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The ethnography in organizations specifies a number of measures and techniques such as (i) the 
role and behavior of the researcher while being a management consultant in the organization; 
(ii) the art of free-flowing (from the researcher) while conducting interviews with informants; (iii) 
the way of interpretation of meetings, which requires the researcher to look “behind rather than 
at meetings” and; (iv) accumulation of stories in the form of intensive data collection 
(Schawartzman: 1993: 38, 43, 47 & 58). Due to the fact that I had been engaged in part-time 
consultation work during a three year period (2006-2009), I had to shorten or bypass many 
procedures required for getting into the field (Jorgensen 1989). Having had 3 years in the 
position of an institutional consultant for the project (2006-2008), I was familiar with the 
geographical location and physical (landscape) and socio-economic conditions. Owing to my 
previous contributions in terms of public consultation and community development for the 
project, I have also gained a stable relationship with the people, and the project owner as well as 
the authorities at local levels (see Box 2). However, upon my return to the project, my role has 
become twofold - that of a researcher, who kept the research problem and scientifically-
oriented ethics in mind and that of a consultant (see Box 3).  
Box 3: The reaction of the stakeholders on my position as a researcher and about my 
research topic 
During my field study, my research topic was introduced in a “softer” way, such as “the PPP in practice and the 
contribution to resolve the problems, constraints and tensions in IR”, inferring that the term of “conflicts” was 
indirectly/ implicitly mentioned.  
In this case, most of the stakeholders, and especially the PAPs and local authorities were interested in expressing their 
points of view on the constraints and tensions in the project. My previous position in the project encouraged the 
stakeholders to share their points of view as they found that their opinions were taken into account in the practice of 
the CDP, PCDP and ERPs implementation. They stated that they understand my academic interest and the issues we 
brought into discussions or interviews were not different from my previous surveys for the community need 
assessments. They were interested to know if their opinions were passed on to the company and the higher level of 
authorities. As a result, we believe that that the information provided by our stakeholders in regards to our research 
topic is reliable and trustworthy. However, our conversations were sometime difficult to be managed since other 
investigation aspects were often dominated by the central concerns of the PAPs, such as the compensation 
related issues.   
Similarly, my research was perceived to be “normal” and “accepted” by the executive agencies, including company 
staff and the state officers. Particularly, it is not uncommon in Vietnam for individuals associated with both public and 
private sectors, to pursue their own study during service, through in-service training courses or university, PhD study 
or any other evening or part-time courses. To an extent, my research title enticed their interests. For instance, one of 
the provincial leaders shared with me the challenges faced during implementation of the compulsory land conversion 
policies in the provinces, raising his expectation about the outcomes of our research: 
“It is good to focus on the roles of the private investors in land conversion. Especially in the circumstances of the recent 
land law revision, that resulted in no significant changes in the compulsory land conversion mechanism...“ - (quote 3) 
The company considered my research as a personal matter “... why do you take your time to do a Ph.D.  which is too 
challenging and time- consuming... you’d rather spend your time on consultation work, and increase your income ... 
You are allowed to investigate our organization but that should be done in an honest and transparent manner, without 
breaking company regulations in terms of information and confidentiality, if applicable” - said by the NPM director - 
(quote 4). 
Nevertheless, our enquiries to report on the research progress and results were often ignored by the management 
who simply said that they were “too busy” for spending time on this matter. 
Thus, I was particularly interested to re-visit the site for appraisal in order to identify its changes 
over time, but also to assess the changes in the community spirit before and after the relocation. 
However, as in any evolving field case, certain changes are unavoidable, such as organization, 
perceptions, patterns of interactions and a variety of other emerging, but not noted previously, 
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elements during the project development. Consequently, our aim is to aggregate as well as 
cross-check our observations during different stages of our field activities in a “more specific, 
systematic detail”. This “never ending cycle” of observing, analyzing, refocusing and re-observing 
would help us explore and refine emerging problems and questions for the inquiry (Jorgensen 
1989).  
Ideally, long-term continuous fieldwork is neither possible nor desirable in our research 
circumstance. Indeed, starting from 2011 till 2013, I spent three days a week in the field for eight 
months. This routine allowed me to conduct intensive fieldwork over three years of the study 
but also to move back and forth so as to analyze what I have observed and recorded. More 
importantly, we were able to observe the patterns of interactions over time. The remaining four 
months per year was spent in KU Leuven, where I consolidated and re-oriented theoretical and 
analytical frameworks based on the results from data collection and preliminary analysis in the 
field in combination with additional literature reviews. Further, at KU Leuven, I also updated the 
methodological guidelines on the basis of convergence of state of the art research methods 
which, in turn helped me to improve the field activities. 
3.4.2. Observation 
Apart from conversations, interviews and the use of statistical data (Jorgensen 1989:22), we 
wanted to add “observation” as a specific measure for data collection which must be recorded 
properly. This is more specific and action-oriented than the general understanding of participant 
observation as an approach or methodology. Based on Jorgensen’s clarification, “focused 
observation” comes about when we target the research questions during participation with a 
careful preparation; whereas “unfocused observation” occurs wherever we are at work or being 
at the site for other purposes. We used the second type of observation more often and it 
appeared to be more helpful in a sense that we could capture valuable information or even new 
discoveries during our numerous consultation activities, daily activities and day-to-day 
communications.  
Participant observation characterizes direct, face-to-face social interaction with “real people” in 
a natural setting as a prerequisite to ensure the reliability of the data collected (Neuman 2007: 
276). It also includes “silent” observation which is sometimes more helpful instead of gathering 
information by asking or using other forms of communications. This measure was used very 
often in our daily consultation performance, especially at various meetings, where we did not 
play an active role of participants but we could still observe various discussions and debates 
between partners, negotiators and planners. For example, while visiting the site office of the 
task force group for Conflict Resolution, we could witness the collaboration between the public 
and private partner while deal with complainers, listen to the opinions of the complainers, feel 
their frustrations and also understand their problems. 
Most of the time, we conducted our participant observation as a single researcher. However, 
sometimes we indirectly involved other field members to produce small reports based on their 
field observation. In doing this, we were aware that team strategies offer distinctive advantages 
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(Jorgensen 1989: 22). Most of the members in our team were locals and many of them were 
from project affected families. The members were informed about my research interest. In 
addition, our team members have been trained to carry out their tasks which comprise public 
consultation and information disclosure activities (see 4.2.4). Under such different participant 
and observer roles, we could employ different perceptions and perspectives to evaluate the 
same phenomenon, events or activities. Interestingly, the deliveries from our team members 
were informed by gender and ethnic values, which essentially deepened our findings in terms of 
gender and cultural dimensions27.  
3.4.3. Interviews 
Interviews and interview content interpretation is classified as “something between art and 
science” (Newman 2007 and Salkind 2006). As such, the interview content requires careful 
preparation. Our interviewees are not selected in a random fashion. Instead, we had to define 
“key informants” in our case, and select them from a pool of our data sources. We closely 
followed guidance on the identification of key informants as recommended by Johnson 
(1990: 10) 
“... Informants are individuals who tend to be interviewed in a more semi-structured or informal, 
in-depth, detailed manner in a natural setting. Informants are often selected on the basis of their 
attributes, such as access to certain kind of information or knowledge that itself may be in a 
function of such things as social status, position in an organization or comprehension of cultural 
knowledge...” 
Accordingly, we have selected key informants under the consideration of two basic criteria 
clarified by Johnson (1990: 38-63). The first was based on theoretical qualifications, which 
emphasized the importance of theory in terms of status, role, position, expertise, category or 
subgroup membership, dimensions and even knowledge. The second was based on an emergent 
or data-driven framework, which justified additional investigations as a result of emerging 
perspectives and opportunities. 
Sixty formal in-depth interviews28 of the key stakeholders have been conducted during our 
qualitative fieldwork conducted in 2011. The content of the interviews was related to the 
perceptions, goals and strategies of the actors, basically associating data to answer our primary 
research question regarding the PPP structures and the actors’ characteristics in the NP project 
(Appendix 2: Fieldwork protocol). 
Interviews can be formal and informal and our interviews were often taken informally. We noted 
that the practice of other ethnographic investigation shows that little formal interviews were 
conducted too (Dalton 1959 in Schwartzman 1993: 53). 
                                                          
27
 Our team of 14 members comprises both male and female; some of them are the project affected people (PAPs) 
being recruited under the priorities of the company’s income generation programs for the PAPs; three of them were 
from ethnic minority groups.  
28
 See List of interviewees. 
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We found that formal and informal interviews were used differently between qualitative 
fieldwork and participant observation. According to Jorgensen (1989), by employing the 
participant observation perspective, formal interviews are sometime useful for quickly and 
efficiently collecting a uniform set of data about people who are related but not central to one’s 
investigation. This is not the case of qualitative research activities in general, where interviews 
are often held with key informants (INCO 200029).  
On the one hand, formal interviews were mainly conducted in our qualitative fieldwork when we 
wanted to obtain information from key informants, being the senior officials or managers, or 
other high-ranking individuals whom we seldom met or had little chance to observe. For those 
types of informants, formal appointments were made prior to the interviews. Due to their busy 
schedule, it took several visits to complete an in-depth interview with them. Therefore, the 
preparation of in-depth interview content (see Appendix 2: Fieldwork protocol) was important to 
ensure that all important aspects would be covered during the course of the interview, or in 
other words, to obtain the core of the issue under exploration.  
On the other hand, during our participant observation, our informal interviews were mainly used 
in our daily consultation work. The way we facilitate informal interviews were realized with 
“something between art and science” as mentioned earlier.  
During various discussions and meetings with our partners, we would choose certain specific 
questions relating to our research interest but within the theme of the ongoing discussion. The 
interviews were often in the form of conversations, further discussions or small talks, which 
aimed to address our content of interest.  
Sometimes we would clearly state to the interviewees that these questions are intended for our 
own research or that they were our personal questions. However, most of the time, the 
conversations with questions were quite free-flowing and interlocked with other casual topics.  
Besides, our interviews were sometimes conducted through e-mail or telephone conversations. 
Thus, by using various techniques in our qualitative fieldwork in the earlier stage of investigation 
and in participant observation in the later stage, we could be able to deeply understand 
the perceptions of our public and private stakeholders, their points of views and the 
relationship between the perceptions and their behaviors during collaboration for compulsory 
land conversion. 
3.4.4. (Focus) group discussion/ meetings 
As a special qualitative technique in which “people are informally interviewed in a group 
discussion setting” (Neuman 2007: 300), a focus group discussion takes advantages of the 
opportunity to observe a large number of comments and discussions on a topic in a limited 
period of time. In addition, the outcomes from a focus group appear to be more trustworthy 
under queries and discussions between participants. Furthermore, the focus group encourages 
                                                          
29
 See Documentation for review: INCO methodology 2000 
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the participation of marginalized people and empowering them to freely express their opinions 
and reactions on critical issues, such as compulsory land conversion.   
Box 4: Focus group discussion in the qualitative (participatory) field study 
The focus group interviews/discussions seek to achieve a particular perspective on a set of issues as seen through the 
eyes of particular groups of people in the study communities. The focus groups should consist of between 6-12 
people, drawn from a representative cross-section of people within the community, and relating to cohorts that might 
be considered relevant to the focus of the research. These might be selected to represent age, gender, occupation, 
exclusion and institutions etc. The research teams should determine a means of ensuring that the focus groups are 
representative of the community as a whole, and not hand-picked by an official or other power holder. Efforts should 
be made to ensure that the focus group discussions in […] a non-hierarchical environment (circles rather than rows), 
and in a relaxed and light-hearted manner. 
(INCO Methodology 2000) 
In our fieldwork, we have conducted 16 focus groups (see Appendix 3: List of interviews and 
group discussion) discussions which included various groups of stakeholders - state officials at all 
levels, mass organizations, NPM staff and the PAP representatives. The less formal focus group 
discussions, with my partners during the consultation work were uncountable (see Appendix 5: 
Lists of collaboration meetings). 
Based on our field experience, the outcome of a focus group discussion was achieved in 
somewhat different way than it is often described in theory and guidelines. In general, group 
discussions were arrangement-wise disorganized, time-consuming and with a little focus, 
especially at community level. 
As such, a (focus) group discussion at community level was difficult to be organized. For 
instance, our topic for the group discussion was supposed to be about the expectations of the 
PAPs, the economic restoration measures as well as the long-term perspective about sustainable 
livelihoods in the resettled areas. The main discussions in such meetings were eventually driven 
to the issues which the stakeholders found to be their most critical concerns, such as the 
compensation prices, the entitlements and the possible ways to get paid at the earliest. Thus, 
the information about the tensions, the attitude, the behavior and the expectations of the 
stakeholders in compulsory land conversion could be gathered by the researcher even in the 
case of organizational failure of the field activities such as group discussions (see more in Box 3: 
The reaction of the stakeholders on my position as a researcher, and about my research topic).  
In addition, it was challenging to get particular groups in the communities to form a formal 
group for a discussion in the later stage of our field study. Under the tensions of non-
satisfaction, criticism and uncertainty about certain implemented policies for compulsory land 
conversion in the affected communities, it was deemed too sensitive to gather people for a 
discussion on their critically interested (research) topics. We learnt that gathering groups or 
crowds could potentially lead to a chaotic situation and even start collective resistance.  
However, owing to our participant observation approach, we had great opportunities to obtain 
collective opinions on the topics which were highly relevant to our research objectives during 
various focused meetings organized in the communities. They were community meetings 
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between the PAPs and representatives of the company and local authority; examples are 
complaint resolution meetings, policy disclosure meetings and meetings for planning and 
negotiation for compensation, to name but a few. As a consultant, I was permitted to join 
various meetings with other partners for problem solving, planning or making agreements, to 
name a few. The observations from the meetings in combination with certain additional 
questions during free time before or after the meetings30 have been re-structured to form a 
more uniform content. By attending formal partners’ meetings I joined the discussions as a 
member; I could study various things, such as leadership in decision making, problem solving and 
planning, and the effect of partnership performance and, also to test our hypotheses and 
discover new study issues. 
3.4.5. Field notes 
Field notes are the primary method of capturing data form participant observation (DeWalt & 
Wayland (1998): 270), and are regarded as the brick and mortar of an ethnographic structure 
(Fetternman 1989: 107). For us, note taking was also a process of data clarification, iterative 
revisions and analysis (Dubois & Gadde 2002, 2012, Schwartzman 1993 and Jorgensen 1989).  As 
part of my daily consultation work, I had a notebook at hand at all times, recording in free style 
about what I have learnt from my observation and communications. Any issues that were 
related to the research objectives were marked and highlighted. Besides, I have composed a 
series of “Dai Tu31 diary” on the laptop where all the collected data was computerized, 
highlighted with comments or questions (Yin 1984). As with all electronic files, it was possible to 
categorize, classify groups and re-group the data and to provide a justification for doing so in an 
appropriate manner. In particular, I would integrate similar evidence in proper categories, 
combine interview content with observations of the same events (Schwartzman 1993: 63 and 
Fetterman 1989: 107). 
Electronic notes (partly summarized from hand notes) were often taken after working hours, not 
just at work. I reviewed the field notes on a regular basis, identified and manually labeled 
whenever possible as being related in particular ways to the emergent issues of study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 Author. 
31
 District where the project placed 
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Figure 5: Taking stock from our consultation work to ethnographic fieldwork 
 
 
3.5. Data analytical methods 
Case studies characterize analytical rather than statistical generalization (Yin 1984), emphasizing 
the importance of analytical power in relation to the research outcomes. The nature of data 
analysis aims at a careful examination of empirical information to reach a conclusion (Neuman 
2004: 328). The data analytical process is simplified by Jorgensen (1989: 107) who stated that it 
stands for breaking up, separating or disassembling of research materials into pieces, parts, 
elements or units. With facts are broken down into manageable pieces, the researcher sorts and 
sifts them, searching for types, classes, sequences, processes, patterns or wholes... the aim of 
this process is to assemble or reconstruct the data in a meaningful or comprehensive fashion 
(ibid. 108).  
To do this, we use coding techniques to convert empirical data into categories, patterns and set 
of relations (Voets 2008: 72, Neuman 2004: 339) so that they can be viewed in contrast or 
compared to each other.  
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Relying on theoretical lens and propositions 
In regards to our data analytic strategy, we chose to rely on the theoretical lens and some 
propositions (Yin’s 1984: 103 & 2009: 130 - 131). As we have explained in the previous sections, 
theories can be used as heuristic tools to enable us to make sense of the data by construction of 
meaningful patterns and organizations of facts. The main theory used in our research is the 
network approach introduced by the Dutch scholars (see in 1.4) while the propositions are 
developed based on the network theory as well other relevant theories in sustainable 
development and IR.  
However, we are also in favor of elaborate descriptions of the case32, taking advantage of our 
data collection methods, which resulted in the richness of evidence.  
Pattern matching  
Pattern matching is our key analytical strategy, supplemented by explanation building 
techniques (Yin 1994: 106; 2009: 141, 149)33. Pattern matching procedures characterize multiple 
iterations in which the researcher seeks matches between (...) hypothesis and the cultural 
(contextual) factors found during case investigation (Campbell 1966 in Fielding & Fielding 1986: 87). 
In order to properly proceed with such an iterative matching process by “going back and forth 
between the framework, data sources and analysis” (Dubois & Gadde 2002: 556 and 2013), we 
adapt the systematic combining scheme (see in Figure 6), which “systematically” combines data 
collection and data analysis, and which is preferably applicable to the in-depth single case study 
(Dubois & Gadde 2002 and 2013). Thus, our fieldwork protocol (Appendix 2: Fieldwork protocol) 
was composed based on this suggestion. 
Figure 6: Systematic combining 
 
(Dubois & Gadde 2002) 
                                                          
32
 It implicitly implements the second strategy, regarded to be in contrast with the theoretical framework - developing 
a case description.  
33
 Not sure if it is acceptable from methodological perspectives? 
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Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is identified as “the major entity that you are analyzing in your study” 
(Trochim, 1999 in Beuselinck 2009); “the object on which a scholar collects its data” (Landman: 
2003 in Beuselinck 2009), or the “case” (Yin: 1984 and 2003). This unit of analysis could be an 
individual, a group, an organization, a process or a movement. 
The main unit of analysis in our research is the process of public private collaboration (PPP), 
which is placed in a particular context of a compulsory land conversion project and is located in 
Vietnam.  
Based on the main unit of analysis which is the PPP process, we purposely define two sub- units 
of analysis, the first of which is the PPP in the process of displacement (SN1) and the PPP in the 
process of economic rehabilitation as the second (SN2) (see Chapter 5: Adopting the analytical 
famework). 
Our decisions are rooted in the notion of a strong engagement between the context and the 
phenomenon. Thus, the land conversion process characterizes two distinct but related 
processes: displacement of project affected people as the first and livelihood rehabilitation as 
the second process (Cernea 1993, 1996, & 2008)... 
However, we are aware of the pitfalls observed by Yin (1994: 44) while employing an embedded 
design. Yin stated that subunits can often add a significant value by enhancing insights into the 
single case... but if too much attention is given to these subunits, the holistic aspects of the case 
risk to be ignored. In our case, this would mean that the original phenomenon (PPP) would 
become the context and not the target of study. Our purpose to develop the embedded design is 
not only to provide a sufficient description of the PPP process, but also to deepen our analysis. 
On the one hand, we argue that by examining SN1 and SN2, it is possible to confront the findings 
in SN1 with the findings in SN2 and vice versa. On the other hand, a comparative analysis 
between SN1 and SN2 would possibly produce replication about how PPP performs in different 
policy problems, the argument which is further elaborated in the following section under 
Replication.  
3.6. Safeguard measures for the quality of research 
Our arguments on the quality of our research are heavily based on three important standpoints: 
i) our research methodology of participant observation, which enhances the quality of the data 
obtained during fieldwork and the quality of the interpretation of data (DeWalt & Wayland 1998: 
264); ii) our personal field experience in combination with our time invested in the fieldwork; 
and iii) our attempt to employ state of the art qualitative techniques in our research for single 
case design (such as the systematic combining scheme in Dubois & Gadde 2013). In the following 
we additionally argue the quality of our research by reference to triangulation, construct validity, 
reliability and some degree of replication. 
104 
 
Triangulation  
In our research, the triangulation is ensured by utilizing various sources of data, and through the 
advantages of a combination of qualitative investigation and participant observation at different 
stages of our field study. Besides methodology triangulation and data triangulation, we were 
aware of other types of triangulations such as investigator triangulation (Denzin in Fielding & 
Fielding 1986: 25). For example, we employed other research team members (who have been 
trained about the research objectives and the research methods) to carry out interviews, group 
discussion and observation, and to provide written reports on the same events (such as the 
conflict reasons). Besides, we also used various sources of case reports by other colleagues from 
other departments. 
Validity  
Various sources of data not only enable triangulation but also increase the validity of operational 
concepts. According to Yin (1984: 34), construct validity is ensured by a combination of various 
qualitative methods (secondary sources, interviews, group discussions and participant 
observation) and appropriate statistical and quantitative sources. In addition, the participant 
observation method can bring high concept validity (highly regarded by Jorgensen (1989: 36-37) 
in that the concepts are examined and tested by observation of everyday life of people.  
We relied on a valid operational set of measures (Yin 1984: 34) which can be identified and 
significantly consolidated through our participant observation. Indeed, the method takes 
advantage of a collection of multiple indicators or forms of evidence regarding key concepts and 
the observed variables (Jorgensen 1989: 36, 37). Particularly, we could identify the conflicts in 
the Nui Phao project by examining not only the resistant cases, but also a variety of statistical 
data of complaints or the results of the complaint resolution status as well as the levels of 
satisfaction of the PAPs. In addition, the power imbalance has been identified through various 
decision making mechanisms within and between the public and private organizations. 
Furthermore, we employ the systematic combining scheme (Dubois & Gadde 2002; 2013) to 
modify the concepts and operational indicators  as a result of the empirical investigation, e.g. 
reconsideration of the indicators of conflicts, which were more often found in the latent form of 
complaints and letters or requests.  
Replication and external validity 
An important aspect in science is replication, while ethnography is “notorious for a lack of 
replication” (Johnson 1990: 19 & 20). This lack of replication logic in a single case design is often 
voiced as a concern by various advocates of multiple case designs (Yin 1984, 2009 & 2012; 
Eisenhardt, 2007). We would rather sympathize with Campbell (in Fielding & Fielding 1986: 43) 
who argued that fieldworkers are not interested in replication; they want to make a discovery on 
their own (see also Dubois & Gadde 2002, 2013).  
Nevertheless, there are certain approaches that allow replication in ethnography, namely partial 
replication and staged replication. Partial replication refers to only portions of other case studies 
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which are repeated or compared. Staged replication takes place within or across sites where the 
researcher can alternatively validate the findings in one site through testing on other sites, or 
verification can be within a single study when the findings from an earlier stage are tested or 
verified in later phases of the same study. These suggestions are useful in our case study since 
our analytical framework is likely to produce partial replication through a comparative analysis 
of the PPP in different domains (displacement and economic rehabilitation) and staged 
replication through the analysis of the PPP at different stages of project development from 
2006 to 2013.  
Reliability 
Both construct validity and reliability of qualitative data are determined by empirical 
demonstration (Fielding & Fielding 1986: 89). In our understanding, to achieve the reliability of a 
case study we must be able to demonstrate the relationship between the researchers and the 
collected data. Accordingly, we adapted certain measures so as to check the reliability of a 
qualitative study as well as our participant observation, as suggested by Wiseman 1970 in 
Jorgensen (1989: 37), as follows: 
- Concepts are formulated and checked by multiple procedures and forms of evidence, 
from various sources (informants, documents, artifacts…) and by different methods 
(observation, interview, group discussion, quantitative survey…); 
- Access to insider’s world. 
We want to conclude the arguments on reliability by providing an overall comment over these 
criteria by Douglas (1970: 12 in Fielding & Fielding 1986: 83) that “the only valid and reliable (or 
hard, scientific) evidence concerning socially meaningful phenomena we can possibly have is 
that based ultimately on systematic observation and analyses of everyday life”.  
Thus, since participant observation is not the only method used in our field activities, the 
application of modern qualitative field techniques is helpful for safeguarding the quality of this 
research work (Table 30). 
Table 30: Summary of quality assurance measures in our case study 
Criteria Requirements Measures applied in our investigation 
Construct 
validity  
Multiple sources 
of evidence 
Systematic Combining Scheme’; concepts are tested and validated by GD, FG 
and interviews and participant observation; reconciliation of qualitative and 
quantitative sources. 
External 
validity  
Replication logic, 
Pattern 
matching 
Embedded units of analysis; 
Partial and staged replication. 
Reliability  Quality of data Triangulation of data collected by the informants and others; full insider’s 
position (or relationship with informants); skillful implication of participant 
observation based on personal experience and qualification;  
Reconciliation of qualitative and secondary (statistical) sources of data. 
(Adapted from Yin 1984: 33-38) 
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3.7. Relation of the researcher to the research problem and the studied site 
Our views on the research problem and the studied site have already been partly discussed in 
the previous section (Box 2: How did I get the consultation contract and my main consultation 
tasks and Box 3: The reaction of the stakeholders on my position as a researcher, and about my 
research topic). This section is set forth to unlock the concerns about certain side effects of 
participant observation on the quality and credibility of qualitative research as well as on the 
studied groups (the ethical issue), emphasizing the neutral position of the researcher.  
Indeed, Patton (1999: 1203) expressed his concerns that the researcher’s personal perspective 
or at least his/ her presence might affect the attitudes or behaviors of other participants during 
participant observation. Moreover, Moose (2005) was critical about the professional identity of 
ethnographers, which might be dominated by the interest of the project donors or influenced by 
the political will. Particularly in our case, our consultation work is hired and supervised by the 
company. However, we are confident about our relatively neutral position in the project due to 
the following reasons: 
First, in regards to our consultation contract, I am not employed by the project since my current 
employer is the Institute for European Studies, which belongs to the government and my PhD 
research was funded by the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC). My employment is short term 
and contract based and not long term based. The latter would bear the risk of making me 
become more dependent on the company. 
Second, in the practice of my field study, I did not experience any interference in the form of 
objections, directions or comments from the company or other stakeholders. The relationship 
with and the credibility held by the stakeholders was helpful to manage the field activities in an 
adequate manner.  
Finally, it is important to note that participant observation was applied at the second stage of 
our field activities in order to reconcile the findings of our qualitative field activities, 
conducted earlier. 
3.8. Ethical issues 
Ethical behavior is critically required in field research (Yin 2009; Neuman 2007; Cresswell 2003; 
DeWalt & Wayland 1998). We were aware of this issue during the research design phase and 
have developed a case study protocol (Yin 2009: 80), taking into account ethical issues. In the 
case study protocol, we anticipated sensitivity, “deviation” as well as possible “harm” to be done 
to the participants during communications and investigation.  
In this section we discuss how the ethical issues were managed in our research. We will also 
state certain levels of trade-off while carrying out the ethnography research in the field of 
compulsory land conversion in Vietnam (Schwartzman 1993; Johnson 1990; Punch 1986). 
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Information to and response from stakeholders 
Atkinson & Hammersley (1994:249) suggested that in the field, the researcher should be known 
to be a researcher by all those being studied, or only by some or by none. 
In general, we only kept relevant stakeholders (or interviewees) informed about our research 
objectives as opposed to keeping all of them informed. Some of the PAPs subjected to our 
participant observation were not precisely informed about our research objectives. Thus, the 
sensitive title of our research might have led to misunderstandings to the PAPs, who might seek 
for an external involvement for their own interest instead of providing our needed information.  
In addition, the project we studied has encountered a conflict boom in the last phases of land 
conversion and the pressure on the project progress limited the access of outsiders/ external 
investigators. Thus we approached our stakeholders with our research topic in a more flexible way as 
illustrated in Box 2 (How did I get the consultation contract and my main consultation tasks). 
However, when we about finished our fieldwork, we did present our research activities and our 
findings to the relevant informants as shown in Box 3 (The reaction of the stakeholders on my 
position as a researcher, and about my research topic). In addition, we also view the responses 
from the stakeholders (or interviewees) as measure for our data validation. In other words, we 
could improve our findings based on the stakeholders’ comments.       
Avoid harm  
There is little disagreement with a basic principle that people should not be physically harmed by 
research - meaning that ethical codes generally prohibit violations of peoples’ right to privacy, 
confidentiality and freedom from exploitation (Jorgensen 1989; Fetterman 1989).  
We were appropriately prepared so that in all our communications with a vulnerable population 
and with the opposed groups in the project, we showed respect of their benefits, privacy and 
confidentiality of the sensitive issues of conflicts and disputes, as well as other cultural and 
political aspects. In addition, the field notes were computerized with classifications and remarks 
during the analysis of our data and reporting. 
Making a contribution  
Lewis & Russell (2011), while viewing that the bias produced by ethnography is unavoidable, 
proposed a new approach (embedded ethnography) to facilitate the rigours of ethical approval 
on the one hand, and to enable for the research feedback to be “meaningful” to the 
collaborators and their objectives (Reiter - Theil, 2004: 23), on the other.  
 As we experienced in our case study, it is often required to spend a lengthy period of time in the 
field - this is necessary in order to observe and fully experience a full cycle of activity (Wolcott 
1988: 157 in Lewis & Russell 2011: 7) so as to make our participant observation “meaningful” in 
practice. Being a consultant in the community liaison and external affairs for a period of 2011-
2012, our research outcomes with regards to policy review, institutional building, planning, and 
108 
 
day-to-day supervision of implementation considerably contribute to our consultation work 
which benefits all stakeholders. Particularly, the participant observation outcomes could 
effectively contribute towards problem solving in the project as provided in Box 5 below:  
Box 5: Contribution of the participant observation result for problem solving in the NP project 
The neighbouring communities (namely Ha Thuong No 3, 4) of the Ha Thuong commune were not subjected for 
displacement for mining activities because the “distance” between the villages and the mine was acceptable by the 
laws. However, these areas will be environmentally affected my mining operations. The local people were not happy 
with the situation and, they strongly requested for compensation for their resident and agricultural land, which are 
neighboring the mine and asked that mine operations would be stopped. Further, nearly a 100 percent of households 
in those villages (with more than 200 households) have built new houses or consolidated their current houses by 
temporary materials in order to claim a greater compensation package from the government.  
The company had no means to stop the tendency of house building and consolidation although the district authorities 
issued several warning letters. 
Arising from consultations with the PAPs in combination with the policy review and discussions with relevant 
governmental organizations, some measures have now been recommended. 
First, based on the policy review which allows for both full and partial displacement under environmental impacts on 
the non-compulsory land conversion, the research team suggested the company to prepare a proposal for 
compensation and relocation of resident land and for the use of the company’s budget instead of the provincial 
budget for this purpose.  
 A decision has been made in favor of the local people (they may choose to relocate or stay (fully of partly), so that 
their expectations of resident relocation are met, while allowing them to continue with the agricultural activities.  
Second, since this is not a compulsory displacement, the senior executives (company and district authorities) have the 
right to allow or reject compensation if over- payment or abuse of compensation is suspected and found. These 
measures, therefore can limit further illegal construction and consolidation of houses.  
However, the research team has taken a great deal of pictures of the local houses and the neighboring landscapes 
before the official announcement of land acquisition. The purpose of the pictures was for a comparison of the 
livelihoods before and after the displacement. The pictures were used as evidence for a housing status so that local 
people cannot claim extra compensation payments based on the newly constructed houses. 
The evidence was provided to media and the authorities used it as a warning and public pressure was called upon to 
suppress wrong/illegal behaviour.  
In contrast, Atkinson & Hammersley (1994: 252-254), discussed the relationship between 
ethnographic research and social and political practice. They claimed that in the past and 
probably still today, most of ethnography has been directed towards contributing to disciplinary 
knowledge rather than towards solving practical problems. In recent years, as a result of broader 
applications of ethnography in various disciplines and applied fields, a more applied form of 
ethnography calls for “collaborative” (referred by Lewis & Russell 2011 as embedded) research, 
boosting a greater impact on social and political practice. However, these authors argued that 
the researchers should not lose sight of what has hitherto been the goal of ethnographic 
research namely, the production of knowledge. Ethnographers should not replace this with the 
pursuit of practical goals which, although sometimes valuable in themselves, are no more 
worthy in general terms of time and effort than the pursuit of knowledge. They (Atkinson & 
Hammersley: 254) concluded that “Utopian attempts to do politics by means of research are of 
no service to anyone”. 
However, we are in favour of embedded research and since we chose participant observation, 
we became a member of the studied organization indicating that our research outcomes must 
contribute to practice in that sense. Nevertheless, we also have to make some trade-offs, while 
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holding a dual role. For example, I had to give up the consultancy work in order to complete the 
research when the empirical data has been sufficiently collected. This is not an easy decision, 
especially if the project still needs one’s continuous service. 
A solution to this dilemma was found by reserving eight months a year for being in the field as a 
consultant, and spending the remaining four months per year at KU Leuven, writing field reports 
and continuing with the courses necessary for PhD completion. The trade-off was the prolonged 
study processes and a disruption of the project consultation work.    
Trade-off between research outcomes and organizational loyalty 
The project we studied is privately owned, and its owner has a presence in the Vietnamese and 
international stock markets. Consequently, the principles of confidentiality, information 
disclosure and external communication (about the project) are subject of strict control and 
restricted in general. This section combines the above sections to a more practical level, 
especially the ones that relate to dissemination and publication. 
 Be “neutral” and “flexible” instead of being straight forward: 
We agree with the ethnical issue raised by DeWalt & Wayland (1998: 288) that “unless 
ethnographers use methods other than just participant observation, they are unlikely to report 
the negative aspects of their subjects’ personalities and lives”. This is true in our case since the 
informants and subjects are (or have become) friends, colleagues, partners and to some extent, 
employer(s) (short-term). However, the way we could reflect practice in our empirical data was 
to be ‘neutral’ and “flexible”. For example, when we reported on a negative case of people who 
tried to abuse land compensation incentives, we relied on the fact that these people’s reactions 
were a result of the absence of control and announcement transparency about sanctions from 
local authorities and the project owner. 
 Be in appropriate time rather than being timely: 
In spite of the fact that our investigation is legitimate in the field, our dissemination of periodical 
research outcomes has been purposely suspended until the majority of complaints and conflicts 
were fully or partly resolved. Both the local authorities and the private owner were not in favor 
of dissemination of sensitive issues in the context of high public pressure on compulsory land 
conversion in the country. 
 Be implicitly critical rather than explicitly: 
Some findings in our research are found to be critical of the government, public institutions, 
private goals, oppression, power imbalance and illegitimacy, which will be difficult to explicitly 
disseminate at a later stage. Our strategy is to combine other published sources of evidence 
including reports, press articles and statements in public forums to implicitly disseminate our 
criticisms. In other word, on top of distributing our own critical pieces, we chose to supplement 
them with similar critical pieces written by other people. 
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3.9. Limitation of our participant observation 
DeWalt & Wayland 1998 are concerned by the tensions between participation and observation. 
She noted that the term participation observation is a paradox because the ethnographer seeks 
to understand the native’s viewpoint but not “go native” DeWalt & Wayland (1998: 263) or in 
other words, “participation implies emotional involvement while observation requires 
detachment” (Benjamin Paul 1953: 69 in DeWalt & Wayland 1998: 262). In our case, by 
attempting to access the case by being a member of the project, one could argue that we have 
become too “native”. We became strongly engaged with the project by being accountable and 
responsible for our project assigned tasks. In this way, we risked falling into the trap that 
Jorgensen (1989) warned about, where the researcher becomes the phenomenon. He claimed 
that “once a researcher becomes a phenomenon… the researcher may be lost to the community 
of science… the research may be contaminated by “subjectivity” and personal feelings and the 
scientific identity of the researcher may be spoiled”. For example, we might over-utilize the 
private investor’s perspective in our arguments on conflict resolution measures. However, owing 
to regular discussions with my promoters (local and Belgian) in combination with information 
sharing with other colleagues, I hope to reflect the role of a researcher during the course of 
participant observation. For example, at the international conference in Lisbon34, I have 
perceived various valuable feedbacks from other researchers on my findings, especially in terms 
of corporate social responsibilities (CSRs) and ethical goals in our research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
The EUROASEAS International Conference organized from 2 to 5
th
 July 2013 in Lisbon: My presentation was on the 
Public Private Partnership and CSRs: Compulsory land conversion in a mining project in Vietnam.  
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4. THE STUDIED CASE 
This chapter presents a comprehensive profile about the NP project, encompassing the socio-
economic background of the project area, the project history and key activities. In particular, the 
introduction of the participant actors and the mapping of the conflict status in the NP project are 
precisely organized in this chapter in order to provide a steady analytical background to answer 
the research questions. 
4.1. The research site 
4.1.1. Thai Nguyen province35 
The province of Thai Nguyen is located 80 km north of Ha Noi. Thai Nguyen is considered as the 
economic, cultural and administrative centre of the midlands and mountainous provinces in the 
north of Ha Noi. It is also the gateway to economic and social exchanges between the midlands 
and mountainous areas and the northern plains. 
The province has a population of 1.2 million out of which a significant proportion are minority 
ethnic groups. In particular, whereas Vietnam’s overall minority ethnic groups account for 13 
percent of the total population of the country as a whole36, Thai Nguyen minority ethnic groups 
account for 30% of the population of the province. Thai Nguyen ethnic minority groups consist of 
Tay, Nung, San Diu, Mong, San Chay, San Chi and Dao. The rest of the province’s population (70 
percent) is the Kinh people. 
Thai Nguyen has a surface area of 3,562 km2. The geology of the province is mainly mountainous, 
accounting for 90.73 percent of the total surface area. The rest - the midlands - accounts for only 
9.27percent37. Thai Nguyen province has nine administrative divisions: Thai Nguyen City, Song 
Cong town and 7 districts: Pho Yen, Phu Binh, Dong Hy, Vo Nhai, Dinh Hoa, Phu Luong. There are 
a total of 180 communes, among which 125 communes are highland/mountainous communes, 
while the remaining ones are plain/midland communes. 
Tea is the strength of perennial tree plantations of the province. Further, Thai Nguyen is rich in 
minerals and forest produce but most of the local produce (minerals, wood, apart from 
agricultural produce) are marketed raw only, especially the minerals such as lead and zinc.  
The coal reserves in Thai Nguyen are second largest in the country. However, in spite of a high 
potential the province is in slow industrialization and urbanization due to a limited development 
budget available from the government in combination with a limited investment capital from the 
private sector. Notably, the provincial government has been ranked at 57th among 63 provinces 
and cities in Vietnam in regards to the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI). The PCI, regarded 
as the only evaluation indicator initiated by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(VCCI) on the competitive capacity between provinces in Vietnam, strongly focuses on the 
                                                          
35
 The statistic in 2010, retrieved from http://www.thainguyen.gov.vn in May 2012 
36
 Retrieved from http://www.vn.undp.org/ in 2013 
37
 Vietnam National Assembly Ethnics Committee, retrieved from http://www.cema.gov.vn in May 2012 
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evaluation of the attitude and behavior of the provincial government towards the private 
sector with the inclusion of policies, transparency, legal institutions, access to land and land 
use stability38. 
Under the impact of the domestic and international economic downturn, the province’s 
economic growth rate in 2011 was reduced to 9.36 percent while the average growth rate during 
2006-2010 was 12-13 percent. The GDP per capita in the province reached 22.3 million VND39 
(1.100 USD) which was lower than the national GDP per capital in 2011 (1.411 USD)40. The 
poverty rate in the province in 2011 was 18 percent, while the one at domestic level was 14 
percent in 2011. In addition, the province has a high close-to-poor rate of about 10 percent of 
the total population, which makes the total of poor and closed-the-poor almost one third of the 
total population in the province. 
The private sector is the key player in the provincial economy, accounting for 63 percent in total 
revenues while the state-owned enterprises account for only 7.7 percent41. Therefore, the 
province is in a dire need for a substantial budget to develop. Thai Nguyen has been subsidized 
by the government budget since the average annual income is lower than the expenditure42. This 
in particular explains why Nui Phao Mining Company (NPM) will play a key role in the provincial 
socio-economic development in terms of budget enrichment once it becomes operational. 
4.1.2. Dai Tu43 district 
Dai Tu is a semi-mountainous district, situated in the northwest of Thai Nguyen Province, 25 km 
away from Thai Nguyen City. The geological conditions are complex with continuous mountains, 
hills and streams. The surface land area of the district is about 57.790 ha of which agricultural 
and forest land account for majority (26.92 percent and 45.2 percent, respectively). The total 
district population is about 168,000 which include 93,800 labour-aged people. Notably, 94 
percent of the total district population is in the agricultural sector, while the remaining 6 percent 
belong to the non-agricultural sector. 
The district is a living place of all the 8 ethnic minority groups beside the Kinh people. The district 
has the largest area devoted to rice and tea cultivation in the province (12,500 ha of rice and 
5,000 ha of tea); Dai Tu also takes advantage of having of Nui Coc Lake tourist area which is 
known nationwide, as well as being a traditional district with historical landmarks of the patriotic 
revolution: There are 169 historical sites and scenic spots44. 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Report PCI 2011 - Vietnam.  
39
 See Documentation for review: Thai Nguyen socio-economic report 2011 
40
 Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD in 2012 
41
 See Documentation for review: Thai Nguyen socio-economic report 2011 
42
 See Documentation for review: Thai Nguyen socio-economic report 2011 
43
 The statistic in 2010 retrieved from http://www.thainguyen.gov.vn  in 2012 
44
 Retrieved from www.thainguyen.gov.vn in May 2012 
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Figure 7: Location of the NP project 
  
The map of Vietnam The Northern part of Vietnam 
(Dai Tu Administrative Cadastral Department) 
Despite the potential of the area, up to 40,300 households are poor, accounting for 24.63 
percent, of the total population, which is considerably higher than the national average rate (14 
percent) and the provincial rate of (18 percent)45. In 2011, the average income per head was 
14.7 million dong/ per year, compared to the 22.3 million/ per year in the province46 (equivalent 
to 700 USD/year and 1.100 USD/ year, respectively).  
The main source of income of the district people comes from tea trees, planted across 5,200 ha, 
which yielded 43,200 tons in 2007. The low yield value was due to the non-advanced tools used 
in the harvesting (mostly families using primitive tools).  
Dai Tu is characterized by low level of education. Even though the district has implemented plans 
for compulsory universal primary education and illiteracy eradication since 1993, the quality of 
education still remains low. The district now has 35 primary schools, 30 secondary schools, three 
high schools and one continuing education centre but their infrastructure is still poor. At least 
two thirds of these establishments are facing a serious lack of investment.  
The Nui Phao Mining Project local area is characterized by a narrow economic base, heavily 
dependent on subsistence agriculture as the predominant livelihood activity. The project area 
has been naturally polluted by ill-managed mining operations in the past, and therefore, some of 
                                                          
45
 Documentation for review: Thai Nguyen province and Dai Tu district:  statistics and socio-economic report 2011. 
46
 Ibid. 
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the significant local development needs to be related to health issues and safe water supplies 
due to the existing environmental and other conditions in the mentioned areas.  
4.2. Nui Phao Project47 
4.2.1. Descriptions 
The Nui Phao48 mining project is conventional open pit mining and a mineral processing 
operation located approximately 80 km northwest of the capital, Hanoi, and about 150 km south 
of Vietnam’s northern border with China. The project is located within the Dai Tu District of Thai 
Nguyen Province. The primary commodities to be produced at Nui Phao are tungsten and 
fluorspar. Secondary metals to be produced include bismuth, copper, gold and silver. Nui Phao 
has one of the world’s largest identified tungsten deposits outside China, with 55.4 million tons 
of ore. Once in production, Nui Phao will be the largest producer of tungsten outside China, and 
among the largest producers of acid-grade fluorspar and bismuth in the world. Nui Phao is a 
unique tungsten-poly-metallic mine which is poised to be one of the world’s lowest-cost 
producers of tungsten (Box 6). 
Box 6: Tungsten - the main products of the NP mine 
Tungsten is a transition metal in colour from white to continental steel, very hard and heavy, heat-resistant with a. 
very high melting temperature (34,100
0
C). Stable in air at room temperature, dissolved in a mixture of hydrofluoric 
acid. Tungsten is precious metal, it is quite rare, only 1.10-4 percent by weight of the Earth's crust. 
The products of tungsten 
- Metal hardware : including use of metal cutting tools and stone tools such as drills scale mining; sophisticated tools 
such as drills used in dental tool the steel industry; weapons (artillery shells, grenades and missiles), and even the 
ballpoint pen. 
- Steel and super alloys: tungsten is used in cutting tools and super alloys used in applications such as jet engine 
turbine. 
- Filament, however, the use of tungsten in this industry is gradually declining due to more efficient light sources are 
being developed and put into use. 
- The electrical and electronic applications such as circuit boards used in the production and in electrical contacts, 
electrodes. 
- Applied Chemistry: Tungsten also has a wide range of chemical applications and other applications in the glass 
industry, ceramics, paint, and oil and gas. 
In the world, China accounted for 75 percent of total world production, other countries including Australia, Bolivia, 
Portugal, Russia, and Colombia, Vietnam produce the rest of volume. 
The major project components include: the open pit mine (Sector 1); waste rock disposal 
facilities (Sector 2); modern mine plant and facilities, including a crushing plant, grinding, 
thickening, flotation, and gravity recovery (Sector 3, 4); a tailings storage facility (TSF) with water 
management ponds (Sector 5); and ancillary facilities, including buffer zones, relocation sites, 
haul roads, accommodation facilities, and mine service (Sector 6). 
                                                          
47
 See Documentation for review: The data is based on the company documents such as the Nui Phao project feasible 
study, RAP, Joint Venture Agreement. 
48
 In English the term of Nui Phao means Artillery Mountain. 
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4.2.2. History 
In 2000 the Canadian company - Tiberon identified a significant poly-metallic deposit at Nui 
Phao. In 2004 Nui Phao Joint Venture was established between Tiberon and two local companies 
(one was private, and the other one was state-owned) with a total investment capital of 150 
million USD. The project was subjected to foreign direct investment (FDI) laws. In 2007 the 
project was acquired by Dragon Capital - a domestic private investment company. The project 
has since become a 100 percent domestic investment. Due to the economic crisis in 2010, the 
project was once again transferred to another private company - the Masan Resources, 
belonging to the Masan Group - a premier private company in Vietnam, specializing in consumer 
products, banks and mineral resources. The amount of investment into the project reached 500 
million USD, ranking the project as one of the biggest mine investment in Vietnam and in the region.  
Current status of the NP project  
Under the impact of historical factors of the project, the compensation and resettlement 
activities commenced in 2006 have been suspended upon every change of ownership. The main 
reason was that the project was “too big” for some investors and that it required a substantial 
investment capital. In addition, the investors encountered a capital deficit under the impact of 
the global financial crisis.  
Within two years of having been re-activated (starting from mid 2010 until mid 2012), the 
percentage of the areas (given as a percentage of the total land required by the project) with 
approved compensation plans acquired by Nui Phao Mining has increased from 30 percent to 
nearly 99.6 percent, with over 97 percent of the land already transferred to the project49. There 
are 56 remaining households resisting the land acquisition process, out of the total 3,300 
affected households. Further, the project has received constant complaints and enquiries from 
thousands of PAHs through the available information channels and from the task force group 
responsible for complaint mediation and resolutions. 
Table 31: The NP Project milestones 
Year Milestone Descriptions 
2004 
Socioeconomic Survey (SES) and Inventory of 
Losses (IOL) for 100 percent of the project affected 
households. 
Prepared by the consultation company, hired by 
the investor (Tiberon), supported by the province 
and district functional departments. 
2004 
Decision No 05/CT-UB of Thai Nguyen PPC on 
activation of land conversion activities of NP 
project. 
Tiberon was looking for a Vietnamese partner 
2004 
Investment license granted with total investment of 
USD 150 million. 
NuiphaoVica JVC between Vietnam and Canada 
(NuiphaoVica). 
2005 
Provincial approval for RAP/ IEA. Based on the Decree 197/ 2004 regarding 
compensation and resettlement; Total estimated 
compensation budget was about 26 million USD. 
                                                          
49
 See Documentation for review: NPM reports, counted to end of June 2012. 
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2005 
Decision No.1932/QD-UBND dated 22 September-
2005 on approval of implementation of 
compensation, assistance and resettlement in 
NPM. 
Provincial Guidance for policy implementation in 
NP project. 
2006 
Service Contracts signed between NPM and the 
District BCSR. 
Service Contracts also signed between NPM and 
other two private consultation companies for DMS 
in order to support the District BCSR. 
2006 
Start implementation of RAP (DMS, PCDP and 
ERPs). 
 
Demarcation Measurement Survey  (DMS); 
Relocation arrangement; 
Economic Restoration/ PCDP and Community 
Support (CDP and CSR). 
2006 
Establishment of Compensation Oversight Board 
(Province). 
28 members. 
2006 
Establishment of Compensation Council for NP 
project (District). 
PAPs and communal authorities are also members. 
2007 Transfer to the new owner - the Dragon Capital. Become a domestic private company. 
2007 
Approval for overall budget for compensation, 
support and resettlement plan of NPM by TN PPC. 
No 2656/2007; total compensation package was 
around 900 billion VND (USD= 40 millions). 
2006-
2008 
Start construction of relocation sites (Nam Song 
Cong and Hung Son 3). 
800 plots for the resettlers. 
2007 
Updated RAP and reviewed and approved by 
TNPPC - Decision No. 2656/QD-UBND dated 26 
Novenber-2007. 
In line with the change of the policy: now Decree 
84/ 2007. 
2008-
2009 
Project suspension due to financial crisis. 4 percent of land has been officially acquired
50
; 40 
percent of total compensation payment has been 
advanced. 
2010 
Project re-activation by the new investor - Masan 
Resources with total investment of USD 500 
million. 
The name of the company from NuiphaoVica 
changed to Nui Phao Mining (NPM). 
2010 
Contract re-signed with the Dai Tu BCSR. Only for compensation activities (not for economic 
restoration and relocation). 
2010 
Updated RAP. 
PPC approval of NPM proposal (Decision No 04-
2010/NPM) on additional policies and budget. 
Revision of Compensation, Assistance and 
Resettlement policies in Thai Nguyen province in 
line with the revised law (Decree 69/ 2009). 
Total compensation package was increased to 
1,400 billion VND (60 million USD). 
2010 
Establishment of Thai Nguyen Land Development 
Fund. 
As guided by the new law; the District BCSR 
becomes the District Land Development Fund. 
2011 
Earthwork commenced - mass recruitment of PAPs. Conflict boom in October 2011 by demonstration 
and re-occupation of land 
                                                          
50
 However, DMS greatly has been completed and payment was advanced to the PAPs. 
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2011-
2012 
Establishment of the Task Force for complaint 
resolution. 
Conflicts were resolved through open dialogues, 
97% of the land was transferred to the project. 
2012 
Decision No 13 of the TN PPC on focused 
responsibilities of relevant departments to 
resettlement projects in Thai Nguyen Province. 
Responsibilities of functional departments, 
including DOLISA in term of training and income 
generation. 
2012 
Decision No 150/ NPMC in regards to additional 
entitlements for PAPs. 
A great deal of long-lasting complaints were 
resolved 
2013 
The mine is in operation. Minority of PAPs is still resisting; further 
displacement for enlargement of project 
footprints. 
4.2.3. Benefit and impact 
Potential benefit of the project 
1,350 million USD is scheduled to be the export value of the project during the first 5 years of 
production (2013-2017). The national and provincial budget will benefit 1,200 billion VND 
(approximately 60 million USD) in the first year of operation (2013) and more than 2,000 billion 
(approximately 100 million USD) VND for every following year51, while the district budget will 
benefit 100 billion/ year (4.5 million USD). The project operations and its outsourcing service will 
begin the transition of the district from an agricultural area to a more industrially oriented 
industry-service and tourism. Besides, the project will create 1,500 jobs for local laborers. The 
tax revenue from product export products will contribute to an amount equivalent to 50 percent 
of total provincial budget. 
Impacts of land acquisition 
The development of the Nui Phao mining project has inevitably resulted in severe land 
acquisition. According to the RAP updated in 2007 of the NP project, the land base of the project 
area is approximately 478 ha (40.9 ha is residential land and 367.2 ha is agricultural and other 
land). The total area required for the resettlement sites is 156.7 ha. There are 3,313 project 
affected households (PAHs), of which 1,231 households need to move their houses (985 
households prefer the resettlement sites while 246 households prefer self-resettlement). The 
estimated and approved cost for compensation, assistance and resettlement is VND 
885,434,422,000 (equivalent to 40 million USD) in 2007, being increased if compared to the 
initial budget of 26 million USD stated by the first RAP in 2005 (see Table 31: Project milestones).  
The project area extends mainly in four communes in the Dai Tu District which are Ha Thuong 
commune, Hung Son commune, Tan Linh commune and Cat Ne commune. Ha Thuong is the 
most severely affected commune with more than 776 houses having to relocate, losing about 
one third of its population, and removing a hundred percent of population of two villages of 
the commune.   
                                                          
51
 NPM Annual report 2011-2012 and see more publication in http://www.baomoi.com/Du-an-Nui-Phao-Hieu-qua-
dung-tien-do/45/9173675.epi 
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In 2012 with the need for the expansion of the project footprint and some additional areas 
required for either engineering works or for the mitigation of environmentally adverse impacts, 
the total area of land needed for six sectors was increased to 678 ha. Additional areas newly 
acquired in 2012 have a total surface area of 66.1 ha, while the total area acquired for the 
resettlement sites and site for economic restoration activities have a surface area of 145.4 ha. 
The total updated cost has increased to VND 1,400 billion (equivalent to approximately 60 
million USD).  
Picture 1: The landscape of the NP project before land acquisition 
 
 
 
 
The displacement of people introduced by the Nui Phao project causes economic, social, and 
environmental impacts. Disruptions to community structure, social networks, and loss of 
productive assets and income sources may cause a long-term hardship, impoverishment, and 
detrimental environmental impacts. 
4.2.4. Resettlement, support and compensation activities 
Due to their size and their significant influence on national and provincial socio-economic 
development, the project’s land conversion activities in the NP project are subjected to the Land 
Laws on Compulsory land conversion (2003) and the subsequently revised Decrees such as the 
Decree 197 (2004), Decree 84 (2007) and decree 69 (2009) during the seven years (2006-2013) 
of the resettlement and compensation stage.  
NPM has been also subjected to the supervision of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency’s (MIGA) policies, in regards to the planning and implementation of compensation, 
resettlement and livelihood rehabilitation. In accordance to the national Laws, a comprehensive 
resettlement process began in 2006 and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was developed as a 
collaborative effort with local and regional authorities and Project Affected Persons (PAPs). 
During the compensation and resettlement process, the RAP is subjected to be monitored and 
revised by internal and external (including international) audits. 
In the meantime, the PCPD and the CDP as well as more specific ERPs have been properly 
developed by the company in order to comply with the international norms as stated in Box 7.  
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Box 7: The international policies applied in the NP project  
A number of international norms, often regarded as social safeguard initiatives, have been set up as key instruments to 
guide the practice in resettlement projects. Examples of such policies are: 
- World Bank Group Operational Policies (OPs) and Operational Directives (ODs) 4.30, including OP 4.01 Environmental 
Assessment and OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement;  
- IFC’s Good Practice Manual (1998) “Doing Better Business through Effective Public Consultation”; 
- IFC’s “Investing in People: Sustaining Communities through Improved Business Practice - A Community Development 
Resource Guide for Companies” and; 
- The International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) and World Bank Group, “Community Development Toolkit”, 
prepared specifically to address community development in oil & gas and mining projects. 
(The NP RAP- 2005) 
The compensation activities 
Since the NPM obtained the Investment License (2004), the project owner was asked to prepare 
a RAP which was officially presented in 2006 and was subjected to annual update. The RAP was 
made in a close participation and consultation of local authorities at all levels including functional 
departments, BSCR and local people, especially potential project affected people (PAPs)52.  
From that time, all relevant actors agreed to carry out land conversion based on the content of 
RAP. The implementation of RAP involves participation of the NPM and all state actors. A service 
contract between NPM and the district BSCR has been signed to carry out technical work (DMS) 
on land conversion in two sectors of project areas (Sector 1 and Sector 3). The NPM also assigned 
other contracts with a professional consultation company to carry out technical work on land 
conversion in other sectors of project areas (Sectors 2, 4, 5 and 6) (see 4.2.1). However, all inputs 
from the land conversion service contract with the consultation company must be filtered 
through appraisal and administrative acknowledgement of the district BCSR. In other words, the 
district authority and its executive BCSR are legally responsible for the inputs of land conversion 
in the Nui Phao project including the inputs from the consultation company hired by NPM.  
Figure 8: Project areas and Dai Tu district administration map 
  
                                                          
52
 NPM RAP 2006: Summary of interviews and meetings of all stakeholders during RAP preparation 
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The relocation arrangement 
With active participation of the local government, three most feasible relocation sites have been 
identified, which were Nam Song Cong, Hung Son and, Dong Bong relocation. The households 
had a choice of which site they preferred. Typically, groups of households may wish to move to 
the same site, to preserve the social and economic connections. The functional department of 
the Dai Tu district together with NPM investigated suitable areas for relocation sites. The design 
of the selected relocation sites was made by NPM in accordance with Vietnamese standards for 
physical infrastructure and social services. The functional department and district authorities 
appraised and approved the construction of the relocation sites. Construction work at the Nam 
Song Cong relocation site was completed in 2008 by NPM and was registered as an 
administrative unit of the Hung Son Commune. Notably, the resettled people at the Nam Song 
Cong relocation site are subject to priority in terms of economic restoration. 
Box 8: The relocation activities in the NP project 
Nam Song Cong and Hung Son 3 relocation sites are situated close to the town of Dai Tu; this assisted households 
from making a transition from a purely rural environment to a somewhat more urbanized environment, with better 
infrastructural conditions. 
The relocation plots were available at no cost to households who are vacating a plot with a value equal or less to the 
cost of providing the infrastructure at the new site. Those whose previous plot was valued higher would receive the 
difference in cash. 
All plots at the resettlement site were provided with a construction permit; and the Land Right Use Certificates (Red 
Book). The households were also given the opportunity to self-relocate to the site of their choice. Some may wish to 
make arrangements with family members living in the vicinity, for instance, the elderly. Others may wish to construct 
a new house on the land they purchase elsewhere. Self-relocating households were given a special allowance, as by 
their actions the cost of developing the relocation sites was reduced. According to the provincial policy, the incentive 
to self-relocation was approved to the amount of VND 40 million (equal to approximately 2,000 USD) per household, 
while recently this amount was increased to a minimum  amount of  VND 80 million (equal to approximately 4,000 
USD) based on the additional budget of Nui Phao Mining 
  
 
Picture 2: Nam Song Cong Relocation Site (2012) Picture 3: Self-relocated in the village (2012) 
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The Economic Restoration Programs (ERPs) 
The ER for the affected HHs was properly developed in RAP of the project in line with the 
international norms in regards to benefit sharing from the project to the PAPs and PACs.  
“[...] All involuntary resettlement projects should be conceived and executed as development 
programs, with resettlers provided sufficient investment resources and opportunities to share in 
project benefits” (World Bank Operational Directives 4.30). 
Notably, the ERPs were implemented based on the company additional finance, being separate 
from the income stabilization allowance, granted by the government policies which have been 
already included in the in-cash compensation payment for the PAPs. 
The ER has been implemented together with the C&R activities since late 2005. In general, all 
PAHs, who lost more than 360 square meters of agricultural land, are eligible for economic 
restoration programs organized and subsidized by NPM. Accordingly, 2,732 PAHs were eligible to 
ERPs, equivalent to 3,446 ER portions53. 
The economic restoration activities derived from the fact that majority of the people were fully 
affected on not only the residential land but also agricultural land. Further, if agricultural land for 
replacing agricultural land loss is not available, affected HHs will not have productive land to 
continue with farming activities or with smaller areas of productive land for farming activities. 
Therefore, compensation for their lost properties is not sufficient to help them to generate 
income after land acquisition. Income restoration with different activities (farm and non-farm 
based activities) must be implemented to make sure that the project affected people will, at 
least, not be worse off. The cross support within the framework of the Community Development 
Plan (CDP) is also needed in the long term to ensure sustainable development.  
The economic restoration programs (ERPs) have been diversified in the forms of vocational 
training and job creations, agricultural service extension (husbandry, tea planting, porcupine 
raising, mushroom farming), non-farming activities including business and out-sourcing service 
development (shops, laundry, car washing and construction service) and funding for self-
employment depending on people’s preference. The ERPs have been particularly implemented 
through recruitment of PAPs for NPM and contractors. In addition, the economic restoration 
activities have been implemented including assistance to the vulnerable groups (female headed 
households, ethnic minority and poor households). 
Besides, collective models are to be encouraged to generate income through outsourcing, 
procurement and supply service for project development. Local supply of bags, pallets for 
Tungsten product and NPM uniforms is accelerated under the company procurement priority 
rankings. Meanwhile, partnership models such as the Hung Son mushroom investor proved to be 
a promising approach for the continuation of the economic restoration activities. 
                                                          
53
 See Documentation for review: NPM Community Liaison report 2011 
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The Public Consultation and Information Disclosure Plan (PCDP) 
The PCDP was developed in 2006 by an international consulting group. The plan was viewed as 
an integral part of the RAP and would maintain its functions throughout the project life inferring 
that the PCDP was not limited to RAP implementation. The implementation of PCDP has a 
double purpose. It aimed at showing all stakeholders that the company continues the 
implementation of company commitment and that national and international standards are 
applicable. It also meant to provide evidence to the financiers, investors and other stakeholders 
that Nui Phao is implementing its project based on consultation and with the participation of 
stakeholders in a transparent way. 
Information disclosure takes place at grassroots level - through various channels and tools, 
including TV, newspapers, community information spots and community loud-speakers to all 23 
affected hamlets and the four commune headquarters. Particularly, the NPM Information 
Centre, established in 2006, has attracted daily visits of PAPs and other interested people. 
In addition, the two-way communication is maintained through intensive public/community 
meetings. The community capacity building and awareness raising activities have been 
generated through workshops and seminars with the participation of external partners. 
Particularly, the main topics for community meetings are related to addressing the complaints 
with regards to the resettlement policies and environmental impacts of the project. The 
complaint mechanism for PAPs in the project has been composed, disseminated and 
implemented accordingly. 
The provincial task force for complaint resolution on compensation and resettlement (C&R) 
issues was set up on 20th October 2011 to deal with huge numbers of complaints and questions 
from PAPs of the Nui Phao project. To date, the majority of complaints and questions have been 
resolved at the task force level. The next step of issuing official letters of resolution by the 
district authority takes a longer process.  
Due to critical needs in accelerating the C&R process, the task force performance results are 
subject to regular and close monitoring.  
The Community Development Plan (CDP)  
The Plan was composed in 2006 by international consulting groups. The plan is viewed as the 
realization of company’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) through community development 
and social safeguard programs in the local area, particularly within its host communities. In 
particular, the scope of CDP activities in NP project encompassed the Gender Programs in the 
form of micro-finance; the economic restoration fund54 for PAP; the construction or 
improvement of infrastructure (roads, schools and health care centers); the programs for ethnic 
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 CDP report 2013: From 2013 NPM committed to fundraising from 100,000 to 150,000 USD annually 
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minorities; the capacity building activities as cross- supportive activities for ERPs and other 
CSR contributions. 
In spite of pre-production (meaning that there were no benefits from the project operations 
yet),  since 2005, NPV ( called NPM now) has provided support to the project communities in Ha 
Thuong, Hung Son and Cat Ne CDP with different activities. For example, NPV supported a 
kitchen for a kindergarten and improved some parts of village access roads in Hung Son 
commune, upgraded the health care centre and primary school in Ha Thuong. They also 
supported severely, storm affected families in Ha Thuong in 2009 as well as supported many 
poor families during the Tet festival time, the Elderly Association and the Catholic minority 
group, to name but a few actions. 
4.2.5. Actors and participants55 
There is a variety of public, private and non-profit actors joining the land conversion process in 
the NP project. Based on the assignments in the institutional arrangements in the NP project and 
the functions in organizations, in combination with day-to-day implementation of land 
conversion activities, the key actors were found to be the investor, the multi-layer state agencies 
and the oversight boards as illustrated in Figure 9 below. 
Besides, there were other related actors, who participated as representatives and acted on the 
request basis such as mass organizations, contractors and training institutions. In this research, 
the community groups of PAHs and PACs were viewed to be the “third party” in the NP project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55
 Summarized from provincial Decision No 01/2010/ QD- UBND 5
th
 Jan 2010; the revised RAP and the NPM 
Stakeholder List. 
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Figure 9: Procedures for compulsory land conversion in the NP project 
 
(Compiled from the Decision No 01/2010/ QD-UBND of Thai Nguyen PPC based on Decree 69/ 
2009/ ND-CP of the Government) 
Thai Nguyen Provincial People’s Committee (TNPPC) 
People's Committee is the executive arm of the provincial government, and is responsible for 
formulating and implementing policy. In Vietnam, provincial governments are expected to be 
subordinate to the central government56. 
Thai Nguyen Provincial People’s Committee (TNPPC) is overall responsible for resettlement 
activities within its administrative jurisdiction. The main responsibilities of the TNPPC include: 
                                                          
56
 Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Provinces_of_Vietnam in May 2012 
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[...] the adaptation of the project resettlement policy, the endorsement of the RAP, and 
the creation of the sub-compensation plan for each sector; 
[...] directing responsibilities to the relevant (functional) departments, for the institutions 
preparing and implementing the RAP and for the Project affected Households (PAHs); 
[...] establishing the Provincial Compensation Oversight Board (COB), the provincial 
advisory team and the Dai Tu Compensation, Assistance and Resettlement Committee as 
well as approving; 
[...] the regulations on the operations of COB and disseminating the responsibilities among 
its members; 
The Thai Nguyen Provincial People Committee is also responsible for approving: 
[...] the unit costs of compensation for land and other affected assets, allowances and 
subsidies to the Project Affected Persons;  
[...] the location and design of the sites for relocation, site planning, detailed designs and 
bidding documents of relocation sites and also for the results of bidding evaluations and 
selection of contractors for site construction; 
[...] the Committee must also address complaints and grievances at the third step of the 
complaint mechanism which is set forth in the project resettlement policy framework. 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Department of Finance (DoF) 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Department of Finance (DoF) is a specialized authority under the TN PPC, 
responsible for the implementation of the local state management function on finance; state 
budget; taxes, fees, charges and other expenses of state budget; state properties; national 
financial funds; financial investment; enterprise finance; accounting; independent audit; tariff 
and financial service activities under the Laws. 
The operation of DoF is guided by the instructions and management of the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF). 
In the NP project, the DoF is responsible for: 
[...] advising the TN PPC on mechanisms and policies related to compensation, assistance 
and resettlement; 
[...] chairing the advisory team for the evaluation of compensation budgets in order to 
assist the TN PPC in the decision making process; 
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[...] appraising the compensation estimation budgets of crops, plants, subsidies, and costs 
of implementation; 
[...] summarizing the problems on the land acquisition compensation process and for 
organizing conferences, for conducting inspections and re-inspections in the field (if necessary) 
in order to propose solutions and, finally, carry out problem solving when required. 
The Vice-director of DoF who is assigned to be a member of Compensation Oversight Committee 
(COB) is responsible for the collaboration with NPM and other stakeholders of the NP project. A 
group of 5-7 experts are assigned to assist the implementation of the functions of the DoF in 
the NP project. 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Department of Construction (DoC) 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Department of Construction (DoC) is a professional unit of the TN PPC, 
responsible for implementing the State administration in the fields of construction; architecture 
and construction planning; urban infrastructure, industrial areas, urban development including 
houses and offices; real estate trading; building materials; public services relating to the 
Department’s State administration; and to implement other duties and rights as allocated and/or 
authorized by the TN PPC and by the laws. The DoC also operates under the professional 
direction and management by the Ministry of Construction. 
In NP project, the DoC is held to: 
[...] advise the TNPPC on the compensation rates for houses, buildings and structural 
objectives; 
[...] determine what types of properties, buildings and structures are legible for 
compensation; 
[...] appraise compensation packages on housing structures and valuable assets. 
The Vice-Director of DoC is also a member of COB and is responsible for the collaboration with 
NPM and other stakeholders of the NP project. A group of 5-7 experts are assigned to assist the 
implementation of the functions of the DoF in the NP project. 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) 
Thai Nguyen Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DONRE) is assigned by the TN 
PPC and the MONRE to perform the state management of land resources, water resources and 
hydrometeorology, mineral resources, environment maps of the province in accordance with the 
law. The TN DONRE is under the direction and management of the TN PPC, and subject to the 
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direction and management of professional services of the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment. 
In the NP project, the DONRE is responsible for: 
[...] defining the area, soil type, and the purpose of each soil type which will be used upon 
the recovery of land for each household assigned to the project; 
[...] determining the eligibility for compensation and assistance of a particular type of land;    
[...] issuing and promulgating complete land acquisition decisions, decisions on land 
allocation for the project affected individuals and collectives. 
The Vice-director of DONRE who is assigned to be a member of COB is responsible for the 
collaboration with NPM and other stakeholders of NP project. A group of 5-7 experts are 
assigned to assist in implementing the function of DONRE in the project. 
In summary, the above mentioned functional departments in the Thai Nguyen province are 
responsible for (i) reviewing the current compensation unit costs and its revision (if necessary) in 
order to meet the replacement values and its submission to the TNPPC approval; (ii) reviewing 
the resettlement policy, revising RAP, additional policies for NPM upon company request and 
giving feedback to the NPM for improvement and finalization of the documents; (iii) reviewing 
the proposed relocation sites, planning and passing on their advice to the TNPPC for its decision 
making; and (iv) coordinating with NPM the implementation activities at local levels. 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Department of Labor Invalids and Social Affairs (DOLISA) 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Department of Labor - Invalids and Social Affairs (DOLISA) is a specialized 
agency of the Provincial People's Committee, with the aim to advise the provincial People's 
Committees in performing the State management in the fields of employment, vocational 
training, labor, salaries, wages, social, labor safety, social protection, protection childcare, 
gender equality and the combat of social malevolence in the province.  
The DOLISA is under the direction and management of the Thai Nguyen PPC, and subject to the 
direction, supervision, and professional guidance by the Ministry of Labor Invalids and Social 
Affairs (MOLISA). 
In the NP project, the DOLISA was assigned to participate with “assistance”, without clear 
responsibilities with regards to the income generation and vocational training. At a later stage 
(2012), the new Government directives57 to the MOLISA indicated an additional provision of the 
Decree 69/ 2009 in regards to the implementation of income generation and vocational training 
for the displaced people. Accordingly, the MOLISA is responsible for subsidized vocational 
                                                          
57
 Decision 52/ 2012- QD- TTg 
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development schemes and job introduction, micro-finance program generation and proposal for 
entitlements for the enterprises which generate jobs and income for the displaced people.  
However, there is an absence of clear directives for the functions and responsibilities of the 
DOLISA at the provincial level and its agencies at the district levels in the specific resettlement 
projects in the province.  
Thai Nguyen Provincial Compensation Oversight Board and advisory team (COB) 
Thai Nguyen Provincial Compensation Oversight Board and advisory team (COB) was established 
in accordance to Decision No. 944/QD-UB of May 2004 of TNPPC. It is headed by the Vice chair 
of TN PPC and Director of Thai Nguyen DONRE and comprises 28 members. Its members are 
representatives of key functional provincial departments, local NGOs (e.g women’s unions, 
farmer’s associations, public relations service etc.,); Thai Nguyen newspapers and broadcasting 
services, Religious Board, Dai Tu District People Committee (DPC) and NPM. The advisory team 
consists of 9 members from DONRE, the DoF, the DoC, the TNPPC and NPM.  
All of COB members are either governmental officials or NPM staff. Therefore, with the 
exception of NPM staff, the remaining members of the COB will be working only part time.  The 
regulations of the COB and detailed responsibilities of each member were prepared and 
approved by the TN PPC (No. 1705/QD-UB; 20th July 2004). The COB and the advisory team are 
to hold meetings periodically to review RAP preparation, the implementation status and to 
propose solutions for any unresolved issues. 
As described in the regulations, the COB and the advisory team are mainly responsible for: 
[...]assisting the TNPPC in coordination with NPM to mobilize and implement the project, 
including all the relevant aspects of the RAP and ensuring that PAHs can at least restore 
their livelihood and get benefits from the project; 
[...] organizing the participation of key stakeholders in RAP preparation and 
implementation and contribute together with all the relevant parties towards the smooth 
implementation of the RAP;  
[...] monitoring and evaluating the results of the RAP implementation and; 
[...] addressing complaints at provincial level. 
Dai Tu District People’s Committee (DT DPC) 
A district is an administrative unit, and the main rural subdivision of the provinces of Vietnam. 
The District People's Committee is the executive arm of the district government, and is 
responsible for formulating and implementing policy at district level.   
 
 
129 
 
Dai Tu District People’s Committee (DT DPC) is responsible for directing its Executive agency and 
Investor on all resettlement activities, including: 
[...] announcement of the cut-off date58 and directing the people in the project area not to 
build new houses or plant new perennial trees; 
[...] direct relevant departments and encouragement of affected communes to closely 
coordinate with NPM in (i) carrying out the socioeconomic survey, census and inventory of 
the PAP and their affected properties and (ii) seeking replacement land for relocation of 
the PAP and land for farming; 
[...] solutions for employment generation and economic rehabilitation for severely 
affected PAP; 
[...] review and approval of the relocation sites and plan for compensating and relocating 
PAP; granting LURC and building ownership to PAP at new sites and; 
[...] addressing complaints at the second level in line with complaint mechanism which is 
set forth in the project resettlement policy.  
Dai Tu District Compensation Oversight Board (DT COB)  
Dai Tu District Compensation Oversight Board (DT COB) was established according to Decision 
No. 1505/QD-UB of Thai Nguyen PPC on 28th June 2004. The Dai Tu COB is headed by the Vice-
Chair of DPC and includes 15 members who are the heads of the (District) Finance Department, 
the (District) Natural Resources and Environment Department; Agriculture Department, Chairs of 
the affected communes and the resettlement managers of NPM, together with the 
representatives of the provincial Farmers’ Association, the Women’s Union; and the affected 
households in the project areas.  
Except for the staff of NPM, the remaining members are working for the district departments 
and therefore, they are only part-time employees of the Dai Tu COB.  
The DT DPC and the Dai Tu COB appointed its executive unit - the Dai Tu Board for 
Compensation, Support and Resettlement (BCSR) to organize, plan and carry out land recovery, 
compensation, assistance and other resettlement activities in the district on behalf of the DPC.   
Particularly, they are responsible for: 
[...] organization of information campaign early in the project and the RP 
implementation;   
                                                          
58
 The policies require people not to make further investments in the areas which are supposed to be acquired in 
accordance with the Decision on Land Acquisition.  
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[...] conduct of the IOL and DMS, preparation of compensation plans for each individual 
project affected household (PAH) and their submission to DOF for review;  
[...] consultation and participation activities, income restoration program, and co-
ordination with various stakeholders in implementing the resettlement action plan (RAP);  
[...] review of updates of RAP in accordance with the provisions of this plan and its 
potential approval. If a proposed update does not comply with this plan it must be 
referred back to the PMB and the World Bank for guidance and direction;   
[...] payment of compensation and allowances, subsidies to PAHs after compensation 
plans are approved by the PPC of Thai Nguyen;  
[...] ensuring a timely delivery of payments and compensation, assistance and other 
entitlements to DPs and;   
[...] assistance in the resolution of grievances for DTDPC.   
Communal People’s Committees (CPCs) 
In Vietnam, a rural commune is a third-level administrative subdivision. Rural communes are 
subdivisions of districts which are in turn subdivisions of provinces. The Communal People’s 
Committee (CPC) is the executive arm of the commune, and is responsible for formulating and 
implementing policy at communal level. 
The Communal People’s Committees (CPCs) of the affected communes namely Ha Thuong, Hung 
Son, Tan Linh and Cat Ne are responsible for: 
[...] day-to-day contact with people having concerns related to compensation and 
relocation;  
[...] helping BCSR, NPM and its consultation companies in carrying out activities such as 
consultation with the PAP, socioeconomic survey, census and inventory, seeking land for 
relocation and farming, information campaign, delivery of entitlements to the PAP and 
their move to relocation sites and the implementation of rehabilitation programs and 
activities for vulnerable groups in collaboration with BCSR and NPM; 
[...] addressing complaints on the first level in line with complaint mechanism which is set 
forth in the project resettlement policy and; 
[...] participating in the monitoring aspects of the RAP implementation such as 
compensation delivery, relocation site development, evaluation of the restoration of 
PAP’s livelihood after relocation, to name a few. 
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The Investor - Nui Phao Mining company (NPM) 
According to governmental regulations, the involvement of the investor in land conversion and 
allocation has been summarized as below. These responsibilities of the investors are defined in 
the ongoing government policies, which however are found to be slightly ambiguous for 
understanding and implementation: 
[...] the investors are responsible for the arrangement of the relocation site or equivalent 
cost for the resettled people;  
[...] investors need to prepare the Resettlement, Support and Relocation Plan and related 
expenses for the district Board of Resettlement, Support and Relocation (BCSR) with 
regards to the implementation of Resettlement, Support and Relocation activities;  
[...] investors are designated as official (formal) members of the district boards of Site 
Clearance and Compensation which is responsible for implementation of the whole 
resettlement, support and relocation process. The functions of the involved investors are 
(but not limited to) to provide relevant information about the project, to provide 
compensation and support measures for the BCSC and to cooperate with local authorities 
for relevant information disclosures in line with current laws;  
[...] investors need to cooperate with BCSR and local authorities to pay a compensation 
and support package as well as to arrange relocation for the resettled people. 
Project Affected Persons (PAPs) or Project Affected Households (PAHs) 
In RAP, eligible PAHs or PAPs for compensation, relocation and/or rehabilitation are defined as: 
- All those living in the project operational area before the cut-off date announced by the 
Province and the District; 
- All those not living in the project operational area, but having land in the area; 
- All those living and/or working on land in the relocation area; 
- All those otherwise adversely affected by the project.  
The involvement of the PAPs in the NP project is characterized by acknowledgment and 
compliance such as checking and signing off their affected lands, assets as well as their 
entitlements, giving feedback of the RAP and providing input to the solutions for implementing 
the RAP smoothly; and moving to new sites in a timely manner after receiving full entitlements 
(Figure 9: Procedures for compulsory land conversion in the NP project). 
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The PAPs or PAHs are entitled to compensation packages, comprising land compensation 
payments, livelihoods support allowance for job replacement and training and the house - 
building (resettling) fund. The Land compensation payment is provided for the compensation of 
on-land fixed assets, whereas the livelihood support allowance is provided for economic 
restoration activities, which were planned by the authorities and the private investor (NPM) in 
order to perform the agricultural service extension, develop off-farm activities and vocational 
trainings. Finally, the PAPs were to decide whether they would self-relocate or move to the 
relocation sites prepared by the investor with standard infrastructure and social facilities (such 
as the Nam Song Cong and Hung Son 3 relocation sites). In the meantime, the PAPs could receive 
the reimbursements of their removal costs and living subsidiaries for the duration of the 
transition period.  
Other related actors in the NP project:  
Other actors include: consulting companies hired by NPM for the resettlement and 
compensation service; other state and non-state actors in partnership with NPM for ERPs and 
CSR programs; and various interest groups, mass organisations and unions (farmers’ union, 
women’s union, fathers’ front, youth union, veterans’ unions...). 
4.2.6. Social conflict in the NP project 
As discussed in 1.2.2, the concept of conflict employed in this research implies resistance, 
tensions and complaints, being broadly used in IR literature. Participatory observation used in 
this research allowed to map the status of conflicts in various forms of latent, emerging and 
manifest conflicts as well as to reveal the root-cause sources of conflicts in the NP project. The 
figures used below were mainly summarized from the reports of the task force group, being 
commonly used by the public and private actors in the NP project as well as served as reporting 
records to authorities if required.   
4.2.6.1. Mapping conflict status in the NP project 
In general, the observed conflict status in the NP project can be divided two stages: before and 
after the construction work starting in the project in 2011. Various forms of conflicts being the 
emerging, the latent and the manifest took place in the NP project. As shown in Figure 10, the 
complaint letters were viewed as emerging form of conflict, which can potentially turn to 
manifest conflicts should the given enquires be not properly met by the project (Gunawan 2004). 
Figure 10 also demonstrates that, in the earlier stage, fewer evidences of conflicts were found 
while the number of complaints and request letters were significantly increased in the later stage. 
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Figure 10: Summary of complaint letters by years in the NP project 
 
The latent form of conflict in the NP project is understood as the tensions between the project 
and the PAPs/ PACs during the project implementation. The tensions can be found during the 
community meetings, where the expectations or demands over the land conversion prices, 
procedures and additional entitlements were critically raised by the PAPs and PACs.  
Besides, some degree of dissatisfaction over the compensation packages or the performance of 
the public and private actors can also induce latent form of conflict in the NP project (4.2.6).  
Manifest conflicts in the NP project refer to the resisting cases and the cases of demonstration 
and violence. Few evidences were found in this regard, compared to the other forms of conflicts.  
Examples of manifest conflicts were found with the group of resistant households resided along 
the National Road number 37, who refused DMS and compensation payment, asking for market 
prices for their resident land; the collective demonstration of various PAPs, who asked to revise 
their compensation payments during October 2011; or the resistant households, demonstrating 
uncooperative behavior in the task force group without reaching any agreement as 
illustrated in Box 9. 
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Box 9: The status of conflict in the NP project 
During the process of land conversion, many PAPs found that their compensation payments were not properly 
calculated. Consequently, they sent their letters of request to the district BCSR as guided by the laws. However, there 
was no response from the district. When the company wanted to acquire the land for construction work, the PAPs 
refused to transfer. It took a lot of time for the company to recall the cases with the district in order to settle the 
complaints, being a condition for the PAPs to transfer their land. Similarly, since a great deal of requests from PAPs 
had not been timely replied to, a lot of complainers gathered in group and came to the NPM information centre, 
asking for proper responses. 
“We know that our letters should be solved by the district for reply but the company should be responsible to assist us 
to obtain the response from the district”, said by PAP (quote 5a) 
“It was many time I sent my letter to the district BCSR but we never have received a response from them… then we 
decided to send our complaint letters to higher level…”, said by PAP (quote 5b) 
The households who resided along the national road No 37 refused the compensation prices because they said that 
the compensation prices offered by the government were found to be 5 times cheaper than the market prices. Many 
of the households did not allow for detailed measurement survey (DMS); some others, who already had received 
compensation payment changed their mind, re-acquiring their land and asking for increased prices. Some of them 
engaged lawyers and some other threatened with violence if anybody entered their areas for DMS. The resisting 
households gathered in group with their relatives and neighbors to stop the acquisition work. That resistance took 
more the form of public demonstration (see below pictures).   
   
Picture 4: Resisting land transfer Picture 5: Face-to-face dialogue for 
complaint resolution 
Picture 6: Complaint resolution 
meeting 
          (Observation and Interviews held in February and March 2012 in the NP project) 
Observation shows that the largest group of resisting households lived along the main roads, 
where their incomes were better generated through non-farm activities such as workshops, 
commercial shops and restaurants. The imposed compensation prices appeared to be much 
lower than the market prices in the same areas. Several resisting households, who strongly 
rejected displacement, pointed out that the compensation value of their residence land should 
be five times higher than the price imposed by the government.  
Also some other types of manifest conflicts were found in a few cases of denunciations and 
grievances of the PAPs, being submitted to the district and provincial courts. However, this small 
amount of denunciations and grievances does not represent the mainstream of conflicts in NP, 
which were subjected to immediate resolution by the Task force group. 
Linking the empirical observation in the NP project to the classification scheme of social conflicts 
introduced by Moore (1996), two observations can be made. Firstly, the majority of the 
complaint and resisting cases in NP project can be generalized as (economic) interest-based 
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instead of value-based, providing that the PAPs were concerned about the compensation 
packages which were found to be “incompatible” to their expectations. In the next section 
(4.2.6.2) the purposes of complaints and resistance thus were to increase their compensation 
value, asking for more in-cash or in-kind benefits. This point has been reaffirmed through 
interviews and group discussions.  
Secondly, the conflict status in the NP project is better understood through observation of the 
root-causes of conflicts rather than being classified into different types as suggested by Moore 
(1996), which is more appropriate for practitioners in conflict mediation in IR projects.  
4.2.6.2. Sources of conflicts in the NP project 
A more in-depth investigation of the social conflict status in the NP project brings about some 
notions about the root-causes of conflicts between the project and the PAPs/ PACs. We claim 
that the root-causes of conflicts are relatively diverse, deriving from the policy problem, the 
implementation process, the awareness and capability of the stakeholders.  
The policy problem 
The policy problem is viewed to be a root-source of conflict in the NP project in two ways: the 
inadequate policy content, comprising the imposed, non-market based prices and the 
complicated administrative procedures, as well as the changes of policies during the project 
implementation. 
First, the nature of the compulsory land conversion policy is characterized by the government 
compensation prices and strict administrative procedures, which are both found to be 
problematic for implementation.   
It is not uncommon in the IR practice for the compensation paid by the government to be less 
than what the value is at free competition (Cernea 2008: 92). Although Figure 11 presents the 
number of complaints about compensation prices as less than 10 percent of the total complaint 
issues, the conflicts in this regard are characterized by critical, active and ongoing 
disputes, causing blockage to the project activities as shown in Box 9 (The status of conflict 
in the NP project). 
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Figure 11: The types of complaint issues and the degrees of correctness 
 
(Summary of complaint resolution of the task force group in October, November and December 
2011 in the NP project) 
In addition, the public administrative procedures regulated in the policy guidelines appeared too 
complicated, causing tensions during implementation. For instance, it was found that the 
procedures for completion of an approval for compensation, support and resettlement for a 
household comprised 17 steps that appear to be difficult to follow properly by the relevant 
actors. In the meantime, as shown in Box 10, the absence of the Decisions of compensation, 
support and resettlement at the household level resulted from different understanding about 
the existing administrative procedures. 
Box 10: Conflicts caused by non-compliance to the administrative procedures 
The figure of the complaint and grievance shows 70-80 percent of the complaint issues related to the absence of the 
Decision of compensation, support and resettlement at individual affected household, signed by the Dai Tu DPC. The 
PAPs strongly requested for this decision as a pressure to force the company and authorities to step back to 
renegotiate and reconsider their compensation package. The reasons for the absence of the Decision for households 
were various. First, there was the interpretation of the policies, where the Decision of compensation, support and 
resettlement could be understood as “decisions for groups of PAHs” from the same location meaning that the 
decisions for some groups of PAHs in the same areas were issued and distributed. Secondly, some decisions for 
household were disseminated without formal acknowledgement by the receivers so that the household refused to 
acknowledge that they had received the decision for their compensation. Thirdly, since the project lasted a long 
period of time, some procedures and documents were confused and lost between public and private actors. 
(Interviews and participant observation through collaboration meetings held 12
th
 March 2012 in Dai Tu - TN). 
Secondly, the implementation of compulsory land conversion in the NP project is heavily 
affected by the changes in the government policies. Within seven years in the project 
implementation (2006-2013), the Land Law was revised three times with additional provisions 
(such as the Decree 197/ 2004, the Decree 84/ 2007 and the Decree 69/2009). As shown also in 
Box 1: The development of compensation, support and resettlement policies in Vietnam in 1.5.2, 
the regulations on compensation support and resettlement was revised three times. In general, 
the new policies were revised with higher prices and better assistance entitlements than the 
formers ones (see 1.5.2). Particularly Decree 69 (2009) in was more beneficial than the former 
decrees, by addressing more assistance to severely affected households, especially households 
which needed to be relocated or lose agricultural land (Box 11). 
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Box 11: A comparison the between the Decree 69/2009 and the Decree 197/2003 
Since late 2009 - early 2010 the NP project was subjected to the new Compensation, Support and Resettlement Policy, 
(Decree 69/2009). In line with this Decree, the benefit for the PAPs considerably increased by 1 to 5 times the 
agricultural land compensation unit prices. They subsidiaries, increased from 1 to 5 times, and the support value for 
life and production stabilization increased to twice the time. In particular, the value of the compensation payment and 
subsidy for an area of 288 square meter of agricultural land
59
 under the Decree 69 reached 29,520,000 VND, whereas 
the same areas of agricultural land under the earlier policy, being the Decree 197 equaled 4,320,000 VND only. In the 
meantime, the mode of compensation calculation was slightly changed too.  
(Interview of C&R specialist from Dai Tu BCSR held in 15
th
 April 2013, Dai Tu - TN) 
As regulated by the laws, compensation prices are calculated based on the compensation prices 
agreed at the time of receiving the compensation payment. Thus, the PAPs who had already 
received compensation realized in the earlier stage realized that they were paid too little, and 
began to return to their land asking for greater compensation payment (see Box 12). 
Box 12: Complaints caused by the policy changes 
Due to the size of the project and the complicated administrative procedures in combination with the desire of the 
NPM to quickly take the land for construction works, it was agreed during 2006-2007 between the provincial 
government, the PAPs and the company that the compensation based on the temporary calculation and entitlements 
would be made for the PAPs prior to the official payment based on the Approvals for compensation, support and 
resettlement. The PAPs had to commit to the hand-over their land and the difference would be paid when the 
procedures for the Approvals for compensation, support and resettlement were completed. This is also explained the 
fact that many PAPs were not given the Decisions on compensation, support and resettlement before they received 
compensation payments. 
The compensation prices were calculated based on the compensation prices agreed at the time of receiving the 
advance payment. However, after one or few years, due to the change of the policies the compensation prices were 
increased (the Degree 69 in late 2009) and the PAPs wanted to renegotiate their compensation. “it is unfair when we 
supported the government and the project by accepting the compensation plan and resettled in another place, but 
then the others who resisted by staying until now could benefit by negotiating for the better prices or being entitled to 
the higher compensation prices and more entitlements under the revised policies” - said by a PAP (quote 5). 
(Group discussion of PAPs conducted on 25
th
 March 2012 in Dai Tu - TN) 
Actually, a prolonged resettlement project as the NP project was challenged by a great deal of 
necessary justifications in accordance to the revised national policies.  
Apparently, the PAPs receiving compensation packages under the former policy did not accept 
the difference in compensation payment since there should be equality between the PAPs, albeit 
that compensation payment has been already made for them. The PAPs utilized the absence of 
the Decision on compensation, support and resettlement to claim that the compensation was 
not yet completed and needed to be revised with the new prices and additional assistance. 
Consequently, Figure 11 (The types of complaint issues and the degrees of correctness) shows 
high numbers of complaints on DMS and assistance items.  
The implementation problem 
At implementation level, the conflicts derived from the capacity of the implementation agencies, 
the project featured and the complexity of local circumstances. To be more specific, the high 
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 The average areas of agricultural land for rice in Dai Tu district - Dai Tu Socio-economic report 2011. 
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number of complaints as shown in Figure 11 implies disagreement of the PAPs and PACs with the 
compensation calculation results (DMS) and the non-compliance of the administrative 
procedures. The project was lasting too long and this explains disrupted procedural steps, 
changing of land status and the missing of documents. Indeed, the DMS took place several years 
before the payment was fully made60; the changes in the housing structures, crops 
diversification and the methods of measurement etc.  “...the DMS were carried out in 2006 and 
the final compensation was made in 2011. Apart from the changes in compensation rates and 
entitlements, there were also changes due to in the landscape changes, which includes the 
locations which become more commercialized (commercial land is compensated at a higher 
rate), the changes of the sizes of trees and the crops...) and the households were split into more 
households with more couples of husband and wife etc.” - said by a district official - (quote 6). 
Consequently, a great deal of compensation packages had to be revised with additional 
demarcation measurement surveys (DMS). In addition, the compensation for agricultural land 
and residential land was mainly calculated based on the communal cadastral maps and the 
LUCs61 of the households, which were found to be sometimes incorrect (see more in VDR 2010, 
2011, Hung Vo 2009). Nevertheless, providing that the capacity of the implementation agencies 
was incompatible with the size of the project, the poor performance was unavoidable. This is 
what we noted from another district officer: 
 “The high number of complaints has been partly caused by incorrect calculation of prices, 
location and entitlements. This is due to the large amount of work that we do; - we deal with 
more than 3,000 households” - (quote 7). 
The awareness of the PAPs 
In view of the policy content and guidelines, not all complaints in compulsory land conversion 
are correct in the practice of land conversion in Vietnam (see 1.5.5). Instead, about half of the 
total of complaints and denunciations in the NP project were considered by the task force group 
to be "incorrect” (as shown in Figure 11), resulting from lack of policy acknowledgement of the 
complainers.  
However, our participant observation in combination to analysis of the content of the 
“incorrect” complaint letters revealed a diversity of the awareness problems. These are worth 
giving a closer look in order to better understand the root causes of conflicts in the NP project. 
We found that the awareness problems of the PAPs and PACs in the NP project were built up 
upon three main drivers: the limited acknowledgment about the policy and procedures; the 
limited awareness about sustainable development and livelihood rehabilitation, and the 
demands for more adequate benefit distribution.  
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 See Table 31: Project milestones: For many PAHs, advanced payment was made after DMS in 2008-2009 but official 
payment procedures were fulfilled later. 
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Firstly, limited acknowledgement about the policy and procedures is inevitable with compulsory 
land conversion, which is characterized by both ambiguous policy guidelines and complicated 
administrative procedures. Moreover, the low-level education of the PAPs in Dai Tu district (see 
4.1.2) as well as the continuous policy changes resulted to a puzzle in policy interpretation. 
Secondly, the second high percentage of complaint letters stated in Figure 11 implies the 
“requests” for assistance items by the PAPs, about twenty five percent (25 percent) of which 
asked for cash payment for economic restoration activities. Hereby are the explanations of the 
PAPs:  
“We can self-restore our livelihoods... we need the cash payment as it is entitled in the company 
policy” - (quote 8). 
“It is safe if we have our money in hand rather than use economic restoration activities. We only 
join the economic restoration activities if we don’t have to spend our compensation 
money...” -(quote 9). 
The complainants seemed to prefer more direct compensations or recruitment by the company 
and were hence reluctant to engage in more indirect economic restoration activities, such as 
vocational training opportunities, agricultural service extensions. 
 “...they critically asked for recruitment based on their concern that there is no opportunity for 
them to generate income after displacement. Paradoxically, we offer them opportunity to 
vocational training and other income generation activities; they refused and keep asking to be 
employed by the company... We cannot recruit all the PAPs, specially most of them have no skills 
and no motivation to work, compared to other non-PAPs”, said by NPM economic restoration 
officer - (quote 10). 
Thirdly, an important point that can justify the awareness of the PAPs in the NP project is the 
inadequate implication of compulsory land conversion for the NP project. In view of the PAPs, 
the private projects with commercial purpose like the NP project should have been subjected to 
the voluntary land conversion mechanism. Therefore, despite being aware of the policy 
requirements, many complainers tended to ask for a more adequate compensation mechanism 
instead of the existing compulsory mechanism: “We don’t care if our requests were eligible by 
the laws or not; but we don’t accept that way ... and we keep asking for our own interest...” -
(quote 11). 
In particular, the PAPs requested more entitlements from the company in terms of income 
stabilization allowance, bonuses and recruitments. These can be viewed as latent conflicts in a 
sense that if the company is unable to properly handle the expectations and the requests of 
PAPs it may lead to uncooperative behavior and resistance by the PAPs.  
“The company takes our land being used for cultivation from generations to generations... and 
their responsibility is to provide us with new income generation opportunities, not just 
compensation payment”, said by a PAP in the community meeting - (quote 12). 
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The arguments of the requestors and complainers derived from their notion of the unequal 
distribution in NP resettlement project as said by another PAP: “We have to leave our home, our 
gardens and we have been paid cheap compensation prices... the tungsten mine would bring a 
great benefit for the investor so this is very unfair...” - (quote 13). 
We can further elaborate this point by reviewing the information logbook which shows that 70 
percent of PAPs who visited the Project Information Centre asked for recruitment and income 
generation initiatives. Particularly, a great deal of collective requests were raised by the affected 
communities and the affected groups with regard to the company fulfillment of the 
commitments in terms of job creation, relocation infrastructures and other community 
development initiatives.  
Thus, the PAPs and PACs strongly requested “additional compensation” from the investor, asking 
better living conditions and more opportunities for income restoration. The requests have been 
implicitly and explicitly supported by the local authorities, especially at communal level.  
Conclusion  
This Chapter presented not only basic background data on the studied case and the wider 
locality, but also a comprehensive profile of the studied case, including the history, project 
activities, and a basic map of key stakeholders being the principal institutions. From this chapter 
there also emerged a first impression of the dimension of conflict in the NP project. The 
description of social networks and relationships in the NP project informs the focus for further 
exploration in the subsequent chapter on the input, throughput, and output of the PPP in 
the NP project.  
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5. ADOPTING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, the case analysis is presented using the analytical framework developed in 
Chapter 2. The aim of the analysis, which is performed using the collected empirical data, is to 
understand the PPP process in the NP project, encompassing input, throughput and output. 
Special attention is paid to the interdependencies among the aforementioned three components 
and finally to the relevant impacts on conflict resolution in the case under investigation.  
Before analyzing the insights of the PPP process components, it is necessary to elaborate on how 
the PPP - approach takes shape in the case under investigation and how the features and the 
types of collaboration can be viewed as the points of departure for a further in-depth analysis 
and a salient explanation. 
5.1. Identification of PPP arrangements in the Nui Phao project 
Our research question focuses on how PPP arrangements take shape in an involuntary land 
conversion project, constituting a new form of governance. Hence, this section takes the first 
step towards the examination of the PPP arrangements in the NP project based on the 
comparative observation of the institutional arrangements of the PPP in the policy framework 
and the actual arrangements of the PPP in the practice of implementation.  
In the NP project, the PPP - approach is recognized by the adoption of the simplest concept of 
PPP which involves cooperation i.e. “to work or act together” (McQuaid in Osborne 2000: 11), 
stemming from the fact that the PPP arrangement in the policy framework is fairly ambiguous, 
compared to the practical arrangement at implementation level.  
As presented in Figure 9 (Procedures for compulsory land conversion in the NP project) in 4.2.5, 
the implementation arrangement, under the mandates stated in Decision No 1/ 2012-QD-UBND 
of Thai Nguyen PPC is characterized by lawful and administrative procedures along the multi-
layer public functional units and authorities. The PPP approach takes shape with an alternative 
institutional framework, with the state or local authorities (who are in principle responsible for 
compulsory land conversion in the NP project) but lack the capacity to deliver (Elsig & Amalric 
2008: 396). Indeed, the alternative institutional framework derives from the idea that the 
province and the private investor together carry out land conversion using their own resources 
with potentially mutual benefits. As a result, the traditional state functions stipulated in the legal 
framework were partly transferred to or substituted by the investor, inferring that the 
governmental actors have become increasingly dependent on the private actor to achieve their 
goals (Voets 2008: 10). 
The voluntary nature of the private actor’s participation stems from its dependency upon the 
existing public service delivery in order to acquire land for mining activities (Elsig & Amalric 
2008). Hence, the private actor seeks partnerships with the public actors and is willing to provide 
more resources as a means to achieve their economic benefit (McQuaid in Osborne 2000). A 
comparison of Figure 9 in 4.2.5 and Figure 12 below shows fair differences between the legal 
regulations and the practical arrangements for the policy implementation in the NP project. 
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Figure 12: The organizational settings of collaborations in PPP of compulsory land conversion 
in the NP Project. 
 
In the previous chapter, Figure 9 (4.2.5) demonstrates the institutional arrangement within the 
policy framework, where the multi-layer and multi-dimensional state actors are delegated in 
decision making and procedural supervision, and the private actor as the project investor plays a 
supportive and cooperative role. The relationship between the public executive agencies 
(viewed as the public service providers) and the private actor (viewed as the project investor) 
was implicitly bound by the service provision contracts which were found to be a formality only 
(we will further discuss the implementation of the signed contracts in subsequent sections) (see 
more in Box 15: the failure of contracting-out between the NPM and the district BCSR, in 5.2.5.2 
and Box 32: the trust based choice for the contracting-out partners in the NP project, in 5.3.2.4). 
Figure 12 shows the institutional arrangement based on the empirical observation of land 
conversion in the NP project. Accordingly, the nature of the assigned relationship between 
public and private actors is characterized by a partnership model instead of a hierarchy of 
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administrative procedures. This is a direct consequence of various joint actions. On the one 
hand, various state agencies are responsible for administrative procedures, which are 
implemented along the hierarchical system between the multi-layered government functional 
and actors. The company is responsible in assisting the completion of the given procedures by 
hiring external consultation companies to carry out the DMS and calculation for compensation, 
on the other. Besides, there is an emergence of a new partnership, encompassing a broader 
scope of stakeholders for economic restoration and social safeguards activities, which deemed 
to go beyond the policy mandates of the public and private actors.  
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5.2. Public Private Partnership input elements 
As announced in 2.2, this section presents the PPP’s institutional structure, encompassing its 
interaction patterns, rules and goals. As elaborated in our theoretical chapter, interaction 
patterns and rules are examined through the study of the policy framework and the institutional 
arrangements, as well as through observation in the practice of policy implementation. Next, the 
actors’ resources, interdependencies and their perceptions will be examined, given that the 
interaction patterns, rules and goals of the given PPP has resulted from the actors’ resources, 
interdependencies and their strategies while entering the partnership. 
5.2.1. Interaction patterns 
The interaction patterns, understood as the linkages and the density of interactions between the 
public and private actors, which determine the types of networks in the NP project, are 
investigated both at implementation level and at documentation level. 
The interaction patterns and the degree of actors’ involvement in the NP project are 
differentiated by two distinct tasks in involuntary resettlement (Figures 13 below), being 
displacement and resettlement, as well as economic restoration and social safeguard activities 
(Figure 14 below). 
As introduced in sections 1.5.5, there are two distinct but related processes identified in the 
involuntary land conversion: (i) displacement, compensation and relocation as an administrative 
procedural process and; (ii) economic restoration and implementation of social safeguards 
policies, recognized as the forms of socially responsible programs in involuntary resettlement 
(Wicklin III - 1999). Thus, the nature of the land conversion in the NP project is regarded as 
multifaceted, encompassing different policy issues, suggesting that the actors seek various forms 
of collaboration in order to effectively tackle each policy issue (McQuaid 2000).  
In our point of view, each type of collaboration found in the NP project can be treated as a single 
model of PPP based on its distinctive task dimensions (Elsig & Amalric 2008). Meanwhile, these 
types of collaboration can also be viewed as the sub-networks of a single PPP model between 
the same public and private actors, encompassing multi-layer relationships and multi task 
dimensions in the specific policy implementation domain (see O’Toole in Kickert et al. 1997 & 
2004, and Scharpf 1997). As a result, we treat SN1 and SN2 below as the sub-units of our analysis 
of the PPP study in the NP project.  
Sub-Network 1 (SN1): Displacement & compensation procedures  
In general, the interaction patterns in this sub-network under policy institutional arrangement 
are characterized by administrative procedures between the public and private actors. 
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In this sub-network, the membership is formed from the application of administratively strict 
collaborative mandates (see also Figure 9). The main function of the sub-network is to carry out 
displacement related activities including both practical works (such as DMS, calculation of 
compensation, compensation making, support and resettlement plans for PAHs) and 
administrative procedural works (such as information dissemination, acknowledgement and 
approval for Compensation, Support and Resettlement Plan (RAP) in order to legitimate 
displacement procedures). In addition, the relocation site selection, design and supervision of 
construction also involve the members of this sub-network (SN1). 
At this level, the District Board of Compensation, Support and Resettlement (BCSR) is a 
responsible executive agency, which is under immediate supervision and leadership of the 
District People Committee (DPC). Besides, the communal authorities play essential roles in 
dealing with PAHs for compensation, support and resettlement activities. In the meantime, the 
district functional departments are assigned to appraise the compensation, support and 
resettlement procedures. As shown in Figure 9 and Figure 13, the practical work for 
displacement is carried out at the commune and district levels. The final administration 
procedures such as the Decisions and Approvals of Compensation, Support and Resettlement 
(DCSR and ACSR) for every household or collective were issued at provincial level. Hence, the 
administrative and legal procedures were relatively followed in accordance with the hierarchical 
mechanism involving multi-layer public actors (Scharpf 1978 in Kickert et al. 1997).  
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Figure 13: Sub-network 1 (SN1): Collaborative setting in displacement and relocation 
procedures 
 
As displayed in Figure 13, the private actor (NPM) is linked to all public actors at all levels. In the 
policy mandate, the linkages were explained as the “support” duties of the private investor to 
the administrative process of displacement and compensation. However, practice shows that 
NPM is involved as the key player rather than the “supporter” by additional policy and 
entitlements, making the relations between NPM and the multilayer public actors to be of a 
collaborative nature (see Mandell & Keast 2007). 
Indeed, NPM has a team of 40-50 staffs providing additional (professional) supports such as 
detailed measurement surveys (DMS), calculation of compensation, relocation sites’ design and 
construction, to name but a few (see more Box 19: Resources of NPM for land conversion 
activities, in 5.2.5.1). In addition, the company hired several consulting companies specialized to 
provide ad-hoc services. Besides, the proliferation of the private actor functions also took place 
in this process in the sense that NPM has set up a communal network of supporters, who are the 
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communal officials, the heads of villages and the PAPs, who can be paid with extra allowance 
from the project.  
Sub-network 2 (SN2): Economic rehabilitation and social safeguards activities  
This sub-network - referred to as a development partnership - is formulated under the 
implementation of the combined corporate programs of NPM: the economic restoration 
programs (ERPs), and the community development plan (CDP) as stated in 4.2.4. These types of 
programs, being both in cash and in-kind resettlement measures (ADB 2006) are viewed as 
socially responsible programs in involuntary resettlement (Wicklin III 1999). 
Thus, differing from the strictly mandated collaborative process of SN1, SN2 is characterized by 
cooperative relationships between the involved actors. This means that in the cooperative 
patterns of relations, as clarified by Mandell & Keast (2007: 576), the involved actors are less 
inter-dependent and the actors might react with each other only when necessary, and for 
information and expertise exchanges.  
Indeed, the involvement of the public actors such as the District Board of Compensation, 
Support and Resettlement (BCSR), the Provincial and District Department of Labour Invalids and 
Social Affairs (DOLISA) were quite ambiguous in these functions, which allowed them to simply 
include the entitlements for economic rehabilitation and social safeguards in cash in the 
compensation package. This practice can be explained by the “public policy vacuum” which, as 
pointed out in the involuntary resettlement literature, stems from the absence of the explicit 
policy guidelines for implementation in this regard (Cernea 1996: 1521).  
Our observation in the NP shows that more voluntary efforts were taken for the social 
safeguards and community development initiatives based on additional finance and expertise 
generated by the private actor. Apart from the predominant role of the private actor, other 
actors joining this network are the PAHs, the PACs, and local authorities at all levels and 
functional departments and other groups of non-state actors being consulting and training 
organizations as well as mass organizations. In practice, however, the interaction patterns in this 
sub-network are characterized by a relatively loose linkage between the actors in a sense that 
the actors interact only when necessary. 
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Figure 14: Sub-network 2 (SN2): Collaborative setting in economic restoration and social 
safeguards activities 
 
Interim Conclusion 
The PPP in the Nui Phao project is exercised in the forms of sub-networks based on two task 
dimensions: (i) the displacement and relocation arrangement and; (ii) economic restoration 
accompanied by sustainable development programs. These two sub-networks are fairly distinct 
in terms of patterns of relations, objectives and strategies. However, they are interlinked in 
terms of similar actor composition and the overall goals in the same policy framework of 
compulsory land conversion.  
Contemporary discussions about the multiple meanings of the PPP suggest a better 
understanding about the PPP type in the NP project in terms of its significance from the 
government perspective. Accordingly, it may be argued that the collaboration in the NP project 
is “a universal fix” for most problems requiring public service delivery62, providing that 
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hierarchical governance dominates and public administration is involved (Linder 1999:43). In this 
collaboration, government managers remain in charge and tend to encourage the profit-seeking 
investors to provide capital and expertise to achieve public goals (Ysa 2007). Consequently, the 
relation patterns of the PPP in SN1 in the NP project can be seen to be to some extent influenced 
by the “command and control” factor. In this respect PPP can be seen as “symbolic”. In contrast, 
the nature of SN2 is mainly viewed as the corporate social responsibility activities (CSR) taking 
the shape of an organic - like network, which advocates reciprocity, interdependence, and 
complimentary strategic interests (Ysa 2007:39) 
5.2.2. Rules 
Rules in a network are formed in order to keep the actors committed to collective actions and to 
structure the behaviour of actors (Ostrom 1990 in Kickert et al.: 43, Klijn 2001and Scharpf 1997). 
Rules help us to understand the structure of the network and the behaviour of the actors. Rules 
are closely linked to the degrees of importance as well as the coordination methods 
between the actors.  
Analyzing rules is not always easy (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 82). Thus, a holistic approach is 
required to investigate the rules of the PPP in the NP case, where a documentation review is 
significantly insufficient. Participatory observation allows us to examine the original rules and 
the dynamics of the creation of new rules as well as the changes of the rules in terms of the 
content as well as the way rules become formalized and/or in-formalized during the course of 
interactions between the actors.   
Thus, rules can be understood through the content of the relevant policy frameworks, the 
institutional arrangements to implement the policies, which define the positions, responsibilities 
and competences of the actors, as well as the administrative procedures pertaining the entry 
and interactions of the involved actors. However, the core nature of the rules should be best 
understood under the light of the specific cases, including the case of conflicts or non-
compliance. In addition, the revisions of the agreements and contracts between the actors at 
different times lead towards the understanding of the changes of rules in the NP project. 
Moreover, informal rules can be identified through observation of the communication, the 
norms and the existing trust in the relations between the actors during policy implementation.  
In line with our analytical framework, we will now deal consecutively with arena rules and 
interaction rules. In addition, the findings on the distinction between SN1 and SN2 as indentified 
in 5.2.1 in this regard suggest exploring the rules of these sub-networks separately.  
5.2.2.1. Arena rules 
Arena rules regarded as the network rules or constituting rules are rules that provide a yardstick 
for actors in determining the nature of the network and the arena in which they operate, as well 
as an insight on how the networks are formed. Arena rules are recognized through three sub-
sets of rules: (i) position rules; (ii) reality (product) rules and; (iii) rewards (payoff, subsidiary) 
rules (Klijn 2001, Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, Klijn & Koppenjan2006). Overall, it may be argued that 
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arena rules in both SN1 and SN2 are legally determined by two main drivers: first, the national 
and provincial policy framework and guidelines, second, the ongoing policies and entitlements 
properly developed by the NPM. Indeed, a large number of rules were constituted by the 
Resettlement Action Plan (RAP), which is composed of existing policies and regulations (Land 
Laws, Decrees and Provincial decisions etc.) and implementation guidelines. The RAP is revised 
on annual basis in line with the changes of the relevant laws and regulations, and the revisions of 
new policies and initiatives by the company. These are explicit and formal rules that establish 
the standard procedures and obligations that stakeholders must follow, indicating a strong 
emphasis on tasks and positions and the standards that the actors must follow in the network 
(Figure 9). Besides, informal arena rules also take place in form of norms and non-legal 
forms of rules found in both the project documents as and the practice of interactions 
between the actors.  
By looking at the sub-sets of rules, the arena rules- especially the position rules and the reality 
rules - in SN1 were found to be more specific, more stable and more rigorous compared to the 
rules in SN2.  
Arena rules in SN1  
Arena rules in SN1 are characterized by a strictly mandated collaborative process. Indeed, the 
position rules are defined within the institutional arrangement chapter in the provincial policy 
and regulations.  
The positions of the actors are determined in the RAPs and re-determined in every revision of 
the legal documents. Position rules specify sets of positions of public and private actors defining 
their authority, tasks and responsibilities (Box 13). The allocation of the positions are 
characterized by a hierarchical order-meaning that the lower-level actors are to report to a 
higher level, as well as by the restriction on the number of the participant actors. Since the 
authorities, functions and tasks of the actors are legally determined, there were rarely any actors 
who by exiting the network left their positions almost un-replaceable (see more in Table 35: The 
level of dependency adapted).  
Box 13: The nature of the formal position rules in SN1 
According to the policy mandates, the functional actors (DONRE, DoF, and DoC) are first and foremost technically 
oriented. In fact, they provide a technical confirmation for the provincial government to make decisions. Similarly, 
district functional departments and the district BCSR are responsible to assist the district authority to verify the 
proposals for upper level decisions. This is an administration system where the members must follow the reporting 
scheme and limit interactions within the given assignments. Thus, NPM plays a supportive role by providing necessary 
inputs for public actors, who make the final decision on each procedure and who can block or standby the procedures.  
(Policy Review: Decision No QD 01/UBND of the TN PPC issued on the 5th January 2010) 
Similarly, in SN1, the reality rules, understood as the required standards for actors in terms of 
information, products and behaviors (2.2.2), were formal, legal and vigorous taking the form of 
fixed compensation rates, standard measurement methods and obligatory/ lawful 
documentation. Formal, legal reality rules are not easily changed despite the fact that some 
were found to be inappropriate during implementation. An example of this is the imposed non-
 
 
151 
 
market prices on compensation payment causing blockage in land conversion (see also Box 9: 
The status of conflict in the NP project). Or, the changes of reality rules often create problems 
for implementation. Indeed, the revision of the compensation, support and resettlement 
policies, encompassing increased compensation prices and additional entitlements in the NP 
project has created big inequalities between the PAPs (see Box 12: Complaints caused by the 
policy changes, in 4.2.6.2). 
Participant observation revealed some sorts of informal pay-off (rewards) rules created in SN1 in 
form of additional allowance and incentives for the public officials at all levels who involve in the 
compensation and resettlement activities. In the view of public officials, the additional allowance 
in the NP project is necessary to encourage motivation and compensate hardship for the officials 
involved, especially in the circumstance of the government low salary scheme and an absence of 
an incentive scheme in public service delivery. 
Arena rules in SN2 
SN2 was mainly structured by the (non-legal) informal arena rules. To be more specific, differing 
from the strictly mandated collaborative process of SN1, SN2 is characterized by informal ad-hoc 
cooperative relationships between the involved actors. This means that in the cooperative 
patterns of relations, as clarified by Mandell & Keast (2007: 576), the involved actors are less 
inter-dependent and they might react with each other only when necessary, and for information 
and expertise exchanges (5.2.1). 
The observation of the policy framework provides that the position rules also specify a set of 
actors, namely the DOLISA, DARD, BCSR, the private actors and the authorities at all levels which 
are positioned in the network as formal and active actors in terms of job creation and income 
generation for the PAPs. In fact, the formal reality rules being vague in terms of the methods and 
the standards for the specific products of rehabilitation and social safeguard activities (see 1.5.2) 
directly affect the use of the position rules in the practice of SN2. For example, in the undertaken 
government provisions about the type of “assistance” it is not clear whether there is a dual 
possibility of assisting “in kind” or “in cash”. As a result, the BCSR the DOLISA and other involved 
public actors opted to pay by cash for the economic restoration and other social safeguard 
entitlements.  
Eventually, the public actors participate in SN2 in the implementation of the economic 
restoration activities and development programs (under the additional financial resources of the 
private actors) on a voluntary basis. Since no sanctions were found for the public actors who left 
their positions, some of them are non-dedicated actors in this regard. In contrast, our earlier 
discussion about the project activities in 4.2.4 also denotes the predominant and irreplaceable 
position of the private actor given that the private actor provides main financial resources in this 
network (Hailey in Osborne 2000) (see more Box 25: The added-value activities under NPM’s 
budget, in 5.3.1). 
In regards to the status of the arena rules in SN2, we observe that the reality rules take the form 
of (international) norms adapted by the company while providing a more “in-kind” assistance 
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towards the economic restoration and social safeguards programs (see Box 7: The international 
policies applied in the NP project, in 4.2.4) and by proposing partnership with various public and 
private actors in SN2 (Figure 14). 
In general, the arena rules in SN2 characterize self-regulation, stemming from a lack of resources 
from other actors. Every year, the NPM management reviews the budget and plans for economic 
restoration programs and other social policies of the company. The size of the budget, key 
supporting programs, priority policies and partnership schemes can be revised based on the 
financial status of the private actors and the results of the win-win negotiations between NPM 
and local authorities (Figure 16: Community support cash value by years in our next section 
5.3.1). As a result, the arena (product) rules in SN2 are mainly driven by the company’s will and 
business objectives and the additional budget can be viewed as the new product rules.  
Our observation of different stages of the project suggests that the nature of the formal arena 
rules in both SN1 and SN2 has been changed to an extent by the creation of the product rules 
which provide additional benefits for the stakeholders in the NP project. As seen in Box 14 
below, the new initiatives feature the new reality/ product rules that aim to balance the 
inequality between PAPs and to encourage the PAPs to hand over the land, as well as to involve 
more support from the state actors. As a result, the position of NPM has been re-defined from a 
mere supportive position to a key player and decision maker in the PPP institutional structure. 
Box 14: New reality rules created by the NPM additional policies and entitlements 
In the first RAP (2005), the additional entitlements, apart from the government entitlements for the PAPs were as 
follows:  
- Assistance for economic restoration and income generation; 
- Assistance to economic restoration/improvement activities and resettlement (either to the resettlement sites or self-
relocation); 
- Assistance to vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities and female headed households. Assistance to poor 
households, employment offers to NUI PHAO, contractors of the project and access to casual work; 
- Bonus, incentives to hand over land and properties on the land to the project. 
At a later stage, Thai Nguyen PPC allowed NPM to have its own policy to support several special cases, such as greater 
incentives towards self-relocation, bonuses to households who give up their land in a timely manner, subsidies to 
households who are not eligible as per the latest Decree, 69/2009 (to be fair with households who are eligible as per 
this Decree) etc. 
More recently (2012), NPM under the approval of TN PPC developed new policies regarding additional compensation 
and new entitlements to solve the “unclear provisions” in the government policies in order to resolve the majority of 
the long- lasting complaints in the project. 
(RAP and new project policies such as Decisions No 592 (28-3-2012) and  942 (29-5-2012) issued by TN PPC 
Beside the creation of new reward rules for problem solving purposes, the company was 
implicitly encouraged to negotiate the conditions of displacement with the PAPs. In these cases, 
the formal procedures and regulations relating to the compensation were less respected than 
the mutual negotiation on the additional benefits for the PAPs. Some cases of resistance have 
been solved in this way. This arena rule being “behind the scene” is viewed to be informal but is 
regularly used. Indeed, NPM implicitly violated the strict arena rules in SN1 compensation 
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packages by offering the so called informal reality rules in SN1. In turn, NPM viewed such arising 
expenses as the investment which in turn could reduce transaction costs during project 
development: “Let’s see if the PAPs resist and refuse to transfer their land... how much we will 
lose if we keep waiting?”- said by a senior NPM manager63- (quote 14).  
5.2.2.2. Interaction rules 
Interaction rules have a procedural character and inform actors what is and what is not allowed 
in a network. Interaction rules provide entry for the actor to the network, which then modify the 
actor’s behavior within the context of the arena rules (Klijn & Koppenjan 2006, Koppenjan & Klijn 
2004 and Klijn 2001). In the NP case, the interaction rules are identified through the public 
administrative procedures and the decision making mechanism (which can be formal and 
informal) on the one hand, the contracts and agreements between the actors, on the other. In 
addition, the informal interaction rules can be identified through observation of the 
communication, the norms and the existing trust in the relations between the actors during 
collaboration.  
Interaction rules in SN1  
The interaction rules in SN1 were claimed to be too complicated, strict and difficult to follow, 
resulting in a degree of non-compliance. In line with the policy guidelines, the public 
administrative procedures in compulsory land conversion strictly determined formal entry rules 
and the interaction rules for each public and private actor, focusing on the administrative 
procedures (steps) that the public and private actors must follow, the tasks to be fulfilled and 
the responsible areas of the actors as well as the time required to fulfill their functions. For 
instance, within two weeks after receiving the plans of compensation, support and resettlement 
(PCSR) from the district executive BCSR, the functional departments must perform their 
appraisals on the given plans and proceed to the next steps. 
Furthermore, the formal entry rules, in SN1, demonstrate top-down relationships between the 
actors (including the private actor), who have to comply not only with the administrative 
requirements but also with the directions from the higher levels (Figure 9). As a result, the 
interaction rules in terms of procedures specify unequal positions of the actors in the network 
and restrict the entry of any other non-mandated actors. 
The interactions between the public and private actors were also determined by public service 
provision contracts. The practice of implementation shows the failure of those contracts despite 
the fact that the private actor attempted to bind the public actors to the commitment 
fulfillments by offering a contracting-out method of cooperation (see Box 15).  
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Box 15: The failure of contracting-out between the NPM and the district BCSR 
The interactions between NPM and the district BCSR are formalized in a service contract. However, as said by NPM, 
the provisions and schedules stated in the contract were not completely complied by the BCSR. No sanctions were 
used. The reason was that the monopoly position of BCSR in acknowledging that all related compensation procedures 
are in line with government policies for compulsory land acquisition could not be replaced by any other actor/ 
contractor.  
Similarly, in regards to complaint resolution, the District Authority was responsible for issuing a hundred of response 
letters to the complainers in order to administratively (formally) close the complaint cases. It was impossible for the 
District Authority to do so for such a short period of time. The solutions were provided by the company, who paid 
additional compensation and entitlements (if any) to the complainer before the official decisions were made by the 
District. 
Nevertheless, both partners attempted to justify and shift towards cooperation and a supportive mechanism, where 
NPM provided the BCSR with necessary inputs so that the latter was able to fulfill the required procedures. Some 
other contracts were made between the company and the BCSR in order to formally and legally provide a service 
expenses for the public officers at the district level.  
(Group discussion of district officials  held on 18 Aug 2011, Dai Tu - TN
64
) 
Besides, participant observation eventually revealed some reasons for the failure of the formal 
forms of the interaction rules in SN1 due to the weakness of the policies and guidelines.  
First, the interaction rules themselves were very complex. The procedures for completion of an 
approval for compensation, support and resettlement comprise 17 steps, and appear to be 
difficult to follow properly by the relevant actors: “it was too much of overload for us to fulfill all 
the administration tasks for more than a thousand of households during that period of time”65- 
(quote 15). In contrast, ambiguity of the content of the interaction rules sometimes led to 
different interpretations by different actors. Box 10 (Conflicts caused by non-compliance to the 
administrative procedures) in 4.2.6.2 provides an example in this regard.  
Indeed, the absence of the decision of compensation, support and resettlement at household 
level was a result of different interpretations of the existing administrative procedures by 
different actors such as: (i) the decision of compensation, support and resettlement for the 
groups of PAHs in the same areas can be replaced with one at household level, (ii) the public 
executive actor, being the district board of compensation, support and resettlement thought 
that the private actor had already distributed the decision of compensation, support and 
resettlement to the PAHs (and vice versa) and (iii) some of the actors thought that all decisions 
of compensation, support and resettlement should be disseminated66 publicly at the commune 
information centers instead of being directly handed to each PAH.  
Second, the public actors were not capable of following the provisions of the service provision 
contract due to resource constraints and also due to the big project size, which exceeded the 
capacity of the provincial and district functional departments (see more in Box 18: The BCSR - 
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the resources are inadequate for the size of the NP project, in 5.2.5.1). In the meantime, the 
public actors were not in favour for an entry of a new private actor in this sub-network as shown 
in Box 32 (The trust based choice for the contracting-out partners in the NP project) in 5.3.2.4. 
The failure of the formal form of interaction as shown above lead to the use  of the informal 
rules, being more in form of moral engagement in order to simplify and shorten the complicated 
procedures in the compulsory land conversion. Indeed, informal rules take place when there is 
more trust and cooperation between actors (see 5.3.2.4). Long-lasting relationships enable the 
actors to know each other better by sharing incentives, by communicating and sharing benefits. 
As a result, the adoption of informal rules resulted in shorter time for consideration of enquiries, 
fewer interaction procedures and less paperwork in the form of formal correspondences, letters 
and documents.    
“We do not have to wait for one week for the appraisal of each responsible level of the public 
agencies as regulated by the laws. It can be much faster now... even within a couple of days...” - 
said by a NPM External Relation staff - (quote 16). 
“We can save a lot of time without the unnecessary administrative procedures... some 
documents can be sent to the communal authorities without sufficient signatures which can be 
filled in later... In many cases, we can call for a meeting without any official invitation letters”- 
said by a NPM Community Liaison staff - (quote 17). 
Interaction rules in SN2 
As SN2 advocates partnership approaches, the entry rules of SN2 remain open to a broad range 
of potential stakeholders (PCDP 2005) encompassing public, private and NGO agencies. 
Meanwhile, the general norms of behavior of the actors in this sub-network, found in the 
company documents (CDP and PCDP) and the vague provincial policy guidelines did not provide 
clear guidance as to what the actors are allowed to do or not to do. Consequently, the 
interaction rules understood as administrative procedures were blurred and the decision making 
mechanism was observed to be informal, trust-based and segmented.  
Indeed, the most common way of interactions among the actors is to promote the reciprocal 
partnership encompassing “cooperation”, “participation” and “contribution”, inferring that 
breaking off some of the interaction rules does not lead to any sanctions. As a result, during the 
early stages, the rules were informal and in line with general commitments or the social norms 
that were implicitly agreed upon by all actors (such as the recruitment of PAPs, the responses to 
the needs of the PACs...). Thus the actors could choose whether to join or not to join the 
economic restoration programs which resulted in a “segmented relationship between public 
actors” in SN2.  
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The actors, therefore, vary and are unpredictable in specific programs (as discussed by O’Toole 
in Kickert et al. 1997). In some cases, the decision making is relatively trust based. For example, 
the micro-finance program for the mushroom plantation was first given to the most severely 
affected commune of Ha Thuong. However, the Ha Thuong commune was not interested in 
mushroom plantation any longer and the loan grant was then shifted to Hung Son hamlet 9 
which was not affected by the project but the community was interested in the mushroom 
plantation.  
The evidence shows that the lack of clarity on the interaction rules in SN2 leads the actors to be 
less committed to the network. Other evidence illustrates the consequences of non-
commitment and weak linkages between the actors. On the one hand, the local public actors 
and the PAPs found that the private actor (NPM) should be held in a greater degree of 
accountability for their commitments, which were not always fulfilled properly as shown in Box 
15 of the previous section. On the other hand, NPM expected more returns from their 
philanthropic contribution (Burke & Lodgson 1996 in Garriga & Melé, 2004: 54). As a result, the 
interaction rules in SN2 were formulated and modified during the interactions between actors 
by having more formal (written) agreements and corporate contract on the win-win principles.  
 “we appreciate very much NPM’s great effort in the stabilization of the PAPs’ livelihood; but we 
also understand that the company in turn, expects our support, especially in regards to 
convincing our people to hand over their land to the project” - as a communal leader said - 
(quote 18). 
Box 16: Tensions between NPM and the Hung Son communal authority 
The Hung Son commune is the second most severely affected commune of the NP project with a total of around 300 
PAHs. The Nam Song Cong relocation site, located in the Hung Son commune was set to receive a hundred of resettled 
households from the Ha Thuong commune (Ha Thuong is the most severely affected commune with more than a 
thousand of PAHs).  
In 2012, the leaders of the Hung Son commune complained to various newspapers about NPM’s non-compliance of 
their financial commitment for the construction of a secondary school for the resettled children. Since 2004, NPM has 
committed (verbally) to the rehabilitation of the infrastructure of PAHs in the Nam Song Cong relocation site. In 2010, 
the company provided a written agreement to fund the extension of the Hung Son secondary school instead of 
building a new school. In turn, the local community welcomed all resettled children to local schools in the Hung Son 
commune. Various enquiries regarding the payment were addressed to the company without satisfactory results 
during 2011-2012, upon which the commune decided to use public media to escalate the matter, and also to 
accelerate the payment process. 
The representative of NPM responded to the newspapers articles by stating that the company did not break any of the 
commitments to the local community. The delay of the payment was caused by the lack of the required documents 
provided by the Hung Son authority. The disputes provided valuable experience to both partners (NPM and the local 
authority), in the sense that all agreements should be formalized with clear provisions.  
(Observation of community meetings in Hung Son commune during August 2012, and media publication review)  
In the later stages, the new interaction rules of SN2 take place in the signed agreements on the 
economic restoration programs, given that the decision making mechanism based on win-win 
agreements between the actors became more clearly defined. As a result, more entry rules have 
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been activated in order to engage active participation and contribution of the local authorities 
and mass organizations to the economic restoration programs in a more responsible manner.  
Interim conclusion 
The examination of the rules pertaining to the PPP arrangement in the NP project, allowed us to 
clarify and more importantly gain a deeper understanding of its structural features, taking in to 
consideration, ambiguity, complexity and dynamics. These are elements shared across cases in 
the PPP literature (Huxham & Vangen in Osborne 2000).  
Hence, the complexity of the PPP in the case under investigation is evident when providing an 
insight into the arena rules and interaction rules of each sub-network. Meanwhile, the 
knowledge of the rules in each sub-network helps us explain the different results of the PPP 
(Koppenjan & Klijn 2004).  
In relation to the ambiguous form of the PPP in the NP project, the rules are found to be vague 
and divergent, as found in SN1 and SN2. Indeed, the arena rules and interaction rules are quite 
distinct in SN1 and SN2 in terms of forms (formal and informal), contents (the degree of 
strictness and vagueness) and the adaptation approaches of the actors (the changes of rules).   
Nevertheless, the dynamics of the rules in the sub-networks characterize a shift from the 
ambiguous PPP to more PPP - like relation patterns. The pattern of interactions in SN1 
represents a “hierarchy” network, and encompasses strict arena rules and interaction rules, 
which are subject to modification due to the de-formalization process of interaction rules and 
the creation of new reward rules, providing more power to the private actor. In contrast, the 
pattern of interactions in SN2 is characterized by a loose linkage between the actors and is 
consolidated by the formalization of the arena, as well as the interaction rules, but also with the 
creation of new reality rules.  
The formal arena and interaction rules derive from the ongoing government policy framework 
and guidelines, which is characterized by weakness in terms of the established institutional 
arrangements, procedures and methods in land conversion (1.5). Indeed, the resettlement 
literature (Cernea 1993-1996, Asthana 1996, Shihata 1993 & Clark 2000) critically addresses the 
status of “policy vacuum” instead of clear normative guidelines and legal structures to cope with 
such problematic, difficult or controversial issues of involuntary resettlements that often lead to 
ineffective implementation. 
Thus, in the context of an imperfect policy framework and the vagueness of the formal rules, the 
informal rules are often used in both SN1 and SN2. This observation demonstrates the practice 
of imperfect rule setting in terms of public administration regime and policy environment in 
Vietnam. It also underlines certain Vietnamese cultural characteristics referred to as “sense and 
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sensibility” by Edwards and Phan (2013). According that culture, informal interactions and trust-
based rules in Vietnam are encouraged in general and in public management in particular.  
Table 32: Summary of rule types in PPP in the NP project 
 Arena rules Interaction rules 
SN1 SN2 SN1 SN2 
Nature Laws, policies - 
normative; 
Clear criteria; 
Compulsory nature; 
Company policies as 
new rules; 
Formal nature; 
Strict compliance. 
Laws, policies - vague; 
Vague, unclear criteria 
partnership nature; 
Company policies as 
new rules;  
Informal natural; 
Non-strict compliance. 
 
Administrative 
procedures; 
Network hierarchy; 
Contracting-out; 
Compulsory nature; 
Mainly defined prior 
interactions. 
Participation and 
voluntary basis;  
Negotiation and 
partnership; 
Mainly formulated and 
modified during 
interactions. 
Problems Conflict and 
complaints caused 
by the changes; 
Impossible to modify 
the content; 
Stable by stages. 
Conflict and complaints 
caused by the higher 
expectations; 
Possible to modify the 
content; 
 Unstable by stages. 
Implementation 
problem: Too strict 
requirements, 
resulted to  
(manipulation by 
non-compliance); 
Procedure shortening; 
Root-causes for conflict 
and complaints. 
Implementation problem: 
Too flexible and vague 
resulted to disputes 
and misinterpretation; 
Increased expectations 
and demands. 
Changing 
strategies  
Create new payoff 
rules and product 
rules; 
Complaint 
resolutions. 
Create new product/ 
position rules; 
Self- regulation; 
Complaint resolutions. 
In-formalization 
process during 
implementation 
(contracts as 
formality), shorter 
procedures, informal 
agreements during 
interactions. 
Formalization process 
during implementation 
(by agreements). 
5.2.3. Goals 
As we have already discussed in chapter two, the notion of separate goals in a network is 
arguably over-emphasized, while common goals, aims and purposes are downplayed in the 
network literature. Thus, our attention focused on understanding PPP goals in the NP project, 
which resulted to the following observations: first, the PPP goals can be viewed as “common 
purpose”, as suggested by Kickert et al. (1997) and were clearly identified in the NP project; 
second, although the private actor strategically aimed on goals intertwinement between 
organisational goals and PPP goals (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004), it was not the case of the public 
actors to the same extent.  
In regards to the first observation, the PPP goals were described by some interviewees as 
common objectives or shared objectives of the public and private actors in the NP project. This 
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point was corroborated while examining the associated documents and plans (CDP, PCDP and 
ERPs), referring to specific project activities.  
In our interviews, the public officials (who are authority leaders and senior civil servants) 
referred to the policy framework, which clearly defines the goals of a resettlement project that 
the public and private executives must follow: 
 “[...] through compensation, support and resettlement policies, to ensure eligible interests of 
PAPs; to stabilize the livelihoods of the PAPs under sustainable development programs and 
labour transfer from agricultural to non-agricultural activities...”67- (quote 19). 
For senior NPM managers, although the given goals may sound as public-functions, they are not 
separated from the specific objectives in the realization of the RAP and CDP, PCDP and ERPs, 
properly developed by the company (as shown in Box 17). 
Box 17: The key principles of NPM compensation, support & resettlement policy 
The principal objectives of the Project Resettlement Policy (PRP) are to ensure that all project affected persons will be 
compensated for their losses and with rehabilitation measures to assist them to at least restore or improve their living 
standards compared to the pre-project time, but also to improve their income earning ability.  
Where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, resettlement activities should be conceived and executed as 
sustainable development programs. Sufficient investment resources should be provided to enable Project Affected 
Persons (PAPs) to share project benefits. They should be meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to 
participate in planning and implementing resettlement programs. As a result, the community development objectives 
propose “various projects and activities defined in different stages and offers a close partnership with internal and 
external stakeholders to enhance community capability by providing appropriate contributions to local communities 
based on their own development needs, under mutually beneficial (win - win) framework that supports both the 
company and community goals”. 
(NPM RAP 2005 and CDP 2006) 
In particular, we observed that the objectives stated in the RAP of the NP project demonstrate a 
precise interpretation of the provincial policy and international norms that the project was 
subjected to. This attitude is fairly common in mining projects, due to their desire to improve 
their attitude towards sustainable development (see Sonnenberg & Münster, 2001). 
“[...] All involuntary resettlement projects should be conceived and executed as development 
programs, where sufficient investment resources and opportunities should be provided to re-
settlers as well as they should  be shared with project benefits”68. 
In particular, the PPP objectives can be interpreted to specific objectives of the project, 
encompassing the implementation of the compensation and resettlement, the PCDP, the ERPs 
and other social safeguards initiatives (CDP) (see 4.2.4). 
Therefore, our observation shows that the project objectives, referring to specific project 
activities in the NP project to be goals of public and private actors when joining the land 
conversion process. 
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In regards to the second observation, some degree of convergence of goals was found while 
studying the PPPs goals in connection with the organisational goals in view of the perceptions of 
the public and private actors in the section (5.2.7). Thus, in this section, observation of the 
perception of the actors clearly demonstrates their institutional/ organization goals. It was 
stated that in order to achieve their organizational goals, each actor mobilizes its resources to 
successfully carry out the land conversion activities in both SN1 and SN2. In relation to the 
private actor, in order to achieve the most important goal in the NP project, being the land for 
mining operations, the company aligned its goals to those of the government, in particular the 
economic rehabilitation and sustainable development of the PAPs and PACs. Indeed, this could 
be a strategy of the private actor to develop market credibility by being associated with the 
government, or to have political motives, such as gaining an “insider” position in policy 
processes, working to achieve policy outcomes favorable to businesses (Carroll & Steane 
2000: 51). 
As far as the public actors are concerned, they were more in favor of providing compensation 
and resettlement services once their institutional goals were properly respected by the private 
actor. However, the public actors tend to concentrate more on their organizational goals, which 
go beyond the PPP goals in the NP project. As a result, although the PPP goals in form of the 
project objectives have been clearly defined; they have been to some extent neglected by the 
public actors.  
Interim conclusion 
Overall study of PPP goals in the NP project demonstrates quite accurately “a common set of 
problems” (Kickert et al. 1997, Ostrom). In other words, our observation shows a mutual goal 
adaptation referred by Kickert et al. (1997) to be “strategic” in the network. 
Thus, the achievements of the land conversion objectives can be expected to enable the 
achievement of the organizational goals, such as the profit making and reduced transaction costs 
for the private actors and socio-economic development and security for the public actors. To 
conclude the PPP goals seem to be undermined in comparison to the organization goals of both 
public and private actors. 
5.2.4. Actors  
As discussed in section 2.2.4, effective problem solving requires cooperative efforts of a variety 
of organizations and the postulation that “no single actor can solve a problem alone” (O’Toole et 
al. in Kickert et al. 1997: 137). Two aspects are to be discussed in this section: actor constellation 
and the dynamics of the actors’ participation.  
The actor constellation and dynamics are identified in accordance with two sources of 
information: policy mandates (see Figure 9: Procedures for compulsory land conversion in the 
NP project) and the empirical observation of the practice of implementation. The policy 
mandates have defined key public actors, who play decisive roles in the compensation, support 
and resettlement activities in NP project. They are authorities at different levels (provincial, 
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district and communal levels), different organizational functional units (the DONRE, DoF and DoC 
at provincial and district levels) and the District Board of Compensation, Support and 
Resettlement (District BCSR). In this research, they can sometimes be labeled as individual actors 
also because each have their own functions and positions in the project despite the fact that 
they are all public actors with the same institutional background, values, and similar perceptions 
over the problems and solutions (see more in the following sections).  
The dynamics of the actors take place when the mandated actors and the actual actors in the 
implementation process are not always the same on the one hand; and participation of the same 
public actors is fairly segmented upon different policy task dimensions, on the other.   
Indeed, the comparative review of the collaborative settings shown in Figure 9 and Figures 13 & 
14 supports this argument. Apart from the key actors committed to the policy as stated above, 
other actors have been found to be “technically required (...) but largely interested in the policy 
agenda” (O’Toole et al. in Kickert et al. 1997: 139). Examples are the DOLISA and other social 
public agencies (or the mass organizations). In addition, the mandated public actors seem to be 
active in a strict collaboration in SN1, and non-active participants in SN2.   
Another point that underlines the dynamics of the actor constellation in the NP project is the 
existence of the third group of actors - the PAPs and PACs, who should be subjected to a certain 
level of analysis even though they are not viewed as public or private actors. Particularly, the 
PAPs are considered as important stakeholders in the NP project, since they are strongly 
involved as policy direct target groups in the compulsory land conversion process as well as the 
active people in the conflict resolution process. As a result, the PAPs and PACs are subject of our 
analysis as the third party, which is actively involved in the assessment of the given PPP process 
and outcomes (Voets 2008: 49). 
Finally, it is necessary to note other participants who may support the key actors in the policy 
process such as: the district economic department, the women union, the farmers’ union and 
variety of other consulting and training institutions (4.2.5). Those participants, however, should 
not be treated as actors in the PPP process because they are indirectly involved with the project 
only. Indeed, their names are not found in the formal implementation arrangements, nor in the 
observation of implementation. In addition, since our research focuses on public and business 
private actors, other non-profit actors (such as the unions) are not considered as participants in 
the given PPP setting. Similarly, other public or private contractors, in the form of consulting and 
training institutions are also considered to be supplementary participants in the given PPP. We 
argue that they are hired by contractors to reinforce NPM inputs in the process of the 
demarcation measurement survey (DMS)/ relocation activities or for the implementation of the 
Nui Phao economic restoration and social safeguard programs so that they are subjected to the 
principal - agent relations to NPM rather than the participants of the PPP network (see Figure 12: 
The organizational settings of collaborations in PPP of compulsory land conversion in the 
NP Project). 
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Interim conclusion 
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 139) suggest certain criteria to be used in the identification of the 
actors involved in the PPP process - such as identifying the actors interested in realizing one’s 
own objectives or policy goals, and the actors having an interest in problem solving. This 
distinction to some extent constrains our research design in regards to identification of the 
actors in the PPP process.  
Indeed, the PAPs and PACs have a great interest in problem solving in the NP project, but they 
are not viewed as actors in our research design, which main focus is restricted the public and 
private actors. To the contrary, some key public actors (being the functional departments) have 
a little interest in the NP project because they act as public service providers. In addition, some 
other public actors such as the DOLISA and the DARD appeared to have their functions in SN2 
but they are almost absent in the implementation practice, meaning that there is a mismatch 
between the legally mandated actors and the active actors in practice. 
5.2.5. Resource dependencies 
Resource dependency is at the heart of inter-organizational theory, which is another theoretical 
root of network theory (2.2.5). 
According to this approach, the resources of the public and private actors and their 
interdependencies are specified by institutional features and the legal mandates. However, our 
assessment of the resources and the dependencies of the actors in the PPP in the NP project is 
not only based on policy documents but also on interviews with persons with different 
perceptions, as well as on participant observation on the use and the development of the 
resources during different periods of time.  
5.2.5.1. Resources 
As discussed in 2.2.5, resources in the policy network analysis are classified in five types by 
Koopenjan and Klijn (2004); namely financial capacities, production capacities, competences, 
knowledge and legitimacy. 
In general, the resources are not equally or steadily distributed among state actors even though 
they come from the same institutional background. In addition, every actor has different types 
of resources, depending on which sub-network they participate in (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004 and 
Kickert et al. 1997).  
Accordingly, Table 33 in this section takes stock of the main resources of the participating actors 
in relation to the sub-network agenda. The distinction made in this table between sub-networks 
is related to SN1 as the first row and to SN2 as the second row. 
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Table 33: Summary of resources of actors in the NP project 
Actors  
Resources Type 
Finance Production Competence Knowledge Legitimacy 
The Thai Nguyen PPC 
 
SN1 
No budget for land 
compensation.
69
 
Decision making: 
New policy issuance and policy 
revision; 
Decision on land conversion for 
households and collectives. 
Public/political mandate; 
Policy and regulatory; 
framework for the 
Project; public 
institutional setting; 
Supervision and oversight;  
Conflict resolution. 
Policy information; 
institutional capacities; 
government strategies. 
 
Representing government 
at provincial level;  
Representing the interest 
of government and the 
population. 
SN2 
Providing access to 
government funded 
programs. 
New policy issuance and policy 
revision. 
 
Policy and regulatory 
framework. 
 
Provincial socio-economic 
development initiatives 
and strategies. 
Representing the interest 
of population in the 
province in general and 
the interest of the PAPs 
in particular. 
The Functional 
Departments 
DONRE, DoC, DoF;  
SN1 
 Policy and regulation guidance 
and advice. 
Expertise. 
Sectorised directives. Sectorised policy; 
Regulations and 
procedures 
information. 
Revision; approval, 
procedures, mandate 
and authorization by its 
own sectors. 
DOLISA, DARD 
SN2 
Provincial funding for 
job creations and 
vocational trainings. 
Policy and regulation guidance 
and advice. 
Expertise. 
Sectoral directives. Expertise and network 
relations 
Revision; approval and 
procedures for provincial 
programs. 
Land Acquisition 
compensation 
Direction 
Committee of TN 
and Dai Tu  
SN1 
 Oversight and supervision. 
Conflict resolution. 
Directives over NPM land 
conversion process. 
Multi-sector and diverse 
knowledge. 
Representing provincial and 
district governments for 
land conversion 
processes. 
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Dai Tu District People 
Committee 
 
SN1 
State limited budget. Support capacity building at 
local level. 
Deliver local services. 
Conflict resolution. 
Directives, mandate over 
administration 
procedures for land 
acquisition. 
 
Streamline of all relevant 
governmental policies 
and regulations. 
Hierarchical Reporting. 
Representing government 
at the district level. 
Representing the interest 
of district and the 
population. 
SN2 
Finance for District 
programs for socio-
economic 
development. 
 Directives, mandate over 
district funding for socio-
economic development. 
 
Development strategies 
and guidelines. 
Local knowledge. 
Representing the interest 
of population in the 
district in general and the 
interest of the PAPs in 
particular. 
The Dai Tu  District 
(BCSR): 
 SN1 
State limited budget 
and revenues from 
contracting-out. 
Expertise; administrative 
procedures for land 
conversion; appraisal of the 
Decision of compensation, 
support and resettlement. 
Monopoly in implementing 
land conversion 
procedure; legitimating 
procedures. 
Policies and regulation. Executives of land 
conversion. 
SN2 
 Administrative procedures for 
economic restoration 
payment. 
Appraisal for economic 
restoration cash 
payment. 
Policy and guideline; 
Experiences from other 
project in economic 
restoration. 
Executives of income 
generation and 
vocational training (as 
stated in policy 
mandate). 
The District functional 
departments 
(District DONRE, DoF, 
Economic 
Department and 
the department of 
social policies) 
SN1 
 Expertise in land conversion 
procedures. 
Sectorised directives. Sectorised policy; 
Regulations and 
procedures 
information. 
Revision; approval, 
procedures, mandate 
and authorization by its 
own sectors 
SN2 
District programs for 
job creations and 
vocational trainings. 
Adapting economic 
development initiatives and 
social policies. 
Sectoral directives. Expertise and network 
relations. 
 
Communal People 
Committees of the 
affected 
communes 
SN1 
 Mobilization of action at 
community level. 
 
Conduct measurement 
survey for land 
conversion; 
Information disclosure to 
Local knowledge and 
government policies. 
Representing local interest 
and government 
mandates 
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 community; complaint 
settlement. 
SN2 
Limited budgets for 
socio- economic 
development. 
Needs assessment, planning, 
implementation, supervision 
and evaluation. 
Decision making over local 
socio-economic 
development programs 
Local knowledge. Credibility. 
PAHs/ PACs  
SN1 
Land and housing 
assets; crops value. 
Self- calculation and 
adjustment of compensation 
packages. 
 
Ownership over land. Adapting Policy 
knowledge; 
understanding about 
people’ need. 
Decision making in their 
own compensation 
package. 
Complaint and grievance. 
SN2 
Compensation payment  
Savings 
Traditional economic models; 
workforce and production 
facilities. 
Self-management over 
household’s economy. 
Local knowledge and 
experience. 
 
Economic rehabilitation  
Benefits sharing from land 
acquisition. 
NPM 
SN1 
Finance for 
compensation and 
relocation sites. 
Financial, material, and 
facilities support for 
local authorities and 
communities. 
Human Resource availability. 
Additional partnership and 
contracting-out. 
Compensation payment. 
Decision making on 
company compensation, 
support and 
resettlement policies. 
Sustainable Development 
Initiatives. 
International Standards 
application. 
Information disclosure 
networking. 
Monitoring and 
evaluation. 
Access to negotiation for 
compensation prices and 
entitlement with the 
PAPs in the later stage; 
Decision maker for the 
company addition 
policies and 
entitlements. 
SN2 
Finance for economic 
restoration and 
development. 
Mobilization and 
partnerships of 
government and 
external resources. 
Leadership and advocacy 
Quality performance. 
Equipment and technical skills. 
Infrastructure development. 
Investment capacity building. 
Decision making on 
company supporting 
policies (economic 
restoration; gender 
programs; programs for 
ethic minority and 
vulnerable groups). 
Partnership network for 
expertise. 
Adapting international 
and national & sectoral 
standards. 
Participation and decision 
making, benefit sharing. 
Other (public/ 
Private/ Non-
Profit); Mass 
organizations 
SN1  Supervision and Advice. Conflict resolution. Local knowledge. Credibility. 
SN2 
Co-financing Expertise and advice. 
Evaluation/ supervision. 
Consensus mobilization. Expertise and network. Credibility. 
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Provincial level  
Thai Nguyen PPC 
Vietnam is a unitary state and its bureaucracy is hierarchical, with decentralization to provincial 
level (VDR 2009 & 2010). Accordingly, in regards to land management in general and the 
compulsory land conversion procedures in particular, the provincial authorities play a central 
role (Thai Nguyen PPC). It was argued that more responsibilities and power to local (provincial) 
government over land management enables them to be “closer to people” and “more able to 
provide the mix of services that people in that area demand” (VDR 2010:26). 
Representing the government in the province, the TN PPC holds the government competencies 
for the land conversion policy implementation including institutional arrangements in the 
resettlement projects in the province. The TN PPC is allowed to issue (or revise) relevant policy 
guidelines on the basis of the standing national laws and relevant public policies. Indeed, the TN 
PPC is allowed to issue new policies and regulations based on the proposals appraised by its 
functional bodies, such as the DONRE, DoF, DoC and others. Finally, the TN PPC is responsible for 
issuing decisions, as well as granting approvals for compensation, support and resettlement 
(DCSR and ACSR) for the affected households and collectives in the NP project.  
In regards to financial resources, Thai Nguyen, one of the few provinces in Vietnam to fall under 
this scheme, is subsidized by the additional budget from the central government70. However, its 
budget remains limited for compensation and development of the NP project. It has been agreed 
between the TN PPC and the NPM that the company would advance the compensation payment 
for the PAPs and PACs, however, these expenses will be deducted from tax revenues once the 
mining becomes operational.  
In regards to SN2, the TN PPC has financial resources in the form of national and provincial 
programs for job creation and vocational training. These resources, however, are used for other 
projects rather than for the NP project because the need for economic rehabilitat ion in the 
NP project has “overloaded” the budget capacity of the province71. As stated by a TN PPC 
Vice leader:  
“We have an annual budget for vocational training and job creation under various national 
programs, such as the national program for job creation and vocational training for young 
people, the training program for farmers (we call as the program 1956), to name a couple. 
However, we often do not have enough funding for the implementation of these programs and 
since Thai Nguyen is in the transition period of industrialization, and there is a great need in 
vocational training. The number of the PAPs in NP project, needed for the vocational training has 
overloaded our financial and training capability. We are seeking more contribution from the 
companies and training institutions in this regard” - (quote 20). 
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Provincial Functional Departments  
The provincial functional units (DONRE, DoF, DoC, DOLISA and others) are delegated to handle 
technical functions in order to implement the process of compensation, support and 
resettlement. They are responsible for making legal decisions and providing technical advice to 
the TN PPC in decision making at provincial level (such as appraisal and plan submission for 
compensation, support and resettlement). The functional groups have the highest expertise in 
the field of compensation and resettlement policies, as well as production, competence and 
knowledge resources in the land conversion process, including displacement procedures and job 
creation & vocational training. Particularly, the functional groups are viewed as the most reliable 
spokesmen in regards to the policy concerns of the PAPs. As a result, the functional groups were 
requested to be key members of the task force group for complaint resolution.  
Those functional units have dual responsibilities (and often dual budgeting) to their superiors 
within a ministry (MONRE, MoF, MoC, and DOLISA) and to the provincial government into which 
they are embedded. However, in the function of compulsory land conversion, they are more 
embedded in the provincial government rather than in the ministries.  
In regards to SN2, it is clear in the policy framework that the Department of Labor, Invalids and 
Social Affairs (DOLISA) is responsible for “leading and appraising training and job replacement 
plans and guiding the district BCSR to establish training and job replacement plans”(Decision 
01/2010/QD-UBND, Chapter 7, Provision 35). However, the evidence shows a limited 
involvement of DOLISA in this regard. This is not uncommon in Vietnam, since a limited amount 
of public funding is given to vocational training including school facilities and human resources 
for training (Bui in Beresford and Tran: 2004). 
In general, the provincial actors are provided with all resources for the implementation 
arrangements for compulsory land conversion in the NP project, except for the financial 
resources for compensation, support and relocation and the operational expenses for land 
conversion. Our observation shows a gap between the entitled resources and the use of the 
entitled resources by the provincial actors. As said by a DONRE official while being aware their 
function that they expect the private actor to be a key player in the NP project.  
“Our department is responsible for land management issues in the Thai Nguyen province. We 
have recently re-structured our organization in terms of improvement of manpower and 
expertise in order to effectively handle our tasks of land management, compensation and 
resettlement. We have devoted a great deal of manpower to the NP project, such as assigning 
the vice director of our department to be fully in charge for the project. However, we think that 
there are a variety of other partners involved in the NP project and the investor has a strong 
capability to mobilize resources for their project development. We have done our best to fulfill 
our tasks... In addition, the DONRE has plenty of other tasks to do in the province, not just the NP 
project” - (quote 21). 
Indeed, some actors are unlikely to use their resources, the DOLISA for example, and others, 
such as the functional units, were quite reluctant in using their production and knowledge 
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resources on a regular basis. Instead, the resources were utilized when it was critically required 
in the context of conflict and complaint boom, which will be discussed further in the text.  
District level 
Dai Tu DPC  
The most recent policy framework, Decree 69 of the Government, allows decision making on 
compulsory land conversion at district level. The Thai Nguyen PPC wanted decentralization to 
lower levels in this regard. In principle, the Dai Tu DPC holds the overall local government 
competences to lead and supervise the Compensation, Support and Resettlement (CSR) of 
implementation at communal level and is responsible for quality performance of compensation, 
support and resettlement at local level.  
However, the problem found at district level lies with the incompatibility between the entitled 
resources and the available resources. This infers that Dai Tu DPC and its executive units are not 
capable of handling the project properly. In other words, there are insufficient competences 
available at the DPC to function properly in the land compensation process, especially in terms 
of policy adjustment and decision making. 
The Dai Tu PPC is more authorized in administrative procedural supervision, appraisal and 
realization and in passing decision making power to higher levels. To avoid the overload for 
provincial level, the Dai Tu DPC has been authorized to issue Decisions on land recovery (the 
Decision of compensation, support and resettlement) only for the affected households; as well 
as to identify and approve procedures for relocation sites and to provide official responses to 
complaints and grievance of PAPs72.  
Decision making (such as the Decisions for land recovery for collectives, and Approvals of the 
compensation, support and resettlement for households and collectives), therefore is shifted to 
the Thai Nguyen PPC and provincial functional level, causing complication and segmentation in 
policy implementation in this project. 
Nevertheless, the Dai Tu DPC also represents the interests of the district and its population 
during land conversion policy implementation. In the relation with its partner - the NPM - Dai Tu 
PPC has several different functions. On the one hand, they collaborate to ensure the success of 
the displacement and land hand-over to its private partner (NPM), while on the other hand they, 
being the “guardians” of their population, act in the interests of the PAPs or PACs. Besides, the 
Dai Tu PPC is responsible for the overall security as well as the socio-economy stability in the 
district, since these are the parameters on which their performance as authority is measured. 
Given the fact that the goals and interests of the various stakeholders such as the PAPs and the 
investors represented by the Dai Tu DPC are distinctive and (to some extent) contradictory In the 
involuntary resettlement projects such as the NP project (as discussed in 1.2.1 and 4.2.6), any 
improper use of competences such as violence or force will endanger the political reputation/ 
position of the District. Evidence was reported recently in newspapers and other public media 
regarding the severe consequences of improper use of power in the districts (and provinces) in 
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 If the official decisions at the district level were not accepted by the complainers, the issues would be brought to 
the provincial level (See Complaint Mechanism - RAP 2005). 
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compulsory land conversion (see Table 2: Resisting cases in compulsory land conversion in 
Vietnam, in 1.5.5). 
 As a result, certain competences of Dai Tu DPC purposely remained unused in some cases 
during land conversion in the NP project.  
The Dai Tu BCSR 
The BCSR is the assigned executive of the district government for the land acquisition activities in 
the Dai Tu district. Although the BCSR was established on a temporary basis, it functions as an 
independent district department, which is ranked at the same level with other functional 
departments in the district. The unit is responsible for carrying out resettlement, support and 
compensation for all investment projects in the Dai Tu district, including Nui Phao. For instance, 
in 2010 the unit carried out 23 resettlement projects in the Dai Tu district. Their activities are 
based on administrative procedures and participation by communities73, social associations and 
PAPs is still poor. Throughout the country the procedures are similar and largely administrative 
(see Hung Vo 2009). 
However, the practice in the NP project shows inadequate resources of BCSR as the district 
executive entity for land conversion. The mandates of the BCSR encompass production, 
competences and knowledge resources. In fact, the workload of land acquisition for the NP 
project requires more production capacities and knowledge than the district functional and 
executives can produce (see Box 18 below).  
Box 18: The BCSR - the resources are inadequate for the size of the NP project 
The team currently has 16 staff, among which there are 4 permanent senior officials, while the rest are contracted 
from the District Authority on an annual basis. Since the contracted staffs from the District Authority are not trained in 
any of the above mentioned institutions, with the exception of short-term training courses, the young officers, who 
are new university or college graduates, work for BCSR as trainees rather than as resettlement and compensation 
experts. In addition, the government salaries appeared lower than needed for living expenses. In particular, the 
average salary of BCSR members is 4 times lower than the average salary of NPM staffs, who are working in the same 
service of land conversion. Consequently, many staffs have left the BCSR after a short time of service.  
According to the report of BCSR of 2011, the total land conversion projects handled by the BCSR in 2011 stood at 23 in 
the whole Dai Tu district among which 17 were new projects. Compared to the size of other projects, the NP project is 
significantly bigger in terms of the acquired area, number of affected households and compensation amounts. Indeed, 
the total land to be acquired in 23 land conversion projects in the Dai Tu district is 195 ha while the NP project 
acquired an area of 644 ha. The total number of resettled HHs in the remaining projects (excluding the NP project) is 
79 HHs while there are still more than 700 HHs who have to re-settle, whereas the compensation value for the 
projects in 2011 was around 167 billion VND (approximately USD 8 million). This compensation amount is much lower 
than the compensation for the NP project, which in 2011 reached 1,200 billion VND (equivalent to USD 60 million)
74
.  
The financial status of the BCSR depends on the progress of land conversion in the NP project. The BCSR was 
contracted by the NPM for carrying out the land conversion activities. A cloudy principle-agent has been established in 
order to legitimize the service expenses equivalent up to 3 percent of the total compensation value. However, since 
the final procedures, such as the approvals for PCSR and HHs are dealt with at the provincial level, a certain amount of 
service costs has been shifted to the provincial  functional departments (DoC, DoF and DONRE), while the rest of the 
amount is transferred to the private consultation company for the land conversion service for the NPM.  
(Review of the annual reports of the DT BCSR 2011; interviews and group discussion held on 18
th
 August 2011 in 
Dai Tu - TN) 
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 The BCSR report 2011. 
74
 In this part we want to compare the workload for the NP project and the workload for other resettlement projects, 
carried out by the BCSR. 
170 
 
In regards to SN2, cash payments for economic restoration and other incentives for livelihood 
rehabilitation were included in the compensation packages. As a result, the BCSR has no 
involvement with the training and job displacement plan for PAPs even though this is in contrast 
to their tasks assigned by the policy mandates (as elaborated in Figure 9: Procedures for 
compulsory land conversion in the NP project). In general, the Dai Tu PPC, the BSCR and other 
functional departments retain their membership in this sub-network relationship by providing 
local knowledge, expertise and co-financing the economic development programs. 
The District Functional Departments 
The district functional groups such as the district DONRE, district finance department, the 
economic department and the department of social policies are, respectively, subordinate 
(lower) levels of the provincial functional departments of DONRE, DoF, DoC and the District 
department of social policies. However, apart from the district DONRE being actively involved in 
the compensation and resettlement procedures, the other functional units are almost absent in 
the policy process. As mentioned above, the functional duties such as the compensation prices, 
the relocation site designs and expenses are mostly appraised at provincial functional levels. As a 
result, the entitled resources of those departments in the NP project are limited to 
competencies in the (limited) sectoral directives, the expertise and local knowledge for socio-
economic restorations.  
Commune level  
Communal People Committees (CPCs) 
Communal People Committees of the affected communes are the lowest level of state 
administrative system in Vietnam. They can be viewed as grassroots-level actors. The commune 
authorities have been the locus of administrative authorities, production and information 
resources. Notably, the administrative competence of grassroots actors comprises 
acknowledgement and confirmation of the content of Plans for compensation, support and 
resettlement with the representatives of PAHs and Mass Organizations (such as Fathers’ Front), 
a legal acknowledgement of detailed assets to be compensated, eligibility of each PAH, 
information disclosure and organizational activities for DMS as a basis for estimation of Plans for 
compensation, support and resettlement. 
In addition, the grassroots actors possess considerable legitimacy resources deriving from their 
functions which are not only of administrative competences, but also of representative 
competence. The communal authorities represent PAPs and PAC in the four affected communes 
namely Ha Thuong, Hung Son, Tan Linh and Cat Ne; so that they have a potential capability to 
enable consensus and mobilization power in the land conversion process.  
There is no doubt to assert that the communal PCs, viewed as the lowest level state actors, play 
crucial roles in enabling the implementation of land conversion in the NP project due to their 
exceptional legitimacy resources for consensus at grassroots level, which is largely employed in 
both sub-networks (SN1 and SN2) in the land conversion process.  
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Community Groups (PAHs and PACs)  
The community groups hold their competencies and legitimacy resources over their land 
ownership as defined by the Land Laws (2003), which recognize the ownership and legitimate 
the land use right of the owner. However, the level of competencies and legitimacy over the land 
has diminished under the provisions of the compulsory land conversion scheme. In other words, 
the compulsory nature of displacement in the NP project has undermined the legitimacy of the 
PAPs. With no formal voice in the land conversion process, the PAPs are usually “the last people 
to be informed about what officials intend to do” (WB 2009).   
In fact, the PAHs (about 2700 households75) have various types of resources in the process of 
land conversion. As the owners of the land and on-land assets, the PAPs have a long history of 
sustaining their livelihoods in the areas. As required by the Laws, the PAPs and PACs are subject 
to fair compensation, economic restoration measures and are entitled with benefits sharing 
from the investor. The guiding principle is that PAPs are not left worse off as a result of the 
compulsory land conversion. The local knowledge and the participation in economic models 
appear as essential resources for the rehabilitation process (SN2) in land conversion.  
Private actor: Nui Phao Mining Company (NPM)  
NPM is a private enterprise placing an investment capital of 500 million USD behind the NP 
project. The company belongs to Masan Resources, which is a new business cluster established 
by the Masan Group - one of the biggest private sector groups in Vietnam. Nui Phao Mining is 
thus subject to the hierarchical management of the Masan Resources and Masan Group. 
However, the decision making process in NPM is homogenous in the sense that the executive 
units responsible for compensation, support and resettlement are fully driven by the will of the 
company- level management instead of the Masan Group level.  
As a private business investor, NPM joined the land conversion process using its financial 
resources, including finance for compensation and design of relocation sites, finance for realizing 
sustainable initiatives including economic restoration and finance for operational expenses 
during the course of policy implementation.  
The intensive observation of the different stages of the NP project resulted in some important 
findings in regards to the dynamics of the resources of this private actor. The first finding is 
related to the formal and informal forms of legitimacy of NPM in the land conversion process. In 
line with the institutional arrangements, the investor was assigned to support the government 
executives to proceed with the necessary procedures for compensation, support and 
resettlement. Indeed, compulsory land conversion is assigned as the responsibility of 
government authorities. However, during the course of implementation, the PAPs gradually 
shifted towards the negotiation mechanism with the private actors. This approach has been 
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implicitly supported by the government executives in the later stage of compensation as the 
solution to the long- lasting resistance and complaints.  
The company’s position was explained by a NPM manager as follow: 
“In order to execute the land conversion process for mining activities in the NP project, we 
definitely cannot rely on the local government to carry out this task on our behalf. This project is 
too big compared to the capabilities of the province and the district on the one hand. We and our 
stakeholders mostly benefit from the project outcomes, thus we should be most responsible, on 
the other. Our project is subject to the compulsory land conversion mechanism, but we should do 
a great deal more for the PAPs and PACs as this mechanism is largely unaccepted by them. Also 
the PAPs and PACs should be convinced by the benefits they may gain from the project to support 
our project by transferring their land and resettle in new places. In order to be able to do so, we 
have invested a great amount of financial capital that not all national level investor can actually 
afford” - (quote 22). 
The second finding points at the notion that the dominant roles of financial resources are a basis 
for producing other types of resources. Indeed, NPM generates production resources, 
competence, formal legitimacy and information resources as described below:  
The production resources of the NPM are evident in their ability to contract-out, their human 
resources and facility investment. According to the policy of the province (as stated in Figure 9), 
NPM is required to provide the necessary inputs to the functional executives and authorities. 
Examples of the inputs are information about acquired land areas, relocation site design and 
construction, cooperation with BCSR for plan making and for the generation of compensation 
and allowance payments for PAPs. In fact, NPM aims at improving the performance of the 
functional executives by direct involvement in every step of the land conversion procedures. 
Meanwhile, the company contracted out other external professional companies and training 
institutions in order to carry out the DMS, compensation calculation and area mapping activities 
on the one hand, and to handle the pilot economic restoration programs, on the other. 
Box 19: Resources of NPM for land conversion activities 
NPM has established a compensation and resettlement section with more than 60 qualified staff and associates which 
reached to 80 people at the most critical stage, accompanied by well-accommodated site offices specializing in land 
compensation, resettlement and economic rehabilitation. Notably, the modern office equipments such as computers, 
printers, photocopy machines, cameras… were provided to the office of the state partner.  
The Organization chart shows that the Deputy General Director of NPM is also the leader of the Department of 
External Affairs. The department is divided into different functional teams such as Community Liaison and Economic 
Restoration, the DMS, the Mapping, the Calculation, the Land Recovery and Relocation, the Monitoring and Evaluation 
sections, to name a few.     
(The annual reports 2010-2013 of NPM Department of External Affairs) 
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The information resources of NPM were produced through increased participation and 
consultation, partnerships and locally subsidized initiatives. 
Under the international standards set forth by the professional safeguard agencies and 
international donors such as the World Bank and the IFC, the implementation of the public 
consultation and disclosure plan (PCDP) allow the company to generate a great deal of expertise 
and knowledge in the related fields (see more in 4.2.4). In addition, NPM has set up its own 
information channels such as the Information Centre, accessible by all PAPs and PAC members. 
Besides, the company subsidized facilities and operational expenses for the 23 information 
corners located in all affected hamlets and communal/ district headquarters76. NPM also 
established partnerships with other media agencies, notably the Thai Nguyen newspapers and 
Thai Nguyen television for the dissemination of NP project activities including policies 
explanation, economic restoration programs and other awareness raising initiatives. As a result, 
the competences and legitimacy resources of NPM are produced through continuous 
participation, additional policies, information disclosures and the quality of policy 
implementation.  
As stated in the previous sections (also see Figure 9: Procedures for compulsory land 
conversation in the NP project), the CPCs and functional units possess full competence 
resources, especially in terms of authority and administrative procedures over the compensation 
and resettlement activities. In the RAP, the company has developed its own policies to increase 
the benefits of the PAPs and PACs. According to the leaders of the company, the additional 
policies are aimed at greater benefit sharing for the PAPs and PACs and on a deeper involvement 
of the private actor in the compulsory land conversion process, where the additional 
entitlements can be used as a means for negotiation and conflict resolution.  
As seen in the previous analysis, the competence resources appeared neglected by state actors 
in the areas of economic restoration and social safeguard initiatives, whereas the company 
particularly invested in these areas. Stemming from the fact that the financial budget for 
economic restoration and social safeguards initiatives is fully granted by the NPM, the company 
in this case has both competence and legitimacy to generate related programs. In addition, the 
implementation of PCDP including policy promotion in combination with the intentional 
dissemination of company contribution to the economic restoration and social safeguard 
measures, has consolidated the legitimacy of its executive roles in the land conversion process. 
As stated by a senior official from TN PPC in the later stage of land conversion, the role and 
contribution of the company as acknowledged by the local government that: “NPM is the unique 
investor in the Thai Nguyen province who considerably invested in economic restoration and 
social safeguards measures for the benefit of the project affected people and communities. It is 
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also the investor who has developed the best additional compensation and resettlement policies 
in the province, and maybe in all of Vietnam”- (quote 23). 
Interim conclusion 
Overall we observe that in SN1, in relation to the land conversion process most of the 
competences belong to the government agencies. Legitimacy resources remain controversial in 
our analysis due to the fact that formal legitimacy of the public authorities is found to be 
contradictory to informal legitimacy of the PAPs. Indeed, the public actors possess formal 
legitimacy in land acquisition, while the PAPs/ PACs, having clear ownership over their land, 
possess only informal legitimacy, in order words they have limited rights in decision making in 
compulsory land conversion.  
The dynamics of the resources in the NP project was discerned by exploring the use of financial 
resources of the private actor. Indeed, the private actor has an advantage simply by possessing 
financial resources. Those were found to be effectively transformed into other types of 
resources needed for land conversion. It may be argued that the input resources of the private 
actor, namely the production resource, competences resources, knowledge resources and 
legitimacy resources can be viewed as the output of the land conversion process, by effectively 
using the financial resources. We argue that the given resources should be considered as the 
input resources since they were intentionally mobilized by the private actor before actual land 
conversion took place in the project area (see Box 14: New reality rules created by the NPM 
additional policies and entitlements, in 5.2.2.1, and Box 19: Resources of NPM for land 
conversion activities, in 5.2.5.1). To further this argument, it is also found that the financial 
resources in compulsory land conversion projects are of essential importance in a sense that 
they can be used as a means to generate other types of resources. The financial aspect appears 
to be even more important in terms of resettlement and economic rehabilitation (SN2). It is 
asserted by various scholars that the root-cause of failure to resettle PAPs sustainably lies with 
insufficient financing for resettlement which includes additional compensation for restoring 
incomes and livelihoods (Cernea 2008 and Wicklin III 1999).  
The study of the resources and the use of the resources in the NP project resulted in our 
identification of the dedicated and non-dedicated actors in the land conversion process in the 
NP project which will be further discussed in our next section 5.2.5.2. A dedicated actor is the 
one, who has “their subjective involvement” in the process, and a willingness to use their 
resources. A non-dedicated actor is the one, who finds no clear interest in the process and tends 
to be less inclined to work hard to find the solution (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004: 146). Accordingly, 
in SN2, most of the public actors at various levels were found to be non-dedicated actors. 
However, we argue that the actors were found to be non-dedicated, not only because they did 
not perceive clear obligations or incentives to join the process, but also because they may tend 
to reserve their resources for other priorities or rely on the financial strength of the investor. 
 
 
175 
 
However, the main reasons for becoming non-dedicated stem from the lack of necessary 
resources to generate the economic restoration and safeguard activities. In SN1, most of the 
public actors were found to be dedicated in the position of the public service provider.  
In contrast, the private actor is found to be the dedicated actor in both SN1 and SN2 since they 
perceive clear costs and benefits of their subjective involvements, as well as the resources 
investment. However, the discussion on this argument will be further elaborated in the following 
section which is more focused on the actors’ perceptions. 
Finally, the incapability of using the competencies of the local authorities provides the fact that 
the functions and the entitled resources of the state actors in a compulsory land conversion 
policy framework are inadequate in the practice of the implementation.  
5.2.5.2. Interdependencies 
The PPP in the NP project developed due to the interdependency between actors (same as 
discussed by Kickert et al. in 1997: 31). The previous section introduced the types and amount of 
resources of the actors, whereas this section elaborates on the degree of dependency of the 
resources of one actor by other actors in a network 
 As stated in 2.2.5, actor interdependencies can be analyzed both by classifying them according 
to coordination methods and degrees of dependencies based on the level of importance 
(Thomson 1967, Staudenmayer 1997 in Voets 2008, Koppenjan & Klijn 2004 and Scharpf 1978). 
In the NP project, the interdependencies between actors are also portrayed in different 
dimensions comprising the inter-organizational interdependencies between the public and the 
private actors; intra-organizational interdependencies between the multi-layer public actors; and 
to some extent- the interdependencies between the executive teams (comprising public and 
private actors) and the third party - the PAPs and PACs. 
Types of Interdependencies  
The interdependency between the public and the private actors 
In general, pooled interdependencies are found in the relationship between public and private 
actors in SN1, which was defined as “symbolic PPPs”, dominated by the hierarchical governance 
of public administrative procedures (5.2.1). This means that each participant (actor) is not able 
to achieve their goals without the involvement of the other. For the private actor (NPM), the 
“compulsory” feature in land conversion implies high dependency on the legal and 
administrative system of public agencies, viewed as monopoly providers in this regard. For the 
public actors, the financial capability of the private actor is viewed as a decisive means to 
materialize the land conversion process, as well as to foster socio-economic development in the 
province. An example can be found with reference to the timeline of the project development, 
when the project was suspended during 2008-2009 due to the national and international 
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financial crisis, since the Thai Nguyen PPC had failed to request investment from their state 
owned partners for the NP project. Given the fact that there are equal opportunities for all 
investors, the size of NP project required a “giant” investment. The Masan Resources would be 
one of the rare investors who can meet such investment conditions.  
In SN2, the interdependencies, however, were different and were of both sequential and 
reciprocal nature. In regards to assistance and economic restoration of the policy framework, 
there was an absence of strict rules which determine the roles of both the public and private 
actors in the rehabilitation processes (5.2.2). General provisions in the policy framework allowed 
cash payments for assistance and economic restoration initiatives. On the one hand, public 
agencies administrated the cash payment procedures instead of building practical income 
generation programs. In this regard, the public and private actors were sequentially inter-
dependent as a necessary administrative formality in generating cash payments for assistance 
and economic restoration. On the other hand, the NPM developed its own economic restoration 
encompassing participation and partnership advocacy between various stakeholders, comprising 
public and non-public actors. Notably, our analysis focuses more on this aspect of relations.  
As seen in Table 35 (The level of dependency adapted), the level of dependencies between 
actors were low and with high (or medium) degree of replacebility, given the fact that an 
inappropriate public actor can be substituted or replaced by a suitable public or non-public actor 
in the economic restoration programs. 
The findings of this part have corroborated our argument on the types of relationships 
recognized in SN1 and SN2 (5.2.1). Hence, the pooled dependencies defined the collaborative 
form in SN1 and the reciprocal dependencies determined the cooperative and coordinative 
patterns of relations in SN2 (Mandell & Keast 2007). Moreover, a mix of three types of 
interdependencies (pooled, reciprocal and sequential), as a result of different task 
dimensions of the collaborations in the PPP in the NP project, best explains the nature of the 
PPP in the NP project. 
Interdependencies within the organizations  
As it was mentioned by Thompson (1967), there are internal interdependencies within a single 
organization. Thus, both public and private actors in a network strongly depend on their 
organizational system. It is necessary to repeat that in this study, the public organization is a 
“public multi-layer system” while the private actor is denoted as a “business company”. 
Accordingly, our research mainly focuses on the interdependencies within multi-layer public 
actors. We assume that such interdependencies essentially influence the PPP process in the NP 
project (see more Klijn & Teisman 2002, 2003).  
It is found that there are both pooled and sequential interdependences between different levels 
and different dimensions of state actors. Indeed, the state actors are linked to decision making 
sequences as a chain of policy actions, where the outputs of some actors are the inputs of other 
actors. For instance, the approval for PCSR (Plan for Compensation, Support and Resettlement) 
for the HH level is issued by the Thai Nguyen PPC. However, a series of actions involving local 
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executives including the BSCR, district authority, provincial functional departments are needed 
in order to realize a final decision at the PPC level. The pooled interdependencies between the 
actors within an administrative system were recognized, while the quality of performance of one 
actor could significantly influence the performance of the others. For example, mistakes in the 
calculation or measurement made by the communal or district executive agencies, made the 
functional department to consequently issue wrong Approvals for compensation, support and 
resettlement. As seen in Figure 11 (The types of complaint issues and the degrees of 
correctness), the majority (about 70 percent) of complaints were related to the calculation of 
fixed assets and DMS for the compensation packages. This mistake required the expertise of the 
task force group to be effectively resolved. 
Indeed, the hierarchy in a public administrative system results in interdependencies between 
different levels of public actors. First, there are pooled and sequential interdependences 
between different levels and different dimensions of state actors. Second, the state actors are 
linked in sequences in a cycle of policy making, where the outputs of some actors are the inputs 
of other actors (2.2.2).  
Differing from SN1, SN2 is characterized by a segmented relationship between public actors. 
Apart from administrative procedures between the communes, district and province needed for 
cash payments for economic restoration for PAPs, there was almost a full absence of pooled and 
serial interdependencies within the public organizational system. To some extent, reciprocal 
interdependencies between public actors were rendered by information sharing and mutual 
adjustment for policy implementation.  
Having performed a similar analysis of the private actor, we found that the functional units of 
resettlement and compensation in the Nuiphao Mining company (NPM) are strongly driven by 
the company management of the Masan Resources Group in close collaboration with other 
operational departments such as administration, HR and construction. However, as stated 
above, since NPM is a homogenous institution, the interdependences within the company are 
not subjected to an in-depth analysis in our research. Nevertheless, the structural chart of NPM 
portrays reciprocal interdependencies between different departments in the company.  
Dependencies of the public and private actors to the third party- community groups (PAPs, 
PACs) 
The compulsory nature of land conversion tends to exclude the dependencies of the public and 
private actors from the PAPs and PACs since the state officials are allowed to “take”77 the land, 
which is legally claimed to be a state asset (see more in 1.5.1). 
However, the practice in the Nui Phao case shows that both public and private actors (viewed as 
the implementation executives) are strongly dependent on the PAPs, who decide on the success 
or failure of the land conversion project. Indeed, as stated in section 4.2.5 the administrative 
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procedures for the compulsory land conversion require the PAPs to “check and sign off” their 
affected land, assets and entitlements, providing that the PAPs have rights to agree or not agree 
with the compensation packages. 
Furthermore, the evidence regarding the resistance of the PAPs, causing a blockage in the 
implementation process in SN1 (as shown in Box 9: The status of conflict in the NP project) 
necessitates an elaboration of the dependencies on the PAPs who are affected by PPP activities. 
Table 34: Interdependencies between actors in each sub - network 
Dimension of actor relations SN1 SN2 
Between public and private actors Pooled Pooled and Reciprocal  
Within the public organizations Pooled; sequential  Reciprocal  
Dependencies  on the PAPs and the PACs Pooled and sequential  Reciprocal  
Degree of dependencies  
Another analytical dimension of actor interdependencies is the degree of dependency 
determined by the importance an actor attaches to the resources owned by the others including 
the possibility of substituting these resources or acquiring them through other actors (Scharpf’s 
1978 in Kickert et al. 1997).  
In general, the high level of dependencies takes place in SN1, and low to medium level of 
dependencies in SN2. Analysis of the degrees of interdependencies also results in identification 
of the critical actors, as well as of the dedicated actors in the network.  
Accordingly, Table 35 in this section is developed based on the adaptation of Scharpf’s (1978) 
and Koppenjan & Klijn (2004:146) suggestions. In comparison to the Thompson’s scheme, which 
focuses on the nature of the dependencies and is preferably applicable to intra-organizational 
dependencies, the presented scheme is better suited for understanding the dynamics of the 
resources, the behavior and strategies of the actors in using their resources and also offers an 
aid for the identification of the critical actors, dedicated and non-dedicated actors in the 
network.  
Our assessment, ranging from the high (H) through the medium (M) to the low (L) level of 
dependency of one actor upon another was based on a series of observations: the revisions of 
the policy documents, the observations of the public-private interactions, interviews of different 
people, and the study of certain specific cases where the collaborative activities were influenced 
or disrupted by the dependencies. On the one hand, based on what resources are crucial in the 
network, we can identify the (non) critical actors, who (do not) possess such crucial resources. 
On the other hand, based on the degree of replaceability of actors, which is often observed in 
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the practice of policy implementation in combination with our assessment of perceptions, (non) 
dedicated actors can be recognized. Below we present the results of our assessment. 
It may be argued that overall, the high level of dependencies takes place in SN1 (seen as the 
pooled dependencies). As a result, the critical actors are mainly found in SN1, where each actor 
has their own administrative function in the compensation process. In SN2, in turn, low to 
medium level of dependencies are identified as reciprocal interdependencies. In SN2 only the 
authorities, who possess important mobilization and local knowledge for the economic 
restoration activities, are found to be critical actors. 
It is interesting that some actors such as the BCSR and the provincial/ district functional 
departments appeared to be important agencies, developing a high dependency on each other. 
However, those agencies can be characterized by a certain degree of replaceability and thus may 
be ranked according to the medium level (M) in our assessment. Indeed, observation in the NP 
project shows that various consultation contractors were hired by the company to carry out 
DMS, compensation and calculation “on behalf” of the state agencies78. This illustrates the fact 
that a critical actor, who is characterized by a certain degree of replaceability, can potentially 
become a non-dedicated actor depending on how much they were willing to participate in PPP. 
In SN1, the state agencies participating in the NP project appear to be critical actors who are not 
completely replaceable since they possess the competence resources as functions to finalize 
various procedures by their appraisals and acknowledgements.   
In SN2, some of the public actors such as the authorities project a low and medium level of 
importance and high level of replaceability. Thus it may be argued that they are non critical 
actors due to their lack of resources to participate in economic restoration. In addition, they 
were also ranked to be non-dedicated actors based on our perceptions’ analysis. This evidence 
critically supports other evaluations of the practice of the land conversion process in Vietnam, 
where the economic restoration and social safeguards measures are still undermined by the 
state agencies (Hung Vo 2009, WB 2011).  
The private actor under investigation appears to be a critical and dedicated one, possessing 
irreplaceable resources in both SN1 and SN2. We found a correlation between the private 
actor capabilities and the nature of CSR PPP, as well as the degree of inter-dependencies, as 
previously discussed. 
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Table 35: The level of dependency adapted 
Actors 
Sub-
Network 
Level of  
importance of 
resources
79
 
Degree of 
replaceability
80
 
Level of 
Dependency
81
 
Critical 
actor? Yes/ 
No
82
 
Dedicated 
actor? 
Yes/No 
The Thai Nguyen PPC 
SN1 H L H Y Y 
SN2 M H L Y N 
Compensation oversight 
Committee (COBs) 
SN1 H L M Y N 
SN2 L H L N N 
The Functional 
Departments DONRE, DoC, 
DoF;  
SN1 H M H Y Y 
DOLISA, DARD SN2 M M L Y N 
Dai Tu District People 
Committee (DPC) 
SN1 H M H Y Y 
SN2 M M L Y Y 
The Dai Tu  District (BCSR) 
SN1 H L H Y N 
SN2 L H L N N 
The District DONRE (SN1) SN1 H M H Y N 
Other District Functional 
Departments (DoF, the 
Economic Department) 
(SN2) 
SN2 M H L N N 
Department of Social 
Policies (SN2) 
SN2 M M L N N 
Communal People 
Committees of the affected 
commune 
SN1 H L H Y Y 
SN2 M L M Y Y 
PAHs/ PACs  
SN1 H L H Y Y 
SN2 L M H Y N 
NPM 
SN1 H L H Y Y 
SN2 H L M Y Y 
(Based on Koppenjan & Klijn 2004:146) 
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 H: the resource is completely needed by the project; M: the resource can be activated when necessary; L: the 
resource is almost unused. 
80
 H: the actor can be replaced by other actor; M: some of the function of the actor can be replaced; L: the actor 
cannot be replaced. 
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 H: the actor is highly dependent on the others; H: dependent in some aspects; L: almost independent and only 
slightly dependent when joint actions are activated. 
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Finally, we found that the low level of dependency of one actor to another counterpart often 
encourages the actors to become non-dedicated in the network as found in SN2. Particularly, the 
low degrees of dependencies in SN2 cause unstable (vulnerable) patterns of collaboration 
relations between the public and private actors in the NP project, since the PPP needs resources 
sharing between public and private actors (...). 
Interim conclusion 
The analysis of the degree of dependencies has shown that the increased role and contribution 
of the private actor has been reinforced by the high degree of replaceability of the public actors 
in the NP project. This is true for both dimensions of displacement and economic restoration due 
to the increasing inability of the state and traditional structures of authority to provide and 
regulate the compulsory land conversion. As Hewson and Sinclair (1999 in Utting and Zammit 
2008) showed this is not uncommon in the contemporary context. To be more specific, the 
dependency of the governmental agencies on the private actor through formation and 
implementation of the network is not only evidenced in the field of sustainable development 
(SN2), as found by Zamit & Utting (2008), but also in public service delivery (Klijn & Teisman in 
Oscborne 2000: 88) as in SN1. 
However, pooled interdependencies still dominate the relationship between public and private 
actors in SN1, viewed as a symbolic PPP, given that the hierarchical governance of public 
administrative procedures takes place in this sub-network. For the private actor (NPM), the 
“compulsory” feature in land conversion explains its high dependency on the legal and 
administrative system of public agencies, viewed as monopoly providers in this regard. 
In contrast to what we observed in SN1, in the case of SN2 the interdependencies are 
characterized by a reciprocal nature, deriving from the voluntary activities triggered by the 
private actor in this sub-network. The finding denotes the vulnerability of this sub-network in 
terms of the dependency on the private actors, encompassing their financial resources and 
strategy in the PPP. This is something we will further discuss in the next section. Moreover, our 
analysis points to a high number of non-dedicated public actors in this sub-network compared to 
the other. 
5.2.6. Power 
This section describes how power is identified in the case study, in terms of the sources of 
power, the forms of power and the distribution of power.  
Sources of power 
The power of actors is linked to the resources they possess. In other words, there is a correlation 
between power and resource dependencies. The sources of power of the public and private 
actors in the NP project are determined by their institutional functions and policy mandates. For 
the private actor, more power is generated by financial resources.  
Public actors, representing the power of the government, are provided with specific 
instruments, mainly in the form of legislation and regulations, to exercise their coercive power 
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(2.2.6). Indeed, the Thai Nguyen PPC and its endorsed functional departments and authorities 
monopolize decision making power over land conversion policies and procedures, meaning that 
they have the authority to carry out tasks or reject them. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the 
PACs and PAPs can also be seen as a source of their veto power in the land conversion process 
(see Box 9: The status of conflict in the NP project). Lastly, the sources of power of NPM stem 
from the strong financial resources and potential contributions to the provincial budget (see 
4.2.3), as well as the decision making power for the additional policies based on the 
company budget. 
Forms of power 
In the NP project, various forms of power such as coercive power, veto power, “power to” as 
well as formal and informal power are exercised intensively by the involved actors. The clash of 
power is critically reflected in the tensions and conflicts occurred during compulsory land 
conversion (4.2.6).  
In particular, coercive power seems to dominate the NP project. The compulsory nature of land 
conversion provides absolute coercive power of the government authorities in decision making. 
The imposed compensation prices (by the provincial government) and various PAP entitlements, 
the administrative procedures endorsed by the functional departments, the decisions on 
complaint resolutions, as well as the right to use the security forces to cope with PAP resistance, 
define the “special” position of the governmental organizations in the compulsory land 
conversion process. Thus, being aware about the forcing measure in the NP project, a provincial 
functional official stated: 
“In general, in land conversion, the PAPs have the right to reject compensation and refuse 
displacement. However, when a majority of PAPs have received compensation and transferred 
their land, then the remaining (minority) of PAPs will be forced to displace” - (quote 24). 
However, not all of the available coercive power of the government is exercised during the 
actual implementation of NP project. There are several reasons for this. 
First, the government is not willing to use violence, since it is regarded as risky. 
“We strongly requested you to take a forcing action in regard to this [...] case. The household has 
received all compensation money and was committed to leave their house since 2010 but they re-
occupied the land by planting banana trees. Now the company needs the land for construction of 
the national road, no 37, and we have the right to use our land. You need to take actions in order 
to ensure that the laws and the authority of the government are respected” - stated by NPM C&R 
leader - (quote 25).  
A district COB member offered the following reply to the above NPM request: 
“According to our experience, the case [that you have mentioned] comprises enough evidence of 
policy incompliance of the resisted household. However, we should be careful because there are 
 
 
183 
 
still many administrative procedures to be fulfilled prior to the forcing action... Meanwhile, the 
resisting people have their own reasons to resist; they are also supported by some lawyers. We 
still want the investor to continue negotiations with the resisting households instead of pursuing 
a forcing action...”- (quote 26). 
Evidently, the decision on the use of violence was not approved by the district government (see 
more Box 33 in our later section 5.3.2.5) which shows that the authorities were unwilling to use 
their forcing power over the land conversion).  
Second, government decisions on land conversion in the NP project were hindered by the veto 
power of the PAPs. As stated in 4.2.6 regarding the conflict status in the NP project, a number of 
PAPs refused to comply with the decisions on compensation, support and resettlement, and, 
instead, requested better prices and compensation entitlements. Moreover, the PAPs re-
occupied the land and challenged the local governments with complaints and resistance, which, 
eventually led to open, resolution dialogues. 
Besides, coercive power is present not only in the relationship between public and private 
actors, but also in the relationships between the multi-layer public actors, who are subject to the 
hierarchical administrative system (5.2.5.2).  
In regard to the power of the private actor over compulsory land conversion, policy guidelines 
show a limitation of formal power in decision making. The various forms of power of the private 
actor are strategically created, using the advantages of the project position, as well as the 
additional financial resources in land conversion. This is demonstrated in Figure 15 as follows: 
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Figure 15: The main influencing trajectory of NPM in order to generate power in the NP project 
 
First, the power over the district government is implicitly manipulated by the private actor in the 
NP project. In particular, the company realized that, since it is difficult to convince the district 
government to make decisions, which would be beneficial for the company, the matters of their 
interest would need to be escalated to the higher (provincial) level.  
As a district leader stated:  
“Sometimes it is too frustrating for us when NPM approaches the higher level to impose decisions 
on us and guide us to follow the company proposal. They should have known that at our level, we 
know best how to deal with the situation and we can explain the higher levels why the actions 
should not be taken” - (quote 27).   
Hence, the influencing power of the company results from the convergence on the perceptions 
of the government actors about the important position of the company in the network. 
Accordingly, this power is linked to the perception of the provincial leaders that resettlement 
and compensation activities should be completed properly and successfully in a timely manner. 
In addition, the company has become the donor for various socio-cultural and economic 
development activities at the provincial, district and communal levels (see more 4.2.4), which 
further added to their leveraging potential.  
Second, the power generated by NPM can also be labeled as power to and power with, which as 
elaborated by Hendriks (2009: 173) can inspire other actors to engage in collective thinking and 
have mutual gain (see Box 20: NPM activities to influence various stakeholders). In addition, 
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further evidence suggests a sense of empowerment and participation of all actors in the 
implementation of SN2 (PCDP, ERPs and CDP). This can be seen as a subtle form of control and 
domination (Lukes 1974), or a strategy to manipulatively create convergence in perceptions in the 
public which can enable the actor to share their power in the network (Eshuis and Klijn 2012).   
Box 20: NPM activities to influence various stakeholders 
Within 18 months (July 2010 Dec 2011), the land conversion progress reached 95 percent
83
 from initial 5 percent. How 
was it done? 
To answer the question on how much resources have been mobilized over the last 18 months to achieve the company 
objectives, a senior staff of NPM said the process required a strong will from the top to bottom levels of the 
authorities to mobilize all the necessary resources for land conversion in the NP project. He emphasized that it is very 
important that the leading agencies understand the importance of the benefits of the project offers to the province 
and the population. Once the top levels appreciate these benefits, they will direct the lower levels to concentrate on 
providing the best service to the project activities. To summarize, the following measures have lead to the timely 
success of the land conversion process:  
First, NPM has set aside a substantial amount of capital devoted to project development, which includes 
compensation and resettlement expenses. Secondly, the company has increased its manpower resources, offered 
them attractive incentives and training courses needed for capacity building on land conversion procedures. Thirdly, 
NPM revised the operational expenses for the public actors involved in the projects, and offered more benefits in 
terms of capacity building and equipment arrangement. Fourthly, NPM re-activated the community development 
initiatives for the affected communities, especially in terms of infrastructural development and economic 
rehabilitation. Corporate agreements were signed on the basis of the progress of the land acquisition in each 
commune. Fifthly, the Masan Group made a considerable financial donation to the provincial social and cultural 
activities (such as the Tea International Festivals organized by Thai Nguyen PPC, the construction of Historic 
Momentum etc.). The company has developed a comprehensive training recruitment priority policy for the PAPs and 
their children in combination with other economic restoration initiatives, providing jobs and income for nearly a 
thousand of labourers. 
(NPM the Speaking Figures on Sai Gon Investment published on 16 August 2012 ) 
Distribution of power  
The analysis of the distribution of power among the actors in the NP project shows power 
asymmetry, dynamics of power, and power sharing between the public and private actors. 
Power asymmetry can take different forms in the NP project, such as the domination of higher 
levels over lower level of public actors, the emergence of informal and manipulative power of 
the private actor over the process and the increased use of veto power by the PAPs. This practice 
shows that power can shift from one actor to another and different types of power can be of 
relevance or used at different times (see more Voets 2008: 47). 
Decentralization in Vietnam over the past two decades focuses extremely on “devolving 
responsibilities to sub-national governments”. As a result, much power and responsibilities has 
been allocated to the provinces, but much less so to the lower levels of district and commune 
(VDR 2010: 26). In other words, provincial levels have gained more importance and power in the 
decentralization process than the district and commune government (VDR 2010: 29). 
Consequently, in compulsory land conversion, and especially in SN1, the top down model of 
administrative procedures presents coercive power of the provincial government over the lower 
level of government and functional organizations. This is clearly understood by any state officers, 
as stated by one of them: 
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“The provincial government has been given power to plan staffing, recruit, appoint, organize 
assignments, evaluate, inspect and even increase, salaries. The district level of the government 
can also undertake the same management tasks, but only if assigned to do so by the 
government- meaning that the staffing plan must be approved by the TN PPC. Communes are 
elected by the villagers” - (quote 28). 
However, the authorities at the district and communal levels possess mobilization power over 
their population in line with their political and administrative positions. They are the decision 
making authority for the conflict and complaint resolutions in the project. The communal level 
has mobilization power rather than coercive or decision making power. 
As a communal official said: 
“... in compulsory land conversion, without communal support, it is impossible to organize 
meetings or any practical activities in the commune. The people may not have a strong 
dependence on the local authorities, but they normally follow the suggestions of the local 
authorities...” - (quote 29). 
In regards to the manipulative power of the private actor, Figure 15 demonstrates the trajectory 
of influence of the public authorities who have political power over the PAPs and other 
functional state agencies. On the one hand, by influencing the leading agencies at every level 
(provincial, district and communal), NPM achieves its power over the lower functional levels, as 
well as over the decision making agenda. On the other hand, the company also directly 
influences the lower-level public executives through capacity building and equipment support. 
Particularly, the way of influencing decision-making by various private investments appears to 
have found a solution for the company to leverage the asymmetry between veto power 
(associated with PAPs) and the political power (associated with the government) as mentioned 
above. The forms of additional investments could be in terms of increased compensation prices, 
bonuses and incentives associated with various corporate social responsibility and accountability 
programs, such as PCDP, CDP and ERPs. 
Interim conclusion 
The analysis of the power of the actors in the NP project presents what was claimed by Kickert et 
al. (1997) and Klijn & Koppenjan (2000) about the close relationship between power and 
resources, competencies, as well as the positions of the actors within a policy sector. Power is a 
function of resources (see also Wirth 1986 in Voets 2008: 47). Mutual resource dependencies 
are not equally divided across actors and cause “asymmetric resources dependencies”, which 
consequently result in power asymmetry in the network. In particular, in the compulsory land 
conversion projects, coercive power, derived from the unique competencies of the public actors, 
dominates the relationship between the public and private actors, but also between the 
implementing agencies and the PAPs.  
Thus, unequal power is not uncommon in the NP project and it is difficult to be balanced, to 
some extent. However, in the NP project, the financial resources of the private actor appear to 
be the most important means to generate power in the land conversion process. The resources 
of the private actor appeared to be the solution for the asymmetry problem of power balance 
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between the executive bodies and the PAPs. The power imbalance problem was mitigated by the 
exchange of resources - financial resources of the private actor, the political (authority) 
resources of the top public levels and the mobilization, production resources of the local public 
authorities. As a result, in the NP project, coercive power was less exercised and often replaced 
by other softer forms of power like generative and mobilization power.  
This practice in the NP project shows that power can shift from one actor to another and 
different power can be of relevance or used at different times. This can be viewed as a form of 
power sharing among the governmental organizations, private actors and the PAPs in order to 
balance the control of the government and ease business decisions (Linder 1999). Hence, power 
sharing in order to cope with asymmetry becomes a key feature in a network (Crosby and Bryson 
2005).  
5.2.7. Perceptions 
This section describes how perceptions of the public and private actors are present in the NP 
project in terms of the actors’ point of view of the problems and solutions in the land conversion 
process and the way perceptions influence goals, means and strategies of the actors (Kickert et 
al. 1997: 82, Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 10 & 49). 
As discussed in 2.2.7, the relevant factors such as cultural and institutional backgrounds and the 
specific positions of the actors in the process are viewed to offer insights into the perceptions of 
the actors and their respective behavior. 
Perceptions, goals, means and strategies are interpreted from a broad range of empirical 
sources, encompassing document reviews, media articles, and in-depth interviews of key public 
and private actors (see Appendix 3: List of the interviewees and group discussion). In particular, 
based on our conducted research investigation in the NP project, we believe that one of the 
most useful ways to understand the organizational perception lies with (focus) group discussions 
on a particular topic or on a specific problem solving case. 
In our point of view, the point of departure towards the understanding of the perceptions of the 
actors is to be aware of their institutional background, values and core business, as well as their 
organizational goals or interests, which determine the use of means and strategies in the 
network. In addition, the perceptions of the actors are influenced by their specific positions in 
the network, which are, to an extent, linked to our previous discussion on the resources - 
dependencies and the power balance. 
Thai Nguyen PPC 
Thai Nguyen PPC views the PPP in the NP project as a means to achieve their development 
objectives and as to solve problems in public service delivery in compulsory land conversion in 
the NP project.  
As a government representative in the NP project, the TN PPC endeavours to couple the 
objectives of the NP project to their long-term, socio-economic and security provincial 
188 
 
objectives. Our observation reveals the dual perspective of the TN PPC over the project which 
sometimes results in a trade-off in their decision-making.  
First, the Thai Nguyen PPC tends to be firmly committed to utilizing an increasing array of PPPs in 
many fields of policy implementation that are not only limited to land management. As shown in 
Box 21 in this section, based on the economic potentials of the NP project, the Thai Nguyen PPC 
regarded the completion of the land conversion process as a “political goal”, which was closely 
embedded in the general socio-economic objectives of the province. If land acquisition is 
completed successfully, the provincial government will gain more revenue sources and more 
authority over how this revenue could be used. Indeed, the project, once operational, will 
contribute an amount equivalent to 30-40 percent of the total current budget to the Thai 
Nguyen PPC. The increased provincial budget has two consequences. It raises the influence of 
the political leaders in the province and it increases the reputation of the province in terms of 
attracting private investments, which reinforces the ongoing transition process of provincial 
industrialization and modernization.  
Due to their limited financial capability (5.2.5.1), the provincial leaders have strong incentives to 
support the joint action with NPM in enabling the compulsory land conversion process, 
especially given the attractive economic restoration and social safeguards initiatives (see Box 
21). The provincial government endeavours to maximize their support to NPM, by mobilizing 
various departments and organizations in the province and district, and requesting them to take 
part in the compensation oversight boards (COBs).  
Box 21: The NP project in view of the provincial leaders 
The outcomes of the projects will change the socio-economic conditions in the province and the Dai Tu district by 
changing its economic composition. Once the project becomes operational, it will create jobs for a thousand people, 
easing the transition from agricultural economy to industrialized economy in Dai Tu district.  
The NP project has attracted much attention from the central government as it has been publicly introduced by the 
province as a “show case” model of the domestic investment project which complies with international standards in 
terms of human resources and technologies. The project has received a number of central governmental delegations 
headed by the Prime Minister (2009), The President of Vietnam (2011), The Chairman of the National Assembly 
(2012), Deputy Prime Ministers (2012) and many other ministers and other senior governmental officials. 
Indeed, in most of its public statements, the Thai Nguyen PPC leaders repeatedly viewed the NP project to be one of 
the most targeted projects in the province, and that the NP project will play a decisive role in boosting socio- 
economic development by contributing to the provincial budget and job/ income generation for PAPs and local 
people. The Vice Chairman of the Thai Nguyen PPC has been appointed to directly supervise and support the project.  
In the meantime, various observations and interviews show that the company is often invited to attend many socio-
economic agendas in the province and that the Thai Nguyen PPC clearly recognizes NPM efforts in the economic 
restoration and social safeguards programs and regards those programs to be “outstanding” in comparison to other 
compensation and resettlement projects in the province. 
(Interviews of the provincial leaders held on 15
th
 Feb 2013 in Dai Tu - TN and review of newspaper publications about 
the VIP visits to the NP project) 
Second, in contrast to the scenario of mutual benefit, the Thai Nguyen PPC is also concerned 
with challenges in compulsory land conversion which are viewed as controversial not only on the 
scale of the current project, but also nation-wide (see Table 2: Resisting cases in compulsory land 
conversion in Viet Nam). In respect of policy making, the province maintained a reluctant 
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attitude to the discretion of innovation such as changes of policies or institutional arrangements. 
In response to our question regarding the possibility of the company to develop more additional 
policies and negotiable schemes for the PAPs, a senior provincial member expressed his concern 
about the “exceptional case” of NPM which may influence the policy implementation in the 
province as a whole: 
“We understand that NPM offered more additional policies, asking for a more open negotiable 
mechanism between the company and the PAPs. We cannot completely accept all these new 
policies and mechanisms. The project is subject to the compulsory land conversion mechanism so 
that the negotiable mechanism is “explicitly” prohibited... The additional policies are very good 
and beneficial to the PAPs... but we should be careful and restrict some key provisions - for 
example, the compensation prices should be strictly general and applicable to all resettlement 
and compensation projects in the provinces. It would be difficult for the province if the PAPs in 
other compulsory land conversion projects in the province ask for the same conditions and 
provisions in NP project - this would be hardly afforded by the provincial budget”- (quote 30).  
Furthermore, evidence shows that the province kept most of the forcing cases in land conversion 
at pending status. A number of factors explain this behavior of the province. One of the leaders 
of the department presented the unwillingness of the provincial government to take this risk due 
to the vagueness of policy guidelines: “Forcing is necessary in compulsory land conversion when 
the policies are not respected by the stakeholders. However, we need to make sure that we 
strictly follow policy guidelines on forcing procedures. We found that we are hardly able to take 
actions at present because forcing conditions and procedures seem to be vague and can be 
interpreted differently by different people...” - (quote 31). 
Another senior official presented his concerns about security in the province and the political 
reputation, which can be influenced by decision making of provincial level: “we should be careful 
in taking hard measures in compulsory land conversion, which may cause strong reactions of the 
PAPs as witnessed in many other forced displacement projects. This is seen as a “hot” problem 
especially in the public media and the national assembly. We do not want to attract public 
attention by touching this sensitive issue”- (quote 32). 
To conclude, in the context of high tensions in land transfer, senior public officials paid more 
attention to the pervasive nature of political risks, to the consequences of their mishandling, and 
to the key issues of how these could be better secured for their management. Consequently, the 
provincial leaders returned to the policy instruments, with strict policy compliance despite their 
inappropriateness. Nevertheless, the province, acknowledging the contribution and potential 
benefit of the project strongly encourage the CSR and benefit sharing of the private actor, which 
is viewed as a problem solving  strategy in the NP project. 
Functional Departments at the district and provincial levels 
At the current stage of project development, state actors perceive the land acquisition issue to 
be more of a “Nui Phao company” issue rather than their own organizational issue. This puts 
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NPM in the position of the key driver in the process of land conversion and the design of 
appropriate economic rehabilitation programs. 
“We understand the pressure under which NPM in, and their reasons for speeding up the land 
conversion process; their investment up to date amounts to 3,000 billion84 VND which, coupled 
with no profits so far, infers that any further delays will cause big losses for the company. As 
such, NPM should have more incentives to encourage PAPs and PACs to move because the 
compensation prices are fixed to all projects and there is a limited government allowance for 
economic rehabilitation” - (quote 33). 
According to senior officials of functional departments, the involvement of NPM and provincial 
functional departments in the land conversion process is indispensable and is required by the 
policy procedures. Accordingly, state officials of the functional departments proposed that the 
incentives of the joint action come in the form of responsibility and workload sharing. The 
provincial actors also underlined their dependence on the performance of lower levels, which 
derives from the fact that their assignment is related to appraisal of the land compensation 
support and resettlement profile of PAPs, prior to the submission to the PPC for final approval. 
From here it appears that the functional departments are put in the “middle man” position - 
between the inputs and decision making - and hence, that the progress of land conversion in NP 
does not have a great effect on them. “If the project is successful, the authorities, the company 
as well as the PAPs will be the ones who benefit the most... We can have some positive appraisals 
from our upper levels but these will not much change our positions and interests” - (quote 34). 
Interestingly, despite of the limited motivation to be active in the project, the state officials we 
interviewed during our investigation demonstrated a strong and reciprocal relationship with 
NPM, which derives from the outcomes of relationship building rather than their formally 
assigned, project tasks.  
“We enjoy working for the NP project as we learn a lot from a project of such a big size; and NPM 
staffs are “professional and dedicated”... Even though the NP project brought us more 
obligations rather than incentives, we tried our best to support the project by mobilizing our 
manpower to revise and appraise the land conversion packages in a proper manner so that the 
project progress can be sped up. The main reason for our support was based on our long lasting 
collaboration, and our efforts have been recognized and awarded by the company” - (quote 35). 
Thus, state officials acknowledged that they “benefit most in terms of enhancement of expertise 
and experience while working for a big project such as NP” - (quote 36). However, the company 
has also provided them with transport means in order to do work on the project site, and their 
office has been renovated supplied with necessary facilities and equipment. The public actors 
found this type of support very encouraging. A DONRE official, during the course of interactions 
in land conversion of the NP project, said that “the functional departments gradually became 
more embedded to NPM than to their district counterparts” - (quote 37). 
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To conclude, the perceptions of the functional units in the NP project is affected by the 
bureaucracy of the public service and the administrative system in Vietnam, where the state 
officials find limited motivation for professional dedication (Edwards & Phan 2013, VDR 2010). 
However, the “emotional rather than the rational” approach in relationship building (Edwards & 
Phan 2013: 92) sheds light on the perceptions of the public actors, enabling a more accountable 
behavior by providing their service to the NP project.  
The Dai Tu District People Committee (DT DPC) 
As a governmental representative at district level, the views of the district are very much in 
accord with those at provincial level. They favour “collective incentives” encompassing socio-
economic development and opportunities for urbanization and industrialization for the district. 
This is clearly demonstrated in Box 22 in this section on the one hand; and PPP is needed to carry 
out compulsory land conversion in the NP project, on the other.  
Thus, being at the executive level with regards to the NP project, the district found the burden of 
the workload and the complexity of a big-size resettlement project in combination with the 
uncertainty of a joint-action, to seriously challenge their capabilities and resources. According to 
the district leaders, it would be fair to say that the burden of the project outweighs the 
incentives. In addition, the problem of the implementation arrangement between the district 
and provincial levels has constrained the district to function properly (5.2.5.2). As a result, the 
district considered a close collaboration with the private actor, who was expected to provide 
more resources needed for land conversion, to be the key driver of their strategy.  
“One of our most important political tasks in recent years is to successfully carry out land 
conversion in the NP project. This is a giant project that involves a broad range of stakeholders. 
Although the project was driven by a close collaboration between the district and the investor, 
the success would be greatly determined by the private investor” - (quote 38). 
Particularly, the Dai Tu PPC as a representative of the interest of the population is most 
concerned about the impacts of the project on the environment and the livelihoods of the 
people on the one hand, and the security in the areas, on the other. As a result, upon entering 
the partnership, the district perceived itself as the authority tasked with ensuring proper 
implementation and safeguarding of policy procedures. In particular this authority can be used 
for complaint resolution or even to restrict the behavior of the private actor, if its actions are 
perceived to be against the interest of the PAPs or the district.  
Besides, the Dai Tu DPC understands that NPM and the Thai Nguyen PPC, as well as the 
provincial functional departments, are strongly interlinked. As such, many senior officials of Dai 
Tu DPC said that they are interested in seeking coherence with NPM in joint decision making. 
This would help them have a greater deal of support and approval from upper levels (TN PPC and 
the functional departments). 
 
192 
 
Box 22: The point of view of the Dai Tu DPC over the collaboration in the NP project 
According to the leaders of the Dai Tu DPC, they are fully aware of the socio-economic potential of the NP project, 
once it becomes fully operational. They emphasize that the NP project is driven by a close collaboration between the 
local government and the investors, taking into account the interest of three parties: the government, the investor 
and the local people. Observation and interviews show that DPC have quite complex attitudes and behaviors with 
regards to the land conversion processes, summarized below: 
In regards to the land compensation issue, the Dai Tu PPC and the Communist Party being mostly concerned with 
stability and policy compliance, would firmly say “no” to any violation of laws or violation of administrative 
procedures. No coercive actions will be taken unless decisions are made at higher levels. Instead, the DPC has 
mobilized all members of the administrative and political system to join the NPM project to ensure that project 
implementation is in strict compliance of current land conversion policies.  
In regards to the economic restoration issue, the district leaders are committed to encouraging the authorities of the 
affected communes to concentrate more on land conversion and economic rehabilitation activities. There are two 
examples related to the DPC efforts in partnership with the NPM in regards to livelihood rehabilitation of the PAPs and PACs. 
First, being aware of the infrastructure and economic development programs of NPM for the PACs, the District has 
selected two most severely affected communes - Ha Thuong and Hung Son to be the “New Modern Communes”
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, 
meaning that these communes will be entitled to more investment from the government in regards to infrastructure, 
economic development, culture and heritage. As a result, with the help of co-financing programs, a school was constructed 
in the Ha Thuong commune, while a kindergarten and mushroom plantation was built in the Hung Son commune.   
Second, the district has co-financed with NP construction works for a mushroom plantation in the Nam Song Cong 
relocation site... At an earlier stage (2008) an unused plot in the Nam Song Cong relocation site was proposed for a 
mushroom plantation cooperative, with a potential to create income for the resettled people. The district decided to 
invest from the district budget in combination with a loan for the Cooperatives while NPM provided training, facility 
investment and mobilization of cooperative members. The cooperatives also attracted investment from the province 
and became a show case for economic rehabilitation for a period of time (2008-2010).  
(GD with district officials held on 18 August 2011 in combination with interviews of the district leaders conducted in 
20
th
 December 2011 in Dai Tu- TN) 
To conclude, the goals of the Dai Tu CPC are linked to the institutional goals of the province, such 
as socio-economic development, improvement of the investment environment, and security in 
the area. However, at the executive level, the district is under high pressure to achieve specific 
organizational goals, such as the completion of the land conversion process, complaint 
resolution and the economic rehabilitation of the PAPs. As a result, the dual perception of the 
district over problem solving was defined by their assigned position: being a policy guardian and 
an active collaborator in the PPP for the maximization of the outcomes of the land conversion 
and economic restoration activities.  
District Board of Compensation, Supports and Resettlement (BCSR) and other district 
functional departments 
The district BCSR and other functional departments perceive that PPP in compulsory land 
conversion is indispensable, requiring more involvement and resources from the investment. 
Given the size of the project and the number of street-level manpower resources, it is impossible 
to carry out the tasks without additional resources, most notably in regards to finance and 
expertise (as partly illustrated in Box 18: The BCSR- the resources are inadequate to the size of 
the NP project).   
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In line with the policy framework, the executive bodies, such as the BSCR and the district DONRE, 
set as their primary goal to provide the practical inputs (such as the DMS calculation) that would 
fulfill correct administrative procedures for compensation, support and resettlement activities. 
In general, our findings on the perceptions of the district executive and the district functional 
units at the district level are similar to the ones at the provincial level. First, the district executive 
and functional units are the public service providers, who are rather reluctant to carry out their 
project work due to a lack of incentives from the government. Second, they found that the land 
conversion activities should be carried out by the company, which will, mostly benefit from the 
project outcomes. As a result, the district executive and the district functional units prefer to 
find themselves in the supportive role, instead of being the key players in the project.  
“We cannot commit our manpower to the project. The company should be responsible and they 
know better than us about how to carry out the project in a proper way and in line with the 
standards set-forth by them. Although we consider land conversion in the NP project to be one of 
the most important goals it doesn’t mean we do not have any other resettlement projects in the 
district to be implemented”- (quote 39). 
Third, similar to the functional provincial departments, the district executive and the functional 
units enjoyed working with NPM owing to a long lasting relationship building, mutual 
communication and reciprocity (see Box 23 in this section). 
However, the disparity in salaries and incentive schemes between public and private staff, has, 
to some extent caused bias in responsibility sharing between public and private staff, where 
public officers consider that NPM staff should hold more responsibility than the district officers, 
who have fewer incentives from the outcomes of the process.   
For instance, this is how a senior district executive answered our question on economic 
restoration: “we never think that our team should be responsible for the economic restoration 
activities although it has been indicated in the policy framework to be related to our jobs. It 
should be the responsibility of the company or the higher levels. We just include the economic 
restoration entitlements in the compensation packages for the PAPs. We never carry out any 
economic restoration arrangements and we believe other districts are doing the same”- (quote 40). 
Box 23: The point of view of the BCSR over the collaboration in the NP project 
Our discussions with senior and junior district officials shed some light on the perceptions of the joint-actions with 
NPM. The perceptions are both challenging and rewarding. The state officials involved in the collaboration with NPM 
can benefit from additional training, study tours and better office facilities and equipment, although they think that 
the level of incentives is still incompatible with the workload needed to handle for the project. The district officials 
found the collaboration with the NP investor to implement land conversion to be their functional responsibility. 
However, they admit that they have gained more experience by working on a big scale NP project, especially since 
NPM staffs are very professional and highly committed. 
In the meantime, by providing the same type of work as the NPM resettlement and compensation team, the BCSR and 
other functional departments found themselves to be in the same workspace as NPM. Many district officers even 
wanted to become NPM staff since this would command a higher salary and advanced social benefits. Many of them 
performed well and were recruited by NPM to be the C&R staff.  
(Observation of collaboration meetings and interviews of the district officials conducted in 18
th
 August and 16
th
 
December 2011) 
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To conclude, the district officials were found to be less committed to their organizational goals, 
which were not clearly and strictly defined in the NP project. They were more interested in the 
incentives and opportunities in the joint-actions, which to some extent encouraged them to be 
more dedicated to the land conversion activities.  
Communal authorities (CPCs) 
Communal authorities of affected communes perceive the NP project to be one where the most 
contribution and benefit sharing comes from the investor. This view is founded on their dual 
functions in the land conversion process of the NP project. At this level, the commune leaders 
and officers are not only street level bureaucrats, but also elected representatives of community 
constituencies. While re-election is what they strive for there is also a real danger of being 
rejected by the communities. They therefore embody the interests of PAPs on the one hand and 
the lowest level administrative units, on the other. Many of the communal officers are PAPs or 
relatives of PAPs. Accordingly, positive outcomes of the project will be incentives for the 
affected communities including the local officials, on the one hand. On the other hand, the 
negative impacts/ outcomes of the project caused high public pressure on the local authorities, 
who are periodically elected (and rejected) by public. 
According to the results of the community-need assessments86, the goals of the communes, as 
well as those of PAPs and PAPs under the impact of the NP project are linked to the 
development objectives. Besides fair compensation and standard incentives for relocation, there 
are high expectations by the affected communes from the NP project with regards to 
infrastructure improvement, job creation, and the mitigation of negative social impacts. Under 
our investigation by stages, the communes were uncooperative at the beginning, but have 
changed their perceptions based on the effectiveness of the private actor’s performance and the 
realization of the CSR programs in their communities:  
“...for us and our people “listening a hundred times is less valuable than seeing only once with 
our eyes”, we are willing to support the project if our interests are clearly defined and delivered. 
For us, commitments and promotion campaigns do not make sense if compared to the practical 
results.”-  said by a local officer leader - (quote 41). 
As a result, the communal level, which is the lowest administrative level in the land conversion 
process, experiences crucial challenges and opportunities. Sometimes these are of a contrasting 
nature. They have to constrain the private actor, who is supported by the higher authorities, in 
order to protect the interests of the PAPs and PACs, on the one hand; and to cooperate with 
NPM to realize the mandates given to them by the higher authorities on the other.  
“We are exasperated with our responsibilities in this project over the last years. It has been such 
a long time that our farmers have suffered from the impacts of the project. As the leaders of the 
commune, we have no time to concentrate on our socio-economic development objectives; 
instead we are fully working for the Nui Phao project. We are under high pressure from the 
                                                          
86
 See List of Documentation for review:  CDP 2006, 2007 
 
 
195 
 
district to expedite land conversion, on the one hand, and we are highly criticized by our villagers 
on the other. The company and the district leaders want us to mobilize PAPs but the benefits of 
the company and the benefits of the community should be clearly stated... otherwise we have no 
way to explain to our people” - (quote 42). 
In addition, holding the dual functions in land conversion, the communes expressed their 
difficulties in coping with top-down directions without a clear legal guidance from the district 
and province. The communal leaders make use of public pressure to excuse for their behavior of 
non-compliance.  
The communal leaders were very critical to the economic rehabilitation and income generation 
programs for the PAPs, and have raised high demands on additional support and benefit sharing 
from the company. They were skeptical about the effectiveness of the proposed economic 
restoration programs and seldom participated as an active partner. The communal authorities 
were more interested in recruitment programs which could provide stable jobs and income 
without much effort from their side.  
To conclude, communal authorities of affected communes proved to be more critical and 
skeptical about the project outcomes and the investor. The commune leaders and officers are 
not only street level bureaucrats, but also represent the interests of PAPs and the PAC. Hence, 
their expectations and demands are related to the immediate benefits in term of compensation, 
support and resettlement for the PAPs and PACs.  
The project affected households and communities (PAHs and PACs) 
In general, the perceptions of project affected groups are focused on the strong confirmation of 
land ownership so as to seek better compensation packages. However, the perceptions on the 
ongoing land conversion processes vary among different groups of affected populations, 
depending on how much they are affected by the project. The majority of the community groups 
found land acquisition to be an opportunity rather than a threat. Based on the results from a 
number of community meetings in the early stages of the project (2007-2008) as summarized in 
Box 24, the PAPs were enthusiastic with land acquisition since they were looking for a long time 
for more opportunities for non-farming jobs, since non-farming jobs are viewed to be more 
stable and productive. Indeed, the problems of income generation by non-farming economic 
diversification are great in most of the rural and agricultural areas in the north of Vietnam (Tan 
2008, Khai 2008 and Beresford & Tran 2004), particularly in Dai Tu district, where the local 
economy was eroded by illegal mining and the general economic downturn (4.1.2).  
Most of the PAPs interviewed during the ethnographic fieldwork, said that they would expect 
more sharing from the project because the compensation prices are too low compared to the 
benefits that the investor will gain when the mine comes into operation. Some households, to 
whom the government compensation prices sounded as unacceptable, have sent a lot of 
complaint letters and threats of resistance: “the compensation package for my family is too low 
if compared to other families, and that may not be enough for us to resettle in a new place...We 
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understand that in many other private projects, the PAPs can have right to negotiate for the 
compensation prices. The NP project is a private business too...“- (quote 43). 
In addition, we observed various degrees of skepticism over the company’s CSRs and the local 
authorities. This is based on the fact that the perceptions of the PAPs were changed based on 
the practical outcomes rather than through verbal commitments or information campaigns (see 
previous discussion on the CPCs). 
As stated in Box 24, PAPs are greatly concerned with income generation. Paradoxically, the 
majority of the PAPs requested cash for economic restoration, instead of joining practical 
programs. They were more interested in cash based-incomes such as daily workers, as opposed 
to investing in new crops or new types of household non-farming production. A survey87 about 
the use of compensation payments of the PAP shows that the PAPs spend more for consumption 
than for long-term investments. This can be partly explained by the fact that economic 
restoration activities were constrained by the limited awareness of the PAPs. Some expectations 
were viewed to be likely “utopian” since some PAPs requested for “significant changes in the 
income generation solution” which could immediately stabilize their livelihoods. 
Box 24: The point of view of the PAPs about the NP project 
When the project starts, it changes people’s lives. The PAPs found that they have more cash as the result of 
compensation for their land. Thanks to this, they could improve their material life and invest in their children’s 
education. They are greatly concerned about their income in the future, especially for the children. They do not want 
to go back to the agricultural way of living again. They instead want to have jobs or sub-jobs
88
 but they cannot match 
the skills of job requirements and, also many of them are over-aged for recruitment or training for some new skills. 
They proposed the company to give more job opportunities to them and their children, which can be viewed to be the 
most meaningful and effective way of compensation. This can be viewed as the company’s responsibility, because the 
company has taken the farmers’ land and will greatly benefit from it. The PAPs were well aware that the provincial 
and district authorities are responsible for land conversion in this project so that the prices are imposed by the 
government policies. Although the PAPs were explained that their interests and eligible rights will be protected by the 
local authorities, some skepticism was evident. In particular, a strong collaboration between the company and 
authorities over the land conversion process was viewed by some PAPs to be the evidence that the authorities were in 
favor of the company’s interests rather than their own.   
However, the PAPs recognized the recent efforts and the contributions of the company in terms of job creation and 
income generation such as the mushroom plantation, husbandry and vocational trainings… However, PAPs asked for 
more diverse and innovative forms of economic restoration, which could significantly stabilize their livelihoods by 
saying that: 
 “We know that you
89
 are experts and experienced... so that some innovative economic restoration models should be 
recommended to us... We found that the current models are not effective... there should be more effective ones...” - 
(quote 44). 
(Interviews and group discussions of PAPs  conducted in 23th May 2011 and observation of community meetings 
during 2012)
90
 
Besides, some members of the affected population confront the land conversion process by 
pointing out the severe impacts it had created (see more 4.2.6.2). For example, some small 
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groups abuse the land conversion process and use it as a means for income generation or 
purposely cause instability in the affected areas.  
Nui Phao Mining (NPM) - the single private actor 
NPM considers PPP as a means to boost the land conversion progress in a timely manner for the 
mine operations, based on their acknowledgement of the limited capacity of the public service 
providers in compulsory land conversion. The perceptions of the private actor are derived from 
the concerns for their own security in the marketplace since their business would no longer exist 
without land ownership for mine operations. 
Acquiring the land is a process which needs to be completed without any further delay, but with 
conciliation. The main reason for this lies with the increasing bank loan interests in combination 
with the painful experience of the predecessors, who had to sell the project due to financial 
exhaustion. The CEO of the Masan Resources talked about the necessity to intensify the 
innovation to achieve land acquisition at “any price” and that “we‘d rather spent our last money 
to survive rather than die with a full money left in the pocket” - (quote 45). He further elaborated 
on the loss caused by the project delay which was much higher than the investment set aside for 
speeding up the process. As a result, the increased investment for land conversion was 
underlined by the management during the “pre-operational” stage of the mine operations as 
critical (see Appendix 6: NPM additional policies).  
Since the early stage of project development91, as said by NPM leader of External Affairs 
Department below, the owners of the Nui Phao project clearly defined that their goals could only 
be achieved by the two decisive means. The first one is of the state “monopoly” competencies 
over compulsory land conversion mechanism; and the second one is the coherence and 
endorsement of the community people, who possess ownership on land… 
“Without the support of the people and the communal authorities, our company will not be able 
to carry out the project. The support of the PAPs was significant because we were fully aware of 
their loss while leaving their residence and agricultural land. We used to be a foreign company, 
which was highly committed to international norms. I myself was working for the big 
international donors; we understand that the interests and long term development of the 
affected communities - especially the ethnic and vulnerable group should be respected. It was not 
only the corporate social responsibility but also a condition for us to earn the coherence and 
support from the local authorities and the affected people.”- (quote 46). 
Strategically, the company focuses on a two-dimensional objective: the system of bureaucrats 
with additional capacity building, expertise and rewards; and the CSRs, benefit-sharing and 
sustainability for the PAHs and PACs. Indeed, the practice in the NP project shows that the 
private actor attempted to create more incentives for the public actors, especially the executive 
and functional departments in order to encourage good performance and accountability. The 
incentive schemes are comprised of additional trainings, study tours, equipment and facility 
provisions, and remuneration for overtime working on the project related issues for state 
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officials and people involved (See the CDP, PCDP and ERPs in 4.2.4) (see also Box 20: NPM 
activities to influence various stakeholders). In addition, the summary of the community liaison 
reports acknowledged that “NPM adopted a variety of “voluntary initiatives” associated with 
codes of conduct such as the economic restoration programs, social safeguards initiatives and 
community development projects as well as proposed increased corporate social investment such 
as infrastructure improvement, environmental protection and occupational health and safety, 
and philanthropy etc.”92. 
To conclude, although NPM is a mining company and given that land conversion is viewed to be 
in the pre-operational phase the expenses at this stage need to be minimized. However, the 
findings of this study suggest the company wants to invest in “resettlement with development” 
which endeavors to overcome the problems of involuntary resettlement and, finally to achieve 
the business goals (De Wet 2001: 4638). 
Interim conclusion  
In our theoretical discussion in 2.2.7 some assumptions were developed in order to understand 
the nature of the perceptions of the public and private actors and their dynamics in the network. 
At empirical level, the findings below may shed light on those assumptions in the specific 
conditions of the Vietnamese context and in the involuntary resettlement domain. 
Perceptions and institutional background 
In the NP case, the perceptions of the public and private actors are driven by their institutional 
background, which define their core business, values and strategies (see also Teisman & Klijn 2003).  
Indeed, the multi-layer public actors in the NP case in general pursue their institutional 
objectives, being socio-economic stability and development, social security and policy 
compliance. As stated above, the local governments tend to link the goals of the NP project to 
their general and long-term objectives, by taking into account the benefits that could be gained 
by the population in the province and district instead of only focusing on the groups of PAPs and 
relevant stakeholders in the NP project. Consequently, in order to secure the general objectives, 
some degrees of trade-offs have been found in the NP case, such as limited innovations in terms 
of policy and institutional arrangements, risk avoidance and strict compliance with the policies 
and administrative procedures.  
In contrast, the core business of the private actor is limited by profit making for its own 
organization as argued by Koppenjan & Enserink (2009), which can only be generated through 
land acquisition for mining operations. The private actor is most concerned about the progress 
of the project, which in turn is significantly determined by the relevant public service providers 
and authorities, but also the resistance of the PAPs who may increase the transaction costs. In 
view of this the company’s strategy is shaped so as to greatly invest in capacity building and 
lobby the authorities and the affected communities by the CSRs. As a result, the strategy of the 
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private actor is characterized by risk taking and innovations, since there were no similar 
approaches found in other resettlement projects in the district and neighbouring provinces.  
In contrast, given that the compulsory land conversion mechanism is strongly constrained by 
central (strict, complicated) regulations, the public actors tend to be the policy guardians in 
terms of formality, legality, honesty and fairness (Kickert et al. 1997: 38) rather than pursuing 
effectiveness and efficiency by risk taking as the private actor does.   
The perceptions of the public and private actors in the NP case are found to be distinctive, but 
not necessarily resulting in serious constraints in terms of goals, means and strategies as 
highlighted by the Dutch scholars (see Teisman & Klijn 2003, 2003). In fact, a shared perception 
between the actors takes place through the common goals and means, being the CSRs, capacity 
building and benefit sharing in the NP project. Hence, the public and private actors perceived the 
opportunities for getting returns on their investments in CSRs93 which were viewed to be what 
Garriga & Mele (2004: 52) call means to the end of profits (and to reduce the unnecessary costs 
caused by conflicts and resistance (as studied in a different context by Van Damme & Brans 2011 
and Heal 2005). 
Since the private actor in the NP case committed to the long-term development of the 
community instead of short-term returns (see Koppenjan & Enserink 2009: 286), the strategy of 
the private actor addresses the institutional objective of the public actors, providing that public 
and private actors can have shared values and shared perceptions over problem solving in the 
NP project.  
Perceptions and positions in the network 
The research in hand concerns multiple public actors, whose perceptions vary depending on 
their positions and the level of authority they possess at different levels of the political and 
administrative system (see Kickert et al. 1997). 
 Our study of the various actors in the NP case demonstrated different perceptions in terms of 
loyalty, accountability and obedience between the higher and lower levels of the public actors; 
and between the political-authorities and the technical bureaucrats (the functional departments 
and the BCSR).  
“Public loyalty” being viewed as policy compliance, and risk avoidance (see Teisman and Klijn 
2002 & 2003) is more respected at the higher level of public actors, who function as both senior 
politicians and bureaucrats. At the lower level, the public actors who can be (de)motivated by 
the relationship with their private counterpart (NPM) tend to be more flexible in terms of policy 
compliance during collaboration. In addition, a certain degree of non-obedience to higher levels 
and non-compliance with the policy procedures sometimes causes tensions between lower and 
higher levels of the public actors (see Rhodes 1980). 
In addition, the degree to which lower level governments (the district and communal levels) are 
willing to take part in the land conversion process depends on how much authority they have 
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been entitled in order to handle various steps and procedures. In the NP case, much of the 
devolved power rests with the province, while lower state actors find themselves as the 
administrative, procedural and regulatory gatekeepers rather than as the guardians of 
legitimacy. As such they are seeking for alternatives for problem solving.  
Meanwhile, a common sense in the hierarchical system is that the incentives and interests of the 
public actors are somewhat different, depending always on the level of the public actor. Hence, 
the degrees of loyalty of the public actors to the system vary. Indeed, the evidence from the NP 
project shows that many street-level bureaucrats wanted to work for the company and have 
attempted to be recruited by the company. This is not uncommon in Vietnam. Since the “brain 
drain” took place, many state officials voluntarily left governmental agencies to join private 
companies in order to obtain better remuneration, better working environment and promotion 
opportunities94 (VDR 2010, Edwards & Phan 2013). 
To some extent, the nature of the public actors in the NP case can be classified in two types: (i) 
the authorities who are committed to a certain political ideology and represent the interests of 
the population and; (ii) the functional departments and the executives, who act as the public 
service providers. However, at senior level, there is a blurred distinction between politicians who 
are seen as high-ranking authority officials and bureaucrat managers of functional institutions. They 
sometimes can be assigned to be one of the others. Thus, our clarification here is more applicable 
to the lower level of staff and officers, rather than to the managerial or leadership - level.  
In general, compared to the authority systems, the functional departments and executives have 
been found to have fewer incentives in the NP project; their remuneration, in particular, paid by 
the government was “incompatible” with the workload required by the NP project. While the 
success of the NP project might bring good reputation and political promotions to the local 
authorities, the functional and executive officers will not see much change in their positions and 
incentives. However, perceptions were found to be dynamic at this level, in particular since the 
functional and executive officers admitted that their perceptions were changed by “enjoying 
working” with NPM, in this way enabling more accountable behavior with regards to the project 
progress. This is related to the impact of a predominant cultural feature of Vietnam as identified 
by some scholars that relationships in the public system in Vietnam are built in a more emotional 
than rational way (Edwards & Phan 2013). 
In a broader sense, the CSR approach is to make use of the “emotional” approach to lobby the 
authorities and generate trust, and reciprocity with the PAPs and PACs. 
Perceptions - goals - strategies 
As discussed in 2.2.7, perceptions, goals, means and strategies are interlinked. In the NP case, 
this can be summarized in Table 36 in this section. For instance, the perceptions of the actors 
can be interpreted from their strategies (Klijn & Teisman 2003). In particular, NPM perceived 
CRSs to be the means for success in land conversion; they financed additional policies and 
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entitlements. The communes find that land conversion should be mainly carried out by the 
private actor and they expect more benefit sharing and accountability from the company during 
implementation. Due to their own limited resources in combination with unclear objectives in 
land conversion (such as economic restoration), the strategic choice of the public actors is to ask 
for more resources from the private actors, such as conditions to foster the land acquisition process.  
Table 36: Summary of perceptions - goals - strategy of the actors in the NP project 
Actor Perceptions 
Goals 
Strategy 
Institutional 
objectives 
(broader 
objective) 
Organizational 
objectives 
Public actors Dual functions of public actors, 
addressing the interests of the 
population on the one hand 
and the interest of the 
investor, on the other;  
PPP is a necessary means to 
enable socio-economic 
development; 
NPM contribution is significant 
for local development; 
Compulsory land conversion is 
sensitive in implementation; 
concerns resistance and 
insecurity; Economic 
restoration dimension has 
overloaded the government 
capacity; Private actor should 
be key player in providing 
resources and expertise. 
Increase 
provincial 
budget;  
Political 
position; 
Income 
generation 
for PAPs; 
Security and 
stability 
(conflict 
avoidance). 
Complaint 
resolutions; 
incentives; 
facility 
improvement; 
political 
reputation 
Risk avoidance;  
Hierarchical order; 
Some degree of policy 
innovation; 
Strict policies 
compliance through 
administrative 
procedures; 
Collective decision; 
Ask for more 
contribution from 
the private actor 
(limited co-
financing). 
Win-win negotiation (at 
commune level). 
Private actors Land conversion is “survival” for 
the company; Advocate for 
long-term reputation of the 
company and brandings;  
Philanthropy and CSR can enable 
compulsory land conversion 
(SN2 can be come means to 
realize SN1); 
Focus on capacity building and 
incentives of the public actors 
who monopolize compulsory 
land conversion. 
Profit making; 
Increased 
reputation to 
get other 
projects; 
Position in the 
stock market 
(cost 
reduction by 
conflict 
avoidance). 
Land acquisition. 
Reduction of 
transaction 
costs; 
The roles of the 
state actors 
and the PAPs 
were essential 
to achieve 
goals in land 
conversion. 
Increased benefit 
sharing through and 
additional policies for 
SN1; 
Effective utilization of 
hierarchical (political 
and administrative 
system) through 
incentives and 
lobbying by added 
value activities. 
The PAPs Compensation and resettlement 
provides more opportunity 
than challenges; 
Private actor should pay more 
due to great benefits from the 
project; 
 Low trust in private actors and 
(local) governments. 
Compensation 
payment; 
Job and income; 
Short-term 
visions. 
Community 
Infrastructure,  
Environment 
protection; 
Social and 
economic 
development. 
Negotiation;  
Ask for more benefit 
sharing (through 
complaints, 
resistance and the 
use of media). 
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Conclusion of PPP input 
In this chapter, the input elements being the PPP rules, interaction patterns and goals in 
combination with the mapping of the actors’ resources and and their characteristics are viewed 
as important explanatory factors of the structure and characteristics of the PPP in the NP 
project. Accordingly, the findings in this chapter did not claim a stable structure of PPP due to  
diverse interaction patterns as well as modification of rules, the point of departure of which was  
the inadequate resource capacity of the  actors while joining the network. In addition,  the 
dynamics of PPP structure and actor characteristics resulting from interactions and constraints 
as well as the PPP design were demonstrated with the (de) formalization processes of rules, the 
change adaption of perception as well as the power generation in form of resource exchange.  
Hence, there is a further need in understanding how the actors struggle for a successful 
collaboration under the impacts of these input components in the specific and complex context 
of IR in the NP project. The following chapter will unlock  these concerns by exploring the 
substance as well as the execution of the PPP in the NP project. 
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5.3. Public Private Partnership throughput elements 
As stated in 2.3, the PPP process has two dimensions. The first dimension, being the content of 
PPP, includes various joint and value added activities of the private actor, while the second 
dimension is focused on the collaboration building processes between public and private actors, 
such as forging of the initial agreement, building leadership, building legitimacy, building trust, 
managing conflict and planning.  
5.3.1. The content of Public Private Partnership 
The content of PPP is simply perceived as joint-actions of the public and private actors 
(Koppenjan & Kijn 2004), or as “a complexity of various activities and various levels and various 
degrees of actors’ involvement” (O’Toole et al. in Kickert et al. 1997:137-143). 
In the introduction to the studied case (4.2.4), we elaborated on project activities, such as 
compensation and displacement, the construction of relocation sites, the implementation of the 
PCDP (including the Complaint Mechanism, the task force group for Complaint Resolution), the 
CDP and the ERPs. In this section, we illustrate the degrees of involvement of the public and 
private actors in the implementation of the above mentioned activities. Thus, based on the 
observed activities in combination with the distinct dimensions which are defined in compulsory 
land conversion, the joint-activities in the NP project can be categorized in two sub-networks.  
 Sub-network 1 (SN1) refers to the compensation and resettlement activities 
 Sub-network 2 (SN2) refers to the assistance activities to the PAPs and PACs, such as the 
implementation of economic restoration programs (ERPs), the PCDP and the CDP. 
This section presents findings related to the core nature of the PPP content in land conversion 
and the impacts of the influencing factors on the PPP activities. We demonstrate that the nature 
of the PPP in the NP project can be characterised by the “added-value” activities, aiming at 
“good practice” in compulsory land conversion on the one hand, and by the response to conflict 
resolution during policy implementation, on the other. Additionally, the results show that the 
PPP activities in the NP project were constrained by the vulnerability of financial resources and 
the changes of rules in the network. 
The added-value activities were widely employed as good practice in compulsory land 
conversion 
These additional activities which were not strictly required by the government policies were 
implemented in the policy process in different forms and at different stages of the land 
conversion process by the private actor (NPM), as shown in Box 25 below (see also Appendix 6: 
NPM additional policies). 
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Box 25: The added-value activities under NPM’s budget 
Apart from the corporate contract with district BCSR, NPM also has signed contracts with two other private companies 
to provide the same land conversion service as BCSR
95
.  
NPM provides an annual budget for economic restoration, environmental impact mitigation and other development 
initiatives. NPM also works closely with the National Bio-Generic Institute to carry out a pilot programme for 
mushroom plantations in PACs. 
NPM has developed widely spread working networks in all affected communes and villages to support the activities of 
the RAP and PCDP implementations. Their activities, among others, include the information campaign about the 
company and government compensation, information on support and resettlement policy, DMS implementation 
support, disclosure of DMS and Compensation Plans, and complaints and grievances settling. All local network 
members working on NPM enquiries are subject to a monthly or daily-based allowance. 
Since 2006, the implementation of the CDP, including infrastructure construction, environment protection, 
subsidization of the organizational expenses and participation in the local social activities at all levels (provincial, 
district and communal) and contribution for poverty alleviation took place although the company did not start 
production yet. 
The company particularly focused on schools, children and education. The majority of infrastructure support was 
provided to school/ kindergarten construction and renovation, facility provisions for school and nutrition programs, to 
name but a few.  
(Review of Thai Nguyen Newspapers published in the first half of 2012
96
 and interviews of NPM community liaison 
staffs conducted in 10
th
 June 2011 and 3th May 2012, Dai Tu - TN) 
The research shows that the value-added activities and additional resources actually result from 
a precise interpretation of the existing government policy. The view stated below explains the 
core of the land conversion process in the light of the policy goals:  “(...) through compensation, 
support and resettlement policies, to ensure eligible interests of PAPs; stabilize livelihood of the 
PAPs under sustainable development programs and facilitate labour transfer from agricultural to 
non-agricultural activities...”97. 
Also, the international norms, define involuntary resettlement goals in regards to the 
development programs more clearly: “[...] All involuntary resettlement projects should be 
conceived and executed as development programs, with resettles provided sufficient investment 
resources and opportunities to share in project benefits”98. These goals have been realized in the 
NPM project owing to the value added activities and NPM resources. Particularly, SN1 was 
supplemented with more resources in order to enhance the compensation and resettlement 
results, whereas additional activities with a greater focus on the outcomes of the land 
conversion process were allocated to SN2.  
As a result, we would agree with the assessment report of the MEGA99 (World Bank evaluator 
group) that various activities implemented in the NP project should be considered as “good 
practice” in compulsory land conversion. However, observation of the added value activities also 
reveals a certain degree of vulnerability. More precisely, the trajectory in the CDP value as 
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shown in Figure 16 below denotes a drop of the community support expenses during 2009-2010 
due to the financial status of the private actor (see also Table 31: The NP project milestones). 
Figure 16: Community support cash value by years 
 
(NPM Community Liaison reports from 2011-2013) 
The value added activities emerged as problem solving for conflict resolution   
In the NP project, complaint resolution appears to be an indispensable content of PPP in 
compulsory land conversion as complaints exist throughout the project implementation (see 
4.2.6). The analysis in 5.2.2 shows that the conflicts in the NP project were caused by the nature 
of rules and the content of the rules such as the changes of policies. These can be viewed as the 
changes of reality rules in the network as shown in Box 12 regarding complaints caused by the 
policy changes. As a result, the complaints and grievances are dealt in accordance with the RAP 
approved steps for the settlement of grievances. To resolve the complaints, more resources 
were needed in the form of additional policies and entitlements.  
The analysis of the history of the NP project (4.2.2) and the allocation times of the NP project 
additional policies (Appendix 6: NPM additional policies) show that new policies developed 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012 responded to the conflicts caused by the government policy 
changes (see Box 26 below).  
Box 26: NPM additional policy in response to the policy changes 
“Out of the 219 households in the Cat Ne commune whose agricultural land was acquired in 2008, Nui Phao has 
compensated 100 percent of the 29 households, while the remaining households have received 90 percent of advance 
payments. 
In 2010, under the new regulations of the Government and the province of Thai Nguyen (in line with the new policy- 
Decree 69/ 2009), the compensation prices were increased by 2.5 times. It was understood that the 29 households 
who have already received 100 percent of the compensation payment were not eligible to the new prices. However, 
NPM provided an additional payment to the value of 40 percent of the total value of agricultural land that has already 
been compensated in order to balance the loss of the households due to the changes of policies”.  
(Vietnam Agricultural Newspaper published on 11
th
  Nov 2013) 
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Interim conclusion 
While study in the PPP content, we found that it is challenging (but necessary) to study policy 
implementation at the local level. The outcomes of this process should be translated into 
concrete actions, while the full range of networked links must be mapped and analyzed. This 
allows for the PPP content to be analyzed in a transparent way, as well as the core nature of the 
PPP activities in land conversion to be properly identified. The findings in terms of the added- 
value activities and the complaint resolutions reveal, in the first place, that in a PPP process, 
joint-actions of public and private actors are indispensible. Secondly, we found that there was 
still room for additional, voluntarily developed added-value activities by the private actors, 
aimed at “good practice”. The voluntary nature of the latter was found to hold the 
characteristics of corporate social responsibilities (CSRs). Thirdly, other types of value added 
activities were formed in response to the policy changes. For example, CSR in the NP project was 
influenced by the emergence of corporate accountability, and defined as “a program of actions 
to reduce external costs or to avoid distributional conflict” as Heal calls it (2005: 398).  
We note that the findings on the role of private actors with regard to the creation of value 
added activities in the studied case can also be largely found in research on sustainable 
development (Elsig & Amalric 2008, Reed & Reed 2006, Heal 2005, Schmidheiny & Malloch 2004 
and Osborne 2000). 
Finally, it is important to note that the PPP content in the NP project was significantly 
constrained by input elements, such as policy changes and financial resources. With regard to 
the vulnerability of financial resources of the private actor, the PPP activities, especially the 
added value activities in the NP projects were viewed to be “unpredictable” as referred in 
Kickert et al. (1997: 32). As to the problem of rules, the complaint resolution has become an 
indispensable content of PPP in the NP project, since the changes of rules and the nature of the 
rules were carefully defined as root-causes of conflicts in compulsory land conversion.  
5.3.2. The collaboration building process 
This section focuses on the second dimension of the PPP processes, being the building of 
relationships (collaboration activities) between public and private actors in the NP project. 
According to Bryson et al. (2006) the forging of the initial agreement, building leadership, 
building legitimacy, building trust, managing conflict and planning are seen as six crucial 
components of a collaboration building process. We will explore the possible influence of 
institutional factors on these collaboration building activities in the NP project, based on our 
previous findings of resources, dependencies and the perceptions of the actors. 
5.3.2.1. Forging initial agreement 
Forging initial agreement is viewed as a foundation for a collaboration setting between the 
actors in a PPP process. It is understood as the negotiating stage wherein the actors agree about 
the patterns of collaboration and their respective roles and functions during the project 
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implementation. Adapting the multi-phase process perspective introduced by Osborne & Murray 
(in Osborne 2000: 78), we discuss the development of the initial agreements over time in the NP 
project in order to better understand the collaboration process in the project.  
The initial agreements in the NP project were triggered by the legal environment, and have been 
revised over time to take into account specific features of the project and the strategy of the 
actors. We treat these three aspects in more detail. 
The legal environment  
According to the law, the NP project was subject to a compulsory land conversion mechanism 
due to which the forming of PPP relations was based on formal policy mandates including the 
designation of formal leadership, the description of members and the decision-making structure. 
The legal environment thus defined the initial conditions for collaboration (2.3.2.1). However, 
the framework did not include many details on the role of the private actor compared to the role 
of multi level authorities and the functional bodies who are legally requested to play a dominant 
role in the compulsory land conversion mechanism. Not only is the framework characterized by 
the predominant role of the public actors, it is also marked by an absence of negotiation 
between the various actors. As a result, the position of the private actor was undermined in this 
network. As we have found in section 5.1, the PPP approach in the NP project is fairly ambiguous 
under the current policy framework.  
Responding to the inadequacies of the initial agreement which originated from the legal 
environment, the initial agreement was modified and linked more closely to the project features 
and the strategy of the private actor.  
The project feature 
NP is the biggest resettlement project in the province and its workload exceeded the capability 
of the government executive agencies (see Box 18: The BCSR - the resources are inadequate for 
the size of the NP project). The additional resources therefore had to be mobilized in order to 
implement the project, including the greater involvement of the private actor.  
Certain legal provisions allowed for a flexible involvement of the investor in terms of 
membership, information provision and the use of its financial resources (see 4.2.5). In addition, 
the nature of a mining project is subject to certain international and national norms regarding 
accountability and responsibility of the investors (see Box 7: The international policies applied in 
the NP project). Strong evidence about proper social safeguards and economic restoration 
policies was found in the content of the RAP, followed up by the CDP and PCDP, which have 
broadened the participation and partnership of various stakeholders including state actors. 
The strategy of the actors 
As elaborated in 5.2.7, the private actor voluntarily provided a greater level of entitlements to 
the PAPs, which allowed pertinent revisions in the legal framework as well as the modification of 
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the RAP. The new provisions of the initial agreements were mainly concerned with the greater 
involvement of the private actor in the land conversion process.  
The revision of the initial agreements is illustrated in Figure 17 in this section. This revision is to 
some extent related to the rule settings in the PPP process (see 5.2.2) and includes formal and 
informal approaches of both sub-networks.  
In SN1, the initial formal agreements were established via legal institutional arrangements in the 
form of contracts between public and private actors. During the course of implementation, the 
process was supplemented with informal agreements through mutual negotiations with less 
strict provisions in terms of the implementation schedule. In contrast, in SN2, the formal 
agreements and contracts which emerged from negotiations between actors took place at a 
later stage compared to SN1 (see Table 32: Summary of rule types in PPP in the NP project, in 
5.2.2). For instance, the point of departure for the initial agreement for SN2 was the non-legal 
form of international codes and norms introduced by the WB or IFC as well as company 
corporate commitments. In order to generate greater support from the local authorities and 
communities, the company proposed formal agreements with clearly defined responsibilities of 
each partner based on a win-win situation.  
Figure 17: Modification of the initial agreements in the NP project 
 
Interim conclusion 
The study of the initial agreements explains the rationale of the collaboration between the 
actors with regard to problem solving in the NP project. The findings pertaining to the actors’ 
strategies can also be useful to understand the evolution of the public and private collaboration 
(Bryson et al. 2006) as well as the influence of the input factors, such as the rules, the power, the 
competencies and the strategies of the actors: 
First, the de-formalization of the initial agreements reveals the constraints during 
implementation of the legal requirements. These are viewed as imperfect rules in SN1 that 
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ultimately lead to certain flexible adaptations to the mode of interactions between the actors (as 
we have seen in 5.2.2). Next to this, the more formal forms of agreements in SN2 derived from 
the strategy of the private actor, who purposely generated more power in the collaboration by 
providing additional resources to the network (see more 5.2.2).  
In addition, the vagueness of the rules allowed greater freedom in policy implementation as 
argued by March & Olsen (1989: 21-28 in Kickert et al. 1997: 42). In the case of SN2 in the NP 
project, more resources were provided by the private actor, enabling the revision of the initial 
agreements based on mutual win-win negotiations.    
5.3.2.2. Building leadership 
Leadership can be broadly understood as “directing the attention of other members to goals and 
the path to achieve them” (Bass 2008: 24). In collaboration, leadership is understood as inspiring 
and mobilizing others “to undertake collective actions in pursuit of the common good” (Bryson & 
Crosby 2005: 191).  
Leadership appeared controversial and complex in the Nui Phao case, encompassing formal and 
informal leadership as well as organizational and collaborative (joint) leadership. The leadership 
in the NP project became most observable during the course of interactions, especially during 
the problem solving circumstances in the later stages of the process during which there was 
significant conflict.  
The findings in this section point out the failure of the lead organization to champion leadership 
on the one hand and the emergence of informal leadership of the private actor, on the other. 
The formal leadership: the failure of the lead organizations   
Formal leadership is first and foremost examined through the position of actors in the 
institutional settings. In the NP project, the Thai Nguyen PPC was the highest responsible level to 
lead the implementation of compulsory land conversion in the NP project. Accordingly, the 
Provincial Oversight Compensation Support and Resettlement Committee (abbreviated as COB) 
were established as the “lead organization” in order to produce collective decisions (see more 
on the functions of the COB in 4.2.5).  
The vice chairman of the TN PPC was appointed to be the chairman of the provincial COB and 
the district COB was chaired by a vice chairman of the DPC. Furthermore, the chairmen of the 
CPCs were delegated to lead the project at communal levels. From the company side, there was 
one representative at the provincial COB and two representatives at the district COB.  
The COBs were established to be the leading organizations to carry out land conversion in the NP 
project. We found, firstly, that the structure of the COBs was relatively weak, as is shown here.  
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“We have our Oversight Committees and Advisory boards with senior representatives from our 
political, administrative and political systems as well as the NPM and the PAPs to ensure 
representativeness in the land conversion process. We have met every two to three months in the 
past but we do not meet anymore. Some people have their name in the committee but it is just 
on paper, since they never voice their opinions or are rarely present at the meetings. The key 
members, however, are the leaders of functional departments and authorities. Those people 
work for the project in their daily jobs in their organization, not through the Committee” - said by 
a member of the District COB - (quote 47). 
In addition, our observations show that the leading function of the provincial and district COBs 
takes effect in the form of a “sponsor position”, thereby providing authority for policy 
implementation which can be in the shape of revisions of new policy and proposals. 
“All new policies, proposals and plans relating to the compensation and resettlement activities in 
the NP project must go through the district or provincial COBs prior to the submission to higher 
levels for approval. However, it is only formality since the decisions are made by only some key 
persons...”- explained by the head of the district BCSR - (quote 48). 
Thirdly, the quick establishment of the task force group for complaint resolution demonstrates 
the sponsor leadership of the lead organization, providing that the members (being mainly 
public actors) can be called to account when certain serious social problems arise. The task force 
group comprising suitable personnel at all levels operated as a selective and a functional group 
for solving complaints and questions (see more Box 28: The task force group for complaint 
resolution). The establishment of the task force group for complaint resolution emphasizes the 
special role of the public actors “to solve problems which have not been and often cannot be 
solved by other organizations” (see Bruijn and Ringeling 1997:153).  
Participant observation by the researcher shows that the problem of the lead organization lies 
with its failure to champion leadership for enabling goal attainment in the NP project. In order to 
deal with the critical problems in the project, the representatives of relevant organizations were 
asked to attend the meetings. As seen in Box 27 below, the meetings held as an official forum for 
problem solving were often restricted to brain storming instead of providing specific solutions.  
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Box 27: Weakness in facilitation of leadership by the COBs 
Various meetings of the district COB during the stage of conflict boom (late 2011 - early 2012) are found to be held 
without any clear outcomes: 
The private actor is often the one who calls for meetings upon a specific problem solving agenda. The meetings are 
chaired by the district leaders; 
The meetings often started with problem statements and proposal of a solution; 
The discussions are often about who is involved in the problems, root-cause analysis and responsibilities of the 
relevant actors; 
The proposal on solutions including the necessary steps for problem solving often ends up with the question of “who 
is the egg and who is the chicken”, meaning that one actor would take an action if the other actors could produce 
necessary (legal) inputs. Due to the complicated problems of forced displacement, no actor wanted individually to be 
involved in decision making, such as signing forcing decisions, penalty decisions, sending security forces to the site or 
responding to the complaint cases without a clear policy interpretation etc.  
The administrative procedures and law policy references are critically discussed. Consequently, no decisions are made 
in cases of unclear policy interpretation.  
(Observation in the collaboration meetings for conflict resolution held during the first half of 2012
100
, Dai Tu - TN) 
The problem of the involuntarily nature of land conversion in combination with vague directions 
stipulated by the law (see 5.2.2) leads to risks in decision making by the government leaders. The 
disagreement in the interpretation of the law and regulations results in the blockage in decision 
making within the COBs.  
“We are here to listen to your guidance and expect to have a decision to solve the problem. You 
come up with the conclusion that we should consider the possible consequences... then for what 
purpose are we here, spending hours to explain our situation?  You are invited to this meeting to 
make decisions, not just listen ...” - as said by the NPM representative during a COB meeting -
(quote 49). 
In response to the concern about the role of the district in problem solving, a COB member, who 
did not want their names to be mentioned said that: “District government has their leadership 
position as they have access to authority but in fact have no capability to exercise power and 
they do not want to take a risk” - (quote 50). 
Informal leadership: relationship to power, resources and capability 
Discussions about informal leadership should be in close relation with power issues (Bass & Bass 
2009). In other words, leadership is about creating and maintaining power. We can also argue 
that having sources of power enables one’s influence on decision making, or achieving the 
leadership in the network. 
Firstly, our analysis in section 5.2.6 demonstrated informal power of the private actor over the 
land conversion process. The private actor exercised to some extent informal leadership over 
decision making by having power over the public actors as shown in 5.2.6 and through its 
                                                          
100
 See Appendix 5: List of collaboration meetings 
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capability demonstrated in problem solving. Box 28 in this section provides an example of the 
informal leadership role of the private actor in the task force for complaints. Indeed, NPM played 
a predominant role by monitoring the results of the complaint resolutions on a day-to-day basis, 
by imposing targets and responsibilities of each member, by subsidizing the operational 
expenses of the group and pursuing the necessary measures to maximize the effectiveness of 
complaint resolutions. Notably, a great deal of complaints has been resolved by the additional 
company policies (5.3.1). 
Box 28: The task force group for complaint resolutions 
From October-2011 the TNPPC established a working team including more than 20 people from three departments of 
the province (DONRE, DOF and DOC), senior officials of the district, communes and staff of NPM. This team is working 
every day at the cultural house of village 8 of Ha Thuong to receive PAP complainants and to prepare the minutes of 
meetings between the working team and complainants. On average, 15 complainants are invited to meet with the 
working team daily. The minutes are signed by both sides and once agreements on the revised compensation package 
are made, the supplemented payments have to be made immediately by NPM.   
The performance and outcomes of the task force group resulted in a considerable reduction of the tensions between 
the affected households, local authorities and Nui Phao Mining. All complaints and answers to the complaints are 
recorded and filed by NPM. The task force group has resolved the majority of complaint cases (being more than 
thousand cases) within a short period of time (6 months). Apparently, all the additional compensation and necessary 
moderation arrangements took place afterwards. The allowance for all the public members from the task force group 
was provided by NPM who, in turn, strongly pushed to speed up the complaint resolution process.  
(Observation of the performance of the task force group during the first and second quarter of 2012 and interviews 
held 10
th
 March 2012  in Dai Tu - TN) 
Secondly, our observation of the monitoring and reporting systems of NPM denotes a strong 
leading capacity to implement the compensation and social safeguards policies under NPM’s 
own budget. Indeed, the majority of company policies were created, revised and implemented 
within a shorter period of time in comparison to the time spent for the making of collaborative 
policy. A NPM C&R staff said that: 
“We have a big team of compensation and resettlement staff, categorized into various functional 
groups. Our activities are recorded; our expenses of compensation, support and resettlements 
are precisely analyzed and filed, all the compensation calculations and allocations are 
computerized since our activities and expenses are subject to financial and social audits so that 
everything is clear and transparent” - (quote 51). 
Interim conclusion 
The study of the formal and informal leaderships in the NP project provides insights into power 
sharing practices between the public and private actors in leadership building. 
The collaborative leadership building in the NP project pertained to the failure of the lead 
organization, given that different perceptions and procedures of the actors hindered the joint-
decision making process (see Huxham & Vangen in Osborne 2000). As a result, each actor took 
up different leadership positions in the network based on his own interests and capabilities:  
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In the sponsor position, the government actors at provincial and district levels endorsed 
authority and access to legal resources to enable project implementation.  
The government actors, especially the functional departments, could also be assumed to be in 
the champion position, which focuses intently on keeping the collaboration going and enabling 
goal attainment in the compulsory land conversion mechanism. However, the analysis of the NP 
project shows that this position was gradually occupied by the private actor. Indeed, in order to 
exercise the champions’ position, “process leadership skills” and necessary resources are 
required. And these were mainly generated by the private actor.   
Informal leadership derived from the production and financial power of the private actor can be 
viewed as the key driver to exercise the network champion role in the NP project.  
5.3.2.3. Building legitimacy 
This section examines the process of legitimacy building, focusing on the activities of influencing 
and managing the perceptions of the (internal and external) stakeholders (Klijn et al. 2012, 
Eshuis & Klijn 2012).  
We found a great effort in terms of awareness rising for the PAPs through the PCDP 
implementation as well as through effective performance in compulsory land conversion. First 
the Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan (PCDP) aimed to increase consultation and 
participation in compulsory land conversion is examined. PCDP is viewed as a comprehensive 
branding framework of the private actor, encompassing on the use of media and two-way 
communication. Second, following the assumption of Bruijn & Ringeling (1997: 154-5) that 
ineffective performance, and especially ineffective unilateral instruments of the public actor can 
undermine legitimacy, we argue that good performance would establish the credibility of the 
actors. Credibility in itself can be viewed as an important legitimacy element. We thus pay 
attention to the activities which aim to enhance the quality of the work in the project. 
PCDP activities 
As mentioned in 4.2.4, the implementation of PCDP takes place at grassroots level, i.e. through 
various channels and tools, such as TV, newspapers, community information spots and 
community loud-speakers to all 23 affected hamlets and the four commune headquarters. The 
NPM Information Centre, established in 2006, has attracted a great number of visitors, among 
which PAPs and other interested people.  
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Figure 18: Report on visitors to the project information center by years 
 
(Compiled from the visitor logbook of the NPM information center) 
Additionally, community capacity building and awareness raising activities for the PAPs took 
place in regular workshops and seminars. Moreover, a two-way communication is maintained 
through intensive public/community meetings (see Appendix 4: List of community meetings). 
The main discussion topics of these community meetings addressed pressing issues of the 
resettlement policies and land acquisition impacts and mitigation measures. We treat these 
elements in more detail below.  
Media relations 
In line with Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 145), we found evidence of a close relationship between 
the media and the generation of legitimacy resources. Furthermore, we also observed as did 
Eshuis & Klijn (2012) that the media played an important role in branding, viewing it as a strategy 
for managing perceptions. As explained by a district leader: 
“(….) in many cases, the people do not believe our explanations, even though they come from the 
leaders of the authorities. They tend to have more trust in the third party, such as media 
agencies…. Therefore we found that media involvement in the project implementation is 
necessary” - (quote 52). 
Our observation shows that the media initiative was strongly supported and attended by public 
actors and authorities at all levels (Box 29). The TN PPC authorized provincial public media 
agencies, particularly the Thai Nguyen Newspapers and Television, to closely follow up on 
project activities for information disclosure and awareness rising of the PAPs. Each of the media 
agencies assigned a group of reporters responsible for the NP project. Notably, some of the local 
reporters were found to be engaged with the project since its early inception to date. 
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Box 29: Media management in the NP project 
Several media agencies have their senior representatives in the Provincial Compensation Oversight Board (COB) for 
the NP land conversion project. They were assigned by the TN PPC to support the project. TN newspapers and the 
Television have also signed service contracts with NPM in order to properly disclose information on the project 
activities in line with the company’s mission. The news aimed to timely disseminate information on the project 
activities, especially on the land conversion progress, including the economic restoration programs, relocations and 
social activities. The written articles in newspapers concerned policy explanation, responses to the complaint cases 
and the promotion of the successful economic restoration models, to name a few. Numerous articles promoted the 
collaboration effectiveness during policy implementation, showing a high appreciation of the company over the 
support and participation of the public actors and vice versa. 
In the context of the conflict boom in 2011-2012, many complaint letters were sent to various media agencies. 
Consequently, several articles with incorrect information have been published by non-contracted newspapers. The 
company requested its media partners (which were not limited to Thai Nguyen newspapers and Television) to have a 
response article correcting the false information. It also requested the Provincial Department of Culture and 
Information to issue a warning letter to media services who published incorrect information about the project. 
(Group discussion with the reporters from TN newspapers and TV held on the 17
th
 May 2013). 
By studying the information content related to the project, we found that there were more 
newspapers, television shows, booklets and leaflets about the added value activities of NPM 
than the ones referring to the public-private joint-efforts. Indeed, the PCDP activities funded and 
implemented by the company ultimately focused more on building the company’s reputation 
and influencing public awareness on the important role and contribution of the company in land 
conversion. Clear evidence can be found in the Appendix 8: Summary of media publications- first 
half of 2012. 
Two - way communication 
According to NPM, one of the key objectives of PCDP is to maintain two-way communication 
between NPM and the stakeholders (see more in 4.2.4). Public consultation should enable the 
company to “create trust and build sound relationships”, as well as to generate “awareness 
raising” for the Project Affected People by providing information (NPM PCDP 2005: 12).  
There was plenty of evidence on the PCDP activities which were well monitored and filed in the 
project, notably the log book of the information centre regarding the visitors and problems 
concerned, the reports on the disclosed information contents, and the lists of the community 
meetings. For this, an Information Corner in each village and communal headquarters101, as well 
as a local network team of 15-20 members were set up and linked to the loud speaker system. In 
addition, the information contents and the topics of the community meetings were timely 
updated with the majority of public and individual concerns about land compensation.  
The activities aimed on enhancing the quality of work or effective performance of PPP 
In view of the business perspective, quality of product and management should be considered as 
an important element of branding activities, aiming to increase competitiveness and attract the 
target audience (Eshuis et al. 2013). This perspective was confirmed by the representative of the 
private actor in the NP project:  
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 It reached to 23 information corners - Community Liaison reports.  
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“The NP project is now in the heart of the provincial and national public media, which could be 
seen as the double-edged knife. Because we are living in the time when the public media is 
allowed to get involved and react on all social problems. The best way for us to be “safe” to 
media’s criticism is not only by having good relationships, but also by our good performance and 
compliance”-  said by a NPM CEO - (quote 53). 
In this section we focus on the related activities and the instruments which influenced the 
quality and effectiveness of the land conversion process. The factors that are identified here are 
(i) manpower investment and capacity building; (ii) the incentive schemes to improve motivation 
of the actors and; (iii) the complaint resolution with involvement of the politicians.  
First, let us focus on manpower investment and capacity building. As presented in the earlier 
findings in 5.2.5.1, legitimacy resources of the private actor were the result of the financial 
resources used to invest in manpower (See Box 19: NPM resources for land conversion 
activities) and capacity building in terms of facility investment and training for both public and 
private actors.   
The second item relates to the incentive scheme to encourage quality performance. In NPM, the 
monthly “Star Awards Program” was promoted to encourage significant achievements of the 
company staff with overseas tours as a special bonus for the selected state officials and NPM 
staff as recognition of their great contribution. Also, a number of awards were given to the C&R 
staff for successful resolution of difficult resistant cases and for the implementation of economic 
restoration by the establishment of the Community Development Fund.  
In the public sector organisations of the NP project, little evidence was found on governmental 
incentives for quality performance. This is not uncommon, since public service providers are 
often viewed as non-profit actors that are (semi) subsidized by the state budget, and are subject 
to the standard remuneration scheme as used throughout the public system102 (CIEM 2006). 
Consequently, there was little motivation for the public actors to be dedicated to the quality 
performance in the NP project (see 5.2.7).  
Indeed, the performance problem in public service delivery was intensively discussed in various 
agendas of the public administration reform in Vietnam (VDR 2005, 2009, 2010, and 2011; CIEM 
2006). The main factors that influence the (de)motivation of the public officials in public service 
delivery were low remuneration, and a lack of an accountability mechanism including sanctions 
and incentives. Nevertheless, the company has developed various incentives and allowance 
schemes for the public officers and their organisations (see more rewards rules in 5.2.2). This 
encouraged the public officials to be more engaged to the project activities, and thus, become 
more accountable. 
The third aspect relates to conflict resolution in the NP project under the active involvement of 
the high ranking public officials. An example of this is found in critical circumstances of problem 
solving during the conflict boom, as shown in Box 30 below. 
                                                          
102
 More reference about public remuneration scheme in Vietnam. 
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Box 30: The reaction of the local authorities to the conflicts in the NP project 
During the critical time of the conflict boom which happened in late 2011, the TN PPC reacted timely to solve the 
problems at hand. The task force group for complaint resolution was established by the TN PPC only one week after 
the conflict boom.  
“We must say that the political system now has joined the NP project, in order for the NP project to succeed. We have 
requested various administrative and political organizations to join discussions and meetings for problem solving. We 
have asked our senior officials from the province to come to the project, to organize community meetings, and have 
established the task force group for complaint resolution at a short notice” - said by a senior TN COB member - (quote 
54). 
“If we don’t timely resolve this situation, how else could we attract more investors to our province - a provincial 
communist party leader said - (quote 55). 
“At this stage, the issues of the NP project are considered the most important political task in our district”- a District 
leader said - (quote 56).  
“Our important tasks are to maintain security and stability in the commune. We absolutely disagree with the reactions 
of the PAPs because they may cause violence and bring a bad reputation to our community” - said by a Tan Linh 
commune leader - (quote 57). 
(Interviews of state officials conducted on 30
th
 November 2011, 19
th
 June, 25
th
 July 2012 and 21
st
 Jan 2013). 
We argue that this evidence underpins our previous findings that high-ranking public actors are 
very much concerned with their sponsor leadership in the NP project in particular, but also with 
their leadership at the district and province in general. Since the conflict status in the project 
threatened to endanger social and political stability, the authorities tried their best to mobilize 
their resources and to resolve the problem. Furthermore, Box 31 below provided visible 
evidence on the close collaboration efforts of the public and private actors in problem solving. 
Despite the fact that the NPM were the ones who proposed the meeting agenda, the public 
leaders often played a predominant role, given the fact that they embody the political 
involvement in problem solving as well as their formal role in the land conversion process.  
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Box 31: Joint-action of NPM and multi-layer public actors for problem solving 
  
Picture 7: NPM & Provincial leaders Picture 8: NPM and functional departments  
  
Picture 9: NPM and district officials  Picture 10: NPM and communal leaders 
 
Interim conclusion  
Our observations show that legitimacy building in the NP project is closely linked to the PCDP 
implementation, encompassing media relations, two-way communication and complaint 
resolution as well as the efforts to meet the stakeholders’ satisfaction by effective performance 
and political accountability. 
The study in the NP case reaffirms the claim of the Dutch scholars (Klijn et al. 2012) that in 
comparison to the public actors, the private actors take greater advantages in terms of budget, 
experience and general knowledge of branding. Branding activities, encompassing the media and 
the two way communication activities can indeed be significantly linked to the PR approach, 
which was often employed in the private sector. To be specific, legitimacy building under a 
business perspective, as observed in the NP project, focused on unlocking public concerns on the 
one hand (through participation, communication and complaint resolution or the quality of 
performance); and on projecting the image and reputation of the company as socially aware, on 
the other (see Patten 1992: 472). 
In view of branding as a governance strategy, some researchers (Klijn, Eshuis, and Braun 2012) 
are concerned with the obstacles of different perceptions of the actors or the lack of political 
support in legitimacy building. However, this was not the case with the NP project, where the 
facilitation of public participation, two way communications and complaint mechanisms were 
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found to be added-value activities in compulsory land conversion, and thus were strongly 
supported by the high-ranking public actors.  
To conclude, the critical context of compulsory land conversion projects such as the NP project 
lies with legitimacy building, which is understood in terms of compliance or the quality of service 
as claimed by Patten (1992). The PCDP activities, to some extent, engender high expectations by 
the public on the performance of the public and private actors, who have to build their 
reputation based on real incentives for the PAPs instead of branding activities alone.  
5.3.2.4. Trust building 
This section discusses trust building at two levels: internal trust building between the public and 
private actors and creating trust between the PAPs and the executive actors (public and private) 
in the NP project. The latter can partly answer our second research question, which is related to 
conflict resolution by trust building in the NP project. 
As defined in the theory section (2.3.2.4), in view of collaboration, trust building can be observed 
through the degree of communication, information and risk sharing between the public and 
private actors. In view of the stakeholders of collaboration, trust can be built, maintained and 
enhanced by three factors: information and knowledge sharing; competency demonstration and; 
good intention. 
Internal trust building in the relationship between public and private actors 
In the NP project the trust between public and private actors was built as a result of the long 
lasting relationship and intensive communications.  
In collaboration processes, a certain time frame is needed for a nurturing and continuous effort 
to sustain trust (see 2.3.2.4). The study of trust building in the NP project therefore needs to 
track the history of the project development, and make use of interviews with the people who 
have a long- lasting experience with the project.  
The most striking result to emerge from our observation is that within the public and private 
organizations nearly the same people have been working together throughout the land 
conversion process since 2005 (which is about 7-8 years).  
The project history (4.2.2) shows that although the company has changed ownership three 
times, transferring from a joint-venture to a domestic private company, the C&R director has 
been working for the project since the preparation stage, and indicated that he would like to 
stay with the project until the land conversion is successfully completed. A similar pattern was 
found in the public organizations, which tend to have the same officers in charge of the projects 
for a long period of time. Some senior officials have been promoted to higher positions of the 
same hierarchical system. For example, one of the district leaders has been appointed to be the 
vice director of the provincial functional department related to the project. 
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This long lasting interaction should be viewed as a foundation for a trust-based relationship 
which allows for an “iterative process” as well as for risk sharing between the actors (Huxham & 
Vangen 2005: 68). Interviews with a number of state staff and senior officials revealed a positive 
image of the NPM in the eyes of its counterparts (as shown in Box 21: The NP project in view of 
the provincial leaders and Box 23: The point of view of the BCSR over the collaboration in the NP 
project). In particular, the strategies of the company in the process of land conversion in terms 
of benefit sharing, corporate social responsibility and public participation were shared, 
supported and appreciated by the public authorities and the implementing agencies. 
Further evidence of mutual correspondence, meeting contents and reports in combination with 
participant observation revealed that the relationship was maintained and consolidated through 
regular meetings and correspondences and especially through daily (formal and informal) 
information exchanges and discussions (see Appendix 5: List of collaborative meetings). 
With regard to the influencing factors, it is found that the perceptions rooted in the institutional 
background and power imbalance, to some extent hinder trust building between the public and 
private actors. We go into detail on this in the sections below. 
Different perceptions rooted in the institutional background 
In some cases, there is a greater level of trust within an organization than between 
organizations. The evidence in Box 32 in this section reveals some level of disparity of trust 
between and within organizations. From the choice of contractors for DMS and the calculation of 
compensation packages, it is apparent that the public actor perceived its counterpart in the 
public sector to be more reliable (i.e. better controlled) than the external counterpart. 
Box 32: The trust based choice for the contracting-out partners in the NP project 
In the later stage of the land conversion in the NP project, in 2009-2010, the new policy provision (Decree 69) allows 
private companies to carry out the compensation and resettlement service for compulsory land conversion projects. 
This means that Dai Tu BCSR can be replaced by a private contractor. According to NPM, the cost for the 
compensation and resettlement service by Dai Tu BCSR is higher than the cost of the same service provided by the 
consulting companies. NPM prefers a private contractor over a public contractor such as BCSR, because it would be 
more able to control the consulting contractors, especially regarding technical quality assurance and time 
commitment.  
Sometimes, frictions occurred between NPM and BCSR, due to the slow responses of BCSR in the NP project. 
Consequently, NPM wanted to extend the service areas for their own contractors to accelerate the land conversion 
process. However, the Dai Tu District authority considers the executive agency for land conversion to be its “right 
arm” - although they are fully aware of the weakness of BCSR. One senior official of Dai Tu DPC said that he feels 
“safe” to sign only the documents provided by his executives or appraised by his functional specialists
103
. From the Dai 
Tu DPC leaders’ point of view, it is more effective to manage the project through lower ranking public organizations 
because they will be timely updated with information through daily communication. More importantly is the fact that 
the executive agencies must bear greater responsibility to their own organizations compared to other external 
contractors. Finally, the DPC is doubtful about the performance of the consultation company since the land conversion 
service is still a new type of service. 
(Interviews of various district officials during the fieldwork conducted from in May to August 2011 in Dai Tu - TN)  
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 Interview of the vice chairman of Dai Tu PC held on 18
th
 August 2011. 
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It seems that the trust based choice indicates that institutional linkage and organizational loyalty 
within multi-layer public actors can influence trust building between public and private actors. 
More precisely, the public actors’ preference for risk sharing takes place internally (within the 
public actor system) rather than externally (with the private actor). In contrast, the private 
company was in favor of market competitiveness by using an external consulting company.  
Power imbalance 
When power imbalance or power differences take place within a network, the actors are 
frequently left feeling vulnerable and reluctant to trust (Vangen & Huxham 2003: 22).  
Based on our observations, the power imbalance between the actors in the NP project 
concentrates the coercive power at provincial level in SN1, meaning that trust may not be 
generated between high level public actors and the private actor. However, as discussed in 5.2.6, 
power sharing takes place in the NP project in a way that coercive power is used to a much 
lesser extent. More precisely, power was transferred to the private actor, who, utilizing its 
alliance with actors at higher levels of the public sector, imposed pressure on the lower levels. 
Indeed, the communal authorities regarded themselves as the lowest level bureaucrats, upon 
whom commands were often imposed by higher levels. The leaders of the communes regarded 
NPM and the Dai Tu DPC to be strong allies. They considered the latter to be driven by NPM’s 
will and interests. As a result, the CPCs, resisted the domination of NPM and higher levels in 
decision making by using strict administrative procedures as well as local public pressure: 
“We take only actions if there is clear guidance and with the authorization from higher levels. We 
cannot do whatever the NPM wants us to do in our community. The higher levels sometime do 
not understand the pressure here. We have received complaints from our community to agree 
with the investor to take over their land...” - said by a communal officer - (quote 58). 
The similar unpleasant feeling of being “pushed” was also found in the interviews with the staff 
of the functional departments and the executive team of BCSR. Many officials complained that 
they had to work under high pressure by NPM who wanted to speed up the appraisal and 
procedural work.  
The above findings suggest that the constraints between the actors could be mainly caused by 
the difficulties of the tasks as claimed by Bolland and Wilsome 1994 in Bryson et al. 2006. The 
public actors shared their view of the workload of the project with the private actor, who 
alternatively offered suitable solutions such as additional entitlements and policies. Therefore, 
we argue that the trust, being built by the public and private actors over a long period of time 
was not seriously hampered by the power imbalance in the project. Similarly, we refer to Figure 
15 (5.2.6), which shows the influencing trajectory of NP over the public actors and explains the 
pressures of the lower levels of the public actors from the higher levels. This figure shows the 
direct influence of the private actor towards the lower levels of public actors by providing more 
assistance and incentives.   
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Trust building for PAPs and PACs  
The issue of trust of the PAPs was a controversial and complicated subject for compulsory land 
conversion. It can be understood through our discussion on involuntary resettlement and social 
conflicts (1.2), the compulsory nature in land conversion in Vietnam (1.5) and the studied case 
context (4.2). 
The trust building activities for the PAPs and PACs, such as information and knowledge sharing, 
competency demonstration and good intention have been aggregated by various project 
activities as well as the collaboration building activities.  
In this section, we present our findings regarding the factors that influence trust building, such 
as disruptions of the project, the degree of commitment and bias. 
Disruption  
We argue that there are valid reasons to be skeptical about the “good intentions” of the investor 
as well as the nature of the added-value activities, which were found to be disrupted and 
business-driven on purpose (see 5.3.1).  
Indeed, the CSRs in the form of community supports were found to have changed during 
different stages of project development (see Figure 16: NPM community support cash value by 
years), being greatly dependent on the financial status of the investor. Some efforts to maintain 
CSR during the suspension process have been found in company reports as well as in the 
acknowledgements of the local stakeholders. However, the impacts of project disruption on the 
trust of the PAPs and PACs have been significant. Our observation during the suspension period 
of 2008-2009 showed that many people believed that the NP project would be sold to investors 
who were, supposedly, interested only in selling at a better price instead of being fully 
committed towards carrying out the compensation and resettlement activities. This concern is 
shown in the comment below:  
“We don’t think the resettlement and compensation project will be implemented. They (the 
investors) just keep it for selling at a better price because it requires a huge capital for 
compensation and resettlement. We have been waiting for 4-5 years since the government first 
announced land acquisition and prohibited further development on our resident and agricultural 
land. Now it is the third investor coming - we don’t think they can be able to complete the 
compensation and resettlement work. Wait and see they will sell the project again (...)”- as PAPs 
said in 2010 - (quote 59). 
Non-commitment  
Trust is generated through “incremental steps and small wins or progressive results” (Agranoff 
2007; Bryson 1988 quoted in Voets 2008: 56). Hence, the non compliance of commitments 
negatively influences the credibility of the company and can give rise to conflicts between the 
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company and the communities as shown in Box 16 (Tension between NPM and the Hung Son 
communal authority) 
As a result, commitments of NPM have, over time, been converted into written form (corporate 
agreements) with clear terms and conditions, in order to pass a clear message to the 
communities who have become ever more skeptical with regards to the good intensions of 
the company.  
Bias 
Our participant observation discovered that perceptions of the PAPs were significantly 
characterized by the bias and hostility towards the mode of compulsory land conversion and the 
nature of the mining project.  
According to the statements of various PAPs the mining activities are believed to bring benefits 
to the investor, who will poorly reward the PAPs. In this sense the interest of the company was 
found to be in conflict with the interest of the PAPs and PACs. Having had a negative experience 
with illegal mining in the area, the communities believe that severe environmental impacts will 
take place in the host communities when the mine becomes operational. As a result, the PAPs 
and communal authorities view the NPM CSRs as “necessary compensation and benefit sharing 
rather than good intension’’. This bias may explain why only a few voluntary participation 
activities were found in the implementation of the CSRs, CDP and the ERPs. 
Based on the above observation, we argue that the legitimacy and trust building activities in the 
NP project were influenced by the financial resources of the private actor. The financial 
resources of the private actor have also been regarded paramount to trust building with the 
PAPs. To be specific, additional programs and entitlements have been provided as a response to 
the bias and skepticism of the PAPs and PACs given the fact that trust can be built in the context 
where the stakeholders know their interests will be protected (Koppenjan & Klijn 2004:230). As 
perceived from the standpoint of the affected stakeholders, the CSR and the benefit sharing as 
well as good practice in the project were apparently not sufficient to create trust among the 
PAPs and PACs. To influence the perceptions and awareness of the PAPs would require a great 
effort and time consumption. 
Interim conclusion 
We argue that trust and legitimacy to some extent have a common value, or in other words, one 
is an essential element of the other. The legitimacy and trust building and the expected results in 
the NP project are combined and illustrated in Figure 19 in this section.  
Figure 19 identifies three key drivers for trust and legitimacy generation in PPP in compulsory 
land conversion: branding activities (such as media campaign and information disclosure), two 
way communications (including conflict resolution and knowledge/ risk sharing), and good 
practice (encompassing added value activities, CSR and benefit sharing, compliance, quality 
management and non-disruption). 
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Figure 19: Legitimacy and trust building in NP project 
 
Important factors that influence the trust building process between public and private actors are 
long lasting relationships between actors, the perceptions and the power imbalance. In view of 
the affected stakeholders, trust building tends to be a utopian task due to legitimacy 
deficiencies, such as the compulsory nature of the relationship between actors, and the 
skepticism about the investor’s motives, being perceived as profit making and mining. In 
addition, the degree of hostility and mistrust can be deepened by the disruption of the project 
and the extent to which commitments are fulfilled by the investor during project 
implementation. 
5.3.2.5. Managing conflict 
In this section, we only discuss the conflicts at network level (between public and private actors) 
or, as referred by Kriesberg (1989), we will focus on inter-organizational conflicts. This section 
gives a brief overview of the conflicts found in the collaborations after which we examine how 
the conflicts are managed in the PPP network. 
Various scholars pointed out that conflict is common and frequent in collaboration (Bryson et al. 
2006; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004, Kickert et al. 1997, Hardy and Phillips 1998). In our case no 
evidence was found of critical manifest conflicts between the public and private actors during 
the collaboration process. However, numerous constraints and tensions, which can be viewed as 
the latent form of conflicts, have grown in solving difficult problems of the project.   
Firstly, the constraints between public and private actors were found to be dissensual (valued-
based) rather the consensual (interest-based) (Kriesberg 1989 in Moore 1996) deriving from the 
fact that the public and private actors have different perceptions on problems, apply different 
solutions and methods in problem solving and operate within the context of an unequal balance 
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of power. Secondly, the constraints between the company and the lowest administrative level - 
the communal people committees (CPCs) can be viewed as interested based, given the fact that 
the CPCs greatly represent the interest of the PAPs and PACs which are to some extent in conflict 
with the company’s interests (see 4.2.6). We discuss both observations in more detail below. 
Managing conflicts caused by different perceptions and solutions 
Different perceptions between public and private actors have been discussed in 5.2.7. In this 
section, we argue that different perceptions can cause conflict (tension) in joint-problem solving 
efforts of difficult cases, especially within SN1. The types of conflict we discuss here were 
managed by a certain degree of compromise between the public actors. The actors agreed for 
the private actor to create and employ informal rules for the problems, because they could not 
be solved by the formal rules in the NP project.  
As seen in Box 33 in this section, public and private actors have different points of view over 
problems and solutions relating to the project.  
For the public actors, the problems in land conversion should be defined in light of the 
administrative procedures. For the private actor, the problems should be evaluated under the 
commercial relations - between the company being the buyer and the PAPs being the seller. 
Regarding solutions, the public actors are concerned about the security and stability in the areas 
and tend to avoid strong measures. In turn, given that the private actor does not accept the 
blockage, it proposes innovative measures such as negotiation, lobbying and win-win 
agreements.    
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Box 33: Tension between NPM and government authorities’ forcing actions 
The land conversion process in the NP project gained a peak of achievements in 2010, when 96 percent of the project 
land areas was transferred to the project.  Tens of resisting households, who were located along the national road, did 
not accept the low compensation prices for their commercial land along this road. The majority of the households 
received advanced compensation payments, which took place at an earlier time. 
Since negotiable prices were not allowed in the compulsory land conversion mechanism, all necessary legal 
documents were prepared for forced removal of those households in 2011. However, the local authorities did not 
want to use military force in the project. They asserted that there were certain administrative procedures which were 
not met, and, as such forced removal was not put in place. The NPM, who needed ground clearance for mining 
operations, argued that the legal procedures were sufficiently prepared by their lawyers. The point of view of the TN 
PPC was that forcing actions could only take place in absolute compliance with legal and administrative procedures 
(which are hardly ever met in any case). In any other case, negotiation and persuasion should be used, and considered 
the only measures possible. The company is also encouraged to use “soft measures” such as incentives and priorities 
for the targeted groups.  
Notwithstanding these perceived and preferred solutions by the above mentioned actors, any negotiation to increase 
compensation prices or other special “treatments” which could lead to inequalities among PAPs were strictly 
prohibited by the provincial government. Consequently, the situation remained unchanged for a long time, causing 
dissatisfaction of the private actor.  
During 2012 and 2013, the problems, however, were solved using a different approach. First, the company carried out 
the “self-protection of construction works” for the plots of land, which was already compensated in spite of the 
resistance of the PAPs, who changed their minds after receiving the compensation payment. It was argued by a lawyer 
that “the protection of construction works” could not be found in the language of the laws and that it has the same 
nature as a forcing action. The company argued, however, that it protected the land it had already bought from the 
PAPs. The local government abstained from the argument, because they viewed it to be “business between the 
company and the PAPs”. 
Second, the company offered some privileges to the resisting households, such as jobs for their children, opportunities 
for re-opening their shops near the company’s entrance as well as other interest packages based on bilateral 
negotiation. 
 
  
 Picture 11: Protection of NPM construction work 
(Observation of the project activities and the reactions of the PAPs in combination with interviews of the provincial 
officials during collaboration meetings in 2012-2013 in Dai Tu, TN) 
As shown in Box 33, the tensions between the authorities and the company with regard to the 
forcing decision over the resistant households were managed by an acceptable solution to both 
actors. Eventually, the coercive power of the public actor was not used for blockage although 
conflict resolution was not in complete compliance with the law. Instead, the public actors 
allowed the market to decide, given that private actor and the PAPs resolved the conflicts by 
themselves. In this sense, value based conflicts in collaboration might inspire innovative 
measures which encourage a counterbalance between the market logic and the logic of 
bureaucracy (see Table 37 below).  
 
 
227 
 
Table 37: The clash of public and private perceptions in PPP in the NP project 
 Represented by Sources of constraints Conflict management strategies 
Logic of Market NPM Blockage in legal & administrative 
procedures 
Blockage in land transfer; increased 
transaction costs 
Break of financial procedures (SN2) 
Innovation and risk taking 
Investment on more resources for 
negotiation and for lobbying higher 
level 
Develop more interaction rules (for 
SN2) 
Logic of 
Bureaucracy 
Public actors Violence and insecurity; violence of 
administration procedures; 
Reputation and political position 
Hierarchical order; risk avoidance 
Ignorance (silence) 
Logic of 
Democracy 
Communal 
actors and the 
PAPs 
Economic interests 
Resistance to oppression 
Ask for more commitments 
Ask for more benefits 
(Adapted from Bryson et al. 2006) 
Managing conflicts caused by the power imbalance  
As discussed in the previous section (5.3.2.4), the constraints caused by power imbalance 
between the public and private actors in the NP project were managed by a trust-based and long 
lasting relationship which resulted in the sharing of workload between the two actors. As 
mentioned by one of the district officials:  
“The company just pursues their own interest while pushing us... but it is understandable... If it 
does not acquire the land in a timely fashion, the company will not survive. There was clear 
evidence from the previous project owner” - (quote 60) - by a district official. 
According to the interviewees, tensions between the investor and the implementing agencies 
exist in all compulsory land conversion projects. The participants have to accept this reality and 
need to find alternative ways to enable the cooperation and support the implementing (public) 
agencies. As found in the NP project, more pay-off rules were created for the public actors to 
encourage collaboration.  
Managing conflict of interest  
Conflicts of interest could more often be found in the relationship between the company and 
the CPCs who represent the interest of the PAPs and the community. To some extent, the 
communal authorities have similar points of views as the PAPs by saying that the benefits from 
the project were incompatible between the affected communities and the investor. Thus, there 
were increased demands for company support, especially in terms of infrastructure. 
Additionally, the reciprocal interdependencies in this sub-network characterize a lack of 
anticipated activities and formal agreements between the actors. As a result, tensions were 
caused by the non-compliance of company commitments or promises (see also Box 16: Tension 
between NPM and the Hung Son communal authority).  
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In order to avoid tensions, as well as to effectively utilize the programs in favour of the 
company’s interests, the NPM and the authorities set up contracts or made agreements, which 
can be viewed as more formal rules with clear provisions on a win-win basis to implement the 
economic or infrastructure initiatives. The review of those formal documents shows a close 
inter-dependency between SN1 and SN2 in the sense that the conditions of the agreements for 
the initiatives in SN2 were found to be cross- supportive for the activities and objectives of SN1 
(see Box 34). 
Box 34: Evidence of cross- support of SN2 for SN1 in the NP project 
The NPM recruitment of PAPs was found to be the key driver in the economic restoration programs. Over the period 
of land conversion (2006-2012), the company has trained and recruited more than 500 PAPs, making the company’s 
workforce exclusively composed of local people. There were 2 among 8 criteria for recruitment priorities emphasizing 
the win-win situation such as the “Level of support and cooperation with the project” and the “Level of priorities 
according to project progress”. 
The Corporate Agreements for Ha Thuong Secondary School construction were clearly defined in the project as a 
“bonus” to the community for supporting NPM and authorities in successfully removing a majority of the existing 127 
resisting households in the commune. 
Letter to support Ha Thuong 60 year anniversary: the support will be given if the commune assigns a team to 
cooperate with NPM to carry out the tea plantation programs for the PAPs. 
The support for the establishment of the local outsourcing of enterprises, providing jobs for only the resettled 
households in the relocation sites. 
(Observation of the CDP activities in the NP project in 2012) 
Interim conclusion 
The study of the capability for managing conflict in the network setting reveals that the tensions 
between the actors were crucial in conflict circumstances. This finding points to the fact that the 
internal tensions or constraints between actors arise during joint-resolving of external conflicts. 
There were, however, fewer internal tensions in the implementation of SN2 than SN1, meaning 
that displacement issues are more crucial in the NP project. Moreover, we found that the 
relationships between public and private actors in the NP project was constrained by different 
perceptions, solutions and strategies in problem solving of SN1 and by the non-anticipated 
contributions, originating from the reciprocal interdependencies in SN2. In accordance with our 
observations, the conflict management measures in NP denotes a high degree of innovation and 
flexibility, encompassing win - win negotiations, increased resource utilization, and the creation 
of new formal and informal rules.  
Some evidence shows, additionally, that the tensions in the collaboration network are, at times, 
unmanageable. They derive from the distinctive institutional nature into which each partner is 
embedded. As suggested by Bryson et al. (2006), by looking at the differences between the logic 
of the market and the logic of the bureaucracy, and democracy, the sources of the tensions in 
the NP project can become more apparent (see Table 37: The clash of public and private 
perceptions in the NP project). We found that in difficult cases of resistance, where collective 
decisions were difficult to achieve through joint actions of the public and private actors, the 
public actors often stayed aside. This in turn allowed the private actor to take risks and become 
responsible for their own decisions. The position of the public actor, which can be seen as a 
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compromise, allowed the private actor to create and employ informal rules for the problems, 
which could not be solved by the formal rules in the NP project.  
5.3.2.6. Planning 
In the NP project, collaborative planning activities were carried out during project preparation 
and implementation. Indeed, we have found various evidence, from planning documents such as 
the RAP, the CDP, PCDP, ERPs, annual action plans to the programs and other plans for the 
problem solving of specific cases. We examine collaborative planning at two levels: master 
planning and planning during implementation.  
Political decision making for master plans of NP project.   
From our observations it became clear that deliberate planning took place during the 
preparation of the RAP, which is viewed as the master plan for land conversion activities in the 
NP project. The RAP was designed to set forth long-term objectives and the implementation 
schedules to achieve those objectives. It was prepared through intensive consultations and 
participation of various stakeholders (see Box 35). Although the Thai Nguyen PPC as the highest 
public level actor was legally responsible for the contents of the RAP, the NPM was the key 
player in the preparation for RAP - the approval of which was viewed as a condition for realizing 
their investment for the project. As a result, RAP was subjected to annual updates and was used 
as a basis for the project’s evaluation. 
Box 35: Deliberate planning for RAP preparation in the NP project (SN1) 
The NP RAP was prepared based on the existing government policies and regulations of compulsory land conversion in 
combination with consultation of various stakeholders. During the RAP preparation (2005) and revision (2008, 2010), 
ongoing meetings were held with PAPs and other key stakeholders. Consultation questionnaires were disseminated to 
all PAPs to get feedback on (i) preference of relocation sites; (ii) choice on mode of compensation (in cash or kind for 
land, housing by the Project or by themselves etc); (iii) choice of proposed economic restoration programs and; (iv) 
proposals to address gender issues and programs for vulnerable groups.  
In addition, a summary of the above activities is provided in several rounds of consultation. The consultations were 
conducted with local people, local authorities and local NGOs to discuss proposals for programs aimed at potentially 
vulnerable groups. The primary goal of these meetings was to discuss particular issues and concerns of these groups in 
the affected communities, e.g. ethnic minorities, in order to develop mitigation measures to improve their income 
generation and livelihood after relocation. 
Notably, the draft of RAP was submitted to the relevant functional departments of Thai Nguyen province for appraisal, 
and was subjected to several rounds of modification and justification. The final draft of RAP after being appraised was 
submitted to the TN PPC for approval. Every year, RAP is subjected to be updated and revised under the new 
compensation prices and (if any) new policies. 
(Methodology chapter of RAP 2005  and of the revised RAP 2008, 2010) 
We also found that deliberate planning took place in preparation of the CDP, the ERP104 and 
PCDP which can be viewed as the master plans in the NP project. Notwithstanding their 
voluntary basis, these plans were made in line with international codes of conducts and norms 
(see Box 7: The international policies applied in the NP project). However, the CDP and PCDP 
plans were not subjected to strict revision and approval of the provincial and district 
                                                          
104
 The ERP was developed as a proper Master program based on one chapter on economic restoration stated in RAP. 
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governments. In addition, in comparison to RAP there was a loose control and lack of immediate 
supervision on the implementation of these plans.  
Notably we found that, despite the fact that the NPM was the planner, the plan would not be 
completed without the involvement of the local authorities at all levels or of PAPs and various 
other stakeholders, which was clearly defined in the methodologies of the CDP and PCDP (as 
shown in Box 36).  
Box 36: Deliberate planning of CDP preparation in the NP project (SN2) 
The Community Development Plan (CDP) was prepared based on the international norms and standards in 
combination with public participation and consultation in order to identify community development needs and 
interests. The community needs assessment was carried out through focus group discussions, meetings and one-to-
one interviews with key informants and stakeholders.   
A total of 117 interviews were held with local residents, leaders of mass organizations, health workers, Women’s 
Union members, the Agricultural Expansion Association and various community leaders.  
The CDP was appraised and approved by the NP management and was internally used only. The CDP can be 
alternatively revised if required.  
 (NPV CDP 2006 and the revised: Methodology chapter and observation of the implementation from 2006 to 2012) 
Collaborative planning during implementation 
The research showed that emergent planning was employed in the NP project in both SN1 and 
SN2 in order to realize the initiatives and long-term objectives stated in the project Master Plans 
(RAPs, CDP, PCDP and ERPs) as well as to address possible problems during implementation.  
However there were no clear distinctions between emergent and deliberate planning, especially 
in SN1. Instead, a mix of emergent planning and deliberate planning was found. This means that 
activities and interactions in SN1 were strictly subjected to control and supervision of the actors 
and administrative procedures, although the activities were planned under an emergent 
approach. This finding is similar to what was pointed out by Mintzberg and Waters (1985:271), 
i.e. that deliberate strategies can also be emergent if formalized: Indeed, during the 
implementation phase of compensation and resettlement (SN1), the public and private actors, 
prepared implementation plans for each project component based on the project status and 
their resource availability (especially financial and production resources). The implementation 
plan with clear targets and schedules (often on an annual basis) was submitted to higher levels 
for approval, given that deliberate planning also took place during the implementation process, 
thereby proposing short-term objectives. In addition, a great deal of activities were planned to 
address problem solving for specific, difficult cases. The complexity of the land conversion 
process occasionally caused problems which required inputs from a variety of actors, including 
approvals from higher levels. 
However, they were also controlled by the existing legal and administrative procedural system: 
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“In many cases we have to plan together, especially when it is related to forcing people or 
acquiring land from the PAPs. For sensitive issues like that, we have to agree about time, 
methods, personnel and responsibilities. The plan should be submitted to higher levels for 
approval and we should be responsible to implement it properly...” - said by a district police 
official - (quote 61). 
Thus, collaborative planning is constrained by hierarchical order, meaning that a plan may not 
take effect if it is not approved by the highest (authority) level. Also, long lasting procedures for 
decision making may negatively influence the effectiveness of problem solving: 
“Sometimes it took a long time to obtain approval from provincial levels for changes of the 
plan...It seems that the higher level did not understand what happens at the implementation 
level. We105 always are the ones who trigger proposals for problem solving because we are more 
concerned about what is going on with the project and look for solutions”- said by a NPM 
external relation staff - (quote 62).  
Collaborative planning in the implementation of SN2 denotes an emergent planning process 
where the private actor fairly independently exercises planning activities. This derives from the 
fact that the objectives in the Master Plans were not clearly announced and that there was an 
absence of strict control of the implementation. As a result, the planning for specific projects in 
SN2 is characterized by participatory planning106 on the one hand, and by resource availability of 
the private actors and the win-win negotiation between public and private actors on the other. 
Particularly, the NPM played a predominant role in planning activities as well as in revising and 
modifying the plans, since the company is more concerned with (and responsible for) the 
progress of the project and the problem solving in the project.  
Although a great deal of partnership is advocated in SN2, it leaves a rather disappointing 
impression on participatory planning when taking into view policies towards young people. In 
this sub-network, the communes and their associated organizations such as Fathers’ Fronts, 
Famer Unions and Women Unions are often invited to discuss the planning of economic 
development or the educational enhancement measures. The failure of the program for young 
people as stated in Box 37 as shown below explains the problem of participatory planning when 
the stakeholders are not capable to participate in planning and implementation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105
 The implementing agencies at district and communal level, including the company - Author 
106
 Based on observation of the methodology of making of the CDP, PCDP and ERPs 
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Box 37: The failure of the emergent planning in the NP project 
Educational advancement is one of the objectives in sustainable development programs which have been clearly 
stated in the master plan of NPM - the CDP. In this plan, the missions, goals, roles and steps of all stakeholders are 
clearly defined and approved by the NPM management, CDP comprised various initiative and the project on order to 
realize the CDP goals: capacity building was one of those. 
The survey shows that a low educational level in the affected communities infers a low capability to join the 
vocational training programs. Since 2008, the company has started a part-time training course in partnership with the 
Dai Tu district vocational training school. The plan was strongly supported by the CPC as they found it very important. 
However, the program appeared to lack feasibility at that time because there were no attendants. The reasons were 
that young people were not interested in further studies due to a lack of clear motivation, and their occupation in 
various other (casual) job opportunities linked to the project’s activities.  
At the end of 2011, since there were no job opportunities for people with a low level of education, the company, the 
communal authorities and mass organizations discussed this issue again and agreed to re-start the program. The 
planning process took the form of open and compact discussions between the company and the communal 
authorities and mass organizations. To ensure the feasibility of the program, young PAPs were consulted. The planning 
process also encompassed participation of the district educational centre, which suggested the allocation of strict pre-
requisites as well as commitments for attendants. The course was planned to start in early 2012. However, there were 
only few people who attended the course. Thus, we found that many young people lost the opportunities to be 
recruited due to low level of basic education. 
(Interviews and group discussion of communal officials held during 6
th
 March 2012
107
 in Dai Tu, TN) 
Interim conclusion 
The study of planning in the NP project demonstrates the complexity of collaborative building, 
especially where the boundary between deliberate and emergent planning in compulsory land 
conversion is unclear. This finding emphasizes the uncertainty about pure forms of emergent 
and deliberate planning in the network (Mintzberg and Waters 1985)108. 
In general, the study shows that at the implementation level more deliberate planning takes 
place in SN1, where collaboration is more strictly mandated than in SN2. However, collaborative 
planning activities are constrained in both sub-networks. Firstly, in SN1, a joint process was 
constrained by pooled dependencies between the company and the multi-layer state agencies, 
providing that the inputs from both private and public actors were needed and subjected to 
mutual agreements between the two parties. As stated above, it is a long and complicated 
process following hierarchical order to legitimate the joint-plans which are intensively needed in 
compulsory land conversion. Secondly, in SN2, participatory planning is a precondition to enable 
economic restoration and capacity building programs. However, the emergent form of planning 
in SN2 has only a limited effect due to the low capability and awareness of the stakeholders, 
who were not always willing to participate (5.2.7). 
These findings are not uncommon. McLaughlin and Osborne (2000: 335) pointed out the 
mismatch between reality and community needs. These concerns have also been mentioned by 
Bryson et al. (2006) as side-effects of emergent planning. In addition, the evidence shows that 
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 See Appendix 3: List of Interviewees and group discussion 
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 Mintzberg and Waters (1985) stated that there are few, if any, strategies that are purely deliberate, just as few are 
purely emergent 
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the participants were relatively reluctant to commit to co-planning due to reciprocal 
dependencies in the economic restoration and development activities. The actors indeed were 
unlikely to feel obligated to participate in a collaborative planning.  
Conclusion of PPP throughput 
This chapter presents the actual execution and implementation process/procedure of the PPP in 
the NP project. 
The empirical observations present in this chapter show that the public and private actors faced 
at least two major challenges when they moved towards the realization of the PPP objectives as 
as well as successful collaboration building activities. The first challenge is that of financial 
resource vulnerability of the private actor. This input element seems to be essential to achieve 
partnership objectives.  The second challenge is that of legitimizing a transformation from public 
bureaucracy to public and private collaboration for policy implementation and combating social 
conflict in IR. In the conventional model of executives in IR, the relationship between public and 
private actors is managed through the logic of bureaucracy in which actions are deemed 
legitimate under administrative procedural criteria. As a result, the public actors in the NP 
project seemed to be not well prepared for the partnership. Here, the capacity of the private 
actor for handling the constraints of collaboration is important because their intention of 
collaboration is to utilize the public actor authority and expertise to meet their business goals. In 
summary, the insights on the collaboration building process in the NP project shed light on the 
real practice of the public administration reform in Viet Nam. The efforts of collaboration 
building were constrained by  lack of steady institutional roots (or background) to enable 
accountability of the public service providers as well as to encourage philanthropic contributions 
of the private business actor.   
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5.4. Public Private Partnership output elements 
This chapter presents the PPP output in order to answer our primary research question in line 
with the design of our analytical framework of PPP process, aggregated by the input, throughput 
and output of PPP. 
As discussed in 2.4, our ambition in this research is to demonstrate the PPP output at three 
levels, namely organization level, network level and community level, and in three dimensions, 
namely the production results and the democratic results, and the regime results, deriving from 
our notion about a comprehensive PPP evaluation scheme, encompassing multi-level and multi-
dimensional aspects.  
Moreover, the findings of this chapter not only answer our primary research question but also 
address our second research question on the relationship between PPP results and conflict 
resolution.  
5.4.1. Production results 
Production results refer to goal attainment or task accomplishment in the network, or in other 
words, the effectiveness of the network. As discussed, production results should be viewed at 
network level, organization level and community level. 
With reference to our evaluation scheme illustrated in 2.4.1 we first evaluate the project results 
- viewed as the production results at network level. 
The next step of evaluation is to interpret how the project results contribute to the overall 
missions of the public and private actors (Murray 2000). At community level, apart from the 
degree of satisfaction, some basis criteria for sustainable rehabilitation from an international 
perspective may be used for our arguments. 
5.4.1.1. Production results at network level 
In line with the PPP goals (5.2.3) the key activities viewed as the PPP content (5.3.1) in the NP 
project are as follows: 
i. The compensation and displacement procedures activities; 
ii. The relocation arrangement activities; 
iii. The economic restoration activities (ERPs); 
iv. The associated community development activities (CDP); 
v. The public consultation and information disclosure activities (PCDP). 
The overview of the project results will be displayed from 2005 to the middle of 2013. During the 
later stage, the compensation, support and resettlement activities were completed to 99.6 
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percent in the NP project, while the construction activities were commenced at the end of 2012 
and operational activities early 2013.  
As mentioned in our methodology chapter, the evidence of the project outputs and outcomes 
stem from participant observation, interviews, discussions and documentation reviews. 
Particularly, the use of participant observation method allowed us to collect the comparative 
pictures109 at different stages of the project development, which serve to illustrate our empirical 
evidence. In addition, the evaluation is also based on various sources of data collected from the 
company and public documents, the reports from the social audits and newspaper articles.  
The results of the compensation activities 
The most striking result to emerge from the data is that the compensation activities in NP 
project have been completed successfully despite the high cost of investment. The positive land 
compensation results were publicly presented in 2012 in the “speaking figure” stated in Box 38 
as shown below.  
With reference to the huge number of PAPs (2,700 households to be removed - equivalent to 
about 15,000 people) the 99.6 percent of the land being acquired indicates that the 
compensation procedures have been completed successfully between the PAPs and the 
executive actors (being the NPM and the multilayer public actors). The resistance rate of 4 
percent, the majority of which are from the PAPs located along National Road No 37 (already 
mentioned in Box 9: The status of conflict in the NP project) at the time of reporting was 
resolved a year after (2013).  
Box 38: The results of the NP project through the “Speaking” figures 
... 99.6 percent 
This is the figure that illustrates accomplished land acquisition over the 5 active areas of the project, two years after 
the domestic investors’ declaration of reactivating the Nui Phao project. It is also a number that any current 
investment project would dream of.  
The Vice Chairman and BoD member of the Nui Phao Mining concisely explained: “The figure of 99.6 percent reflects 
people’s unanimity. We appreciate the results, because louder than words, statistics are most convincing and 
indisputable." 
Also according to the Vice Chairman, Nui Phao Mining Deputy General Director, who has nearly 9 years of experience 
with the project, the figure of 99.6 percent is the result of a professional, transparent, and fair method of execution, 
while the benefits of the PAPs and the community are respected. 
When put into production, the Project will be using around 1,500 employees while being committed to prioritize 
hiring of the local workforce. Nui Phao Mining has so far spent over 1,200 billion VND
110
 on compensation, support 
and investment in helping the PAP with compensation, support and resettlement.  
(Sai Gon Financial Investment Newspaper, published on August 16
th
 2012). 
http://www.saigondautu.com.vn/Pages/20120816/Du-an-Nui-Phao-Nhung-con-so-biet-noi.aspx 
                                                          
109
 The pictures used in this research have been used for the company newsletters or public presentations - meaning 
that the copyrights have been legitimated - Author. 
110
 Equivalent to USD 50 millions - Author 
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In addition, the Pictures 13 below shows the visible change in the landscape of the project area 
compared to Picture 12, clearing the ground for the mine operations in 2012.   
Picture 12: The project landscape from 2005 untill 2010 
 
 
Picture 13: The project resettled landscape after September 2012 
 
However, we need to look at the history of the NP project to understand whether the land 
conversion activities in the NP project were satisfactory for all stakeholders, and also, which 
factors influenced the results of the project. Looking back to the whole process of compensation, 
support and resettlement in the NP project, we found that it has not come cheaply. Indeed, the 
project started in 2004 and it was expected that the compensation and resettlement phase 
would have been completed in 2007. Further investigation about the history of the project 
shows that the prolonged preparation phases and the impacts of the national and regional 
financial crisis have caused a severe tension that forced the two previous project owners 
(Tiberon and the Dragon Capital) to withdraw their capital from the project. Consequently, the 
disruption of the continuity of the NP project meant a great loss to the former investors and the 
affected people. It is important to realize that Masan was not the original investor and that they 
benefited from the failure of the previous investors by re-acquiring the project which had been 
in preparation for a long time. However, strong and resilient financial capability proved to be 
prerequisite for the success of the company. Indeed, the following quotation of a CEO of the 
project underlines the extremely high increase of the investment costs for the project 
development:  
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 “In comparison to the initial estimation budget in 2004, the current budget in 2012 for 
compensation, support and resettlement for the NP project was 2.5 (two and a half) times 
higher. The reasons for the higher expenses are mainly due to the fact that the original project 
footprint was extended from 450 to 650 hectares, the revised compensation rates, the increased 
entitlements due to the changes of policies and, especially, due to the additional supporting 
policies initiated by the NPM”- (quote 63). 
Thus, the practice in the NP project demonstrates the fact that resettlement expenses were 
often underestimated (see also Cernea 2008 & 1999, De Wet 2001) and thus they were also 
increased due to the long-lasting project as argued by Thomsen (2008).  
Despite the increase of the overall cost, the investor confirmed their satisfaction with the return, 
providing that the use of the resources was effective in NP project. This argument can be further 
developed by a comparison between the cost and benefit calculated by the different stages of 
the project history. Indeed, Figure 20 below demonstrates a dramatically increased trend of the 
tungsten prices in the global market from 2000 to 2012. There is no doubt about the increase of 
the return, which could be ten times higher than the original turnover estimation. Therefore, the 
increase in the investment cost is relatively acceptable.  
Figure 20: Tungsten as the main product of the NP mine and the price trajectory 2000-2010 
 
(Masan Resources annual report 2012) 
Interim conclusion 
The successful land acquisition in the NP project represents the result of SN1 and is mainly 
understood as the goal attainment of the private actor. Evidences demonstrate high degree of 
satisfaction of the private actor over the project results despite of the high cost of investment. 
The evaluation of the compensation activities in the NP project also underlines the importance 
of the financial capability of the private actor to the success of those activities in particular.    
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The results of the relocation activities 
To assess the relocation activities in land conversion project, some factors can be examined, 
being the policy entitlements for the resettlers, the physical and social conditions in the 
relocation sites, and the livelihoods set up in the new resettled areas. However, the livelihoods 
set up in the new resettled areas will be discussed in the following section - the results of the 
economic restoration activities. In general, the relocation activities of the NP project were 
carried out with “positive deliveries” as evaluated by various observers. 
As regards the policy entitlements, the previous analysis presents the additional benefit for the 
resettlers in terms of bonus, subsidiaries and allowance for the vulnerable group (as stated in 
Box 8: The relocation activities in the NP project). To quantify the results in relocation activities, 
we can look at the number of resettlers in the project and their status (see Box 39). 
Box 39: Resettled in Nam Song Cong relocation site 
The Nam Song Cong relocation site was built in 2006, before the actual land acquisition took place in the project areas, 
and stemmed from the investor’s point of view that the PAPs should have a place to relocate before they transfer their 
residential land to the project.  
The relocation site comprises 425 plots. Currently, 50 percent of these are occupied by the resettled people. The Nam 
Song Cong relocation site was designed with all necessary physical, social and cultural infrastructures, namely, the 
market, cultural house, health clinic, cemetery, school, electricity and clean water. There was also a church built for the 
catholic group, one that was bigger than the old one. The survey
111
 also found that the prices for the households sold 
their plots at the relocation sites varied from VND 250 million to 550 million, which are 2-3 times higher than the original 
prices (the price per plot which NPMN sells is VND 125 million). Notably, 100 percent of the resettled households have 
been provided with the LUC (Land used certificate) for their plots (see the pictures).  
The survey results show that the resettlers seem to be happy in more stable and better accommodated houses in the 
relocation site. However, some of them are frustrated with the smaller plot of residence in comparison to their former 
land. They are also concerned about the job availability in the new areas since they have no land for cultivation or no 
ability to learn other non-farm skills etc. Notably, the old people suffered more about a boring life in the relocation site 
since they have nothing to do there. In addition, the old people reported they missed their old villages and neighbors.  
   
Picture 14: Nam Song Cong 
relocation site (2012) 
Picture 15: The hand-over of Red 
book for the resettler
112
 
Picture 16: Construction of the 
cultural house (2012) 
(NPM Audit Report - first half 2012) 
The relocation activities in the NP project consisted of self-relocation and the allocation of the 
relocation sites. Of the more than 700 relocated households, about 40 percent were self-
relocated, meaning that the people themselves purchased new land for resettling. The 
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 Social Audit Report 2012- See Documentation for review 
112
 Red book is used as ownership certificate of house or land - Author 
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interviews with self-relocated group show that the compensation prices in combination with the 
additional subsidies offered by the company for self-relocation allowed them to build new 
houses which looked better than the old ones (see box 40). Similar points of view were provided 
by the social audit report of the project.  
Box 40: Resettled landscape in the project area 
  
 
 
 
 
Picture 17:The house before (2010) and after relocation 
(2012) 
Picture 18: The house before (2008) and                          
after relocation (2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 19: The house before (2007) and after relocation 
(2012) 
Picture 20: The house before (2007) and                                             
after relocation (2012) 
The two relocation sites have been constructed by the company, providing relocation plots for 
all PAPs, who wished to live in the relocation sites. The majority of those interviewed conducted 
on 22th June 2013 commented that the Nam Song Cong and Hung Son 3 relocation sites were 
the best relocation sites in the Thai Nguyen province in terms of physical and social 
infrastructure, and are often presented as show case models of the resettled areas by visitors, 
often including governmental leaders. 
Interim conclusion 
In general, in view of physical infrastructure the status of Nam Song Cong relocation site is a 
relatively clear evidence of the deliveries of the NP resettlement project, which met the 
international norms (OP 04-WB), indicating that “the PAPs should have better living conditions 
than the ones before the project”.  
In the next section, we discuss other important aspects of the relocation, being the livelihoods 
set up in the new relocation sites: the results of the economic restoration activities.  
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The results of the economic restoration activities  
Since there were no precisely determined goals in SN2, our evaluation is based on the basic 
principles of rehabilitation and social safeguards measures in land conversion. Particularly, basic 
living conditions, business establishment, employment, social security for the PAPs were critical, 
requiring both in cash and in-kind resettlement measures (ADB 2006). 
The economic restoration activities can be viewed as socially responsible programs and as a form 
of benefit sharing in involuntary resettlement (Wicklin III in Cernea 1999).  
As discussed in section 1.5.4, economic restoration entitlements in line with the policy 
framework are often spent in cash to the PAPs in most of the resettlement projects in Vietnam. 
Consequently, the practice of cash payment for economic restoration entitlements in the NP 
project is not uncommon (see 4.2.4). However, the PAPs and PACs in the NP project were 
offered to join various economic restoration programs, encompassing agricultural and non-
agricultural income generation activities as shown in Figure 21 in this section. We found that this 
practice is relatively unique in other resettlement projects in the province as well as in Vietnam 
In more detail, from our investigation it appears that the degrees of success are relatively 
different between the agricultural and the non-agricultural activities in the NP project, providing 
that the results of the economic restoration activities should be accurately evaluated.  
First, positive results were found in the non agricultural activities encompassing vocational 
training, job creation and recruitment, viewed as an effective measure to secure income for the 
PAPs in a timely manner (see ADB 2006).  
Indeed, hundreds of jobs have been created in the newly established cooperatives, providing 
services and products for the mine operations. Especially, the training and recruitment policies 
of NPM offered stable jobs for more than 500 PAPs as shown in Figure 21. Furthermore, the 
NPM recruitment policy is committed to offer employment to 1,500 PAPs in the following years 
(2013-2014)113. 
Figure 21: Economic restoration programs  
 
(NPM Community Liaison Report until June 2012) 
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Figure 22: The recruitment of PAPs for NPM 
 
(NPM Community Liaison Report until June 2012) 
Notably, the PAPs who originated as farmers with no necessary skills and educational 
background were trained by the company prior to recruitment as shown in Box 41.  
Box 41: Vocational training and recruitment in the NP project 
In mid-2012, Nui Phao completed a training program for 230 project affected people.  As part of the negotiation for 
land access, and in preparation for commencement of operations, the group of trainees embarked on a 15-month 
program to learn the technical requirements of operating a polly-metallic processing plant. Most of the participants 
had no previous experience within the mining industry. The training program required participants’ attendance at 
college, visits to other mines in the province and on-the-job-training. Salaries, accommodation and other costs were 
paid for by Nui Phao. At the conclusion of the program, participants received a vocational qualification or trade 
certificate and were guaranteed a job at Nui Phao. All of the participants who completed the training remained 
working at Nui Phao throughout 2013. Approximately 22 percent of the group was women.  
(NPM Sustainability Report 2013) 
Furthermore, our investigation during late 2013 showed positive results of local outsourcing 
activities, having created nearly one hundred of jobs for PAPs. Three local enterprises were 
found established by the NPM economic restoration team in order to provide uniforms for NPM 
employees, bags and pallets for packaging mineral products for export. In addition, a local 
cooperative was established to provide environmental and sanitation service for the mine 
operation. Under our observation, all the local supply groups were subjected to skill training, 
subsidized prices as well as procurement priority of the company.    
However, our observation shows some tensions caused by the increased demands in job 
creation for the PAPs which the company could not afford. The imbalance between the big 
number of PAPs114 and the limited number of needed employees for the NPM and its contractors 
in combination with the low level of education of the PAPs is seen as problematic in training 
activities. Indeed, this is not uncommon in involuntary resettlement since farmers are “in 
extremely vulnerable position in the increasingly competitive urban labour market since they 
have less education and typically no other skills that are marketable” (ADB 2006: 48). 
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In addition, in comparison to the success in the non-agricultural activities, the evaluation results 
of the agricultural service extension activities did not show equal positive results.  
Despite the success in the traditional agricultural activities such as tea plantation (Box 42), some 
other programs, such as the organic vegetable plantation, mushroom plantation, and cow rising 
were introduced, and then disrupted due to the lack of participation. The discontinuity of those 
programs explains to some extent the failure of economic diversification.  
Box 42: Success of the tea plantation program 
Thai Nguyen province is known for growing the best tea in Vietnam. In 2013, Ha Thuong commune, hamlet 7, achieved 
VietGAP certification for its tea. The VietGAP standard, meaning Vietnamese Good Agricultural Practices, was officially 
approved by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in 2008. Certification means that the agricultural 
product has fulfilled four criteria: 1. Standardization of production techniques, 2. No chemical contamination or 
physical contamination at harvest, 3. Work environment prevents human rights and labour abuses; 4. The product 
process is traceable from production to consumption. Hamlet 7 began growing tea, with NPM support since 2008. 
Eighteen households participated in the program that included attending sessions with experts, using correct 
fertilizers and conducting regular health-checks on the tea. With NPM support, the householders visited other districts 
in the province to learn from other tea farmers particularly in the use of drying machines to dry the tea after 
harvesting. NPM sponsored the purchase of drying machines on the condition that recipient households maintained 
and looked after them. Those households obtained GAP certification in 2013 and they now obtain higher prices for 
their quality product. 
(NPM Sustainability Report 2013 and Observation) 
However, a commune leader explained that a discontinuity of a new economic restoration 
model, which was successful in the pilot stage is not necessarily a disadvantage. It is argued that 
the PAPs already have learnt a new type of the income generation model and they may come 
back to continue it while there are no longer other short-term jobs115 in the areas.  
Meanwhile, the practice of the economic restoration activities and their initial results show that 
the limited awareness of the participants comprising PAPs and the low level of participation of 
the local authorities relatively influenced the activity results in SN2. Indeed, despite the fact that 
the new agricultural programs were often successful in the pilot stages, the PAPs still wanted to 
work as casual116 workers or to be recruited by the NPM (5.2.7). More critically, some PAPs, after 
having received a large amount of compensation money were not interested in the economic 
restoration activities. Our studies of various reports from the NPM economic restoration team in 
combination to the various interviews of local officer show that the majority of PAPs wanted to 
have cash for the economic restoration entitlements instead of joining the programs (see also 
quotes 8, 9 and 10 in 4.2.6.2).  
Furthermore, an important finding to emerge from our participant observation is the limited 
participation of the local authorities in the economic restoration programs, while demanding 
more responsibility of the company in this regard. It was often observed that the communal 
leaders together with the economic restoration team of NPM organized various activities and 
introduced them to the PAPs. The implementation processes including supervision, promotion 
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and evaluation were mainly carried out by the NPM staff. NPM sometimes had to attract the 
participation of local authorities in the economic restoration programs by offering some kind of 
community support. For example, we found a provision in a supporting agreement letter in 
regards to the company support with gifts for the commune stating that “the... CPC should 
cooperate with NPM to carry out the VietGap tea plantation program for the PAP in the ... 
hamlets”. This evidence is in correlation with our previous discussion on the perceptions of the 
local authorities who critically asked for the economic supporting programs for the PACs and 
PAPs while viewing the implementation of those programs as NPM’s responsibility. 
Interim conclusion 
In the NP project, it is found that the economic restoration activities in SN2 have focused on the 
long-term goals of rehabilitation. Accordingly, the results of the economic restoration are not 
easy to identify in the short run, or otherwise, positive effects in terms of economic restoration 
may not be evident until sometime later as found in our investigation. Eventually, the “failed” 
programs, which have been introduced to PAPs and PACs can still be re-activated in future based 
on the experience learnt. As discussed in 2.4, Bryson et al (2006) suggested to evaluate the 
collaboration results through not only first order effects (viewed as direct results) but also 
through second or third-order effects (viewed as indirect results). Given the time frame of our 
study, the direct results of economic restoration activities are indeed not manifest. 
Our findings in this section also demonstrate that the results of the economic restoration 
activities were determined by not only by the financial resources of the private actors, but also 
critically by the awareness of the PAPs and the active participation of the local authorities, which 
may hinder the implementation of the ERPs.  
The results of the Community Development Activities (CDP)  
According to the objectives of the CDP, prepared in 2006, the CDP’s beneficiaries should be not 
only the affected communities but also the neighbouring communities in the Dai Tu district. In 
addition, the NPM management determined that the CDP during the preparation stage of the 
NPM (meaning the land conversion period) was to be used as a cross-support means for the 
compensation, relocation and economic restoration activities.  
The most striking results of CDP were found in infrastructure development; especially in 
construction and renovation of the schools, kindergartens, clinics and cultural houses (see 
Pictures in Box 44 in this section). Compared to the community need assessment results in 2006 
(as shown in Figure 23 below), the results of CDP relatively tackled the most critical difficult 
aspects of the affected communities, being infrastructure, job opportunity, and economic 
development, etc. 
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Figure 23: Community need assessment by categories and priorities 
  
(Community needs assessment survey 2006). 
In addition, the capacity building and awareness raising workshops were organized regularly for 
the PAPs. The CDP also engaged in various sustainable initiatives, such as the gender (micro-
finance) program, education advancement, and the programs for the ethnic minorities (see Box 
43). However, we were not able to evaluate the specific effects of the programs to the changes 
of the awareness and behavior of the PAPs (Appendix 4: Community meetings). 
Box 43: The establishment of the Cao Lan ethnic minority display corner in  
 Ha Thuong commune 
The Cao Lan ethnic group originated from a mountainous part of Thai Nguyen province in northern Vietnam and 
moved to hamlet 5 and hamlet 6 of Ha Thuong commune. Under the land acquisition of the NPM project, the majority 
of the PAHs (nearly one hundred households) from hamlet 5 decided to resettle in hamlet 6, whose population is 
mainly Cao Lan ethnic, too.  
In 2013, NPM helped the Cao Lan ethnic minority group in hamlet 6 celebrate their heritage by establishing a display 
of artifacts and cultural material. Over the years, the Cao Lan people’s lives have changed considerably and the 
establishment of this display helped to reinvigorate discussions about the group’s background and cultural heritage. 
Moreover, the resettled and the native people can share their cultural heritage in this sense, making them more 
closely integrated. 
  
 
Picture 21: Cao Lan Ethnic display corner and performance of Cao Lan folk songs 
 (Observation in the NP project on 10
th
 March - opening ceremony of the Cao Lan Display corner) 
We studied the statistics reports in regards to the numbers of the programs organized, the 
expenses and the pictures of the activities and achievements. In addition, interviews were 
conducted with different stakeholders. We also found reports of high levels of satisfaction and of 
acknowledgement by external observers of the tangible results of CDP (as well as ERPs other 
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CSRs) in media articles, audit reports, and keynotes of the leaders at all levels (from national to 
provincial and local). Yet, the interview results with the PAPs and the communal authorities 
show more complexity. While some interviewees acknowledged the extra-supports from the 
project to their community, others found that these efforts should not be appreciated if 
compared to the negative impacts of displacement caused by the project. In particular, in view 
of the communal authorities, the CDP initiatives should be seen as additional compensation to 
the affected community rather than benefit sharing or CSR of the company.  
Accordingly, a communal senior official said that “we cannot deny that there are many additional 
supports from the project such as the construction of schools, cultural houses, clinics.... However, 
we expect more than these since the company will much benefit from mining operations and our 
shares are not adequate...”- (quote 64).  Similarly, a female PAP in Nam Song Cong relocation 
site, pointed out the nature of the CDP projects by saying that “they (the company) said about 
the corporate social responsibility and the additional contribution to our relocation site... we 
don’t view those works as community supports... and we think they must do so because they 
have to compensate for us instead of giving supports as they said...”- (quote 65). 
Box 44: Some infrastructure works for the affected communities 
    
Picture 22: Hung Son cemetery access road before (2008) 
and after improvement (2011)  
Picture 23: Ha Thuong secondary school before (2010) 
and after renovation (2012) 
    
Picture 24: Cao Lan Ethnic temple before (2011) and  
after relocation (2012) 
Picture 25: The church in the old residence (2011) and the 
new one in the relocation site (2013) 
In regard to the influency factors to the results of CDP, we have already mentioned the influence 
of the financial status and the strategy of the private actor as discussed in 5.3.1. Since the CDP 
was made up by the win-win negotiation between the NPM and the local authorities (5.2.6 and 
5.2.7), the number and scope of the infrastructure works or other subsidiaries, to some extent 
also depended on the degree of participation and support of the local authorities to the project.  
In addition to our conclusion, the implementation of CDP was successful thanks to the 
partnership with other public and private organizations for carrying out the development 
programs such as the Bank for social policies for micro-finance programs, the Thai Nguyen TV for 
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building the houses for the poor; as well as the voluntary participation of the PAPs and the local 
mass organizations in construction of the temple and cultural house and the gender programs. 
Interim conclusion 
In this research, CDPs together with ERPs and other CSRs were recognized as the NPM efforts in 
building trust by “good intension/ or goodwill”. The practice of CDP in the NP project shows that 
the economic restoration activities were complemented by social reconstruction activities for 
the PACs, being the construction of social infrastructures was well as the programs for ethnic 
minorities, the women groups and the vulnerable groups. Accordingly, the results of CDP tackled 
some sorts of adverse impacts in IR in terms of social exclusion and marginalization, by making 
the resettled community and the host community to be more integrated. However, our group 
discussion with different groups of PAP demonstrated that the degree of acknowledgement and 
satisfaction of the CDP results was relatively limited at the community level, deriving from their 
perception about the incompatibility between the “pains and the gains” in the NP project.  
The results of the task force group for complaint resolution 
Our assessment of the conflict resolution activities in NPM points at positive results, 
encompassing a high number of complaints being resolved, relatively high level of satisfaction of 
the stakeholders, especially the PAPs, and no coercive measures used for displacement. Notably, 
the task force group for complaint resolution is viewed to be a functional unit of the complaint 
mechanism being allocated by the implementation of PCDP since 2006.  
The results of the number of resolved complaints 
The results for the complaint resolutions were found to be clearly observable in the NP project 
because the performance of the complaint mechanism; especially the task force group was 
properly monitored by monthly reports.  
Accordingly, Figure 24 in this section shows a steady increase in complaint numbers, reaching to 
more than 700 complaints from late 2011 until 2012. The detailed study of the complaint 
resolution status in combination with documentation review and observation (discussion, 
interviews, meeting participation) results in interesting findings regarding the way the 
complaints have been resolved.   
First, 90 percent of the complainants have had their compensation packages revised and have 
increased the total cash amounts awarded to them. This may suggest a poor performance of the 
compensation and resettlement team. However, the evidence from Figure 11 (The types of 
complaint issues and the degree of correctness) shows that the majority of the complaints were 
incorrect in terms of lawful procedures and entitlements. Our discussion with the NPM and the 
district staff revealed certain degrees of flexibility in the interpretation of the law procedures 
and entitlements which have been purposely adapted in the way that most benefit the 
complainants. Our discussion with the task force group members highlights the following: 
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 “The high number of complaints has been partly caused by incorrect calculation of prices, 
location and entitlements. This is due to the large amount of work that we do - we deal with 
nearly 3,000 households. However, some policy provisions were very unclear for the calculators. 
One such example is about the compensation for the houses where the law did not clearly 
indicate correct compensation for the underground house parts and the walls between different 
rooms. Another example was that the DMS were carried out in 2006 and the final compensation 
was made in 2011 due to the project disruption. Apart from the changes in compensation rates 
and entitlements, there were also changes due to in the landscape changes, which includes 
locations which become more commercialized (commercial land is compensated at a higher 
rate), the changes of the sizes of trees and the crops...) etc. Thus our strategy is to flexibly adapt 
the laws in the way that most benefits the PAPs” - (quote 66). 
Figure 24: Complaint resolution status of the October, November and December 2011 
 
(Based on the monthly reports of the task force group for complaint resolution) 
Second, more than 20 percent of complaints that initially remained unsolved due to a lack of 
policy guidelines shows a risk of blockage in resolution or agreement between the project and 
the complainants. To resolve the problem, NPM has issued new policies to provide additional 
compensation for the disputed cases which were unclearly guided by the provincial policies117. 
As a result, the number of blockage complaints dropped sharply to almost 1 percent after the 
NPM additional policies were introduced as shown by the illustration content namely “No policy 
implication” in Figure 24.  
The results in the high level of acceptance 
Figure 25 below indicates that the complaints have been resolved properly, resulting to quite a 
high number of accepted items between the complainants and the project (51 percent totally 
accepted and 29 percent partly accepted) and low level of the non-accepted (20 percent). 
Notably, the non-accepted cases have been resolved by the additional company policies as 
mentioned above.  
 
 
                                                          
117
 See Appendix 6: NPM additional policies 
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Figure 25: Degree of acceptance to the complaint resolution 
 
(Based on monthly reports of the task force group for complaint resolution) 
In addition, apart from the additional policy measure, there is some evidence showing that 
complaints and tensions were solved in the NP project also by other measures - such as 
negotiation for more entitlements and recruitments. 
“We offer job priorities to the PAPs who have been severely affected and also to the resisting 
people, since the requests of those cannot be resolved by policy. We often used this strategy to 
assist the disadvantaged PAPs and reduce the tensions due to resistance. In addition, owing to 
the priority recruitment policies for PAP, NP can have more support from the PAPs and their 
relatives, now being our employees”- said by the NPM HR manager (quote 67). 
Particularly, the local leaders, who were concerned about the tendency of resistance during the 
last quarter of 2011, showed their satisfaction with the results of the complaint resolutions in 
which “no forcing measures have been used although we were, at times, about to do so”- said by 
a commune leader (quote 68). 
Thus, Figures 26 and 27 in this section show that the complaints seemed to be managed in NP 
project with gradual decrease in complaints during 2011-2012. 
Figure 26: Trend of the number of the complaints in 2011-2012 
 
(Based on the monthly reports of the task force group for complaint resolution) 
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Figure 27: Comparison of complaint receiving and resolving status from 2011 to 2013 
 
(Based on the monthly reports of the task force group for complaint resolution) 
Resistance and constraints cannot be completely resolved in the NP project 
The reports show that legal procedures have not been fulfilled by the district authorities. In 
principle, the complaints and grievance cases should be concluded by written decisions, which 
were not available yet. According to the district BCSR, it would take a long time to compose the 
official decisions for hundreds of the complaint cases in the NP project. Consequently, the 
working minutes between the project representatives and the complainants have been used as a 
basis for complaint resolution (see more Box 28: The task force group for complaint resolution, 
in 5.3.2.2). 
The resisting cases of a minority of the households located along the national road No 37 were 
still ongoing. According to the local authorities and NPM, those households found that they can 
personally negotiate with the project for more compensation benefits due to their exceptional 
location. Our investigation revealed that the households requested compensation rates which 
were approximately ten times higher than the (proposed) government prices, and much higher 
than the market prices for other plots in the same conditions.  
Interim conclusion 
The key factors that determined the results of the conflict resolutions in the NP project are the 
additional company policies to fill the gap in the provincial policies, provisions of additional 
benefit sharing in terms of job and income generation. Notably, the results of the task force 
group provide a convincible example about successful collaboration of the public and private 
actors in conflict resolution, resulting to the decline in complaint letters, high degree of 
acceptance of the complainants to the solutions and making the complaint mechanism to be 
more effective and reliable for the PAPs and PACs.  
To some extent, the evidence shows that the conflicts and tensions have not been solved 
completely in the NP project. As it was explained by some interviewees, some PAPs were in 
favour of pressing for better compensation prices since they viewed that the negotiable 
mechanism was implicitly implemented to some “special” cases only. 
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The study of the production results of the PPP brings an important notion about the public value 
rewarded by the collaboration instead of being created by single actors alone as believed by 
Bryson et al. (2006: 51). The public values identified in the production results can be drawn from 
the complete sets of compensation procedures, the decrease of the conflicts and complaints in 
the project areas, the positive effects of economic restoration and income generation. Adapting 
Scharpf’s point of view (1978) mentioned in 2.5.3.1, these achievements should be interpreted 
as the collective benefit of the actors as well as the evidence of the effectiveness of the PPP in 
the NP project. 
Furthermore, evidences have shown a great deal of attempts to combine multiple forms such as 
benefit sharing (in SN2) based on win-win situations; and the additional policies (in SN1) in 
response to the resistance of the PAPs, that bring the compulsory mechanism in the NP project 
to some extent closer to voluntary mechanism in land conversion. This approach was also 
suggested by some IR scholars such as Wicklin III (in Cernea: 1999), Cernea and Mathur (2008).   
5.4.1.2. Production results at organisation level 
To uncover the production results at organization level, we need to revisit the goals of the 
actors, stated in Table 36 (Summary of perceptions - goals- strategy) of the actors in the NP 
project in 5.2.7 and analyze to which degree have these goals been achieved so far.  
The biggest challenge for the evaluation of goal attainment in the NP project is the absence of 
precisely determined goals with the public actors (5.2.3 and 5.2.7). The goals of the private actor 
were quite clear in terms of the profit making objectives through land acquisitions as well cost-
benefit consideration for achieving the goals.  
For the investor (s) of the NP project 
The production results in the NP project show that the investor succeeded in land acquisition for 
mining operations, being survival despite to high costs of investment. The primary goal of the 
NPM in the project is the land acquisition for construction and operation of the mine, which 
eventually commenced in 2013. The secondary goal of a profit-making organization as NPM, is 
the return on investment, in other word, the effective reduction of the operational costs for 
carrying out the compulsory land conversion project.   
Indeed, the investment on the CSRs in the forms of the additional compensation policies, 
economic restoration and safeguards initiatives, will be reimbursed by the gain which is 
significant since the estimation of turnover from the mining activities equals billions of USD118. 
Importantly, the observation of the national and international stock market shows that the stock 
codes (MNS) of the investor remained as “blue chips” throughout the process of the NP 
project development, showing a stable capital status and brand of the NP mining project in 
the stock market.  
                                                          
118
 As stated by the Masan representative in the shareholders’ meeting in early 2013.  
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In addition, the mediation work in the task force group has reduced the existing and long lasting 
tensions among PAPs, timely prevented resistance, encouraged successful negotiations and land 
transfer from the complainants to the company. In spite of the fact that evidence shows a large 
amount of additional financial investment from NPM to the land conversion process, the NPM 
confirmed a return of investment in terms of transaction costs. 
 “Imagine, one month of delay in land transfer would result in the company to lose billions of 
VND. The experience from the previous investors shows that in case of failure to speed up the 
land acquisition, your capital would run out due to the blockage” (quote 69) - said by a project 
leader.  
In this sense, conflict resolution was claimed to be the most important element in cost reduction 
(for similar findings in other research, see Van Damme and Brans: 2011). 
In addition, the study of the degrees of goal attainment of the various investors in the NP project 
demonstrates the impacts of the input factors, such as the financial resources and the actors’ 
strategies on the success or failure of their investment.  Under our observation, the failure of the 
previous investors of the NP project shows a high risk in the investment in a land conversion 
project, which required appropriate land conversion strategies. The effective and efficient 
investment in the NP project could be only achieved thanks to the strong and resilient financial 
capability of the investors. 
SN2 is viewed as instrument for achieving the primary goal of having the land acquired for mine 
operations. Since SN2 invested in socially responsible activities in land conversion, the win-win 
results attained in SN2 were able to downplay the conflicts of interest between the company 
and the PAPs/ PACs (Richter 2004 in Reed & Reed 2006). The evidence shows that a great deal of 
complaints was solved owing to the recruitment and the income generation initiatives. 
Particularly, the results of SN2 as well as the effects of the additional policies in SN1 (in common 
terms the CSRs), are regarded as the “socially responsible attributes”. These have definitely 
enhanced the reputation of the company towards the local government and the PAPs/ PACs, 
gaining more trust and reciprocity (Garriga & Melé 2004: 55). As a provincial leader publicly 
stated in a local newspaper as follows: 
“Nui Phao Mining company gave us good lessons about how to generate the employment and 
vocational training for the district. Nui Phao did the things that we actually cannot do in this 
regard. For instance, they changed the awareness and the mindset of the farmers in the 
production of goods in line with the industrialization and modernization. I think, Nui Phao is one 
of very few companies in the province, even in the country to do these things. They are 
responsible for the PAPs by the supports in construction of infrastructure, vocational training and 
recruitment, the CSRs for the poor, the social policy families and to the social and cultural 
activities in the district and communes....” - (quote 70)119 
                                                          
119
 Retrieve from http://baothainguyen.org.vn/tin-tuc/xa-hoi/nuiphao-mining-chua-co-loi-nhuan-van-lam-tot-trach-
nhiem-xa-hoi-207939-85.html in March 2013. 
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To some extent, the core business practice of the NPM was improved by attracting more support 
from the local governments and the functional agencies. Indeed, the company has mobilized a 
big team from the public actors at different levels to concentrate on the project activities, to 
speed up the progress and be more accountable to the project outcomes.  
For the public actors  
In general, it is not easy to precisely examine the degrees of the goal attainment in the public 
sector, encompassing multi-layer public agencies and authorities. According to our clarification 
in Table 36 (Summary of perceptions-goals-strategy of the actors in the NP project), there should 
be two aspects of analysis, addressing the organizational goals of the public service providers on 
the one hand and the public goals of the government authorities on the other.  
In view of the organizational goal, focusing on the quality of public/ administrative service 
delivery, there was an absence of a clear benchmark system for performance assessment (CIEM 
2006). However, in our interviews of the state officials in regards to the level of satisfaction, the 
most obvious findings are those of high satisfaction with the results of the project in terms of 
compensation and resettlement activities. These are consistent with the authorities’ 
organizational goals as public service providers in compulsory land conversion. In particular, the 
state officials expressed their pride in overcoming the difficulties in the handling of complaints 
and grievances issues in the project, so as to ensure stability and legitimacy in the land 
acquisition process.  
In view of the public goals, the results of the economic restoration programs and other 
sustainable development initiatives provide support to the view that the public goals are 
achieved in the NP project and are in line with the national goals.  
For the authorities, the results of the economic restoration and other safeguard programs in 
terms of job creation, income generation and economic diversification in combination with the 
positive results of conflict resolutions eventually contributed to the stability, security and socio- 
economic development as clarified in Table 36 (Summary of perceptions-goals-strategy of the 
actors in the NP project). Indeed, the observation of the degrees of goal attainment of the public 
actors in the NP project results in interesting findings about the relationship between the 
outputs of the added value activities generated by NPM and the achievement of the socio-
economic goals of the district and provincial authorities. 
First, the local governments, instead of financially investing in the rehabilitation of PAPs and 
PACs in the NP project, could reserve their budget for other purposes “... we tried hard to 
mobilize the budget from the national vocational training program, namely the 1956 program for 
farmers, especially for those who are affected by land acquisition. However, they said that NP 
should use their own budget for vocational training for the PAPs since the limited budget should 
be used for other farmers in the district. In fact, we know that our training programs are eligible 
for the funding from the 1956 national program” - said by a NPM economic restoration officer -
(quote 71). 
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Second, the DT DPC benefited from the CDP and ERPs resources from NPM to boost the local 
socio-economic development in the district as well as to meet the political objectives of the 
district (Box 45). 
Box 45: The contribution of the NP project to the modern village development 
The Vietnamese government has launched a national program namely “the modern village” development in rural 
areas throughout Vietnam for the period 2010-2020. The general objective of the program is to develop new rural 
landscape with a modern socio-economic infrastructure, and appropriate economic structure and production 
modalities; to link agriculture with development of service industry, to link rural development with urban projection 
and planning and, ultimately to improve living standards of rural people.   
Accordingly, DT DPC assigned the two affected communes by the NP project (Ha Thuong and Hung Son) to be the first 
candidates for modern villages in the district. The modern villages should satisfy 19 national criteria for new rural 
areas. After two years, about 50 percent of the criteria have been satisfied thanks to the results of the CDP and ERP 
generated by NPM. These criteria are the infrastructure development (schools, cultural houses, kindergartens, roads 
etc.), economic diversification with the collective models (tea plantation with local brand, cooperatives and business 
groups), capacity building (skill development and education enhancement) and poverty reduction (building houses for 
the poor, subsidiaries). Notably, Hung Son commune following by Ha Thuong commune, were recognized to be the 
two leading communes in 2013 in terms of the social cultural and production facilities in the district. 
(NPM Annual Report 2013 and Thai Nguyen Newspapers published on 11
th
 June & 19
th
 August 2013). 
Furthermore, the economic restoration programs were carried out in the context of the 
increased government concern about the jobs and income generation for the famers in the 
Vietnamese countryside (Beresford & Tran 2004). Rural industrialization and diversification that 
were being promoted refer to a wider range of activities, encompassing all the given activities 
carried out in the NP project.  
Interim conclusion 
The production results in the NP project show that the positive community outcomes in terms of 
economic rehabilitation, relocation and conflict resolution addressed the company goals both 
directly and indirectly. Indeed, the company succeeded in cost reduction, credibility 
enhancement and, mobilization of the government support for land acquisition. 
For public actors, our assessment is focused more on the “client outcomes”, being the benefit 
for the community people and the socio-economic development in the project areas (Provan & 
Milward 2001). We assume that the positive project results have enhanced the reputation and 
credibility of the government authorities in both positions of the public service provider and the 
social safeguards body in compulsory land conversion. 
5.4.1.3. Production results at community level 
Network effectiveness at community level must be judged by the contribution to the 
communities being served by the network (Voets et al 2006, Provan & Milward 2001). The 
overall impression of the production results at the community level in the NP project is relatively 
close to the realization of the so-called “resettlement with development objectives" (WCD 2000, 
Cernea 1993, 1996-7-9 & 2000, McDowell 2002 & 1996). 
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Indeed, the PPP performance in the NP project strongly represents the interests of the key 
stakeholders, being the PAPs and PACs due the nature of land conversion and economic 
restoration activities in the project. More specifically, the interest of the PAPs and PACs in this 
part should be viewed in terms of economic benefits in both short term (the compensation 
package) and long-term (income generation), and the equality and justice in proceeding land 
conversion process (Hung Vo 2009 and WB 2010 & 2011). Obviously, it is impossible to satisfy all 
the needs and expectations of different groups of PAPs. It would require more research efforts 
to make a more precise evaluation. Hence, within this study, we attempt to identify the basic 
results “in the aggregate” (as suggested by Provan & Milward 2001), addressing the basic 
outputs that the PAPs and PACs finally benefited in the NP project in both dimensions of 
compensation and economic restoration.  
In regards to the outputs of SN1, the PAPs benefit with better cash compensation and better 
entitlements. First, Box 46 presents the advantages of the additional policies and entitlements 
packages which are “higher than the compensation based on the provincial policies”. Second, 
the complaint resolution activities lead to the adjustment with increase in the compensation 
packages of the complainants as demonstrated in Figure 24 (Complaint resolution status in the 
last three months in 2011) in 5.4.1.1. Third, the good infrastructure in the relocation sites can be 
the initial living condition for the resettled people to start their livelihood diversification.   
Box 46: NPM policies and entitlements for PAPs evaluated by the public media 
A well-known national level newspaper, specialized in agriculture and rural development has made analysis on NPM 
policies as follows: the investors made relatively good supporting policies to share the difficulties with the PAPs. For 
example, the compensation for the forestland being 260 million VND per hectare, and for the agricultural land (paddy 
land) being 65 million VND per “sao” has been multiplied 2.5 times in comparison to the baseline rates regulated by 
the government policies.  
Besides, the PAP also received other entitlements regarding the subsidies for the loss of crops and on-land assets, 
production stabilisation, job creation and economic restoration, the incentives for timely land transfer and 
transportation to the new place, the supporting allowance for the poor, the social policy families and the vulnerable 
groups, the priorities for the recruitment of the PAPs etc. In our calculation, more than 50 percent of cash payment 
was comprised by the additional entitlements and incentives, meaning that the compensation payment for the land 
and properties was only a portion of the total amount of the given compensation packages. 
 Another example can be given in regards to the company’s effort in sharing the difficulties of the PAPs. "Of the 219 
households affected by the acquisition of the agricultural land in Cat Ne commune, in 2008 NPM has paid 100 percent 
cash for the 29 households; the remaining households have been advanced with the 90 percent of the total 
compensation value. In 2010, with the new compensation policies, the compensation rate for agricultural land has 
been increased to 2.5 times (stated above). In principle, the 29 households who have received 100 percent of 
compensation payment were not eligible for the new prices. However, NPM created a “supporting initiative” which 
offered 40 percent of extra payment for the total compensation payment for the agricultural land so that the affected 
households did not feel disadvantaged in comparison to the others.  
Interview of the District BCSR specialist held on 15 May 2011 in Dai Tu - TN. 
See more: “Nui Phao Resettlement and Compensation activities” published in  Viet Nam Agricultural and Rural 
Development, November 2013 
(http://nongnghiep.vn/nongnghiepvn/72/1/15/117496/Hinh-mau-Nui-Phao-Mining.aspx) 
The outcomes of SN2 tend to create medium and long-term benefit for the PAPs, tackling the 
sustainable rehabilitative needs, such as job creation, economic diversification and capacity 
building.  
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 “Three of our children have been trained and recruited by the company. Our life now in the 
relocation site is quite good since we have jobs and I myself can open a shop for small business... 
we don’t expect much from the shop at the moment... but we still have some savings ...”- said by 
an elderly man- who is PAP (quote 72). 
Our analysis of results of SN2 encompassing both successes and failures of the income 
generation model in the previous section highlights the need to measure the impacts of SN2 in 
medium-term and long-term instead of its immediate effects. As a result, the benefit of the PAPs 
and PACs from the economic restoration and community development should be viewed in this 
broader sense.  
“The project has significantly changed our life. We have never had this much money. We could be 
able to invest in new land and new economic activities that we planned before, but we did not 
have enough money for investment. We have been guided by the project with some new 
economic models... we will consider to do... etc. Now we have to focus on stabilization of our life 
by building a good house, investing on our children’ education” (quote 73) - as said by a resettler 
in Nam Song Cong relocation site. 
In particular, Nui Phao’s priority recruitment of PAPs, described as PPP production results, has 
placed more than 900 resettled people into employment, either directly or through contractors. 
All unskilled jobs (100 percent) were filled by the PAPs in 2013. Nui Phao has also identified 
some products that it purchases for the mine - sample bags, pallets and uniforms to name a few 
- that could be supplied by local providers and/or cooperatives and has assisted in establishing 
such businesses. In 2013, NPM trained almost 100 people in skills ranging from tea production to 
driving (including obtaining licenses). 
“I have received the advanced compensation money of the NP since 2008... We have just 
transferred our land recently to the project. I have used the money for construction of our house 
in the relocation site and open a garment group. We have just extended the group in order to 
produce uniforms for the company workers”- said by the head of the garment group in Ha 
Thuong commune who was a PAP - (quote 74). 
In the broader view of the local socio-economic development, the improvement of the 
infrastructure and the entitlement to the status of modern village also appeared to be the 
product of the economic restoration and community development activities. Furthermore, the 
neighbouring communities share a better infrastructure with PACs as well as benefit from socio-
economic developments boosted by the project. Social stability and security are furthered since 
the majority of land has been acquired and major complaints have been resolved. 
We initially believed that the PAPs and PACs should have been most affected by the project 
disruption (we will elaborate on this in the following chapter). However, we note that the level 
of negative impacts caused by the disruption were lessened in short-term owing to the advanced 
payments, the construction of the relocation sites prior displacement (see Table 31: The project 
milestones, in 4.2.2) and continuous economic restoration initiatives lead by NPM and local 
authorities. According to our information, the total additional expenses for the added-value 
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activities specialized for the PAPs and PACs’ benefit in the NP project amounted to 
approximately 300 billion VND, equivalent to USD 15 million, which equals about 10 percent of 
total expenses for land conversion activities in the NP project. More importantly, the additional 
expenses were used not only in cash as extra compensation costs, but also for in kind support, 
focusing on sustainable income generation activities and stabilization of living for the PAPs as 
described in the economic restoration results. 
Finally, an overview of livelihoods of the resettlers in the Nam Song Cong relocation site may 
represent the rehabilitation status of the PAPs in the NP project. As shown in Box 47 below a 
majority of the resettlers somehow have their livelihood stabilized by new types of job and 
income generation.  
Box 47: Livelihoods of the resettlers in the Nam Song Cong relocation site 
In the relocation sites, job creation and income diversification were found to be the key objectives of the ERPs, 
providing that the relocated people have no more agricultural land for cultivation and they are removed from the 
home communities to a new living environment.  
The results of a short survey by the social auditors in 2012 show the status of the livelihood rehabilitation in the Nam 
Song Cong relocation site as follows (the survey includes the existing 200 households, comprising 400-500 main 
labourers): 
- Almost 10 percent of the resettled people came back to their remaining land in the home villages for 
agricultural activities; 
- About more than 10 percent of the resettled people runs a small trading business at the relocation site 
(restaurants, shops, guest houses etc.); 
- About 20 percent of the resettled people already have jobs or have arranged an income by themselves 
(being state officers, working for other companies, running their own business); 
- About more than 20 percent of the resettled people have been recruited to work for NPM; 
- About less than 10 percent of the children of the resettled people have been sent to vocational training by 
NPM and will be recruited by NPM; 
- About 5 percent of the resettled people have been involved in the cooperatives established under the ERPs; 
- About less than 20 percent of the resettled people have no stable jobs and work as casual workers for NPM 
and its contractors. 
Besides, under the EPRs, a mushroom plantation workshop established by NPM and the Taiwanese investor Phu Gia 
Company was built near the Nam Song Cong relocation sites in order to generate employment for the project affected 
people and people in the communities in the project areas. 
(Social audit report of the NP Project 2012). 
Interim conclusion  
The findings on the production results of the PPP in the NP project are meaningful to the 
literature of involuntary resettlement, particularly with regard to the contribution of the PPP in 
this field. The empirical study about the specific measures such as the additional policies, the 
benefit sharing, the institutional capability in livelihood restoration for the PAPs and PACs, the 
conflict resolution as well as the long term development for the displaced communities 
contributes to the IR literature, by showing alternative approaches to mitigate the adverse 
impacts of the involuntary resettlement (Cernea 1993, 1996, 1999, 2008 & WCD 2000....).  
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Conclusion of the production results in the NP Project 
In the NP project, each partner (public and private) claims the success of the partnership. The 
effectiveness resulted in the goal attainment and the degree of satisfaction. The efficiency was 
claimed with high investment cost from the private actor, who also confirmed the returns. In this 
sense, it is important to acknowledge the aggregated costs (including financial and social costs) 
of the partnership and compare them with the full financial and social benefits (including the 
benefit of other actors and the community) rather than each partner focusing upon its own cost 
and benefits (see McQuaid 2000: 23). 
Indeed, the results of the added value activities in both SN1 and SN2 perceived as generated by 
the private actor’s own costs significantly contribute to the organizational goal attainments of 
the public actors, the private actor and the project affected people and communities. This also 
emphasizes that financial capability of the private actor plays a crucial role, which determines 
success and failure of the resettlement projects.  
The findings in this section provides evidence to the proposition by Provan & Milwards (2001: 
420-2) that the network and organizational outcomes are inter-related in the sense that the 
network results can contribute significantly to organization-level results (the case of the public 
actors); and, conversely, the success of network members is critical to overall network 
effectiveness (in case of private actor). 
In addition, the public value from PPP in the NP project was found mainly at community level, 
where the efforts of public and private actors collectively increase the benefit of the PAPs and 
contribute to the conflict resolution in land conversion (see Murray 2000: 279). At network level, the 
public value was in the form of mutual gains (as pointed out in Bryson et al. 2006: 51) tackling 
both the displacement and economic rehabilitation dimensions in land conversion process.  
Finally, the assessment of the PPP results in the NP project also contributes to the CSR PPP 
literature. Particularly, the practice in the NP project provided convincible evidences about the 
impact of CSR to not only the community benefit but also effect to organizational goal 
attainment.  
5.4.2. Process results (democratic results) 
Given that democratic results can be produced through collective action, this section aims to 
access the results of collaboration building (5.3.2). As suggested in 2.3.2, we will assess three 
values of democratic quality: legitimacy, accountability and accordance (Skelcher 2005, Skelcher 
& Sullivan 2008, Voets et al. 2008).  
Based on our assumptions, we believe that the democratic results at community level, with key 
stakeholders, such as the PAPs and the PACs, are particularly important. We argue that the 
democratic outputs could generate trust, viewed as an essential factor in conflict resolution. 
Hence, an analysis of democratic outputs directly and indirectly answers our second research 
question addressing the relationship between the nature of PPP and conflict resolution.  
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5.4.2.1. Legitimacy 
The evaluation of the legitimacy of PPP rests on three levels: organization level, network level 
and community level. 
Organization level 
In the NP project, legitimacy seems to be most recognizable from organization level perspective. 
The specific legitimacy results of the NPM can be identified based on the degree of involvement 
in decision making (Voets et al. 2008), and on public and media acknowledgement (Klijn et al. 
2012).  
The output legitimacy of the public and private actors is found to be correlated to the input and 
throughput legitimacy (Bexell and Mörth 2010). Indeed, the private actor’s strategy (input) and 
collaboration building activities (throughput) resulted in the increase of involvement in formal 
policy making as well as a better acknowledgement by the public media and the PAPs of the 
added-value activities of the private actor. In contrast, public actors retained a limited 
involvement and have been less acknowledged by the public media due to resource constraints 
and the consequences of the “bureaucratic behaviors” in problem solving. We will deal with the 
degree of involvement and of public and media acknowledgement of both actors separately. 
Private actor 
Degree of involvement 
NPM tends to strategically increase their involvement by adaptation of the economic 
rehabilitation initiatives and creation of the new compensation initiatives. The company has 
obtained a certain level of formality in regards to full authorization of implementation of its own 
(additional) resettlement, support and compensation policies.  Hence, the policy framework of 
the NP project has been enriched by the company policies, which are regarded as the “policy 
response” to the specific government policy gaps in the IR projects (for a similar argument see 
Cernea 1996, 2008) (Appendix 6 - List of NPM additional policies). 
Informally, NPM intensive role in consultation and participation of stakeholders in combination 
with the unique role in relieving government of budget deficits have changed its position from a 
supporting to the key player in the process of land conversion and in policy implementation. This 
role was recognized as “socialization” of public service in Vietnam (CIEM 2006) and functioned to 
develop corporate philanthropy and tackle various social exclusion issues (see Warhurst 2005). 
Public and media acknowledgement  
Suchman (1995: 574) has emphasized the important role of social audience to accept or 
recognize the desire and appropriateness of a given collaboration. Media acknowledgement is 
considered as a powerful output legitimacy element (Klijn et al. 2012) in a sense that it 
represents public awareness and attitude over the role and contribution of the private actor in 
land conversion (5.3.2.3).  
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By observing various articles and television reports120, we have found a change in the 
perceptions about the company in the media. For instance, in the past few years, due to several 
ownership changes, the project was viewed as a product for sale, meaning that the investor was 
perceived as not being fully committed to compensation and resettlement activities. For 
instance, a national-wide newspaper raised their skepticism by saying that “The great 
expectations of Thai Nguyen province on the effectiveness of the largest foreign investor121 in 
Vietnam in the mining sector is gradually becoming an illusion122” in their published issue in 
2009. However, the same newspaper has acknowledged the progress and achievements of the 
project and with compliments in the later stage: 
 “Compared to other land conversion projects in Thai Nguyen Province, NP has the best 
compensation policies and entitlements. Up to 90 percent of the PAPs in Cat ne supported the 
project by receiving compensation payments. The PAPs said that they have never dreamed about 
such a big amount of money in their life... Indeed, the land compensation prices applied in this 
project appeared to be higher than the market price for the agricultural land at the time of being 
acquired...” 123 
Similar changes in perceptions were found in the interviews with the local people. Various 
interviewees, especially the PAPs said that they were concerned about the project being used for 
a commercial transfer between the investors. Our interviews were conducted during the time 
when the third investor began the re-activation of the project (2010). One interviewee who was 
PAP stated:  
“They (the investors) are only interested in the sale of the project, instead of focusing on 
compensation activities. We have been waiting so long, being unstable and cannot concentrate 
on our production. We are not sure whether they will acquire the land as planned or just keep 
pending for a better sale. Particularly, the new investor is a Vietnamese company- we don’t think 
they can carry out this big project while other foreign investors had to withdraw their capital” -
(quote 75). 
The situation seems to have changed since the rapid resettlement and compensation activities 
(Box 38: The results of the NP project through the “Speaking” figures) took place during 2011-
2012. The intensive public dissemination of the project progresses has lead to a decrease of the 
skepticism over the project feasibility.  
The greater media acknowledgement and the decline of public skepticism over the private actor 
stems from the branding activities as mentioned in 5.3.2.3, which have highlighted the 
effectiveness of the company activities and the positive results of the socially responsible 
programs (CSRs). 
                                                          
120
 NPM has a media filling system including recorded DVD of all television news and newspaper articles - Author. 
121
 NPM was a foreign invested company in the first stage of development (2005-2007) - See Table 33: The NP project 
milestones 
122
 Retrieved from http://www.baomoi.com/Thai-Nguyen-Nuiphaovica--Nguy-co-tan-xac-phao/45/3180196.epi in 
September 2009 
123
 Retrieved from http://nongnghiep.vn/nongnghiepvn/72/1/15/117496/Hinh-mau-Nui-Phao-Mining.aspx in 
November 2013 
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Public actor 
In contrast to the private actor’s status as mentioned above, the public actors, entitled with full 
formal authority in land conversion, where only involved to a limited extent in SN2 due to 
certain constraints of production and financial resources (5.2.5.1). In SN1, the results of the 
collaboration building also show limited leadership of the public actors in regards to the planning 
activities as well as the problem solving of difficult cases of displacement.  
Meanwhile, due to an absence of comprehensive branding activities, the public actor appears 
less successful to the outside world, compared to the private actor in terms of public and media 
acknowledgement in SN1. 
Degree of involvement 
The practice of collaboration building in the NP project shows that the degree of the public 
actors’ involvement in SN2 was limited compared to their formal position in the policy 
framework. This practice illustrates a paradox of policy and implementation practice in land 
conversion in Vietnam. Despite the availability of a domestic policy and legal framework aimed 
at protecting the rights and livelihoods of the PAPs, there seems to be an absence of the 
institutional capacity needed to realize the implementation of SN2 (for similar argument, see 
Hung Vo 2009).  
However, in the later stage of the land conversion, the legitimacy of the public actors increased 
as a result of their increased participation in SN2. Indeed, the government became gradually 
engaged in the project activities with more resources such as the national program for 
vocational training for farmers (program 1956), the provincial-level program for agricultural and 
economic development, and the micro-finance programs of the Policy Bank etc…  In addition, 
the public actors succeeded in enhancing their credibility in the context of conflict boom by a 
timely establishment of the task force group for complaint resolution and a strong political will 
to resolve conflicts and complaints in the project (Box 30: The reaction of the local authorities to 
the conflicts in the NP project, in 5.3.2.3). Indeed, the credibility of local government stems from 
their effort to maintain social security, justice and compliance in the localities (see also Bruijn & 
Ringeling in Kickert et al. 1997: 154-5). Arguably, the credibility should be viewed as an attribute 
of output legitimacy in the sense it resulted from the effectiveness of the public actor 
performance in a particular circumstance such as conflict resolution in the NP project (see ibid.). 
Public and media acknowledgement  
Observation shows that the role of the public actors in the project is weakened in the eyes of the 
public when compared to NPM. Very few (or almost none) of the interviewees (PAPs or local 
people) admitted that the local government or district authorities were involved in 
implementing the economic restoration programs. Instead, from the stakeholders’ point of view, 
the process is strongly driven by NPM. It is observed that most of PAPs come to NPM for their 
enquiries, especially with regards to income generation concerns rather than to the local 
authority headquarters. We observed a higher number of visitors to the NPM information 
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centers allocated at the NPM site for job and recruitment purposes than to the ones placed in 
the headquarters of the district or the communes. 
“We often go to the NPM information centre - which is located in the company’s headquarters to 
seek for information about job opportunities and the necessary information about economic 
restoration. The communal people committee has nothing to do with this and is not the place 
where we can find similar information”- said by a PAP - (quote 76). 
To some extent, our review of the content of media publications124 confirms our findings that 
that the land conversion process in the NP project is increasingly perceived as the NPM activity 
rather than the compensation, support and resettlement project carried out by the province and 
the district. 
Nevertheless, we also found that some national-wide newspapers125 could not deny the 
important and irreplaceable role of the public actors in the NP project as repeatedly discussed 
earlier, in terms of policy compliance, conflict resolution and moderation of the relationship 
between the land developer and the PAPs.  
Network level  
At network level, legitimacy can be examined by looking at the extent to which the given 
network is recognized as an entity by both insiders and outsiders. In other words, is the 
collaboration between public and private actors perceived as an effective and credible network 
by both the insiders and the outsiders (Human & Provan 2000: 328). 
Various factors can be used to examine output legitimacy at network level (Voets et al. 2008; 
Human & Provan 2000), such as the recognition of the network as “an entity”, the degree of 
trust and free communication among members and the capability to attract internal and 
external resources. Those factors are interrelated and mutually sequenced in our analysis. 
Recognition of the network as an entity by both insiders and outsiders 
We need to examine whether the PPP in the NP project is recognized as a governance network 
in terms of membership. The answer is already available in this research, where the PPP 
approach has been largely recognized by the involved actors as an “indispensible” mode of 
governance with a high expectation of problem solving capacity of the partnership. Although PPP 
in the NP project was not sufficiently recognized by the legal assignments, it was strongly 
mandated by administrative procedures for SN1. In addition, SN2 entirely produced more formal 
agreements for the collaboration during the course of interactions, enabling a greater 
engagement between public and private.  
                                                          
124
 See Appendix 8: The issues dated on 1 April 2012, 17 & 28 April 2012 of Thai Nguyen Newspapers; the issue dated 
on 22 April 2012 of the Viet Nam News. 
125
 See Appendix 8: The issue dated on 29 April 2012 of Law and Life Newspapers, the issue dated on 20 May 2012 of 
Thai Nguyen TV. 
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The sense of being in the same network is often reflected in the statements of “common 
success”, “common efforts”, and “common objectives” etc. given by both the public and private 
actors. However, the sense of being in the same network is perceived differently from formal 
membership. 
At the district, provincial and national levels, the NP project is viewed as a socio-economic 
development project, which is essentially important in terms of local budget generation and job 
& income creation as well as indirect contribution to the industrialization process in the province 
(see more 5.2.7). In other words, the collaboration between public and private actors in the NP 
project is often seen as a joint project for the common goods or a collaboration project in the 
eyes of the political and authoritative actors and other societal actors. 
“The reason that we can co-operate very well is that we understand each other. Our active 
participation is not really based on the company’s requests... we are engaged because we are in 
the same sailing boat...where the destination would open a prospective future to all” -firmly said 
by the District Communist Party leader - (quote 77). 
“The completion of land conversion in the NP project resulted from the continuous effort and 
cooperation between local authorities at all levels and the investors as well as the support of the 
PAPs and PACs (...)”- a CPC leader - (quote 78). 
In contrast, at lower levels, the partnership was unclearly recognized since the company was 
perceived as the land developer - for profit investor, who is distinct from the public actors who 
were simply seen as the public service providers. Arguably, the lower level of authorities, 
especially at communal level seems to suffer a great deal of the adverse impacts of the NP land 
conversion project on the one hand; and they are unlikely in the position to care much about the 
benefit of the project in a broader sense such as the contribution to the provincial budget or the 
general economic development in the areas. As a result, we sometimes noted similar statements 
such as:  
“This project belongs to the company... the benefit from the project comes to their pocket... it is 
not a state-owned project. The district and the province only assist the company to acquire the 
land...” - as stated by a PAP - (quote 79). 
“We have spent too much time and efforts for the land conversion activities for the company... 
The project can bring some benefit... but the company benefit most,  so that we should be paid 
for the extra working days we worked for the project”- said by communal cadastral officer - 
(quote 80). 
The degree of trust and frequency of mutual communication  
Mutual communication between actors in SN1 was highly intensive through regular meetings, 
joint-activities and daily official information exchanges alongside the legal and administrative 
procedures (5.3.2.4). On the other hand, trust has been generated through long-term 
relationships and risk sharing and aggregated through broadly informal correspondences, which 
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formed the core of the relationship and engaged the actors to work towards the most difficult 
tasks during collaboration. 
“I think that the collaboration between the authorities at all levels and the investor was quite 
successful in the NP project. We have been working together for a long time and the project has 
been at the heart of our political responsibilities (...). The positive results of the project mark the 
common efforts between the authorities and the company over the last few years”- said by the 
district leader - (quote 81). 
In turn, a C&R senior of NPM shared her opinion about the relationship with the public 
counterparts as follows: 
“... We need the support of the authorities... and we have tried our best to build up a good 
relationship over the last years... Thus, we have doubt about their dedication to assist the 
company as much as they can... Because we understand the difficult position of the local 
authorities in this project, so we cannot expect their full support to our decisions in some cases...” 
- (quote 82). 
Our finding about the development of trust- based interactions and communication in PPP in the 
NP project are supported by the recent study on the inter-organizational relationship in Vietnam 
by Edwards and Phan (2013). The study clearly indicated that connections and relationships are 
very important in achieving mutual agreements. Especially in the cases of private companies, 
good relations with government bodies were certainly useful. In this view, NPM tends to 
generate frequent interactions, incentive schemes and various corporate social responsibility 
activities, being viewed by Mörth and Spekman (1994 in Ysa 2007: 39) to be essential for the 
trust-based relationship.  
“Among the ongoing projects in the area, Nui Phao Mining is one of the projects providing the 
best practice in resettlement, relocation and social security for the PAPs and PACs. The relocation 
sites invested by the company have become the show case of the standard relocation sites in the 
province. We, thus believe that the company is committed and will continue to be responsible to 
the PAPs and PACs” - (statement by the Chairman of TN PPC in his visit to the NP project126). 
Ability to attract internal and external support 
In the NP project, we found that the higher degree of participation and commitment to joint 
actions results in to co-production/ co-creation of solutions during the course of 
implementation.  
With regards to SN1, the most committed behavior took place during the conflict boom, when 
both actors mobilized their best resources for problem solving (see more section 5.3.2.3). In 
addition, the public actor was creative to give more space for negotiation between private actors 
and the PAPs by not using the veto power to stop the negotiation as it was not allowed by law as 
                                                          
126
 Retrieved from http://baotintuc.vn/doanh-nghiep/nuiphao-mining-neu-cao-trach-nhiem-cong-dong-
20131231172410846.htm on 25th December 2013 
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demonstrated in Box 33 (Tension between NPM and government authorities’ forcing actions) in 
5.3.2.5. 
In SN2, the public actors become more interested in the collaboration and increased their 
participation, providing more expertise and finance through relevant government programs. For 
examples, a number of joint activities took place in the latter stage of land conversion such as 
the program for vocational training for the mining workers-who were PAPs of the TN DOLISA; 
the additional provincial funding for the district in order to corporate with NPM to train new 
skills for the PAPs; and the cooperation with the provincial bank for social policies for micro 
finance programs to generate economic restoration activities for the PAPs and PACs.  
Besides, the participatory approach for economic restoration and sustainable development 
resulted in more partnerships with various external actors such as the Taiwanese mushroom 
investor and the TNG garment factory. To be specific, the Taiwanese mushroom plantation 
workshop allocated their business in Dai Tu under the call of the Thai Nguyen PPC for economic 
restoration for the PAPs of the NP project as well as for general economic development of the 
Dai Tu district. The ground clearance and infrastructure for the workshop were developed by 
NPM. The new garment factory, promising a thousand of worker positions, has been allocated in 
the project areas by the call of the project in combination with the favourable investment 
procedures offered by the TN PPC. 
Community level  
Output legitimacy at community level can be approached by looking at the way collaboration 
building process impacted upon participation of the community, or in other words, the real 
impacts of participation (McQuaid 2000) (see more 2.4.2). Legitimacy at community level was 
generated by adaptation of the consultation, negotiation and participation principles in favour of 
the interest of the PAPs and PACs as described in 5.3.2.3. 
It is necessary to look at the democratic environment in Vietnam in terms of participation in 
planning, where public participation in planning is perceived  as unnecessary and time- 
consuming (Bach in Beresford & Tran 2004: 247). Particularly, at the governmental policy making 
level, there is little room for involvement of the public in providing inputs as well as scrutinizing 
and affecting governmental decision making (Bach in Beresford and Tran 2004: 247)... 
Particularly, the “compulsory” mechanism in land conversion has undermined the core nature of 
legitimacy from a legal perspective since the voices of the grassroots stakeholders were not 
heard at the higher policy making level (see more 1.5). 
However, the study at implementation level of the compulsory land conversion policies in the NP 
project indicates that certain degrees of participation have been generated during the course of 
collaboration building. 
First, the PAPs and PACs were defined to be key stakeholders in PPP (5.2.4). Box 48 below 
explains that several opportunities were given to the key stakeholders to participate and 
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contribute to planning and decision making during different phases of land conversion (see more 
Appendix 4: List of community meetings, Box 35: Deliberate planning for RAP preparation in the 
NP project (SN1) and Box 36: Deliberate planning of CDP preparation in the NP project (SN2)). 
Box 48: Participation and consultation for relocation site in the NP project 
Two rounds of consultation for relocation site development were carried out by NUIPHAOVICA
127
 in the period from 
June 2004 to April 2005. The first round was from June to October, 2005 for the Interim RAP and the second round 
was from November, 2004 to April, 2005 for the Final RAP. Consultation was conducted using various means, 
meetings, questionnaires, direct interviews and group discussions. Approximately 60 representatives of the affected 
villages were also taken to the proposed relocation sites. Participation involved more than 1,000 PAPs in all affected 
villages.  
In the meetings, NUIPHAOVICA (the former name of Nui Phao Mining) clearly informed local authorities, PAPs and 
other key stakeholders about the characteristics of the proposed sites, physical and social services that would be 
developed at each site, principles of compensation, plot allocation and procedures for movement to the site as well as 
the purpose of consultation and participation for resettlement planning and implementation.  
(RAP 2005 and the revised versions: Methodology chapter and observation of the collaboration meetings) 
Second, considering that output legitimacy in participation is achieved when the participation 
has a real impact (Bexell & Mörth, 2010 and McQuaid 2000), it is interesting to observe that new 
or additional formal rights and benefits for the PAPs and PACs were developed gradually, 
evolving from participation and consultation in the preparation phase; the implementation 
phase, as well as during conflict resolution.  
Indeed, various additional policies and entitlements were developed based on the consultation 
results of the PAPs during the preparation process as stated in Box 48. For instance, the place 
and scope of the relocation site, the selected economic restoration models such as the 
porcupine rising and cow rising were actually recommended by the PAPs and PACs. 
Subsequently, the NPM priority recruitment policies, compensation bonus schemes as well as 
various initiatives for social security for the PAPs and PACs were developed to resolve the 
constraints based on a win-win situation during implementation. For instance, a new provincial 
decision was developed on the basis of the accumulated complaints and requests from the PAPs 
and PAPs. Under our investigation, this decision, issued in response to the gap in the 
government policies however, was implemented by using NPM’s own budget. As illustrated in 
Figure 24: (Complaint resolution status from the October, November and December 2011), in 
5.4.1.1, 194 complaint cases among 206 unresolved cases have been completely resolved thanks 
to the implementation of the new decision128.  
The issuance of the new policies and entitlements in favor of the interests of the community 
people stems from the fact that the inputs from the participation of PAPs has been taken into 
account in formal decision making, or in other words - the voices of the PAPs and PACs were 
heard by the decision makers.  
                                                          
127
 NUIPHAOVICA was the former name of Nui Phao Mining (NPM) company - Author 
128
 See Appendix 6: NPM additional policies: Decision No.107 
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Interim conclusion  
Our findings show that the participation and consultation has created a real impact on the 
benefit of the PAPs and PACs in the NP project. Therefore, it is believed that the PAPs and local 
authorities’ confidence in the existing participation and consultation systems of the project had 
increased. In particular, the participation and consultation took place through the project 
development, encompassing the preparation phase and implementation phase as well as served 
as key approach for problem solving. Given that participation and consultation proved to be 
effective for safeguarding the interest of the key stakeholders, the method of participation such 
as face to face negotiation and win-win situation has modified the compulsory land 
conversion mechanism closer to the voluntary (or so called negotiable) mechanism in the NP 
project. Moreover, as argued by Das & Teng (2001, cited in Van Garsse and Verhoest 2007: 
15), trust should be produced through a process of negotiation, encompassing shared 
meaning” and “win-win” situation in combination with the making of commitments, and the 
execution of commitments.  
To conclude, along with what Bexell and Mörth, (2010:16) suggested, we found that the 
practice of negotiation and win-win situation in the NP project, along a market based 
solution, was more conducive to legitimacy building for the community people, than the 
government-based solutions.  
5.4.2.2. Accountability 
One of the most important democratic values is accountability. A precondition for accountability 
is a sufficient degree of transparency and access to information, as well as the availability of 
accountability mechanisms including sanctions of some form (Bexell & Mörth 2010, and Steets 
2005 in Dinh & Eynde 2012).   
In addition, democratic accountability can be approached in two ways: internal and external. 
Internal accountability can be observed at organization and network level, and external 
accountability at community level.  
Organization level 
“Organizational accountability”, regarded as “giving account” refers to the responsibility of a 
member organization to his/ her parent organizations (Bovens 2005). 
Private actor 
Foreign investment firms in Vietnam tend to be well organized, efficient and focused on 
maximizing the returns on the investment they have made129 (Edwards & Phan 2013: 32). Hence, 
NPM is characterized by a strict formal internal accountability mechanism, which includes clear 
performance guidance, incentives and sanctions.  
                                                          
129
 NPM was initially foreign - invested; the later investor is domestic, using the same structure with foreign expertise 
in management and production - Author. 
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Our participant observation shows that, NPM is a business driven, private company, where 
employment is market-based, i.e. competition based. The performance of the employee is 
subject to company formal policies and the benchmark system for evaluation. The company is 
ranked among top 10 with regard to high salaries in Vietnam130, and it also offers social benefits 
to its employees. However, strict company rules apply and a severe sanction mechanism has 
been introduced since the early stage of its establishment. Since 2005, about 10 percent of its 
employees have been dismissed or subjected to disciplinary actions131, mainly arising from 
problems with accountability or violation of company rules. In each department, there is a clear 
job description for each individual, which is regarded as the basis for performance evaluation 
and benchmarking132. Observation shows that the results-oriented performance appeared to be 
the key for evaluation principles in NPM. For instance, during weekly meetings, the head of C&R 
has to report on the progress of land acquisition and to clearly explain why the tasks have not 
been properly performed, then propose solutions as well as to work out an action plan for 
problem solving. 
The accountability mechanism in NPM is influenced by Western management principles 
introduced by expatriates, encompassing a more formal management structure, a stronger focus 
on results, and more decentralization (see Edwards & Phan 2013). 
Public actor 
In contrast to the NPM, there is a lack of accountability mechanism in the public institutions. 
They also have formal job descriptions for their members, but the evaluation system is mainly 
pro-forma (for similar argument, see CIEM 2006 and VDR 2010). In addition, the performance 
evaluation scheme remains unreliable due to too general content which is applicable to the 
whole public administrative system in the country or in the province. The periodical and annual 
activity reports are viewed as self-reports of organizations or individuals. The evaluation reports 
mainly stipulate problems without indicating which individuals or groups are responsible. The 
performance evaluation, however, does not make sense to the majority of individuals and 
groups due to a low level of incentives, which correspond to salaries of low level state officials 
(see VDR 2010 & 2011).  
The measures to supervise, consolidate and maintain accountability of the actors in public 
departments are fairly centralized, meaning that higher levels supervise the lower ones. This is 
typical for the public administrative system in Vietnam, and is called “accountability through 
hierarchy” in which the performance evaluation heavily relies on the internal reporting array 
instead of an independent (external) oversight role (VDR 2010& 2011). 
For public actors, accountability is, therefore limited to strict policy compliance instead of self-
obligation in seeking alternatives for problem solving (5.2.7). This explains why we sometimes 
hear state officials say: “we found what we can do ... and we should do...But a decision from 
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 Interview of NPM HR and General Director held on 19 March 2013 in the NP project. 
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 It was about 20-30 cases on top of 300 employees counted from June 2012 - NPM HR reports. 
132
 There are job descriptions and organizational chart of the community liaison team with job description for each 
position. 
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upper levels is needed ... it may take too long and it may cause unwanted consequences if the 
decision is made too late... but we have no choice... it is not our fault as we have tried our best...” 
- (quote 83). This may explain why the public actors rarely adjusted their performance even 
though they found it to be necessary. 
Network level 
The accountability between the network members in the NP project can be approached by 
looking at the quality of the two-way communication including the openness and responsiveness 
between public and private actors, the supervision institutions, and the sanction mechanisms 
(Bexell and Mörth 2010, Steets 2005 in Dinh & Eynde 2013, and VDR 2010). 
Openness and responsiveness 
The degrees of the openness and the level of responsiveness can be assessed by looking at the 
quality and frequency of the formal and informal two way communications between the public 
and private actors (5.3.2). 
The formal way of information exchange by official letters, meetings and resolutions took place 
every week. The informal way of communication, being the daily conversions and 
correspondences were often used as effective communication means and opinion exchange 
channels. A NPM external relation staff said: “we think it is effective to discuss with local officials 
during a drink or meal, we can become friends and easily share and sympathize with each other. 
Many important venues have taken place and have been solved after-working hours between 
NPM and various levels of state actors” - (quote 84). 
However, the public and private actors were not fully satisfied with the level of responsiveness 
during collaboration. The locals and in particular communal leaders said that they are unsatisfied 
about the long waiting times in regards to payments by NPM for their allowances as well as the 
expenses for the CDP construction and facility support for their time spent working for the 
project. NPM explained the delay of payment to local people by referring to the fact that the 
company has to follow its own financial system for payment on the one hand (Box 16: Tensions 
between NPM and the Hung Son communal authority, in 5.2.2); and that the payment is made 
based on the level of the company’s satisfaction about the performance of the public officials as 
well as the fulfillment of the tasks committed to the public actors, on the other: 
“Sometimes we have to reconsider our transfer of payment for the community support items 
such as the school construction... The reason is that the commune, while pushing us for the 
payment never fulfill their commitments in regards to issuance of administrative warning letters 
to some resisted households. They want us to be responsive but they themselves always delay in 
taking actions”- stated by the C&R leader - (quote 85). 
In addition, NPM told that they were   sometimes frustrated because of the long-lasting process 
of consideration and appraisal of their state counterparts, especially at the district and provincial 
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levels. We found that the high level of pooled interdependences between the public actors has 
influenced the level and quality of responsiveness. As we have discussed in 5.2.5.2, the 
hierarchical dependencies in the decision making of the public system results in long waiting 
times for administrative procedures. This is in particular true in the case of difficult 
problems, where there was often no response from lower levels until the decisions are made 
at higher levels. 
Supervision institutions 
 The failure of the lead organizations, being the provincial and district COBs, discussed in 5.3.2.2, 
resulted in weak supervision by those organizations of the collaboration in the NP project. Little 
evidence was found about the guidance of the provincial or district COBs regarding 
accountability behavior of the member- actors in the NP project. In interviews, some individual 
members of the COBs seem to be somewhat unsatisfied about the effectiveness of the COBs. 
The formal directions of the COBs mainly focused on the problem solving of the specific 
cases of the compulsory land conversion activities instead of the behavior of the public and 
private actors.  
Sanction/incentive mechanisms 
In the NP case we have not yet identified any formal forms of sanctions applicable in the 
collaboration network, except in the “terms and conditions” stipulated in service contracts 
between NPM and the BSCR. However, the violation of those terms and conditions did not lead 
to any sanctions as we have mentioned in Box 15 (The failure of contracting-out between the 
NPM and the district BCSR) in 5.2.2.  
Under our observation, the network oversight mechanism may take place within the public 
administrative system, i.e. at public level. For instance, NPM could report a malfunction of their 
counterparts to higher levels (district or even provincial) authorities who may implicitly or 
explicitly remind their lower levels to take necessary adjustments (the accountability through 
hierarchy as mentioned above).  
In addition, the monopoly function in providing the land conversion service may have 
undermined competitive or accountable behavior of the public agencies (see more in 5.3.2.3). 
Furthermore, we also found that political accountability of public leaders and senior officials also 
influence internal accountability of the network (see more in 5.2.7). The provincial and district 
leaders find themselves to be responsible for enabling the collaboration in the NP project in 
order to achieve the political goals through socio-economic goals. 
Community level 
External accountability is increasingly discussed in Vietnam, in its quest to develop into a modern 
middle income country. People are becoming more demanding, asking for greater transparency 
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(VDR 2010, 2012). In a recent evaluation, Vietnam is claimed to have a weak transparency due to 
the absence of generalized law on access of information (VDR 2012). The so-called Grassroots 
Democracy Decree of 1998 aimed to provide the opportunity to ordinary people to supervise 
and monitor the activities of local authorities, or in other words, to promote the importance of 
publicizing information and including active participation of citizens in decision making, but was 
carried out with limited results (Beresford & Tran 2004: 13 and VDR 2010: 27).  
This lack of transparency potentially results in corruption, especially in the land management 
domain, spatial redefinition of urban zoning, compensation and resettlement activities (VRD 
2012, Fortier 2010: 240, and Beresford & Tran 2004).  
Transparency and the prevention of corruption can be effected through access to information 
and oversight, which we will consecutively discuss (VDR 2010 & 2011).  
Access to information  
In the NP project, the possibility of corruption has been limited thanks to the clear compensation 
payment method in combination with the effective information disclosure activities.  
For example, all the Decisions and Approvals for Compensation, Support and Resettlement 
(DCSR and ACSR) have been publicly disseminated in the local information corners and through 
the loud speakers systems in all the affected communes. Hence, the PAPs have a chance to 
check and compare (between themselves) their compensation packages including the rates and 
relevant entitlements. In addition, the compensation payment packages in the NP project are 
transferred directly from the investor’s account to the PAPs’ accounts instead of going through a 
middle body such as the district’s BCSR133. This “direct” mechanism can limit unnecessary 
administrative procedures and possible corruptions. 
Furthermore, in order to understand the level of transparency in regard to the access to 
information, we mainly used the evaluation results of the implementation of the PCDP in the 
NP project.  
Accordingly, three specific aspects of the PCDP are to be analyzed: the information disclosure 
manner (being timely or not timely disclosure, the accurateness of the information content), the 
types of information disclosed as suggested by the VDR 2010; and the institutionalized 
mechanism of information disclosure as suggested by Bexell & Mörth (2010). 
Thus, our observation in combination with an evaluation survey- conducted during the last 
quarter of 2010 among PAPs, was used to understand the above mentioned aspects.  Due 
the low educational level of the PAPs, we were not able to produce complicated 
questionnaires. The indicators in the questionnaire had to be fairly basic and brief to enable 
proper answers from the PAPs. 
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 In most of the compulsory land conversion projects in Vietnam the compensation payment often go through the 
district’s or provincial executive’s bank account, raising a concern about the possible corruption.  
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About 500 questionnaires for PCDP evaluations were distributed; and about 45 percent of the 
forms (equivalent to 230 units) were filled in by the PAPs and communal officials134. Thus Figures 
28 in this section, demonstrate the results of the survey, in regards to the level of sufficiency, the 
quality of the disclosed information and the degree of satisfaction in regard to timely 
information disclosure. The figures generally show positive assessments of the PAPs if compared 
to the results of the national-level survey on the information disclosure about land management 
in Vietnam, which indicated that the information about compensation, support and resettlement 
was found in public space of only 20.5 percent of the total surveyed communes in Vietnam135. 
Figure 28: Survey results on evaluation of PCDP in the NP project 
Your evaluation of the content of 
the project flyer in information 
centre 
Your assessment of the disclosure 
activities 
Timely and not timely information 
   
The information from the Figures 29 below was supplemented by Figure 30 - the types and the 
quantity of information disclosed (by years), providing that a great deal of information needed 
by the PAPs and various types of project-related information were actually disclosed and well 
recorded  in the NP project.  
Figure 29: Information disclosure report by types of information 
 
In addition, the survey results also show the performance of the information channels in the NP 
projects as shown in Figure 30. Indeed, the NP project is quite unique in setting up the project 
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information centers, the information corners in each affected village (with in total 23 units), and 
using the local loud speaker systems for information disclosure to all PAPs and PACs (see the 
pictures in Box 49 in this section). Furthermore, the information about the project progress, 
policy and relevant issues can also be accessed through regular community meetings, 
newspapers and television programs (see Appendix 4: Community meeting; Appendix 5: 
Collaboration meeting and Appendix 8: Media publications).  
Figure 30: The use of information disclosure channels in the NP project 
 
Box 49: The NP information centre and the local information corners of the NP project 
   
 
Oversight 
In Vietnam, the oversight bodies are the organized civil society, the elected bodies (being the 
communal and provincial people’ councils, mass organizations), and the media which play 
different roles in the evolving accountability systems (VND 2010: xii). As mentioned earlier that 
there is too little space for the organized civil society to be involved in forming critiques of 
mainstream development (Bach in Beresford & Tran 2004: 273). Similarly, the Viet Nam 
Development Report (VDR) (2010) presents a weak capability of the existing (elected) oversight 
institutions, such as the People Council at district and provincial levels, the mass organizations, 
as well as other community-based interest groups, in challenging the usual practices of 
government and businesses and suggesting alternatives. According to some authors, the 
technocratic and hierarchical system of government results in low levels of transparency and the 
limited roles of the oversight bodies (Fortier 2010). 
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In the NP project, a similar weakness of the formal oversight bodies was found. Our interviews 
with some members of the District and Provincial People Council reveal that the members do 
not have information to do their jobs, partly because the NP project is a big project, subject to 
direct supervision of the TN PPC, but also because they themselves thought that 
“implementation was quite smooth and successful and hence not problematic.”- stated by a 
member of the district people council - (quote 86). 
On the contrary, we did find evidence of external oversight by other actors at community level in 
the NP project, stemming from the size of the project and the impact of the project on the socio-
economic development in the province. These external supervision actors were the financing 
agencies, the media and the political groups, which significantly influenced the external 
accountability of the company in particular and the collaboration network in general. 
First, the company is being viewed to benefit the most from the land conversion process and, as 
such, is closely overseen by social and financial audits commanded by the foreign and domestic 
financing institutions (commercial banks, investment groups, IFC). Those institutions were most 
interested in the democratic results of the project, such as the degree of transparency, the 
access to information as well as the benefit for the PAPs and PACs in terms of the compensation 
entitlements and the income generation in a sustainable way. Therefore, the social auditing 
reports and sustainable reports are produced annually to reflect the democratic results of 
the project136. 
Second, a pervasive involvement of the public media in the land conversion domain took place in 
recent years (as stated elsewhere). Particularly, the NP project has brought itself into the heart 
of local and national media due to its size, the scope of socio-economic impacts as well as the 
results of the company branding activities (5.3.2.3). The media in Vietnam has benefited from a 
considerable expansion of autonomy over the last decades, gaining more control over their 
finances, structures and activities (VDR 2010). Hence, the media’s increasingly strong oversight 
role can both decrease and increase legitimacy in response to the performance of the NP actors. 
The community liaison staffs have jokingly said to us that the company has become “good food” 
for the public media because they have been chased by the media very often (see Appendix 8: 
List of media publications). 
Third, the NP project is intensively followed up by the provincial and central government. The 
leaders of the province and governments were most interested in the progress of the project, 
the complaint and grievance issues and its impacts on the livelihoods of the local people 
(Appendix 7: List of provincial and governmental level visits to the NP project). The company as 
well as the local authorities is required to submit annual reports to respective government 
ministries and departments, but also to allow regular visits and inspections of mandated groups 
of evaluation teams from the provincial and central governments.  
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 See Documentation for review.  
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Conclusion 
In this study, we addressed both the internal accountability and external accountability of the 
PPP. The internal accountability was analyzed mainly at the organization and network levels. The 
external accountability was analyzed mainly at community level.  
At organization and network levels, the top-down model of administrative control (hierarchy) as 
well as the monopoly position of the public actors in providing public service seem to have had a 
negative influence on the internal accountability in the NP project ( for similar finding , see VDR 
2010: 27). In addition, the weakness of the lead organizations in combination with an absence of 
a sanction mechanism, to some extent influenced the level of responsiveness and democratic 
accountability at network level (see Huxham & Vangen in Osborne 2000: 303). It is important to 
note that the accountability of the public actors seem to have been influenced by the additional 
allowance provided by the private actor. However, it is argued that the additional allowance in 
combination to a long lasting relationship can be utilized by the private actor to influence the 
public actors in a sense that the public actors can compromise for the sake of the private actor’s 
profit rather than devote to public goods (see Forrer et al. 2010). 
At community level, despite an absence of a powerful sanction mechanism or a formal oversight 
body in place, the external accountability in the NP project was properly subjected to public and 
media pressure, the external social auditing, the political supervision of the senior officials, and 
the internal accountability of the private actor. Particularly, there was also a relatively high level of 
transparency in regard to the access to information at community level stemming from the 
effective institutionalized information disclosure channels in the NP project.  
5.4.2.3. Accordance 
Voets et al. (2008) proposed the definition of accordance as “asking and expressing consent for a 
decision or action by the policy network”. He further pointed out that accordance covers at least 
three criteria: issues offered for consent, mechanisms to give consent and the status of consent. 
Discussion about consent seems to be more appropriate at the collective or group level. For 
instance, agreements can be achieved through critical debates, public hearings, lobbying and 
public demonstration (Skelcher 2005: 93).  
Network level 
The findings from the collaboration building process show that most of the decisions are based 
on mutual discussions and agreements between the public and private actors through regular 
meetings and correspondences.  
However, the basis for giving consent is law based, meaning that the agreements or approvals 
should be made in accordance with the regulations and administrative procedures in SN1. 
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According to these regulations and procedures, the public actors possess the veto power in 
making final decisions relating to the government policies and procedures. Innovative ideas are 
sometimes blocked, since the public officials are quite sensitive to any decisions which they 
perceived to be likely unlawful or unclear in the policy guidelines (see more 5.2.7 and 
5.3.2.5). It takes time for the private actor to convince the public actors and this is often 
done through lobbying.  
As discussed earlier, lobbying activities stem from the company’s attempt to convince the local 
government by the effective performance and the contribution of the CSRs (5.4.1). Besides, the 
increased trust, reciprocity and mutual understanding aggregated from the long lasting and 
intensive communications between the actors, has enabled better consent in decision making 
and taken away certain policy concerns. For example, the additional compensation policies and 
the advance payment mechanism were characterized by the TN PPC as “exceptional” in the 
provincial policy making; or the encouragement of the negotiation between the company and 
the PAPs (see Box 33: Tension between NPM and government authorities’ forcing actions, in 
5.3.2.5). 
In SN2, giving consent was not restricted by laws or regulations. The participant actors are 
encouraged to give consent in planning and implementation processes (Box 35: Deliberate 
planning for RAP preparation in the NP project (SN1) and Box 36: Deliberate planning of CDP 
preparation in the NP project (SN2), in 5.3.2.6). However, NPM performed as the decision maker 
to the CDP and economic restoration programs because majority of the expenses of these 
programs budget was subsidized by the private actor (Box 34: Evidence of cross- support of SN2 
for SN1 in the NP project, in 5.3.2.5). 
In general, giving consent at network level in the NP project has moved beyond the hierarchical 
and administrative order as often seen in the compulsory land conversion projects. This is 
resulted from the joint-planning and decision-making process, largely implemented in both SN1 
and SN2 of the NP project.  
It is argued that consent in compulsory land compensation may remain an empty concept, 
particularly due to coercive actions by the authorities.  
In fact, consent in forcing actions is hardly possible to achieve in later stages of the land 
conversion process. It is too risky for public actors to allow using military or police to remove the 
resisted PAPs. Consequently, in some of the project areas, the project development activities 
have been blocked for years due to a small group of resisting PAHs, without any feasible 
solutions agreed between NPM and the public actors (see Box 9: The status of conflict in the NP 
project, in 4.2.6.1). 
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Community level 
Consent is more important at community level, especially for PAPs and PACs to voice their 
opinion and improve their benefits from the project. In Vietnam, consent is linked to the formal 
accountability mechanism (for similar suggestion, see Skelcher 2005), being the National 
Assembly, the provincial and communal people’ councils. In principle, the new or revised 
government policies and regulations should go through those agencies for discussion and 
approval prior to official issuance. As we have already discussed, those formal accountability 
mechanisms proved to be ineffective, especially at local (district and communal) level (VDR 
2010). However, this seems not to be the case of the NP project because public hearings and 
debates were often conducted during the implementation of PCPP, by means of regular 
consultation and participation, and the complaint mechanism. Sometimes, public 
demonstrations or individual reactions and violence were used by PAPs as a kind of “veto 
power” in decision making (4.2.7).  
Giving consent through regular consultation and participation as well as public hearings 
The participatory approach in the NP project offered some space for public hearings in the form 
of regular community meetings, consultation and surveys, social auditing and the operation of 
the complaint mechanism (5.3.2.3).  
First, a consistent mechanism of feedback from the PAPs and PACs is drawn from the frequent 
meetings under the problem-focused agendas, the information centers and the local information 
network members.  
In Appendix 4 (List of community meetings), we can see a summary of community meetings for a 
period of time, where the points of view of the participants can be aggregated. The majority of 
the concerns related to administrative procedures, calculation methods or revision of 
entitlements were resolved through discussions and negotiations between the PAPs and the 
executive team. However, there is a great deal of unsolved problems in regards to the 
government compensation prices and the demands which go beyond the policy framework.  
For SN2, the feedbacks from PAPs and PACs provided important inputs for program planning and 
organizing. A senior community liaison officer said that they had to organize community 
meetings in order to gather opinions from relevant stakeholders for their economic restoration 
program preparation, implementation and evaluation. In fact, an economic restoration program 
would not be organized if the stakeholders did not agree to participate.  
Giving consent through public demonstration, resistance and violence 
The practice of compulsory land conversion shows that the PAPs are frequently consulted, but 
the decision making is not based on consensus; instead, it belongs to the local governments, 
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who embody public administrative procedures or the investor, who represents their own 
decision making power on their own policies. Our observation in the NP project shows that PAPs 
requested for a more effective mechanism to address and unlock their most critical concerns - 
the compensation prices and entitlements.  
Thus, during the conflict boom in 2011, a massive number of PAPs turned to re-occupy 
their land, asking for face-to-face dialogues since their concerns were not timely 
addressed (Box 9: The status of conflict in the NP project). The public demonstration 
immediately resulted in the establishment of the task force group for complaint resolution, 
which resolved a great deal of complaints from the PAPs. In the meantime, the existing 
complaint mechanism was consolidated.   
In some other cases, when they found that their critical concerns were not properly resolved by 
the project, PAPs refused consent and resisted land transfer, raising complaints to higher 
responsible agencies (as shown in Box 9: The status of conflict in the NP project) or showing 
uncooperative behavior in complaint resolutions. 
Besides, the PAPs and PACs found the media to be an effective way to exercise some power on 
the company and the authorities. During the period of 2011-2013, about ten articles were 
published on newspapers and TV, which reflected on the problems of land compensation and 
resettlement in the NP project. The information was mainly based on interviews with the 
complainers. Once, the local communities, representing the interest of the communities, pushed 
NPM to fulfill their commitment to finance the communal secondary school, and they critically 
brought the case on local newspapers (see Box 16: Tensions between NPM and the Hung Son 
communal authority in 5.2.2).  
“NPM is a big company, who is concerned about reputation... We should address their non-
commitment to the public so that they can seriously consider their decisions...”- said by Hung Son 
communal leader - (quote 87). 
Giving consent through the complaint mechanism 
Participatory observation in the NP project revealed that the complaint mechanism was an 
important channel for PAPs to voice their opinions and expectations as well as their 
disagreements to the project. Those expectations and demands may lead to more serious 
reactions if not satisfied (see above section). 
It was found that the complaint mechanism was properly applied after the conflict boom (2011) 
and with the function of the task force group for complaint resolution. The results are recorded 
in Figures 24, 25, 26 and 27 in 5.4.1.1. 
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The complaint mechanism was designed to guide the PAPs to obtain appropriate responses to 
their concerns from both the project agencies and the authorities. The mechanism was also 
linked to the Dai Tu DPC and TN PPC and the courts (as described in box 50). 
Box 50: The functioning of the complaint resolution mechanism 
A formal complaint mechanism for resettlement and compensation issues that involves working through the district 
and commune authorities was set up since 2005. 
The first step of the complaint mechanism entails the involvement of the communal people committees (CPCs) which 
receives the complaint and commits itself to resolving it within 15 days. The second step involves Dai Tu district, the 
district BCSR who will reach a decision on the complaint within 15 days. The third step is used when PAPs are still not 
satisfied with the decision at district level, so he/she can appeal to the Provincial People’s Committee (PPC) or the Dai 
Tu District Court within 15 days of receiving the decision from the DDCSRC. The PPC or Dai Tu District Court then 
reaches a decision on the complaint within 15 days.  
The PAPs are exempted from all administrative fees in connection with the above processes, and are entitled to 
recover any legal fees. 
NPM assigns its staff to monitor all steps of complaint settling and always has a member of the complaint settling 
team at the Dai Tu district and commune levels.  
The PAPs can also bring their grievances to the NPM on every working day and they will be assisted in supplying the 
information related to the compensation and resettlement policy. The redress of complaints are closely monitored by 
NPM and an independent monitoring agency. 
(RAP updated 2010 and Observation) 
In the practice of implementation, the mechanism was found to be useful to resolve the ordinary 
complaints relating to corrections of compensation packages based on revision of DMS; or 
additional company assistance payments and recruitment demands. Besides the use of the 
complaint mechanism, about twenty percent (20) of total complaint issue as shown in Figure 25 
(Degree of acceptance to the resolution) viewed as the difficult enquiries were addressed by the 
PAPs by alternative options such as the individual reactions, violence or collective demonstration 
(as stated in the previous section). 
Closer investigation revealed that efforts were made by the company to make the 
complaint mechanism function properly. Indeed, most of the responses for the complaints 
cases were properly prepared by the NPM C&R staff and were revised and distributed by 
the district officials.  
“We understand that the district BCSR should be responsible for replying the complaint issues. 
However, they are so busy with other projects in the district on the one hand… And we should be 
more responsible to the complaints relating to our project, on the other hand. Then we proposed 
a joint plan that we can assist the district so that we can be able to promptly respond to the 
complaint letters” - said by a Community Liaison staff - (quote 88). 
“NPM should be responsible to resolve our complaints. They are the one who acquire our land… 
The district and province just assist them with the procedures… Our complaints about 
compensation and resettlement should be addressed to them properly…” - cited from the 
community meeting for complaint resolution - (quote 89). 
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Conclusion 
The most striking findings emerged from our analysis on the accordance dimension of the 
democratic results in NP the project. First, it appears that the effective means to reach consent 
in the most critical concerns of the PAPs and PACs are public demonstrations and media 
pressure instead of the formal mechanisms. Indeed, informal channels-demonstration, 
resistance and (verbal) complaints which critically manifested veto power of the PAPs in 
compulsory land conversion proved to be more effective in enabling open dialogues for the 
benefit negotiation an consolidates the existing mechanism. This argument is valid in the context 
of involuntary resentment projects, where PAPs are forced to resettle under the terms and 
conditions set forth by the government.   
Second, the status of consent is essentially important for democratic accountability in 
compulsory land conversion projects. It means that the most critical concerns of PAPs should be 
addressed and responded to during participation and consultation. To be more specific, the 
practice of the NP project shows that professional and dedicated participatory channels are not 
always effective to resolve the root-cause problems between PAPs and the government, such as 
the compulsory nature of the project and the imposed compensation prices. In other words, the 
well organized and diverse forms of giving consent (public hearings, complaint mechanisms) are 
less important than the way consent is treated. This means that consent should be interpreted 
as veto power in decision making in order to safeguard the interest of the PAPs and PACs in 
compulsory land conversion.  
Conclusion about the democratic results in the NP project 
This section seems not provide a clear scheme for assessing partnerships’ democratic qualities 
since the three dimensions of legitimacy, accountability and accordance overlap to some extent, 
by virtue of using similar democratic variables such as public participation, information 
disclosure, two way communications and media acknowledgement.  
At organization level, the degrees of democratic results between the public and private actors 
differ in a sense that the administrative - based regulations might not be as effective as the 
market-based ones.  
At network level, the democratic results of collaboration were restricted by the bureaucracy and 
limited institutional design for oversight and sanction mechanisms for the network members. 
Most problem solving outcomes in the network mainly resulted from the mutual 
communications, trust and added-value activities.  
At community level, various efforts have been taken by the project to enable public participation 
and consultation, such as information disclosure for PAPs and responsive behaviour of the 
executive agencies. As a result, some degree of legitimacy, transparency, and accountability 
viewed as necessary attributes of trust building has been relatively evidenced in the studied 
case. However, the dilemma of the legitimacy input- such as the compulsory nature in the NP 
project suggests a doubt as to which extent the democratic values actually exist in the 
280 
 
compulsory land conversion, being viewed as “an almost loss of control over choice and 
resources” (De Wet 2001: 4639, Wicklin III: 1999, and Oliver Smith 1991:135). It seems that the 
PPP results seemed not resolve the root-cause problems of compulsory land conversion in the 
NP project. As a result, public pressure including media reporting, auditing, and (sometimes) 
political pressure became the main drivers for the actors to be held accountable.   
It is argued that, despite the positive democratic results as mentioned above, trust between the 
PPP actors and the PAPs & PACs were not apparent outputs of the NP project. We will further 
discuss this finding in the next section. 
5.4.3. Regime results 
Regime performance is understood as the way a policy network becomes more robust and 
resilient and how it becomes a part of governance (Voets et al. 2008). The way to understand 
the robustness and resilience of the network is to explore whether the network is continued, 
modified or terminated (Bryson et al. 2006).  
In this research, the evaluation of regime performance is extremely important because PPP is 
viewed to be a new form of governance in involuntary land conversion in Vietnam (Hung Vo 
2009).  
The robustness and resilience of the network can be understood through the status of the 
membership, including capacity building, network institutionalization and quality of relationship 
as suggested in 2.4.3. 
5.4.3.1. Membership 
Membership implies to a number of members in a network, their commitment, behavior and 
contribution to the network (Provan & Milward 2001, Boyne 2002 and Voets et al. 2008).  
The study of membership in the NP project resulted in two important findings:  the vulnerability 
of the membership, and the dynamics of the positions of the actors in the network settings. 
These findings are related to the characteristics of a network regime, which allows the 
partnerships to constantly restructure and revise their membership (Jacobs in Osborne 2000: 
221). 
First, there was an element of vulnerability regarding the number of members, which was 
unstable, and the degree of their involvement in the policy implementation. In fact, there was a 
“lack of clarity about who the members are” (see also Huxham & Vangen in Osborne 2000: 300). 
For instance, organizations such as mass organizations, the DOLISA, the COBs, and the district 
BCSR were assigned to be in charge of certain tasks in the institutional arrangements, which 
however lacked strict obligations and clear mandates (5.2.1 & 5.2.2). As a result, some of the 
public actors partly (or fully) left their active roles during policy implementation (especially 
in SN2). 
 
 
281 
 
Second, the practice of PPP in the NP project has portrayed two contradictory trends with regard 
to the changes of the nature of membership. On the one hand, there is the formalization of the 
private actor’s role and position in all activities. On the other hand, we see the de-formalization 
of public actor roles and positions in some specific activities such as economic restoration, social 
safeguards, public consultation and disclosure activities. We argue that the regime of the PPP 
network in the NP project became more and more dependent on the private actor and its 
resources. In other words, the capability to attract and retain members of PPP in the NP project 
seemed to be determined by the private actor’s resources and strategies (see 5.2.2 & 5.2.4). 
Similarly, various studies also emphasize potential governance contributions from private actors 
that might compensate for the decreasing capacities of national governments for providing 
public goods (see Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002 for this argument). 
The private actor has also attracted more “secondary” or informal members in the collaboration 
network, such as consultation companies and other economic restoration partners, which 
ultimately contributed towards the expertise and knowledge in the land conversion process. 
Meanwhile, SN2 tends to attract more public actors, who used to be less dedicated (unwilling to 
participate) to actively participate in the PPP. 
Besides, a network is seen as capacity building or as a learning process, in which resilience and 
robustness are aggregated through the improvement and consolidation of capacity and 
resources of the participant members (Voets et al. 2006, Elsig & Amalric 2008).  
The capacity building of the public actors in the NP project concerns the changes in perceptions 
over land conversion, better collaboration experience, equipment and facility improvement, 
while for private actors it is more related to the experience and expertise in the network.  
In general, the NP project is considered to be the biggest land conversion project in the Thai 
Nguyen province. For both the investor and the local government, this is the first time they have 
to “work together” in such a big project. In particular, the local authorities benefit with better 
facilities and equipment for their workplaces on the one hand (see Box 19: Resources of NPM for 
land conversion activities in 5.2.5.1). On the other hand, the state officers, especially at the 
lower level have learned a lot from cooperation with NPM leaders and staff. According to a 
communal officer, NPM staffs are professional, responsive and dedicated to the affected 
communities. Hence, experience of the collaboration actually helped the state officers enhance 
their knowledge in the management and execution in a professional manner (see Box 51 in the 
following section).  
For NPM, experience gained through “earning by doing” allows them to work with 
more confidence.  
 “I have tens of years of experience in the supervision of development and urbanization projects 
for the World Bank, particularly in the field of involuntary resettlement. However, this has been 
much different from my past experience as a WB expert and when I started to work for the NP 
project as a practitioner in a specific implementation process. This period has, to some extent, 
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changed my own vision about IR, and enriched my awareness about the gap between the policy 
and practice. Indeed, the practice of compulsory land conversions as I witnessed in the NP 
project, characterized with high density and variety of participants; and the interactions between 
them were highly complicated. In particularly, what I have learnt in resettlement projects is that 
the investor must be strong in financial resources as well as be able to strategically use the 
resources to enable the local governments to get involved and to support your project…Besides, 
thanks to the intensive cooperation with the government organizations, our team is now better 
aware of government policies, rules and norms in carrying out land conversion in the local 
conditions. Now we can say that we will be much more confident to carry out our forthcoming 
resettlement project in the neighboring communes137” - (quote 90)- said by a senior director of 
NPM, who is in charge of C&R in the NP project. 
5.4.3.2. Institutionalization 
The institutionalization of PPP under regime perspective concerns the endurance of the network 
or its capacity to develop as a proper organization or, in other words the capacity to produce a 
replica model of the collaboration (Voet et al. 2008 and Bryson et al. 2006).  
In Vietnam, only PPP in the infrastructural development has been institutionalized by 
government policies, criteria and norms for proper operations (see 1.5.6). The problem of a 
more formal institutionalization of the PPP in the NP project is the existence of “different 
collaboration configurations in flux” (the term used by Jacobs in Osborne 2000: 221), which are 
the procedural formal collaboration setting in SN1, a highly institutionalized form of the task 
force group for complaint resolution, and the informal network setting in SN2. In addition, the 
short-term nature of the displacement compensation procedures, which is considered to be a 
transitional stage for mining operations, seems to constrain the process of institutionalization of 
the network.   
In regards to a replica model of collaboration, the practice in the NP project has encouraged the 
provincial government to adapt the collaborative approach to cope with the challenges in 
compulsory land conversion (Box 51 in this section). One senior official from DoF said that the 
practice of NPM has ultimately contributed to policy adjustments in terms of land conversion 
procedures and safeguards policies (which are in favor of PAPs and PACs) as well as to the 
executive agencies. For instance, the main provisions of the first provincial policy framework in 
regards to compulsory land conversion, namely the Decision No 2044/UBND-2007) as well as 
more recent policies (…) have been composed by taking the strong points of RAP of the NP 
project (2005). We can also observe the effect of the PPP model in the NP project at the higher 
level - the policy making level. Indeed, a former leader of the Dai Tu district who was elected a 
member of the National Assembly raised the issue that job creation and economic 
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 NPM is going to acquire about 500 hectares of land for another mining operation in the neighboring communes. 
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restoration for the PAPs by stating that these items should be more clearly stated in the 
revised Land Laws138. 
Box 51: Impacts of PPP to the expertise and experience of state officials 
One of the leaders of DONRE considered the land conversion in the NP project to be a good model of PPP in land 
conversion. He emphasized that the project considerably influenced the thinking of the provincial policy makers. For 
instance the Decision 535/ UBND-2011 used for further guidance in the NP land conversion implementation has 
provided important references for other land conversion projects in the province. 
Although the involvement of investors has been mentioned in the policy framework, including the guidance for 
implementation arrangement, the case of the NP project suggested an even greater degree of involvement of 
investors in forms of corporate social responsibility, accountability to PAPs and PACs.  
Thus, many state officials affirmed that apart from a more appropriate land conversion mechanism of the 
government, the strong financial resources of the NP investor have played a decisive role in the project 
implementation. One of the key lessons learnt from the NP project is that it is necessary to involve more in-kind 
contributions from investors- who are viewed to benefit the most from the land conversion process. Such 
contributions must be formed as a partnership with the local government. Particularly, a combination between 
investors’ policies and provincial policies needs to be emphasized. This explained about the increased participation 
of various public agencies taking place during the implementation process of the NP project. 
(Interviews of state officials during the collaboration meeting held on 25 June 2012 in the Thai Nguyen province
139
) 
To conclude, the close collaboration between NPM and the public actors can be regarded as 
informally institutionalized. First, replica models have been introduced in other land conversion 
projects in the Thai Nguyen province (as mentioned above). Second, similar PPP will be 
employed for the second mining project which is financed by the same investor (Masan Group). 
Third, the public and private actors understand each other during the course of interactions and 
the norms of mutual interactions have been formulated and consolidated periodically. Forth, 
despite the short-term nature of land conversion, the commitment of NPM in long-term 
economic restoration and sustainable development denotes the probable endurance of the PPP 
in the NP project. 
5.4.3.3.  Quality of relationship 
In this research, the quality of relationship is explored through discussions on trust building 
among the actors in the NP project. As stated in 5.4.2.1, trust between public and private actors 
in the NP project has been clearly evidenced in our evaluation legitimacy at network level 
(5.4.2.1). Thus, this section focuses on the results of trust building at community level, from 
which the quality of the relationship between the project (public and private) executive agencies 
and the PAPs and PACs can be inferred.  
As stated in 5.3.2.4, the PPP actors in the NP project have attempted to build trust through 
various activities such as information and knowledge sharing (i); competency demonstration (ii) 
and; good intention (iii). Our findings demonstrate that the impacts of those activities on trust 
between the PAPs and PACs are complex. 
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 See introduction chapter - the revision of Land Laws is carried out in 2013 by the National Assembly. 
139
 See Appendix 5: Collaboration meetings. 
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Evidence shows that trust building between the PAPs and PACs was constrained by different 
factors. First, there was skepticism about the “good intentions” of the investor as well as the 
nature of the added value activities which were found to be purposely disrupted and business-
driven. Second, we see the biases towards the mode of compulsory land conversion and the 
nature of the mining project, where the interests of the company and of the PAPs and PACs were 
found to be in conflict. The content of group discussions and interviews of PAPs in regards to 
their thoughts about NPM contribution to the livelihood rehabilitation demonstrated skepticism 
about the motivation of the NPM philanthropic activities. Moreover, some PAPs found that the 
efforts of the company in regards to their support and job creation should be seen as the 
company’s responsibility rather than philanthropic and charity contribution:  
“NPM said a lot in public about their contributions to the PAPs and the PACs in terms of 
infrastructure improvement and job creation… According to our point of view, it is not their 
philanthropy or charity… Instead, it is their obligation because they have taken our land cheaply 
and have made big profits from our land…” - (quote 91). 
Third, the non-compliance of commitments during the project implementation negatively 
influenced the credibility of the donor and gave rise to conflicts between the donor and the 
beneficiary (Box 16: Tensions between NPM and the Hung Son communal authority). 
As a result, there is little evidence that the PPP results in the NP project have been generated as 
a product of goodwill trust as the term used by Das and Teng (2001 in Van Garsse & 
Verhoest: 2007) in spite of great efforts of enhancing corporate social responsibilities and 
the added value activities.  
An NPM leader admitted a limited acknowledgement of the PAPs and PACs about the “goodwill” 
activities by showing his disappointment as below: 
“[…] the demand of the PAPs is unlimited and sometime unreasonable… we don’t understand 
what they expect from us. They have received a very high compensation payment. They have 
been given jobs and a good relocation site…. While interviewed, they still badly commented on 
the project” - (quote 92). 
It can be argued that there was sufficient evidence to shift our attention to competence-based 
trust, which can be generated in the NP project by positive PPP (production and democratic) 
results as identified in the previous sections.  
Our observation of the effects of production and democratic results in the NP project suggested 
a notion that the PAPs have greatly benefited from the production results of the PPP, in terms of 
provisions of additional policies and entitlements, and the agreements gained during conflict 
resolution (see 5.4.1). Similarly, the democratic results denote that the interests of PAPs and 
PACs are safeguarded through result-oriented participation, accountability, transparency and, 
especially a helpful giving-consent mechanism in the NP project (5.4.2). Hence, these findings 
clearly demonstrate the ability of the PPP to hold the promise of a more effective and legitimate 
governance (Benner et al. 2003 & 2004, Treck 2004 in Bexell and Mörth 2009: 147).  
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In view of non-affected people as well as the authorities, the PAPs have gained a great deal of 
profit from the project. In particular, in comparison to other neighbouring mining companies as 
well as other resettlement projects in the province, the NP project is very generous in regards to 
the benefits it provides to the PAPs: 
“NPM is too rich and can afford to be generous to the PAPs… Many people became rich thanks to 
huge amounts of compensation payments. Before the project, those  people never dreamed of 
such big houses, modern facilities and better living standards as they have now…” - said a non-
PAP - (quote 93). 
“In discussions about positive aspects of the NP project, some points can be acknowledged. To 
some extent, many people wanted to be PAPs… It is true! In this remote and mountainous area, 
they cannot sell their land to anybody even if they want… now they could sell it to the project… 
and such enormous amounts of money have never been owned by the farmers who never 
dreamed about such modern facilities and non-farm jobs as they have now”- said by a leader of a 
neighboring commune (Tien Hoi commune)140 - (quote 94). 
Given that competence trust is based on various resources and capabilities as well as the 
successful goal attainments in the network (Das and Teng 2001 in Van Gestel et al. 2010), some 
degree of competence trust could be generated among the PAPs and PACs. Moreover, as argued 
by Das & Teng (2001), trust should also be produced through a process of negotiation with 
“shared meaning” and “win-win” situations, which were found to be largely employed in the 
NP project.  
However, given that trust is a feature of the network (Van Gestel et al. 2010), the PPP regime in 
the NP project is sustainable owing to a degree of trust generated and sustained by the public 
and private actors during collaboration. 
Conclusion 
The findings about robustness and resilience of the network in the NP project encompass both 
the positive aspects, such as the potential of the network, and the negative aspects such as the 
vulnerability of the network.   
Concerning the positive aspects of the network regime in the NP project, the increased 
legitimacy in combination with the creation of social capital allows the PPP to be sustainable and 
further developed in the compulsory land conversion domain.  
Particularly, we found that the nature of the relationship between NPM and public actors has 
slightly changed from conventional bureaucratic to more market-like, results- oriented output in 
the collaboration. In other words, the actors in the NP project gradually started to employ the 
negotiable mechanism in the voluntary mechanism of land conversion, which is significantly 
more desirable by the PAPs and various societal actors (Hung Vo 2009). The introduction of 
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 Tien Hoi is a non-affected commune 
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incentive schemes, the contracting out and win-win agreements for infrastructure support 
denotes the “entrepreneurial” spirit in public-private relationships.  
Concerning the negative impact of the network regime in the NP project, we need to emphasize 
the importance of financial capability of private actors. We found that the financial capability of 
the private actor proved to be unstable and highly vulnerable under the impact of the financial 
crisis or the increase of investment costs. Meanwhile, the vulnerability of membership (including 
of public members) may influence the capability to sustain the network, especially in SN2.  
All findings shown in this section claim that there is still an absence of a strong PPP regime due 
to a lack of necessary rules, norms and decision making procedures in land conversion in 
Vietnam. In the process of informal institutionalization, the proliferation of the NPM 
involvement in the project activities to some extent, has undermined the roles of the public 
actors, constrained their dynamics and functions. Indeed, in many cases public actors tend to 
rely on the private actor’s resources and, in the process, become less accountable.  
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents a discussion of our research process and findings. In this chapter, we 
reflect on the methodology, theories and concepts developed during our research as well as on 
the relevant implications that these findings have for further research and policy making.  
6.1. Revisiting the research background and questions 
Before formulating the main conclusions of the study, it is useful to revisit the background of this 
research, including the research questions. 
The point of departure for this study derives from some of the most critical development 
problems in transitional economies, such as the one in Vietnam: involuntary resettlement and 
social conflict. Inspired by the increased role of the private actor in sustainable development, 
especially in the pervasive forms of PPP and CSR, this research focuses on the exploration of the 
PPP function in the field of compulsory land conversion in Vietnam and its possible contributions 
to conflict resolution. 
In particular, the research aimed to address the following question: “How do (or in which way) 
PPPs contribute to social conflict mitigation in involuntary resettlement (IR) in Vietnam? In order 
to answer this question the main focus was placed on addressing the descriptive analysis of the 
PPP processes in IR.  Next, based on the results of the PPP process analysis, the contribution of 
the PPP to conflict resolution was explored based on the assumption that conflict resolution can 
be considered both as the output (as immediate results of PPP) and the outcome (indirect 
results) of the PPP. 
Our ambition was to develop an adequate analytical framework, which would allow us to obtain 
a sufficient and holistic overview of the nature of the PPP, encompassing the PPP institutional 
characteristics, the actors’ characteristics, the PPP activities including the collaboration building 
activities, the PPP results, and particularly the added values that PPP can bring to conflict 
resolution. To structure the analysis, our analytical framework relied on network theory, with 
supplements from various concepts from other relevant literatures. 
Our study can be classified as a qualitative, single case design based, encompassing qualitative 
fieldwork and participant observation in a resettlement and compensation project for mine 
operations in the North of Vietnam.  
6.2. The empirical findings to answer the research question 
The study was set out to explore the operation of PPP in the practice of an involuntary 
resettlement project in Vietnam - the NP project. The answer to our main research question was 
elaborated under a holistic design of the logical model components that include PPP structure 
and institutional characteristics (input), PPP process (throughput) and PPP results (output-
results). 
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The study thus sought to reveal the nature, functioning and results of the PPP in the NP project. 
It also explored, but at a lower level of ambition, the interrelations between the components of 
the logical model such as for instance the influence of input characteristics over the process of 
the PPP; or of input over results. 
For structuring our analysis, we drew upon network approaches, and more particularly on the 
variables with descriptive and explanatory power about the structure (interaction patterns, 
rules) and characteristics (actors, resources, dependencies, perceptions) of PPP actors, about 
PPP activities (content and collaboration building), and PPP results (production and democratic 
results). With the heuristic aid of these variables, and the in-depth participant observation and 
qualitative field study, we have thus attempted to understand the practice of PPP in compulsory 
land conversion.  
The main empirical findings are characterized as a comprehensive description of the PPP in a 
particular field of involuntary resettlement and sustainable development study. 
PPP arrangement in compulsory land conversion: ambiguous and complex 
In this research, the emergence of the PPP approach in the NP project can be viewed as a 
development in the implementation of compulsory land conversion in the context of Vietnam, 
signalling an increased participation of the private actor in response to the weakness of 
governmental institutional arrangements, which were found to be inadequate for the big sized 
mining project. 
The PPP approach in the NP resettlement project could only be identified by precise observation 
and by the adaptation of the simplest concepts of PPP, since at first sight compulsory land 
conversion is typically characterized by the implementation of public administrative procedures 
by the government authorized bodies (WB 2011). The policy framework assigned the main tasks 
of compensation, support and resettlement in the NP project to the multi-layer public actors. It 
also defined supportive and subordinate roles of the private investors, who were viewed to be 
the main beneficiaries of the process, rather than having any executive power. After more 
detailed inspection, however, we found that the multi-layer public actors were not in the 
position to handle their functions properly, stemming from institutional and resource 
constraints. 
Thus, the PPP approach in the NP project emerged as a coping mechanism for the 
implementation of a big-sized project, emphasizing the strategic interactions between the actors 
(Kickert et al. 1997: 32). The public actors at implementation level encouraged greater 
involvement of the private actor, who purposively and voluntarily invested financially and 
provided expertise to the project in order to enable land acquisition in a timely manner for 
mining operations. The emergence of the PPP in the NP project may raise a question about the 
definition of PPP, since hierarchy with “commands and controls” still dominate the relationship 
between the actors. Thus, we adapt the simplest concept of PPP which involves cooperation 
i.e. “to work or act to together” (McQuaid in Osborne 2000: 11) in order to be in the position 
to define the practice of compulsory land conversion in the NP project as a type of PPP, 
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while acknowledging the fact that the PPP arrangement in the NP project is both ambiguous 
and complex.  
The findings below demonstrate the complexity of the interaction patterns as well as the 
dynamics of rule settings. Insights from the network perspective were helpful to emphasize the 
particularities of PPP in IR in the public administration and legal context of Vietnam. 
Interaction patterns: the complexity of the PPP structure in IR 
The structural complexity of the PPP in the NP project denotes two different interaction patterns 
shaping the two distinct styles of collaboration. 
These special patterns or features are derived from the core nature of the IR, and are related to 
two distinct but related activities: displacement & resettlement on the one hand, and economic 
restoration, on the other (Cernea 1999, 2008). Accordingly, the collaborative style of PPP for the 
first process (SN1) characterizes the so-called symbolic PPP (Ysa 2007; Mandell & Keast 2007), in 
which hierarchical governance dominates and public administration is involved in order to carry 
out the compensation and displacement procedures. In this collaboration, government 
managers remain in charge and tend to encourage the profit-seeking investors to provide capital 
and expertise to achieve public goals (Linder 1999). In contrast, the cooperative nature of PPP in 
the second process (SN2) is mainly viewed as an evolutionary process of CSR, with some authors 
calling the network obtained in this way - organic, due to its evolving nature (Ysa 2007:39, 
Mandell & Keast 2007). Networks of this kind advocate various partnerships and voluntary 
contributions to the economic restoration and sustainable development initiatives for the PAPs 
and PACs in the NP project.  
At the same time, in the NP project, the private actor views the PPP and CSR to be instrumental 
in achieving their business goals, denoting “self-interest” as the core driver of the for-profit 
business sector (Reed & Reed 2006 & 2008, Garriga & Mele´2004). 
Rules: evolving nature of PPP in compulsory land conversion  
The study of the PPP rules has sought to understand the evolving nature of sets of rules 
(Koppenjan & Klijn 2004: 72) of the PPP in the NP project, typically representing the PPP in its 
emerging or infancy stage of formation. 
Indeed, from the formal institutional point of view, there are ambiguities with the PPP approach 
in the NP project, which has resulted in the PPP process to evolve as a network. The 
development of the PPP approach to a network is also a result of the formalization of rules 
taking place in the development dimension (SN2), and de-formalization of rules taking place in 
compensation and displacement procedural dimension (SN1) of compulsory land conversion. 
In light of our empirical findings, the arena and interaction rules are quite distinct in SN1 and 
SN2 in terms of forms (formal and informal) and contents (the degree of strictness and 
vagueness). Both sets of rules have been modified during interactions. Particularly, the 
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relationship patterns in SN1, which were characteristic of a “hierarchy” network in regards to the 
strict constituting and complicated procedural rules, are subject to modification due to the need 
for a process for de-centralization of interaction rules and the creation of new rewards rules. In 
contrast, the relationship patterns in SN2 are characterized by weak interdependencies between 
the actors and are consolidated by the formalization of the arena as well as the interaction rules 
in combination with the creation of new product/ reality rules.  
The practice of rule settings and rule modifications of the PPP in the NP project reveals the 
weakness of the public administrative system as well as of the policy environment in Vietnam. 
The policy framework and guidelines are seen as inadequate in terms of institutional 
arrangements, procedures and methods in land conversion. Furthermore, PPP proved to be 
capable of producing new rules in response to the status of “policy vacuum” (Cernea 1996: 1521, 
see more Cernea 1993- 1996, Asthana 1996, Shihata 1993 & Clark 2000) in IR. In addition, PPP 
tends to resist hierarchical orders by simplification and replacement of rules, bringing 
compulsory land conversion closer to the governance approach rather than the government one.  
Empirical findings on PPP rules in this research suggest that using rules as explanatory variables 
can be useful not only to explain the interaction patterns in PPP, but also to understand PPP 
development in the context of imperfect formal rule settings.  
PPP characteristics: the rational based on resource dependencies  
Given that PPP is viewed as a form of network governance, known as a complex set of actors 
(Stoker 1998: 18), the focus of PPP characteristics is centred on the actors- public and private.  
In this research, the resource interdependencies between actors proved to have strong 
explanatory power over the actors’ constellation and actors’ characteristics such as power, 
perceptions, goals and strategies in the PPP in compulsory land conversion. The resource 
interdependencies also can explain the mismatch between the legally mandated actors and the 
active actors in the practice found in the NP Project.  
Hence, in light of the concept of resource dependencies, it is necessary to establish identify who 
are the real actors in the PPP in the NP project. It seems that the public and private actors are 
highly dependent on the important resources in the land conversion, which belong to a third 
party - the PAPs and PACs as the land users. Thus, the PAPs and PACs should not be excluded 
from our analysis as “actors” despite the fact that PPP theory refers only to public and private 
actors. This point fits with the criteria for identification of the actors involved in the PPP process 
suggested by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004: 139). It thus seems important to include in the analysis 
not only those actors who are interested in realizing their  objectives or policy goals, but also 
actors having an interest in problem solving, such as the beneficiaries of services. Ultimately, 
even if not given a formal place in the partnership, these actors have resources the formal ones 
are dependent upon. 
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Resources interdependencies  
The network perspective draws our attention to the study of the resource interdependencies 
among the actors, and the application thereof result in a number of important findings.  
Our first finding in this regard relates to resources deficiency of the actors in compulsory land 
conversion. The local governments possess all the necessary competences to be responsible for 
the implementation of compulsory land conversion. They are also supported by the functional 
and executives bodies with expertise and policy knowledge. However, there was a gap between 
the resource capacity of the public actors and the scope of the workload in the NP project. In 
addition, the rationale of the PPP also derives from the perceptions of the public actors (mainly 
regarded as functional and executive actors), who claim that increased participation of the 
private actor is indispensable, since compulsory land conversion is seen as more of the 
company’s issue than the issue of  public service providers. 
This explains why some public actors, such as the DOLISA and the DARD, although they had 
formal roles in SN2 were almost absent in the implementation process. The private actor joined 
the PPP as a project investor with financial resources, expertise and knowledge, the latter of 
which had also been generated from the use of their financial resources. The rationale of the 
private actor is to gain profit through more legitimacy resources for their involvement in order to 
speed up the land conversion progress.  
In this regard, the study reveals the dynamics and the role of the financial resources, which have 
become the means to generate other types of resources, to determine the degree of 
dependencies as well as power manipulation, and to some extent, to influence the perceptions 
and strategies of other actors during collaboration. The financial resources appeared to be 
indispensable during the resettlement and economic rehabilitation activities. It is asserted by 
various scholars that the root-cause of failure to resettle PAPs sustainably lies with insufficient 
financing for resettlement which includes additional compensation for restoring income and 
livelihoods (Cernea 2008 and Wicklin III 1999). Thus, sufficient financing should be viewed as a 
prerequisite for the private actor to achieve success in compulsory land conversion. This 
may seem an obvious finding. However, financial capabilities are often underestimated in 
the IR literature. 
The second finding demonstrates the increased capability of the private actor in handling some 
state functions in compulsory land conversion. This finding has been reinforced by a certain 
degree of replaceability of the public actors in displacement procedures, and a high degree of 
replaceability in economic restoration activities, given the increasing inability of the state and 
traditional structures of authority to function properly in compulsory land conversion (see 
Hewson and Sinclair 1999 in Utting and Zammit 2009 for similar argument).  
Nevertheless, pooled interdependencies still dominate the relationship between public and 
private actors in the compulsory land conversion, given that the hierarchical governance of 
public administrative procedures takes place in this policy field. For the private actor, the 
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“compulsory” feature in land conversion explains its high dependency on the legal and 
administrative system of public agencies, which are viewed as monopoly providers in this regard. 
Our discussion on resource interdependencies between the PPP actors is linked to the dynamics 
of power explored in this studied case. In compulsory land conversion, the coercive power of the 
public actor over land acquisition, although legally endorsed, was gradually replaced by a softer 
form of mobilization power in response to the resistance of the affected people. In the 
meantime, the PPP in the NP project shows power sharing tendencies between authorities and 
the company on one side, and between the authorities and the affected people on the other 
side, as a result of power manipulated by a strategic use of financial resources of the private 
actor and also due to the increased public consultation and participation for problem solving.  
Actors in PPP: perceptions - strategies: the public-private divide? 
In this research, much effort was spent to uncover the perceptions, goals and strategies of the 
actors, starting from the assumption that those variables hold explanatory power over the 
behaviour of the actors during collaboration, the constraints found in the collaboration building 
process as well as the results of the PPP in the NP project. The findings stated below are 
informed by a holistic view on understanding of perceptions, representing the institutional 
values, the core business and the strategies of the public and private actors in the contemporary 
Vietnam context. 
In general, perceptions of public and private actors are deeply rooted in their institutional 
backgrounds. Besides, the divergence of perceptions of the public actors is also linked to their 
positions in the traditional public system and the tasks assigned to them in the PPP. In our 
observation, the dynamics of perceptions are presented in forms of shared goals and strategies 
during the course of interactions between the actors. We demonstrate our argument below: 
Our findings with regards to the institutional background of the public actors show an inherent 
tension between organization goals and the collective interests. In other words, the institutional 
goals of the public actors in the PPP in the studied case led to trade-offs of their strategic choices 
in the PPP.   
In particular, provincial leaders in Vietnam prefer economic development as a way to bring their 
provinces out of poverty and therefore offer extra incentives to the investors and their 
investment projects (WB 2011). However, the observed perceptions of the public leaders also 
represent the philosophy of the Vietnamese management system, which strongly emphasizes 
the values of hierarchy, duty, obedience and the dominance of the collective over the individual 
as well as loyalty, obligations as a result of a combination of Marxist-Leninism ideology with 
Confucianism (Edwards & Phan 2013). Therefore, public leaders are not in favour of changes, 
innovation or risks which may pose a threat to their traditional duties and system. Consequently, 
the land conversion process in the NP project is constrained by (i) hesitation to introduce new 
compensation schemes for the PAPs that would contradict the compulsory land conversion 
mechanism; (ii) risk avoidance by avoiding forced expulsion  for the remaining resisting cases 
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and; (iii) strict compliance with the government policies and administrative procedures, even 
though they are no longer adequate.  
Differing from the public actors, the private actor - NPM stands for capitalist ideas, which are the 
result of a process of market liberalization in Vietnam (see VDR 2010, Edwards & Phan 2013). 
They perceive PPP in the NP project as a means to achieve their business goals. The private actor 
is most concerned with the progress of the project, which is significantly determined by the 
relevant public service providers and the authorities, and the resistance of the PAPs which may 
increase the transaction costs. Therefore, the company’s strategies lie with increased financial 
investments for capacity building, for lobbying the authorities and corporate social responsibility 
for the project affected communities. Thus, it is believed that, the strategies of the private actor 
are characterized by risk taking and innovations, particularly considering there were no lessons 
to draw from other such resettlement projects in the district and provinces.  
Furthermore, our study of the multi-layer public actors in the NP case points at somewhat 
different perceptions in terms of loyalty, accountability and obedience between the higher and 
lower levels of the public actors; and between the political-authorities and the technical 
bureaucrats (the functional departments and BCSR). This underlines that the nature of the public 
system is more diverse than it is often streamlined (generalized) in literature.  
On the one hand, it is not difficult to realize that “public loyalty” is more respected at the 
higher level of public actors, who act in the capacity of both senior politicians and bureaucrats 
in the present studied case. Particularly, the political context cannot be ignored since Vietnam 
is a one-party state and majority of senior politicians and bureaucrats are members of the 
Communist Party.  
On the other hand, a certain degree of non-obedience to upper levels and non- compliance with 
policy procedures sometimes take place at street-level, causing tensions between lower and 
higher levels of the public actors (see more Rhode 1980). In addition, the degree to which lower 
level governments (district and communal levels) are willing to take part in the land conversion 
process depends on how much authority they have to handle various steps and procedures. In 
Vietnam, much of the devolved power was passed to the province (VDR: 2010), while districts 
and communes find themselves as the administrative, procedural and regulatory gatekeepers 
rather than active and enthusiastic problem solvers at implementation level. 
Further to the discussion on divergence of perceptions among the public actors in the NP 
project, it is found that financial incentives in the functional departments and executives are 
smaller than in the government - authority system. Particularly compared to the workload in the 
NP project, the salaries for agents of the functional departments were “incompatible”. This 
problem was intensively discussed at public administration level in Vietnam, emphasizing a need 
to motivate the civil servants in order to enhance performance and accountability in public 
service (VDR 2011). 
However, the change of perceptions was apparently found even at this level since the functional 
and executive officers admitted that they were “enjoying working” with NPM. This, together 
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with “extra incentives” offered by the private actor has in, turn made them more accountable to 
the project progress as well as more engaged with the private actor. This can be viewed as 
relationship building in a more informal manner in order to engage public and private actors in 
the cultural context of Vietnam. To be more specific, the private actors found good relationship 
with the government functional and authority bodies to be essential for their business 
development (Edwards & Phan 2013). 
In summary, given that the compulsory land conversion mechanism is strongly constrained by 
central (strict, complicated) regulations, public actors tend to be policy guardians in terms of 
formality, legality, honesty and fairness (for similar finding, see Kickert 1997: 38) rather than to 
pursue the effectiveness and efficiency by risk taking and innovations as the private actor does. 
However, the perceptions of the public and private actors in the NP case are found to be distinct, 
but not necessarily resulting in serious constraints such as the failure of the PPPs as researched 
by the Dutch scholars (see Teisman & Klijn 2002, 2003). In fact, a shared perception between the 
actors takes place through the development during implementation of CSRs, capacity building 
and benefit sharing in the NP project.  
PPP Process 
In this research, the PPP throughput is built upon two dimensions: the first dimension refers to 
the content of the PPP and the second dimension refers to collaboration building activities. The 
empirical findings demonstrate dynamic responses of the public and private actors towards the 
influencing factors. In view of our observation, the PPP structural elements: the rule settings, the 
interaction patterns as well as the actors' characteristic elements such as the resource status, 
the divergence of perceptions are found to be influencing characteristics of the PPP process.  
PPP in compulsory land conversion: philanthropic in discourse but non-philanthropic in 
implementation 
The first dimension is inspired by our research interests and is concerned with whether PPP in 
sustainable development has any special features. We have discovered that the added value 
activities make the content of the PPP in compulsory land conversion special. Given that the 
PPP- approach in compulsory land conversion was introduced in some form in Vietnam, the 
joint-activities in terms of displacement procedures imply “public service supply socialization” 
(CIEM 2006). In general, the meaning of socialization can be understood as the government 
allowing “the private and other non-state actors to take part in the provision of services” which 
are traditionally and legally handled by state administrative entities (ACUÑA  Alfaro 2009:79). 
However, the usage of the term socialization is no longer appropriate in the studied case since 
the PPP content refers not only to the provision of services but also separate added value 
activities voluntarily developed by the private actor. Thus, the empirical analysis of the actual 
added value activities in the PPP in the NP project brings the PPP close to characteristics of the 
CSR type of PPP, which are not emphasized in the official policy framework for PPP. 
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Although philanthropy is often claimed to be an important attribute of PPP in sustainable 
development (Utting & Zammit 2008, Ananya and Daryl 2008, Windsor 2006, Osborne 2000 and 
Rosenau 1999), the perceptions of the private actor over the rationale of the PPP (as stated in 
the previous section) and the vulnerability of the added-value activities in the NP project as 
stated below still testify to the prevalence of the commercial nature of the PPP over 
philanthropy and non-profit. In particular, added-value activities have been disrupted once by 
the global financial crisis and have been terminated as in the case of non-commitments. Further, 
these activities are regularly revised based on win-win negotiations, and modified based on the 
responses and resistance from the affected people. To conclude, philanthropy of PPP in IR is 
subjectively influenced by the resources and perceptions of the PPP actors.  
Collaboration building in IR: a successful battle for collaboration? 
The second dimension - collaboration building activities - focuses more on the actual dynamics, 
execution of collaboration and the responses towards the structural influencing factors. 
In the NP project, it is clear that the collaboration building activities were substantially affected 
by the divergence of the institutional structure of the PPP as well as the actors’ characteristics. 
Particularly, the private actor is very active in joint-effort engagements with the public actors 
and its will is shown in increased resources utilization and risk sharing. In turn, the public actors 
being unlikely well prepared for a partnership, become more dependent on the executive 
arrangements, mostly triggered by the private actor.  
The collaboration building in the NP project contains six aspects: forging initial agreement, 
building leadership, building legitimacy, building trust, managing conflict, and planning.  
The study of the initial agreements:  the way PPP structure was formed and modified as a result 
of self- organizing processes of the network.  
The roots and the growth of PPP can be portrayed by sequential observation of the development 
and modification of initial agreements for PPP. Particularly, the de-formalization of the initial 
agreements reveals the constraints during implementation of the legal requirements in SN1 that 
ultimately led to flexible adaptations in regards to the tasks and positions of the actors. In the 
meantime, the formalization of the commitments of the added-value activities in SN2 was 
accompanied by the growing importance of more benefit sharing and the win-win principles in 
the NP project which could be observed in the way the public and private actors interact. 
Trust and legitimacy building: mutual communication and “good intension” are not always 
panacea for mistrust in the IR project. 
Trust and legitimacy building are crucial to understand the core of PPP activities in order to 
achieve consensus and acceptance through information sharing, continuous communications, 
and brandings activities in the NP project.  
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To some extent, trust and legitimacy building improved the reputation of the company and 
acknowledged joint-efforts between the authorities and the company in the project. The 
evidence in the present case shows the positive effects of collaboration building on the 
participant actors, including the public actors at the higher levels as well as the larger public, 
such as the audience of the media activities.  
The evidence in the studied case shows the challenges of gaining trust and legitimacy of the 
important groups of stakeholders who were directly affected by the PPP activities in the context 
of IR. Indeed, the strong presence of branding activities in combination with “good intensions” of 
the CSRs of the private actors do not imply that trust can be sufficiently created among the PAPs 
and PACs as well the communal level of authorities. Practically, in view of the PAPs and PACs, the 
legitimacy and trust building activities were subordinate to the appreciation of eventual results 
of the PPP, meaning legitimacy sprang more from the output than from the throughput. In 
addition, trust and legitimacy building activities in the NP project were considerably constrained 
by a traditional popular distrust of mining operations and the compulsory nature of the project 
with a commercial purpose. 
Leadership building and planning: Power sharing as response to the failure of coercive power 
in IR. 
The study of both leadership building and planning activities brings about the insights of power 
sharing practice between the public and private actors in the studied case.  
The Thai Nguyen PPC is the highest responsible public level leading the project. In the sponsor 
position, the provincial and district government provide the endorsing authority and access to 
legal resources to enable project implementation.  
However, at the level of network champions, the private actor deserves most merit, since the 
private actor has been the primary driver of this collaboration, and goal attainment in the 
compulsory land conversion mechanism has been achieved primarily owing to its efforts. Given 
the fact that the company is more concerned (and responsible) with the progress of the project 
and problem solving in the project than the public actors, the company played a predominant 
role in planning activities as well as in providing the necessary resources  for implementation. 
The failure of the lead organizations such as the CBOs at the provincial and district level shows 
that collective decisions as well as joint-planning activities were difficult to achieve between the 
public and private actors for a challenging case of compulsory land conversion. Instead, the 
public actors often stayed aside, giving space to the company to take risks and be responsible for 
their planning.  
In contrast to the earlier findings which show that certain public actors were, to some extent, 
not concerned with the progress of the project, the observations during the stage of the 
booming conflict suggest active leadership of high-ranking public officials over conflict 
resolutions. Since the conflict status in the project threatened to endanger the social and 
political stability, the highest level of local government attempted to resolve the problem. 
Despite the fact that NPM initiated problem solving, the public leaders acted more timely, given 
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the fact that they were aware of their necessary involvement in problem solving as well as their 
formal role in the land conversion process.  
Managing conflict: social capital (trust-based) approach vs. formal contractual approach to 
problem solving. 
In the NP project, the conflicts between public and private actors were well managed although 
different perceptions over problems and solutions often constrained collective decision making. 
We found no evidence of a critical manifestation of conflicts between the public and private 
actors during the collaboration process. Observation shows that the private actor seems to be 
more active in seeking solutions. Indeed, the private actor attempted to compensate for the 
hardship of the public officials by providing incentives, a variety of support measures or 
influencing the higher levels by increasing resources utilization.  
In addition, contracts and agreements were increasingly used to clarify the responsibilities of 
each party during the collaboration for economic restoration and social safeguard. In turn, the 
public actors sometimes compromised by withdrawing their “policy guardian position” in some 
difficult cases of resisting PAPs, allowing the private actor to resolve the problem by themselves. 
In such a way, additional financial resources were often needed to manage internal conflicts as a 
solution to avoid blockage in joint-decision making, which indirectly affected the progress of the 
project. In the NP project, the private actor, who was concerned with the project progress was 
willing to pay such a price, provided that PPP in practice could overcome the constraints of 
collective action problems, and suggested the alternative solutions which did not necessarily 
require prior formal forms of agreements to guide the responsibilities and behaviours of the 
public and private actors. 
PPP results 
The findings of the PPP results can be best synthesized upon answering the most practical 
questions about the PPP in the studied case: Can everybody win in compulsory land conversion? 
And can PPP be an effective form of governance in comparison to the conventional public 
service delivery in compulsory land conversion? This section also implicitly answers our second 
research question regarding contribution of PPPs to conflict resolution in compulsory land 
conversion. 
Our first question: can everybody win? 
The answer is provided by the identification of the PPP results not only at participant level, but 
also at community level. 
At participant level, task accomplishments or production results appeared to be crucial for both 
public and private actors. Since PPP was developed based on self-interested motivation, the 
actors seek alternative ways to successfully accomplish their tasks and functions (for public 
service providers) as well as goal attainment (for private actors) in compulsory land conversion.  
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The analysis shows that the investor is successful in having the land acquired for mining 
operations, and potentially gets the return of high costs of investment. The government 
authorities and functional departments also viewed the PPP results in the NP project as 
successful task accomplishments since the public actors overcame the workload and the 
resources deficiency in order to handover the land to the investor.  
A considerable number of complaints have been resolved in a prompt manner and with 
relatively high degree of acceptance by the complainants. In addition, the formal complaint 
mechanism has been widely used by the PAPs and PAC, given that informal resistance such as 
demonstration and violence or incorporative behaviour was minimized. In this sense, the 
credibility of public service delivery and the better quality of performance in compensation 
procedural activities have been enhanced accordingly. 
The question “can everybody win?” is of crucial interest at community level. This derives from 
the research interest in understanding the practice of the trade-offs between the “pains” and the 
“gains” in involuntary resettlement, where long-term interests may get into conflict with the 
interests of groups or individuals who are immediately and adversely affected (see Shihata 1993). 
According to our findings, the PAPs and PACs were entitled with a great deal of benefit sharing 
from the PPP results in the NP project. Indeed, the system of benefit sharing takes place in the 
NP project both in the forms of monetary benefit through additional compensations and 
entitlements, and through the establishment of a long-term development fund. Benefit sharing 
is also rendered as a non-monetary benefit in the form of livelihood restoration, social 
infrastructure restoration - such as roads, schools, cultural houses and healthcare centres. This 
approach appears to be relatively unique in the practice of compulsory land conversion in 
Vietnam, which was claimed to have a lack of proactive solutions for economic restoration for 
the PAPs (as stated in WB 2011 and Hung Vo 2009). The practice of various resettlement projects 
in Vietnam shows that the investors want to follow their own investment plans without 
considering their greater responsibility for the affected land-users, while the local government 
considers that their responsibility needs to end after the compensation, support and 
resettlement process is completed. In contrast, the PPP results identified at community level 
have shown the practical benefits which are not only the sustainable rehabilitative needs, 
such as job creation, economic diversification and capacity building for the PAPs, but also 
boosting/ advancing competitive socio-economic development for the PACs which became 
one of few modern villages in the province. To some extent, the results of the econo mic 
restoration and social safeguards activities in the NP project represent a realization of 
“resettlement with development” (RwD) approach as recommended by the World Bank for 
implementation of IR projects.  
Our second question: can PPP be an effective form of governance in comparison to the 
conventional public service delivery in compulsory land conversion? 
The assessment of the public values in the PPP shows that the PPP can produce results, solutions 
and processes that otherwise would not have been possible with single, hierarchical 
organizations (Agranoff & McGuire 2001). 
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First, the PPP can accomplish the results that neither public nor private authority can accomplish 
independently during the course of the NP project. Public value is most likely created by making 
use of each sector’s characteristic strengths while also finding ways to minimize, overcome, or 
compensate for each sector’s characteristic weaknesses (for similar finding in other research, see 
Agranoff & McGuire 2001). In the NP project, the private actor provided financial resources, 
expertise to the partnership and CSRs, whereas the multi layer public bodies provided not only 
the knowledge, legitimacy and competencies but also the access to broader public resources, 
such as government programs and budgets. Thus, the public and private actors have utilized 
each other’s synergies to overcome the workload of a big size project and the resources scarcity 
to achieve own interests as well as collective interests in compulsory land conversion.  
Indeed, our research findings emphasize the added values built upon additional financial and 
expertise resources of the private actors, which are most clearly observed in the better quality of 
compensation, support and resettlement, more resources for conflict resolution as well as a 
greater deal of benefit sharing for the affected community as stated in the previous section. 
Notably, the added value activities are those activities that are not strictly regulated in the policy 
framework of the compulsory land conversion (WB 2011). As a result, the added value activities 
and the respective results are often absent in the conventional public service delivery in 
compulsory land conversion, with a provision that the NP resettlement project grants greater 
added value activities in comparison to other resettlement projects without immediate 
involvement of a private actor.  
Second, the PPP in the NP project demonstrates the ability to creatively produce solutions, 
mostly observable in the circumstances of conflicts and tensions. Notably, our findings seem to 
be in contrast to the observation of the complaint resolution,  found to be a major weakness in 
the implementation of compulsory land conversion in Vietnam (WB 2010 & 2011). 
Indeed, the complaint mechanism in the NP project advocates face-to-face dialogues, where the 
complainants can discuss in person their problems, instead of providing documentation and 
following traditional administrative procedures. Essentially, the complaints were resolved on the 
basis of policy revisions and the additional entitlements instead of being resolved based on the 
existing policy provisions. Furthermore, the complaint mechanism is well monitored and 
managed in order to generate a high degree of acceptance of the complainants as a way to 
mitigate conflicts in the project.   
Third, the analysis of PPP democratic results presents the capability of the PPP to produce a 
greater deal of process values which offer a means to measure governance effectiveness, such 
as legitimacy, accountability and accordance.  
The PPP is viewed to be an effective instrument to not only increase participation and 
consultation of the PAPs and PACs but also to produce output-based democracy. Our findings 
demonstrate that output legitimacy was gained in the project in the forms of the additional 
policy provisions and entitlements as a result of public consultation and participation. In 
addition, there is a public acknowledgment of the project and the policies resulting from the 
300 
 
branding activities, namely, better access to information for the PAPs and PACs due to the 
information disclosure activities and enhanced credibility of the PAPs achieved using the 
complaint mechanism as a formal consent giving mechanism in the project. Notably, the 
democratic values mainly resulted from the implementation of the PCDP, properly developed by 
the private actor to support compulsory land conversion in the NP project.  
Nevertheless, the PPP in the NP project is also characterized by a limited democratic 
accountability due to the absence of a formal reward and sanction mechanism for the executive 
members, as well as the lack of a strong lead organization of the PPP. More importantly, in 
general, there is a lack of powerful public oversight bodies in Vietnam. Our study reveals a threat 
(or the failure) to (of) democratic accountability while demonstration, resistance and media 
critiques have been used in the project as the informal forms of consent refusal of the PAPs 
and PACs.  
In addition, the problem of trust in the NP project is exacerbated by the traditional negative bias 
of the communities towards mining projects and the compulsory nature of the private project 
with a commercial instead of public purpose. This practice constrains the conflict resolution 
capability of the PPP since the root-causes of the conflicts have not been completely eliminated.  
PPP regime: does it need a long way to go?  
As shown in our research statement, the motivation of this research lies with assessing the PPP 
of the studied case in order to understand whether the PPP, as Voets et al. (2008) said can 
strengthen the capacity of the government to deal with crises and/or future challenges. It is 
linked to the normative aspect of this research - to provide appropriate recommendations for 
legitimating the PPP as a suitable problem solving instrument in compulsory land conversion in 
the context of Vietnam.  
The findings shown in this research claim that there is an absence of a strong formal PPP regime 
encompassing formal rules, norms and decision making procedures in compulsory land 
conversion in Vietnam. Instead, by analyzing the actual collaboration between company and 
public actors in the NP project, we found an informally institutionalized CSR regime. Despite the 
informal character of collaboration, the PPP results demonstrate an undeniable potential of the 
PPP as an effective problem solving instrument, especially in conflict resolution in compulsory 
land conversion which determines the robustness and resilience of the given PPP.  
Indeed, the findings present positive results in terms of effective public administrative service 
delivery, voluntary benefits sharing, conflict resolution through promoting the participation of 
communities, consensus creation between PPP actors and the PAPs and PACs, dialogue 
strengthening among government bodies, investor and the PAPs, improved consent giving 
mechanism and the generation of a high degree of transparency, to name but a few.  
However, in line with our findings, the robustness and resilience of the network in the NP project 
is exposed by the vulnerability of network membership, especially in SN2. Indeed, some public 
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members, being non-dedicated had the tendency to become “free riders” in the network since 
they perceived that the private actor should be the key player in the NP project with “private 
business” goals. Meanwhile, although SN2 design strongly calls for a strong involvement of its 
members, most of the participant members proved to be non-committed to the economic 
restoration activities. In addition, the vulnerability of membership also resulted from the high 
dependency of the PPP regime on the private actor and its financial resources, the latter of 
which in turn are found to be vulnerable to the impacts of economic downturns, financial crises 
or the increase of investment costs.   
In contrast to the above findings, the robustness of the PPP can be sustained by the enhanced 
quality of the relationship between participant members in the PPP as a result of the capacity 
building process as well as the creation of greater trust and social capital during the course of 
interactions.  
Capacity building of the public actors in the NP project resulted in changes of perceptions during 
the development and economic restoration activities in resettlement projects, better 
collaboration experience, and more equipment and better facilities to needed sustain the 
project activities. More importantly, the learning process of the collaboration has resulted in 
practical implications at both policy making levels and implementation levels. To be specific, the 
lessons learnt in the NP project have been partly adopted in the provincial resettlement policy 
guidelines and have been recommended as good implementation practice for other projects in 
the province. And most importantly, the PPP practice in the NP project, especially in terms of 
economic restoration has been reported to the national assembly agenda. This point re-asserts 
our first argument that the PPP can be robust and resilient if proven to be effective in problem 
solving regardless of being only informally institutionalized.  
However, the evidence shows that the poorly institutionalized PPP arrangement potentially 
leads to a lack of control over the PPP, which can change its core in favour of some actor’s 
interest. To be specific, there is an absence of a strong lead organization and a sanction/ reward 
mechanism to oversee internal and external accountability of the participant (actors) as shown 
in the process results of the PPP at network level. Thus, the public pressure and media criticisms 
observed in the NP project should not be regarded as government control over the PPP and CSR. 
Particularly, as found in the NP project, the size of incentives offered for the public officials and 
the size of equipment support for their organization can both influence the behaviour of the 
public actors, who may compromise for the sake of the private actor’s profit (see Forrer et al. 
2010 for similar argument).  
In addition, compulsory land conversion is generally perceived to be short-term since it is viewed 
as a transitional stage for the project development activities. In the NP project, although the 
long-term nature of the economic restoration activities was introduced, the short-term nature of 
the displacement compensation procedures still dominates over the key project activities. This 
may threaten the endurance of the PPP. 
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6.3. Reflection of the analytical framework and possible theoretical contribution 
Chapter 2 developed an analytical framework based on network theory, by integrating the key 
elements of planning and management of PPPs in sustainable development, the core network 
concepts as variables for understanding the PPP structure and actors’ characteristics, and 
insights stemming from the cross-sector collaboration process. This section presents some 
reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of the adopted analytical framework.  
Network theory as useful approach through a holistic analytical framework 
It is often claimed that network approaches are not fully appreciated by certain scholars 
(O’Toole 1997, Dowding 1995, and Peters 1998 in Morçöl & Wachhaus 2009), who claimed that 
network theory lacks sufficient theoretical and empirical development to explain reality. 
However, we believe that this scepticism should not apply to our research. We think our use of 
network theory succeed in reconciling a number of the core network theory components into 
one single analytical framework. This analytical framework shown in Figure 31 helped to 
understand the operation of the PPP process in compulsory land conversion in a holistic way, 
encompassing the different dimensions of input, throughput and output, and at the different 
levels of analysis of organisation, network and community.   
Figure 31: The PPP analytical framework in view of the network theory 
 
Under this framework, networks are viewed to be both structures and processes, encompassing 
structural development as well as the dynamics over the processes. Indeed, the strength of our 
approach lies with the fact that it addresses the concerns raised by some scholars that network 
researchers mainly focus on the structural aspect of networks (Thorne 2009). Instead, the 
process (throughput) elements, focusing on the dynamics of the PPP exhibit the self- organizing 
dimension of a network as well as the response of the network under the influence of the 
structural factors. In addition, the concrete findings of the PPP dynamics in form of the 
formalization and de-formalization of rules can contribute to the ongoing theoretical debate on 
how network and hierarchy can co-exist within each other (Thorne 2009). 
The application of this analytical framework to empirical level was challenged by lengthy 
research protocols and reports since the ambition of this research implies a large extent of 
dimensions as well as an in-depth analysis at different levels. A compromise had to be made by 
having a single (but in-depth) case study instead of multiple case studies. 
Input Throughput Output 
Interaction patterns; 
Rules, Goals, 
And Resources dependencies, 
Power, Perceptions 
Network content; 
Collaboration building activities 
Production results; 
Process results 
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at network level;  
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Beyond an explorative and descriptive framework: towards explanation 
As stated in Chapter 3 (Methodology), the qualitative research design advocates rich 
descriptions of the phenomenon, in our case the PPP in compulsory l and conversion in Vietnam. 
As a result, the exploratory findings of the research suggest that the studied PPP differs from 
mainstream PPPs discussed in 1.3.3, in terms of the structural dynamics, the process constraints 
and the core nature of the PPP outcomes.     
The first particularity of the research findings refers to the structure of PPP in IR. By revisiting the 
theoretical framework, we found that PPP in sustainable development entertains philanthropic 
and sustainable goals to achieve win-win scenarios by endeavouring to establish a balance 
between ethical business and corresponding business growth (see 1.3.2). The PPP goals of this 
research study are commercially oriented and go beyond philanthropy or sustainability, and 
attempt to offer “a new way to achieve economic success”141. Indeed, the core nature of the 
outcomes of the studied PPP demonstrates increased competitiveness (instead of trust) of the 
private actor while it simultaneously improves the compensation and livelihoods and other 
social safeguard conditions in the communities in which it operates. As a result, the government 
support and the consent of the communities have provided a pathway for the business 
development of the for- profit private actor.  
The second particularity of the research findings refers to the PPP process in IR in the transitional 
Vietnamese context, encompassing cultural differentiation, democratic legitimacy, legal 
environment as well as the dynamics of economic and social problems. In particular, the social 
needs in this context were viewed with respect to the poor and vulnerable groups. In this regard, 
not only public and private relations but also the relationships with the community as the third 
party are explored in the given PPP. We indeed found that the PPP process was constrained not 
only by the characteristics of the public and private actors, but also by those of the communities.  
The third particularity of the research findings is related to considerable efforts that were 
required to identify and analyze the PPP outcome in terms of economic restoration in IR. The 
study of PPP outcomes in this research particularly addressed the gap of empirical evidence on 
reconstructing livelihoods in IR literature, which is more concerned with describing and 
deploring impoverishment processes than resettlement successes (see Cernea 1997:1580). In 
addition, the vulnerable aspects of the livelihoods in IR have been revealed in this research. 
Indeed, the PAPs - being the farmers, who were familiar with traditional cultivation have joined 
the unskilled workforce in the mining and processing industry; and moreover they have become 
more dependent on the business sector and the government than they were before. 
Besides, by adopting the network perspective, which attempts to understand the influences of 
structural factors over the process and results (as suggest by Klijn et al. 1997), a certain degree 
of explanation has been achieved in this research. Indeed, the theoretical assumptions as stated 
in Figures 3 and 4 were partly tested at empirical level of this research and the dynamics of the 
                                                          
141
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network were also demonstrated; or the results of PPP demonstrate some degree of causal 
relationship between the input elements and the project results.  
For example, financial resources were found to be influential to the PPP content, being the 
added value activities as well as to the PPP results in terms of conflict resolution. In addition, we 
witnessed in this research how different perceptions between public and private actors, 
represented by the logic of market and the logic of bureaucracy constrained the joint-decision 
making in PPP process. We also learn that the vagueness of rules in SN2 leads to lack of 
accountability of the public actors during collaboration building, making them to become non- 
dedicated actors in the network.  Moreover, the disempowerment nature of rules in SN1 has 
significantly influenced trust building among PAPs and PACs in compulsory land conversion 
despite various CSR activities taking place in the project. 
Furthermore, in this research, the network elements have been separately observed in two 
distinct but related sub-networks, being SN1 and SN2 in IR. As a result, similar findings in regards 
to the influencing factors towards the PPP processes have been recognized in both sub- 
networks. In particular, the different characteristics of the network elements in the two sub-
networks provide supporting evidence for alternative ways of presenting the data and 
consolidating the original assumptions (about the influencing factors). Hence, this may 
contribute to the validity of the research findings in a sense that the influencing factors have 
been examined in both sub- networks. 
 Network as self-regulating - a puzzled conceptual and analytical scheme 
Despite a successful description of the developed PPP, representing the self-regulating feature of 
the network, our empirical findings do not clearly demonstrate a self-organization mechanism 
due to a confusing set of rules put forth in the analytical framework. Indeed, there was 
insufficient theoretical development within the network theory to demonstrate the 
formalization and de-formalization of arena rules and interaction rules in a more specific manner 
since the sub-types of rules (reality rules, rewards rules and position rules) are not sufficiently 
clarified in the network literature. Thus, an in-depth study of formal and informal rules in PPP is 
more appropriate to understand the evolving nature of PPP in IR. This point also responds to the 
recent claim regarding gaps in network research, particularly when it comes to the analysis of 
informal networks (Kapucu et al. 2014). 
Finally, we suggest the boundaries of network analysis by demonstrating that the configuration 
of actors of PPP should not imply only public and private actors. As discussed in section (6.2), this 
research suggests including the third party of PPP, being the community people who were 
impacted by PPP to the analytical framework. In a particular field of IR, the in-depth analysis of 
the PAPs as key actors proved to be useful to precisely evaluate the PPP results in relation to 
conflict resolution in IR. In this sense, it is found that network literature while providing 
suggestion to evaluate PPP output at the community level, has little attention towards the 
characteristics and the involvement of the third party in terms of PPP input and throughput. 
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Thus, the third party, being the community should be equally considered to be an actor of PPP, 
and included in the study of input and throughput of PPP in the domain of IR.  
6.4. Reflecting on the research strategy 
The reflections on the research methodology have already been discussed in Chapter 3. This 
section underlines the advantages and disadvantages of the data collection methods, which 
proved to be of significance for the generation of the research findings.  
The data collection activities in this research were carried out back and forth through the 
research process (2010-2013). The present data have been collected by a broad range of 
methods, encompassing document review, qualitative fieldwork and participant observation. 
Thus, the major disadvantage of this research methodology lies with its complexity and time 
consumption. However, these considerations are outweighed by the fact that the complex and 
time-consuming method in this research has been “productive” considering the vast amount of 
empirical data collected and the substance of the research findings. 
First, qualitative fieldwork at an early stage was useful to capture the characteristics of the 
actors including their perceptions and perspectives which reveal an extent of the complex, latent 
and unpredictable information of the actors’ thoughts. To some extent, the findings have been 
triangulated through participant observation carried out at the later stages. For instance, the 
interviews of the representatives from public functional departments revealed the “hidden” fact 
that additional financial incentives proved to be important for joining the collaboration, although 
this point of view is not accepted by the mainstream ideology of the public service system. 
Similarly, the attitude of the affected people in regards to economic restoration, identified by 
participant observation, was found to be different from their critical requests over the same 
issues in various group discussions earlier carried out by qualitative field work. In particular, the 
observed behaviour under participant observation method demonstrated their intention to get 
cash payments instead of asking for long-term sustainable income generation as recorded during 
qualitative fieldwork as well as during public consultation for project implementation (RAP, CDP 
and ERPs).  
In addition, the core of the added value of PPP in IR could have been easily interpreted as 
philanthropic. However, by analysing the rationale and strategy of the private actor through 
triangulation with different data collection methods (documentation, interviews, discussion and 
observation) and different data sources (statistic reports, media articles, interviews) a 
commercial dimension has been identified.  
Second, the qualitative method takes advantage of identifying the core of PPP in compulsory 
land conversion and the nuances of PPP in terms of structure, process and results as well as of 
the influences of the PPP structural dynamics, which all may have been difficult to capture 
quantitatively. Indeed, the ambiguous and complex nature of the PPP, the complexity of the PPP 
structure; the evolving nature of the PPP rule setting as well the failure of coercive power or 
trust building in the studied case were identified by long-lasting field activities and participant 
observation. More importantly, the explanatory power stemming from the rich empirical data 
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resources as a result of the complex qualitative approach in this research can be used to suggest 
potential causal mechanisms for further studies as well as to generate hypotheses on the 
potential mechanisms. Examples of this are the causal relationship between the strategic use of 
financial resources and power generation in a power asymmetry context or between public 
consultation and information disclosure and the democratic results, or the degree of de-
formalization of rules in IR and conflict resolution, to name but a few.  
Third, since ethnography is a form of field research that seeks to learn the culture of a particular 
setting, participant observation takes a great advantage in understanding a complex 
phenomenon, especially in form of the conflict related issues. On the one hand, participant 
observation allowed an access to an “inaccessible” phenomenon of conflicts and to the 
“inaccessible by outsider” statistical reports on complaint resolutions in the studied case. On the 
other hand, participant observation allows a deeper understanding of various manifests, 
emergent and latent forms of conflicts which were linked to the need to exploring the root-
cause sources of conflicts, such as the influence of social and cultural norms.  
Finally, in a broader sense, the complex and long-lasting data collection method in this research 
was also helpful in terms of safeguarding the ambition of an in-depth case study. Being 
embedded to the studied case, the researcher was able to account for and/or describe the 
changing contexts and circumstances during the study. Accordingly, the research design and 
data collection method were altered/modified to suit the new findings emerged during data 
collection. In other words, the research issues and the analytical framework were reoriented 
when they were not in accord with the empirical world (Dubois & Gadde 2002: 554); for 
example, the qualitative field survey in this research was supplemented with the participant 
observation method and the multiple case research design was changed to the a single case 
research design. 
This section ends with highlighting some limitations of our methodology. Although participant 
observation was used in the second stage of our fieldwork, ethical concerns emerged, since the 
researcher was partly employed by one of the stakeholders of the studied case. This might have 
caused researcher bias, with a focus on the observations of the private actor (being the 
employer of the researcher), and restricted sampling of other stakeholders such as the public 
actors and the PAPs.  
Consequently, in view of the research findings, the positive results of the PPP determined by the 
private actor’s contribution might have taken dominance over the negative results of the PPP.  
However, the researcher was fully aware of the above mentioned bias and hence took measures 
to overcome potential bias by investing in long-lasting fieldwork in combination with precisely-
prepared fieldwork guidelines as well as triangulation during data analysis.   
6.5. Further research 
Due to time constraints, this research work does not fully describe all the dimensions of the PPP 
in compulsory land conversion in the NP project. However, we believe that empirical findings will 
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inspire further research to succeed in portraying a clear picture of the delicate nature of the PPP 
in compulsory land conversion.     
We believe that compulsory land conversion is one of the most “painful” paradoxes of 
contemporary development, which has intrigued many social science researchers. We firmly 
believe that the findings of our research theme on involuntary resettlement unanimously merit 
additional investigation and elaboration, which will help shape and enhance the knowledge of 
the PPP under network perspective. 
The first suggestion presented here pertains to the power issue which is not sufficiently studied 
in the network literature (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). It would be interesting to explore various 
power configurations in compulsory land conversion, in particular the setting where cohesive 
power and power-over dominate the network settings. Our empirical findings draw attention to 
power proliferation of the private actor in the NP project as a result of financial resources 
utilization. Particularly, the power manipulated by giving additional benefits and incentives to 
the public actors as well as to the PAPs and PACs may represent a special power trajectory in 
developing countries. However, the findings underline the unused coercive power, being 
replaced by a softer form of mobilization power as well as the increase of power sharing in the 
form of power with and power to in the NP project. The power sharing found in this research 
seems to contradict the theoretical assumption that the dynamics of power manipulation may 
extend the power asymmetry in the compulsory land conversion by the financially powerful 
actors imposing control over lower power stakeholders. Thus, a powerful actor may choose to 
wield their levers behind the scenes (Agranoff and McGuire 2001). The research design of this 
work was inherently not intended to provide means to understand this process, especially its 
connection to the problem of democratic accountability in the NP project.  
The second suggestion is related to a more in-depth analysis of the economic recovery 
dimension of PPP. This dimension is somewhat neglected in the IR literature (Wicklin III 1999, 
Asthana 1996 and Cernea 1993 & 1997), and we believe that network analysis could be a helpful 
route forward to capture this important challenge in land conversion. We have found that the 
limited outcomes of the economic restoration activities in the NP project stemmed from the 
actors’ perceptions of a variety of problems, such as the limited awareness of the PAPs of 
economic restoration measures as well as the neglecting attitude of the government actors over 
the development goals in IR. In the meantime, the theoretical assumption in IR, particularly in 
mining induced displacements, critically stated that the reconciliation of economic development 
directives with the realization of the well-being of PAPs is impossible (Terminski 2012). The 
proposed research design aims to not only understand the structural factors of the PPP, but also 
the contextual conditions, such as the specific nature of mining induced displacements as one of 
the categories of IR, (Terminski 2012 and Parasuraman 1996) or the policy environments and the 
local conditions. A further elaboration can be inspired by normative research questions such as 
what are the key drivers which influence the effectiveness of the economic rehabilitation 
process. And what kinds of incentives are desired by the private sector to get engaged with 
sustainable development in a responsible manner? Besides, in view of the impoverishment risk 
and the construction model suggested by some well-known IR authors such as Cernea (1997, 
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2000), McDowell (2000) and Mathur (2008), there would be a great deal of research interests 
inspired by the practice in the NP project. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate if there are differences between the PPP in 
public service delivery and the CSR by a comparative study on the causal relationships between 
the input factors and the PPP/ CSR outputs and outcomes, which was not sufficiently explored by 
our qualitative case study. The findings of this research might suggest some hypothesises for 
testing which are more relevant for other quantitative studies 
Finally, the analytical framework presented in this research can be adopted by other research 
settings, especially multiple - case designs. Although the (internal) validity of the analytical 
framework was tested in separate units of analysis, such as two sub-studied cases, the single 
case design is still treated as disadvantageous by some scholars (Eisenhardt 1991 in Dubbois & 
Gadde 2002 and Yin 1984,). Therefore, external validity of this analytical framework can be re-
affirmed through other multiple-case designs. In this regard, a supplementary case can be 
selected on the basis of the preliminary results from the first case. This case can come from a 
non- PPP model, but the same contextual conditions (same district or province) in order to 
identify the “differences” associated with the studied PPP compared to the traditional mode of 
implementing land conversion in Viet Nam.   
6.6. Recommendations 
In our point of view, understanding the applicability of research findings in a particular context is 
important. Thus, this section discusses several ideas on the PPP as a new form of governance in 
the compulsory land conversion within the legislation context of Vietnam. 
In the transitional context of urbanization and industrialization of Vietnam, the concerns on how 
social conflicts in compulsory land conversion can be mitigated reaches deeply into the core of 
national policy and practice. Recently, the limited changes in the Land Laws revised in 2013 
demonstrate a deadlock in seeking for adequate policy solutions to resolve the dilemmas in IR. In 
line with the revised Land Laws, the compulsory land conversion mechanism still applies to 
projects with commercial purposes, despite strong objections of various scholars and 
practitioners, who base their opinions on the fact that the root-cause sources of conflicts in 
compulsory land conversion cannot be completely be eliminated at policy making level (Wells 
Dang 2013). This means that social conflicts were inevitable in compulsory land conversion 
projects in Vietnam. The NP project is not exceptional. 
Thus, given that PPP cannot eliminate social conflicts arising in IR, the outcomes of this research 
sufficiently demonstrate that PPP in IR has the potential to become an effective instrument in 
policy implementation and can contribute to conflict resolution. Thus, the transfer of “good 
practice” can be useful for both policy makers and practitioners. 
In view of policy making, the empirical-based findings in this research can eventually contribute 
towards policy implications in terms of good practice, useful elaborations of practical guidelines 
and principles for effective realization of compulsory land conversion policies. This implication 
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eventually contributes to conflict resolution in a sense that it can diminish one of the root-causes 
of conflicts, such as policy vagueness (WB 2009). To be more specific, the following provisions 
are recommended: 
First, resettlement should be more strictly viewed as part of economic development where  
rehabilitation should be seen as an “open issue”, encompassing various principles, and 
resettlement with long-term development initiatives such as for instance non-monetary benefit 
sharing mechanism. In particular, although the general principle of the current Land Law ensures 
a reasonable benefits sharing mechanism between the State, the investor, and the affected 
stakeholders, there are still no specific regulations as to how this reasonable sharing should be 
addressed in practice (Hung Vo 2009 and WB 2011). On the one hand, the poor-commitment of 
financial resources utilization for the CSRs as well as the scepticism of the philanthropic 
dimension of the PPP (or in other words, business-driven CSRs) as found in the NP project, mean 
that benefit sharing of for-profit resettlement projects should be mandated in a more specific 
manner. On the other hand, the practice in the NP project shows that the availability of private 
financing not only for sufficient compensation, support and resettlement but also for greater 
development objectives has essentially provided the government bodies more capacity to 
properly function in compulsory land conversion. This practice emphasizes financial strength as a 
pathway for private actors to enter the PPP in compulsory land conversion. 
Second, the identification of the development of the PPP regime in the NP project brings an 
important notion about the core of compulsory land conversion, which can be modified in a 
more flexible way. Indeed, although market based solutions “must not be applied to the 
compulsory land acquisition policies”, the PPP process in the NP project demonstrates a shift 
from an administrative process based on administrative decisions (WB 2009: 32) to certain 
market-based solutions which involve discussions on benefit sharing and timely policy 
corrections as a response to complaints and resistance stemming from the gaps or vagueness of 
the policy content. Thus, a more proactive attitude of the PPCs is needed, who are tasked to 
adapt government policies in the local context as well as to timely and flexibly revise and 
supplement additional provisions as a response to problem solving at implementation level. 
In view of the project practitioners- especially the public managers and senior civil servants, it is 
required proactive attitudes and behaviours while joining/ managing PPP in compulsory land 
conversion. Despite the fact that the PPP is found to be an effective instrument for problem 
solving and conflict resolution in compulsory land conversion, the legitimacy and democratic 
accountability issues also deserve careful deliberation. The greater involvement of the private 
actor in decision making, often accompanied by the proliferation of the private actor’s power 
bring a considerable concern about the ability of the government to manage the PPP and hold 
the PPP members, especially the private actor, accountable. From this perspective, attention 
should be paid to the role of the private actor in decision making and conflict resolution which 
should be precisely supervised through formal oversight organizations. In addition, in order to 
improve the structural conditions of lead organizations as well as the sanction mechanisms in a 
PPP network it is necessary to reinforce the existing public oversight bodies or to establish an 
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independent ombudsman for complaint resolutions, which will also safeguard democracy in 
compulsory land conversion. This recommendation thus may be useful also for policy makers. 
Another suggestion for the project practitioners is to generate additional resources for PPP by 
gaining access to national programs. Our empirical findings on the increased involvement of the 
public actors, instigated by increasing their funding needed for economic restoration activities in 
the NP project can be used to resolve one of the most critical challenges of the governments in 
developing countries- financial resource deficiency. Thus, financial resources of the public actors 
for a partnership can be generated by gaining access to national - level policies and programs, 
which can be engaged at project level.   
In view of the PAPs/ PACs and the lower-levels of government, the practice in studied case 
provided very clear evidence that the reactions of the PAPs and PACs demonstrated that social 
conflicts have eventually resulted in better policy and entitlements for the PAPs and PACs. It 
means that unless the government recognises the PAPs and PACs as one of key actors in the PPP, 
conflicts in compulsory land conversion are not likely to be solved.   
Thus the quality of participation should be enhanced so that the involvement of the PAPs and 
PACs in compulsory land conversion can be legally and practically acknowledged at both decision 
making and implementation levels. The PAPs, PACs are suggested to ask for a credible 
mechanism, through which they can exercise their functions as participating actors. Notably, the 
decision making agenda including planning, leadership & legitimacy building and managing 
conflicts should be treated as a collective action of the executive public and private agencies and 
the affected stakeholders.  
Finally, greater awareness raising activities should be made available to the affected 
stakeholders in the form of long-term rehabilitation measures, which were found to be 
undermined not only by the practitioners but also by a broad range of the affected people. 
 
 
  
 
 
311 
 
References 
Acuña-Alfaro, J., (2009). Reforming Public Administration in Viet Nam. Current Situation and Recommendations. 
SECODES & UNDP. The National Political Publishing House. Ha Noi, Viet Nam. pp. 447. 
Agranoff, R. (2007). Managing within networks: Adding value to public organizations. Georgetown University Press. 
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big questions in public network management research. Journal of public 
administration research and theory, 11(3), 295-326. 
Agranoff, R., & Mc Guide M. (2003). Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local Government. 
Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press. 
Albareda, L. (2008). Corporate responsibility, governance and accountability: from self-regulation to co-
regulation. Corporate Governance, 8(4), 430-439f. 
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of public administration 
research and theory, 18(4), 543-571. First published online: November 13, 2007. 
Asmal, K. (2004). Environment and Sustainability: Looking to the Future. In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (Eds.). (2004). The 
Partnership Principles: New Forms of Governance in the 21st century. Archetype Publications. London 184-195. 
Asthana, R. (1996). Involuntary resettlement: survey of international experience. Economic and Political Weekly, 1468-
1475. 
Atkinson, P., & Hammersley, M. (1994). Ethnography and participant observation. Handbook of qualitative research.  
In Denzin, Norman K. (Ed); Lincoln, Yvonna S. (Ed), (1994). Handbook of Qualitative Research: 248-261.  Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Aubert, V. (1963). Competition and dissensus: Two types of conflict and of conflict resolution. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 26-42. 
Auty, R. M., & Brown, K. (1997). An Overview of Approaches to Sustainable Development. Approaches to Sustainable 
Development, London: Pinter, 3-17. 
Balabanis, G., Phillips, H. C., & Lyall, J. (1998). Corporate social responsibility and economic performance in the top 
British companies: are they linked? European Business Review, 98(1), 25-44. 
Bass, B. M., & Bass, R. (2009). The Bass handbook of leadership: Theory, research, and managerial applications. Simon 
and Schuster. 
Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1994). Improving Organizational Effectiveness Through Transformational Leadership. Sage. 
Battenberg III, J. T. (2004). Global Partnership from a Business Perspective (p. 127-135). In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. 
(Eds.). (2004). The partnership principle: New forms of governance in the 21st century. Archetype Publications. 
London. 
Bebbington, A., Guggenheim, S., Olson, E., & Woolcock, M. (2004). Exploring social capital debates at the World 
Bank. Journal of Development Studies, 40(5), 33-64. 
Behura, N. K., & Nayak, P. K. (1993). “Involuntary Displacement and the Changing Frontiers of Kinship: A Study of 
Resettlement in Orissa”. In Cernea, M. M., & Guggenheim, S. E. (Eds.). “Anthropological Approaches to 
Resettlement. Policy, Practice and Theory”. Westview Press. Boulder. San Francisco. Oxford. 
Bellver, A., & Kaufmann, D. (2005). Transparenting transparency: Initial empirics and policy applications. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper. 
Benner, T., Reinicke, W. H., & Witte, J. M. (2004). Multisectoral Networks in Global Governance: Towards a Pluralistic 
System of Accountability 1. Government and opposition, 39(2), 191-210. 
Benner, T., Reinicke, W. H., & Witte, J. M. (2003). Global public policy networks: Lessons learned and challenges 
ahead. The Brookings Review, 18-21. 
312 
 
Benner, T., & Witte, J. M. (2004). Everybody’s Business: Accountability, Partnerships and Future of Global Governance 
( p. 36-47). In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (ed.) 2004. The Partnership Principles: New Forms of Governance in the 
21st century. Archetype Publications. London. 
Beresford, M., & Tran, A. N. (Eds.). (2004). Reaching for the dream: challenges of sustainable development in 
Vietnam (Vol. 33). NIAS Press. 
Bexell, M., & Mörth, U. (2010). Democracy and public-private partnerships in global governance. 
Beuselinck, E. (2008). Shiifting Public Sector Coordination and the Underlying Drivers of Change: a Neo - Institutional 
Perspective. Faculty of Social Sciences. Katholike University of Leuven (PhD Dissertation). 
Bich, D. T. N., & Van Eynde, S. (2013). 9. Public-private partnerships in CDM implementation in Vietnam. The 
Governance of Climate Relations Between Europe and Asia, 205. 
Blewitt, J. (2008). Understanding Sustainable Development. Earthscan (2008), pp. 288. 
Boyne, G. A. (2002). Theme: Local Government: Concepts and Indicators of Local Authority Performance: An 
Evaluation of the Statutory Frameworks in England and Wales. Public Money and Management, 22(2), 17-24. 
Börzel, T. A. (1998). Organizing Babylon‐On the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks. Public administration, 76(2), 
253-273. Blackwell Publishers. 
Bovens, M. (2005). Public accountability. The Oxford handbook of public management, 182. Page Proof. 
Bressers, H. T. A., & O'Toole Jr, L. J. (1998). The selection of policy instruments: A network-based perspective. Journal 
of Public Policy, 213-239. 
Brinkerhoff, J. M. (2002). Partnership as a social network mediator for resolving global conflict: the case of the World 
Commission on Dams. International Journal of Public Administration, 25(11), 1281-1310. 
Brown, M. M. (2004). Partnering with Private Sector in Development. In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (ed.) 2004. The 
Partnership Principles: New Forms of Governance in the 21st century. Archetype Publications. London. 210-223 
Brundtland, G. (1987). Our common future: Report of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development. 
Bruyninckx, H., & Belis, D. (Eds.). (2013). The Governance of Climate Relations Between Europe and Asia. Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Bruijn J.A. & Ringeling  A.B. (1997). Normative Notes: Perspectives on Networks.  (in Kickert et al. 1997: 152-165) 
Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Stone, M. M. (2006). The design and implementation of Cross‐Sector collaborations: 
Propositions from the literature. Public administration review, 66(s1), 44-55. Special Issue. 
Byrne, M. (2001). Grounded theory as a qualitative research methodology.AORN journal, 73(6), 1155-1156. 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FSL/is_6_73/ai_75562157/ 
Carroll, P., & Steane, P. (2000).  Public- Private Partnership: Sectoral Perspective. In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000): Public-
Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective. Advances in Management and Business 
studies; 19. London: Routledge.  36-56. 
Cernea, M. M. (Ed.). (1999). The economics of involuntary resettlement: Questions and challenges. World Bank 
Publications. 
Cernea, M. M., & Guggenheim, S. E. (1993). Anthropological approaches to resettlement: policy, practice, and theory. 
Westview Press. Boulder. San Francisco. Oxford. 
Cernea, M. M. (1996). Public policy responses to development-induced population displacements. Economic and 
political weekly, 1515-1523. 
Cernea, M. M. (1997). The risks and reconstruction model for resettling displaced populations. World 
development, 25(10), 1569-1587. World Bank. 
 
 
313 
 
Cernea, M. M. (2000). Impoverishment Risk and Reconstruction: a Model for Population Displacement and 
Resettlement. In Cernea, M. M., & McDowell, C. (eds.): Risks and Reconstruction: Experiences of Resettlers 
and Refugees. Washington DC. 2000, pp. 498. 
Cernea, M. M., & McDowell, C. (Eds.). (2000). Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees. World 
Bank Publications. 
Cernea, M. M. (2000). Risks, safeguards and reconstruction: a model for population displacement and 
resettlement. Economic and Political Weekly, 3659-3678. 
Cernea, M. M. (Ed.). (1999). The economics of involuntary resettlement: Questions and challenges. World Bank 
Publications. 
Cernea, M. M., & Mathur, H. M. (2008). Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? Reforming Resettlement 
through Investments and Benefit-Sharing. Oxford University Press. 
Cernea, M. M. (2008). Compensation and benefit sharing: Why resettlement policies and practices must be 
reformed. Water Science and Engineering, 1(1), 89-120. 
CIEM (2006). Reform of Public Service Supply in Viet Nam. Working paper No 4/2006. Center for Information and 
Documentation Vietnam Development Report 2009: Capital Matters. World Bank Ha Noi 
Clark, D. edited by André Carothers (ed.). Resettlement: The World Bank’s Assault on the Poor. Center for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL). May 2000. 
Colletta, N. J., Lim, T. G., & Kelles-Viitanen, A. (Eds.). (2001). Social cohesion and conflict prevention in Asia: Managing 
diversity through development. World Bank Publications. Asher, M. (2002). Social Cohesion and Conflict 
Prevention in Asia. Asian‐Pacific Economic Literature, 16(1), 50-51. 
Coleman, J. S. (1989). Social capital in the creation of human capital (pp. S105-108). University of Chicago Press. 
Collin, S. O., & Hansson, L. (2000). The Propensity, Persistence and Performance of Public Private Partnership in 
Sweden. In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000): Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective. Advances in Management and Business Studies; 19. Routledge. 
Coy, P. G., & Woehrle, L. M. (Eds.). (2000). Social conflicts and collective identities. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches. Second Edition. 
SAGE Publication. 
Crosby, B. C., & Bryson, J. M. (2005). A Leadership Framework for Cross - Sector Collaboration. Public Management 
Review 7 (2). Routledge. 
Cross, R., & Cummings, J. N. (2004). Tie and network correlates of individual performance in knowledge-intensive 
work. Academy of Management Journal, 47(6), 928-937. 
Culas, C., & Van Suu, N. (2010). Norms and Practices in Contemporary Rural Vietnam. 
Curtis, S., Gesler, W., Smith, G., & Washburn, S. (2000). Approaches to sampling and case selection in qualitative 
research: examples in the geography of health. Social Science & Medicine, 50(7), 1001-1014. Elsevier. 
Das, V. (1996). Dislocation and Rehabilitation: Defining a Field. Economic and Political Weekly, 1509-1514. 
Desrieux, C. (2006). Revisiting Relational Contracting In Public Private Partnerships: A Comparison of French and 
American Local Public Service. Paper Presentation in Colloque International ÉTAT ET REGULATION SOCIALE -  
Comment Penser La Coherence De L’Intervention Publique ? 11,12 et 13 Septembre 2006. Paris. 
De Sardan, J. P. O. (2005). Anthropology and Development: Understanding Comtemporary Social Change. Zed books. 
DeWalt, K. M., & DeWalt, B. R. (2010). Participant observation: A guide for fieldworkers. In Bernard, H.R. (ed.). 
Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology. Altamira. 
Dewalt K. M., Dewalt B. R. (2010). Participation Observation in Bernard, H. R. (1998). Handbook of methods in cultural 
anthropology. Altamira Press. 
314 
 
Dewalt K. M., Dewalt B. R. with Wayland C.B. (1998). Participation Observation in Bernard, H. R. (1998). Altamira 
Press, 259-300 
De Wet, C. (2001). Economic development and population displacement: Can everybody win?. Economic and Political 
Weekly, 4637-4646. STOR. 
De Wit, J., Sang, V., Van Chien, L., Hien, T., Hung, V., Ha, H., & Mai, M. (2012). Assessing decentralised policy 
implementation in Vietnam: The case of land recovery and resettlement in the Vung Ang Economic Zone. ISS 
Working Paper Series/General Series, 546(546), 1-55. 
Dingwerth, K. (2005). The democratic legitimacy of public-private rule making: What can we learn from the World 
Commission on Dams?. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International 
Organizations, 11(1), 65-83. 
Dowding, K. (1995). Model or metaphor? A critical review of the policy network approach. Political Studies, 43(1), 136-
158. 
Downing, T. E. (2002). Avoiding new poverty: mining-induced displacement and resettlement (Vol. 52). International 
Institute for Environment and Development. 
Dubois, A., & Gadde, L. E. (2002). Systematic Combining: An abductive Approach to Case Research. Journal of Business 
Research 55 (7): 553-560. Elsevier. 
Dubois, A., & Gadde, L. E. (2013). “Systematic combining”- A decade later. Journal of Business Research. 
Duc Ke & Phong Cam (2008). Do Thi Hoa va Cong Nghiep Hoa: Hang Trieu Nong Dan Bi Anh Huong. Urbanization & 
Industralization : Millions of Farmers Have Been Affected. Bao Tien Phong online : 
http://www.tienphong.vn/Thoi-Su/123715/Hang-trieu-nong-dan-bi-anh-huong.html 
Dunleavy, P. (2003). Authoring a PhD: How to plan, draft, write and finish a doctoral thesis or dissertation. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Dwivedi, R. (2002). Models and Methods in Development-Induced Displacement (Review Article). Development and 
Change, 33(4), 709-732. EBSCO Publishing. 
Easterly, W., Ritzen, J., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Social cohesion, institutions, and growth. Economics & Politics, 18(2), 
103-120. 
Edwards, V., & Phan, A. (2013). Managers and management in Vietnam: 25 years of economic renovation (Doi 
moi) (Vol. 114). Routledge. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: opportunities and challenges. Academy of 
management journal, 50(1), 25-32. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of management review, 14(4), 532-550. 
Elsig, M., & Amalric, F. (2008). Business and Public–Private Partnerships for Sustainability: Beyond Corporate Social 
Responsibility? Global society, 22(3), 387-404. Routledge. 
Escobar, A. (1997). The making and unmaking of the third world through development; in Majid Rahnema with 
Victoria Bawtree. The Post Development Reader.  Zed Books. 85-93. 
Eshuis, J., Braun, E., & Klijn, E. H. (2013). Place marketing as governance strategy: An assessment of obstacles in place 
marketing and their effects on attracting target groups. Public Administration Review, 73(3), 507-516. 
Eshuis, J., & Klijn, E. H. (2012). Branding in Governance and Public Management. Routledge. 
European Commission (2003). Guidelines for Successful  Public Private Partnerships. 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/ppp_en.pdf 
Falconer, P. K., & McLaughlin, K. (2000). Public Private Partnership and the New Labor Government in Britain. In 
Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000). Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective. 
Advances in Management and Business studies; 19. London: Routledge. 
 
 
315 
 
Fetterman, D. M. (1989). Ethography. Step by Step. Applied Social Research Methods Series. Sage. 
Fielding, N. G., & Fielding, J. L. (1986). Linking data: the articulation of qualitative and quantitative methods in social 
research. Beverly Hills (CA): Sage, 41-53. 
Fink, C. F. (1968). Some conceptual difficulties in the theory of social conflict. Journal of conflict resolution 12: 412. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study. Research Qualitative Inquiry 12 (2): 219-245. 
Forrer, J., Kee, J. E., Newcomer, K. E., & Boyer, E. (2010). Public–private partnerships and the public accountability 
question. Public Administration Review, 70(3), 475-484. 
Fortier, F. (2010). Taking a climate chance: A procedural critique of Vietnam's climate change strategy. Asia Pacific 
Viewpoint, 51(3), 229-247. 
Frances, J., Levacic, R., Mitchell, J., & Thompson, G. (1991). Markets, Hierarchies and Networks the Coordination of 
Social life. Edt. Sage Publc. London. 
Fritzen, S. A. (2006). Probing system limits: decentralisation and local political accountability in Vietnam. Asia Pacific 
Journal of Public Administration, 28(1), 1-23. 
Garriga, E., & Melé, D. (2004). Corporate social responsibility theories: mapping the territory. Journal of business 
ethics, 53(1-2), 51-71. 2004. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
Geddes, M. (2005): Making Public Private Partnerships Work: Building Relationships and Understanding Cultures.  
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 
Goerdel, H. T. (2006). Taking initiative: Proactive management and organizational performance in networked 
environments. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16(3), 351-367. 
Goodsell, C. T. (2006). A new vision for public administration. Public Administration Review, 66(4), 623-635. 
Goyal, S. (1996). Economic perspectives on resettlement and rehabilitation. Economic and Political Weekly, 1461-
1467. 
Gunawan, I. K. (2004). The Politics of the Indonesian Rainforest: A Rise of Forest Conflicts in East Kalimantan During 
Indonesia's Early Stage of Democratisation. Cuvillier Verlag. 
Ha, N. K. D. (2010). Danh Gia Thuc Trang va De Xuat Giai Phap Dam Bao On Dinh Nang Cao Chat Luong Cuoc Song 
Nguoi Dan Vung Di Dan Tai Dinh Cu. (Evaluation and Recomendation of Solution for Improving the Living 
Standards of the Resettlers). Ministry of Sciences and Technologies -  The Hue Province Vietnam.   
http://skhcn.hue.gov.vn/portal/?GiaoDien=11&ChucNang=341&NewsID=20100504075232 
Hailey, J. (2000). NGO Partners: The Characteristics of Effective Development Partnerships.  In Osborne, S. 
(2000). Public-private partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective. Routledge. 
Hall, C. M. (1999). Rethinking collaboration and partnership: A public policy perspective. Journal of sustainable 
tourism, 7(3-4), 274-289. 
Hall, T. E., & O'Toole, L. J. (2004). Shaping formal networks through the regulatory process. Administration & 
Society, 36(2), 186-207. 
Hamann, R. (2003). Mining companies' role in sustainable development: the'why'and'how'of corporate social 
responsibility from a business perspective. Development Southern Africa, 20(2), 237-254. Taylor & Francis. 
Hand, J. L. (1986). Resolution of social conflicts: dominance, egalitarianism, spheres of dominance, and game 
theory. Quart. Rev. Biol., 61, 201-220. University of Chicago Press. 
Hansen, T. (2012). The Generalist Approach to Conflict Resolution: A Guidebook. Lexington Books. 
Hardy, C., & Phillips, N. (1998). Strategies of engagement: Lessons from the critical examination of collaboration and 
conflict in an interorganizational domain. Organization science, 9(2), 217-230.  
Hart, O. (2003). Incomplete contracts and public ownership: Remarks, and an application to public‐private 
partnerships*. The Economic Journal, 113(486), C69-C76. Blackwell Publishing for the Royal Economic Society. 
316 
 
Hayllar, M. R., & Wettenhall, R. (2010). Public‐Private Partnerships: Promises, Politics and Pitfalls. Australian Journal of 
Public Administration, 69(s1), S1-S7. 
Heal, G. (2005). Corporate social responsibility: An economic and financial framework. The Geneva papers on risk and 
insurance-Issues and practice, 30(3), 387-409. 
Hendriks, C. M. (2009). Deliberative Governance in the Context of Power. Polity & Society 28 (3): 173-184. Elsevier. 
Hill, M. J., & Hupe, P. L. (2002). Implementing public policy: governance in theory and practice. London: Sage. 
Hill, R. P. (2002). Service Provision through Public-Private Partnerships An Ethnography Ofservice Delivery to Homeless 
Teenagers. Journal of Service Research, 4(4), 278-289. Sage. 
Hirschi, C. (2010). Strengthening Regional Cohesion: Collaborative Networks and Sustainable Development in Swiss 
Rural Areas. Ecology & Society, 15(4). http://www.ecologyvandsociety.org/vol15/ 
Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (1993). Patterns of policy instrument choice: policy styles, policy learning and the 
privatization experience. Review of Policy Research, 12(1‐2), 3-24. 
Human, S. E., & Provan, K. G. (2000). Legitimacy Building in the Evolution of Small Firm Multi- lateral Networks: A 
Comparative Study of Success and Demise. Administrative Science Quarterly 45 (2): 327-365. 
Hung, N. (2010). Bay Muoi Phan Tram Khieu Nai Lien Quan Den Dat Dai. (Seventy Percent of Petitions in Vietnam Is 
About Land Compensation). http://vnexpress.net/GL/Xa-hoi/2010/09/3BA20DEE/ 
Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. (2000). Leadership in the Shaping and Implementation of Collaborating Agendas: How 
Thinks Happen in a (no quite) Joined-up World. Academy of Management Journal (396): 1159-1175. 
Huxham, C. (2003). Theorizing Collaboration Practice. Public Management Review 5(3): 401–423. 
Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. (2005). Managing to collaborate: The theory and practice of collaborative advantage. 
Routledge. 
Huxham, C., & Vangen, S.  What makes partnerships work?. In Stephen P. Osborne (ed.) (2000). Public-Private 
Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective. Advances in Management and Business 
studies; 19. 2000. London: Routledge. 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) (1998). Doing Better Business Through Effective Public Consultation: A Good 
Practice Manual. The World Bank 
https://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/Publications_Handbook_DoingBetterBusiness 
Illich, I. (1997). Development as planned poverty. The post-development reader, 94-112. 
Jacobs, B. D. (2000). Partnership in Pittsburgh: The Evaluation of Complex Local Initiative.  In Osborne, S. 
(2000). Public-private partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective. Routledge. 
Jenkins, H. (2004). Corporate social responsibility and the mining industry: conflicts and constructs. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 11(1), 23-34. 
Johnston, B. R. (1994). Who pays the price. The Sociocultural Context of Environmental. Island Press. 
Johnson, J. C. (1990). Selecting ethnographic informants. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Johnston, W. J., Leach, M. P., & Liu, A. H. (1999). Theory testing using case studies in business-to-business 
research. Industrial Marketing Management, 28(3), 201-213. 
Jorgensen, D. L. (1989). Participant Observation- A Methodology for Human Studies. Sage. 
Kagermann, H. (2004). A Fair Share of Responsibility (p. 111-118). In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (ed.) 2004. The 
Partnership Principles: New Forms of Governance in the 21st century. Archetype Publications. 
Kambalame, D., & De Cleene, S. (2006). Partnership building as an approach to addressing corporate social 
responsibility in the agriculture sector in Malawi. Development Southern Africa, 23(2), 281-287. Routledge. 
Taylor and Francis Group. 
 
 
317 
 
Kanbur, R. (2003). Development economics and the compensation principle. International Social Science 
Journal, 55(175), 27-35. 
Kapucu, N., Hu, Q., & Khosa, S. (2014). The State of Network Research in Public Administration. Administration & 
Society, 0095399714555752. 
Khai, V. T. (2008). Thuc Trang Chinh Sach Phat Trien Nong Thon Hien Nay. (The Situation of Recent Rural Development 
Policies). Nong Nghiep Viet Nam (The Vietnamese Agriculture) 9-10 July 2008. 
http://www.talawas.org/talaDB/showFile.php?res=14013&rb=0502 
Khanom, N. A. (2010). Conceptual issues in defining public private partnerships (PPPs). International Review of 
Business Research Papers, 6(2), 150-163. 
Kickert, W. J., Klijn, E. H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (Eds.). (1997). Managing complex networks: strategies for the public 
sector. Sage. 
Kickert, W. J., & Koppenjan, J. F. (1997). Public management and network management: An overview. Netherlands 
Institute of Government. 
Kim, A. M. (2009). Land Takings in the Private Interest: Comparisons of Urban Land Development Controversies in the 
United States, China, and Vietnam. Cityscape:  A Journal of Policy Development and Research. 19-31. 
Kirkby, J., O'Keefe, P., & Timberlake, L. (1995). The Earthscan reader in sustainable development. Earthscan 
Publications Ltd. 
Klijn, E. H. (1997). Policy networks: an overview. Managing complex networks. Strategies for the public sector, 14-34. 
Klijn, E. H., & Teisman, G. R. Governing Public - Private Partnerships: Analysing and Managing the Process and 
Institutional Characteristics of Public Private Partnerships. In Osborne, S.  (ed.) (2000). Public-Private 
Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective. Advances in Management and Business 
studies; 19. 2000. London: Routledge. 
Klijn, E. H., & Teisman, G. R. (2003). Institutional and Strategic Barriers to Public - Private Partnership: An Analysis of 
Dutch Cases. Public money and Management, 23(3), 137-146. 
Klijn, E. H. (2008). Complexity Theory and Public Administration: What's New? Key concepts in complexity theory 
compared to their counterparts in public administration research. Public Management Review, 10(3), 299-317. 
Routledge. 
Klijn, E. H. (2008). Networks as perspective on policy and implementation. In Cropper, S., Ebers, M., Huxham, C., & 
Ring, P. (2008), Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press pp: 118-146 
Klijn, E. H. (2001). Rules as Institutional Context for Decision Making in Networks The Approach to Postwar Housing 
Districts in Two Cities. Administration & Society, 33(2), 133-164. 
Klijn, E. H., & Edelenbos, J. (2011). The Influence of Democratic Legitimacy on Outcomes in Governance Networks. 
Paper for the 11
th
 conference of the Pubic Management Research Association (PMRA), 2-4 June 2011, Maxwell 
School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse, USA. 
Klijn, E. H., Eshuis, J., & Braun, E. (2012). The influence of stakeholder involvement on the effectiveness of place 
branding. Public Management Review, 14(4), 499-519. 
Klijn, E. H., & Koppenjan, J. F. (2006). Institutional design: changing institutional features of networks. Public 
management review, 8(1), 141-160. 
Klijn, E. H., & Koppenjan, J. F. (2000). Public management and policy networks: foundations of a network approach to 
governance. Public Management an International Journal of Research and Theory, 2(2), 135-158. 
Knill, C., & Lehmkuhl, D. (2002). Private actors and the state: internationalization and changing patterns of 
governance. Governance, 15(1), 41-63. 
318 
 
Knoke, D., & Kuklinski, J. H. (1991). Network Analysis: Basic Concepts. In Grahame, T., Frances, J., Levacic, R., & 
Mitchell, J. (eds) (1991). Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: the coordination of social life. London: Sage. 173-
182. 
Koch, C. and Buser, M. (2006). Emerging metagovernance as an institutional framework for public private partnership 
network in Denmark. International Journal of Project Management 24 (7):548–556. Governing Science, 
Technology and Innovation. 
Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Klijn, E. H. (2004). Managing uncertainties in networks: a network approach to problem solving 
and decision making. Psychology Press. 
Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Enserink, B. (2009). Public-private partnerships in urban infrastructures: reconciling private 
sector participation and sustainability. Public Administration Review, 69(2), 284-296. 
Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2005). The Formation of Public‐Private Partnerships: Lessons from Nine Transport Infrastructure 
Projects in The Netherlands. Public Administration, 83(1), 135-157. 
Kriesberg, L., Northrup, T. A., & Thorson, S. J. (Eds.). (1989). Intractable conflicts and their transformation. Syracuse 
University Press. 
Kriesberg, L. (2007). Constructive conflicts: From escalation to resolution. Rowman & Littlefield. 
Kumar, K., & Van Dissel, H. G. (1996). Sustainable collaboration: managing conflict and cooperation in 
interorganizational systems. Mis Quarterly, 279-300. 
Kumar, R. (1999). Research Methodology. A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginner. Sage. 
Levacic, R. (1991). Market and Government: Overview. In Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R., & Mitchell, J. (eds) 
(1991). Markets, hierarchies and networks: the coordination of social life. London: Sage. 25-34. 
Lewis, D. (2000). Building “Active” Partnership in Aid - Recipient Countries: Lesson From a Rural Development Project 
in Bangladesh. In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000). Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective. Advances in Management and Business studies; 19. 2000. London: Routledge. 
Lewis, S. J., & Russell, A. J. (2011). Being embedded: A way forward for ethnographic research. Ethnography, 12(3), 
398-416. Sage. 
Linder, S. H. (1999). Coming to Terms with the Public-Private Partnership A Grammar of Multiple Meanings. American 
behavioral scientist, 43(1), 35-51. 
Lund-Thomsen, P. (2009). Assessing the impact of public–private partnerships in the global south: The case of the 
Kasur tanneries pollution control project.Journal of Business Ethics, 90(1), 57-78. 
Lukes, S. (1974). Power: A radical view (Vol. 1). Macmillan: London. 
Mandell, M., & Keast, R. (2007). Evaluating network arrangements: Toward revised performance measures. Public 
Performance & Management Review, 30 (4), 574-597. 
Marin, B. (1991). Policy networks: Empirical evidence and theoretical considerations. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. 
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (2010). Designing qualitative research. Sage. 
Marsh, D. (1998). The development of the policy network approach (pp. 3-17). Comparing policy networks. 
Buckingham: Open Univerty Press. 
McDonald, B. D. (2006). From compensation to development: Involuntary resettlement in the People's Republic of 
China. University of Melbourne, School of Anthropology, Geography and Environmental Studies. 
http://repository.unimelb.edu.au/10187/3122 
McDowell, C. (2002). Involuntary resettlement, impoverishment risks, and sustainable livelihoods. The Australasian 
Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies, 2, 2002-2. 
McDowell, C. (Ed.). (1996). Understanding impoverishment: The consequences of development-induced 
displacement (Vol. 2). Berghahn books. 
 
 
319 
 
McLaughlin, K., & Osborne, S. P. (2000). A One- Way Street or Two Way Traffic? Can Public Private Partnership Impact 
on the Policy Making Process? In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000). Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in 
International Perspective. Advances in Management and Business studies; 19. 2000. London: Routledge. 
McPherson, M. F. (2012). Land Policy in Vietnam Challenges and Prospects for Constructive Change. Journal of 
Macromarketing, 32(1), 137-146. Sage. 
McQuaid, R. W. (2000).  The Theory of Partnership: Why have Partnership? In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000). Public-Private 
Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International Perspective. Advances in Management and Business 
Studies; 19. London: Routledge. P 9-35. 
Menahem, G., & Stein, R. (2013). High‐capacity and low-capacity governance networks in welfare service delivery: a 
typology examination of the case of israeli municipalities. Public Administration, 91(1), 211-231. 
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook. Sage. 
Mintzberg, H., & Waters, J. A. (1985). Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. Strategic management journal, 6(3), 
257-272. 
Miraftab, F. (2004). Public-Private Partnerships The Trojan Horse of Neoliberal Development?. Journal of Planning 
Education and Research, 24(1), 89-101. 
Moore, C. W. (1996). 2nd edition The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict [Paperback] San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996. 
Moore, M., & Hartley, J. (2008). Innovations in governance. Public Management Review, 10(1), 3-20. Routledge. 
Morçöl, G. (2005). A new systems thinking: implications of the sciences of complexity for public policy and 
administration. Public Administration Quarterly, 297-320. Fall. 
Morçöl, G., & Wachhaus, A. (2009). Network and complexity theories: A comparison and prospects for a 
synthesis. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 31(1), 44-58.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7440/is_200903/ai_n39229451/ 
Mosse, D. (Ed.). (2011). Adventures in Aidland. The anthropology of professionals in international development (Vol. 
6). Berghahn Books. 
Moulton, L., & Anheier, H. K. (2000). Public Private Partnership in the United States: Historical Patterns and Current 
Trends. In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000). Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective. Advances in Management and Business studies; 19. London: Routledge. 
Murray, V. (2000). Evaluating the impact of public private partnership: a Canadian perspective. In Osborne, S. 
(2000). Public-private partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective. Routledge. 
Neubert, M. J., & Taggar, S. (2004). Pathways to informal leadership: The moderating role of gender on the 
relationship of individual differences and team member network centrality to informal leadership 
emergence. The Leadership Quarterly, 15(2), 175-194. Elsevier. 
Neuman, W. L. (2004).  Basics of social research. Qualitative and quantitative approaches. Pearson. 
Northrup, T. A. (1989). The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict. In Kriesberg, L., Northrup, T. A., & 
Thornson, S. J. (ed) (1989). Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation. Syracuse University Press. p 55-82 
Oliver-Smith, A. (1991). Involuntary resettlement, resistance and political empowerment. Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 4(2), 132-149, Oxford University Press 1991. 
Oliver-Smith, A. (1996). Fighting for a place: The policy implications of resistance to development-induced 
resettlement. Understanding impoverishment: The consequences of development-induced displacement, 77-
97. 
Oliver-Smith, A. (1996). Anthropological research on hazards and disasters. Annual review of anthropology, 303-328. 
Osborne, S. (2000). Public-private partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective. Routledge. 
320 
 
Osborne, S. P., & Murray, V. (2000). Understanding the process of public-private partnerships. In Osborne, S. (ed.) 
(2000). Public-private partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective, 70-83. Routledge. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing The Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1986). An agenda for the study of institutions. Public choice, 48(1), 3-25. 
O'Toole Jr, L. J. (1997). Treating networks seriously: Practical and research - based agendas in public 
administration. Public administration review, 45-52. 
O'Toole Jr, L. J. (1997). Implementing Public Innovations in Network Settings. Administration & Society 29 (2) : 115-
138. Sage.  
Pagaza, I. P., & Argyriades, D. (Eds.). (2009). Winning the Needed Change: Saving Our Planet Earth: a Global Public 
Service (Vol. 30). IOS Press. 
Painter, M. (2003). Public administration reform in Vietnam: problems and prospects. Public Administration and 
Development, 23(3), 259-271. 
Parasuraman, S. (1996). Development projects, displacement and outcomes for displaced: two case studies. Economic 
and Political Weekly, 1529-1532. 
Participation, Negotiation and Conflict Management in Large Dam Projects. 2000. Secretariat of the World 
Commission on Dams. www.dams.org 
Pattberg, P., Biermann, F., Chan, M., & Mert, A. (2007). Partnership for Sustainable Development: An Appraisal 
Framework. Global Governance Working Paper No 31- Oct 2007. www.glogov.org 
Patten, D. M. (1992). Intra-industry environmental disclosures in response to the Alaskan oil spill: a note on legitimacy 
theory. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17(5), 471-475. 
Patton, M. Q. (1999). Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis. Health services research, 34(5 Pt 2), 
1189. 
Pautsch Weischer, M. C. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility as a tool for sustainable development-The public sector 
endorsement of CSR in the development of the world’s periphery (Doctoral dissertation). 
Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (1998). Governance without government? Rethinking public administration. Journal of public 
administration research and theory, 8(2), 223-243. 
Petschow, U., Rosenau, J. N., & von Weizsäcker, E. U. (Eds.). (2005).Governance and sustainability: New challenges for 
states, companies and civil society. Greenleaf Pub. 
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2004). Public management reform: A comparative analysis. Oxford University Press. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2011). Creating shared value. Harvard business review, 89(1/2), 62-77 
Provan, K. G., & Milwards, H. B.  (2001): Do Network Really Work? A Framework for Evaluating Public Sectors 
Organizational Frameworks.  Public  Administration Review 61 (2): 414-423. 
Punch, M. (1994). Politics and ethics in qualitative research. Handbook of qualitative research, 2, 83-98. 
Punch M. The Politics and Ethics of Fieldwork.  Qualitative Research Methods Series 3. Sage 1986. 
Quinn, C., & Snell, C. (2008). Book Review Perspectives: An Introduction to Sustainable Development by Rogers, P., 
Jalal, K., & Boyd, J. (2007)- Earthscan. The e-Journal: Sustainability: Science, Practice, and Policy. Spring 2008 Vol 
4, 1. http://sspp.proquest.com/archives/vol4iss1/book.rogers.html 
Raab, J., & Milward, H. B. (2003). Dark networks as problems. Journal of public administration research and 
theory, 13(4), 413-439. 
Rahnema, M., & Bawtree, V. (1997). The post-development reader. Zed Books. 
 
 
321 
 
Reed, A. M., & Reed, D. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility, Public Private Partnerships and Human Development: 
Towards a New Agenda (and Beyond). Paper presented at the Conference “Public Private Partnership in the 
Post - WSSD Context”. Copehaghen Business School. August 14-15, 2006. 
http://unrisd.org/unrisd/website/events.nsf/b79a596027955ef080256b530039c1c3/fb216dc8973104b1c1257
21200422734/$FILE/ReedCSR.pdf 
Reed, A. M., & Reed, D. (2009). Partnerships for development: Four models of business involvement. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 90(1), 3-37. 
Reiter-Theil, S. (2004). Does empirical research make bioethics more relevant?“The embedded researcher” as a 
methodological approach. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 7(1), 17-29. 
Rhodes, R. A. W. (1980). Some myths in central-local relations. Town Planning Review, 51(3), 270. 
Rhodes, R. A. (1997). Understanding governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity and accountability. Open 
University Press. 
Rogers, P. P., Jalal, K. F., & Boyd, J. A. (2008).  An Introduction to Sustainable Development. Factor 10: The future of 
stuff, 4(1), 50. Earthscan. 
Rosenau, P. V. (1999). Introduction The Strengths and Weaknesses of Public-Private Policy Partnerships. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 43(1), 10-34. 
Sabatier, P. A., & Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1999). The advocacy coalition framework: An assessment. Theories of the policy 
process, 118, 188. 
Salkind, N. J.  (2006). Exploring Research (Six Edition). Pearson. 
Scaroni, P. (2004) Plugged into Society (p.119-126). In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (ed.) 2004. The Partnership Principles: 
New Forms of of Governance in the 21st century. Archetype Publications. London. 
Scharpf, F.W. (1978). Inter organizational Policy Studies: Issue, Concepts and Perspectives in K.I. Hanf and F.W. Scharpf 
(eds): 345-70. 
Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in policy research (Vol. 1997). Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press. 
Schäferhoff, M., Campe, S., & Kaan, C. (2009). Transnational Public‐Private Partnerships in International Relations: 
Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results. International Studies Review, 11(3), 451-474. 
Schmidheiny, S. (2004). Partners, Governance and Government. In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (ed.) 2004. The 
Partnership Principles: New Forms of of Governance in the 21st century. Archetype Publications. London. 175- 
183. 
Schuh, G. E.  (1993): Involuntary Resettlement, Human Capital and Economic Development. In Cernea, M. M., & 
Guggenheim, S. E. (1993). Anthropological approaches to resettlement: policy, practice, and theory. Westview 
Press. Boulder. San Francisco. Oxford (p. 55-62). 
Schwartzman, H. B. (1993). Ethnography in organizations (Vol. 27). Sage. 
Selsky, J. W., & Parker, B. (2005). Cross-sector partnerships to address social issues: Challenges to theory and 
practice. Journal of Management, 31(6), 849-873. 
Sensarma, S. R., & Okada, N. (2007). Social Conflict over Displacement, Resource Rights and Survival Risk: A Case Study 
of Rajaji National Park, India.京都大学防災研究所年報. B= Disaster Prevention Research Institute Annuals. 
B, 50(B), 177-188. 
Sharma, R. N. (2003). Involuntary Displacement: a few encounters. Economic and Political Weekly, 907-912. 
Shihata, I. E. (1993). Legal Aspects of Involuntary Resettlement. In Cernea, M. M., & Guggenheim, S. E. 
(1993). Anthropological approaches to resettlement: policy, practice, and theory. West view Press. Boulder. 
San Francisco. Oxford (p. 39-54). 
322 
 
Skelcher, C., & Sullivan, H. (2008). Theory-driven approaches to analysing collaborative performance. Public 
Management Review, 10(6), 751-771. 
Skelcher, C. (2005). Jurisdictional integrity, polycentrism, and the design of democratic 
governance. Governance, 18(1), 89-110. 
Skelcher, C., De Rynck, F., Kiln, E. H., & Voets, J. (2008). Designing Democratic Institutions for Collaborative Economic 
Development: Lessons from Belgian and Dutch Case. In Considine, M., & Giguere, S. (eds) (2008): The Theory 
and Practice of Local Governance and Economic Development. Basingstoke : Palgrave 215-232  
Sonnenberg, D., & Münster, F. (2001). Mining Minerals Sustainable Development Southern Africa. Research Topic 3: 
Mining and Society. Involuntary Resettlement. 
Sørensen, E. (2006). Metagovernance the changing role of politicians in processes of democratic governance. The 
American review of public administration, 36(1), 98-114. 
Stake, R. (1994). Case studies. In Denzin, N., Lincoln, Y. (Eds.). Handbook of Qualitative Research: 236-247. Sage. 
London. 
Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (2004). The Partnership Principles: New Forms of Governance in the 21st Century. Archetype 
Publications. London. 
Stillman, P. G. (1974). The Concept of Legitimacy. Polity, 7 (1): 32-56. 
Stogdill, R. M. (1950). Leadership, membership and organization. Psychological bulletin, 47(1), 1. 
Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: five propositions. International social science journal, 50(155), 17-28. 
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of management 
review, 20(3), 571-610. 
Tadem, T. S. E. (2003). (2000). Transforming the State into a Partner in Cooperative Development: an evaluation of 
NGO- government Partnerships in Philippine. In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000). Public-Private Partnerships: Theory 
and Practice in International Perspective. Advances in Management and Business studies; 19. Routledge 
Tan, P. V. (2008). PhD Thesis (In Vietnamese). Social Conflicts in Rural areas of Viet Nam. In the reform era (Xung dot 
xa hoi o nong thon thoi ky doi moi). Ministry of Education and Ho Chi Minh National Administration Academy. 
Teisman, G. R., & Klijn, E. H. (2008). Complexity theory and public management: An introduction. Public Management 
Review, 10(3), 287-297. Routledge. 
Teisman, G. R., & Klijn, E. H. (2002). Partnership arrangements: governmental rhetoric or governance scheme?. Public 
Administration Review, 62(2), 197-205. 
Termeer, C. J. A. M., & Koppenjan, J. F. (1997). Managing perceptions in networks. Managing complex networks: 
Strategies for the public sector, 79-97. In Termeer, C. J. A. M., & Koppenjan, J. F. (1997). Managing perceptions 
in networks. Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector, 79-97. 
Terminski, B. (2012). Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement. Social Problem and Human Rights Issue. 
Research Paper, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10535/8836 
Thanh, N. Q. (2005). Su Giao Thoa Giua Von Xa Hoi Voi Cac Giao Dich kinh Te Trong Gia Dinh : So Sanh Gia Dinh Viet 
Nam Va Gia Dinh Han Quoc (The Social Capital Interference with Household Economic Interactions: 
Comparison between Vietnamese Households and Korean Households). Xa Hoi Hoc (The Sociology) No 2 (90) 
2005. P 108-121. 
The Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) 2012: Measuring citizens’ 
experiences. 
The World bank Operational Policies (OP) 4.12 (2001). Involuntary Resettlement. 
Thomas, K. W. (1992). Conflict and conflict management: Reflections and update. Journal of Organizational 
Behavior, 13(3), 265-274. 
 
 
323 
 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organization in Action. McGraw Hill, New York. 
Thorne, K. (2009). Symposium-Network Theory in the Twenty-First Century: New Direction or Dead-End for Public 
Administration?: Introduction.Administrative Theory & Praxis, 31(1), 38-43. 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7440/is_200903/ai_n39229451/ 
Thynne, I., & Massey, A. (2009). Global governance: prospects and challenges. In Pagaza, I. P., & Argyriades, D. (Eds.). 
(2009). Winning the Needed Change: Saving Our Planet Earth: a Global Public Service (Vol. 30). 13-27. IOS 
Press 
Tricker, M. (2000). Rural Action for the Environment in the UK: Developing Partnerships and Promoting Learning 
Through Network. In Osborne, S. (ed.) (2000). Public-Private Partnerships: Theory and Practice in International 
Perspective. Advances in Management and Business studies; 19. 2000. London: Routledge 
Tuan Anh, N. (2009). PhD Thesis on Kinship as Social Capital Economic, Social and Cultural Dimensions of Changing 
Kinship Relations in a Northern Vietnamese Village. VRIJE Universiteit, Netherlands. 
Ty, P. V., Van Westen, A. C. M., & Zoomers, A. (2013). Compensation and Resettlement Policies after Compulsory Land 
Acquisition for Hydropower Development in Vietnam: Policy and Practice. Land, 2(4), 678-704 
UNDP 2001: Modernizing Governance in Viet Nam. UNDP Ha Noi. 
UNDP Viet Nam (2005). The Millennium Development Goals and Viet Nam’s Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-
2010. 
Utting, P., & Zammit, A. (2009). United Nations-business partnerships: Good intentions and contradictory 
agendas. Journal of Business Ethics, 90(1), 39-56. 
Utting, P. (Ed.). (2002). The greening of business in developing countries: rhetoric, reality, and prospects. London: Zed 
Books. 
Utting, P. (2005). Corporate responsibility and the movement of business. Development in practice, 15(3-4), 375-388. 
Routledge. 
Van Damme, J., & Brans, M. (2011). Public participation and the quest for policy legitimacy. status: published. 
Van Dijk, M. P., & Pfisterer, S. (2009). Review of the WSSD Public-Private Partnership Program in Tanzania. Expert 
Centre for Sustainable Business and Development Cooperation. 
Van Garsse, S., Verhoest, K., & Vlaanderen, S. B. O. (2007). Trust in Public-Private Partnerships. Status: published. 
Van Gestel, K., Voets, J., & Verhoest, K. (2012). How governance of complex PPPS affects performance. Public 
Administration Quarterly, 36(2).  
Van Gestel, K., Voets, J. & Verhoest, K. (2010). It takes two to tango: The interplay between trust and control in PPPs 1 
2. Paper presented at IRSPM XIV, 2010, 7-9. 
Van Tulder, R. (2010). The Collaborative Paradigm: Dealing with the Increasing Role of Partnerships in Sustainable 
Development. The Partnership Resources Center. Working Paper Series ISSN 2211-7318. 
Van Wicklin, W. A.  III (1999). Sharing Project Benefits for Improving Resettlers’s Livelihoods. In Cernea, M. M. (Ed.). 
(1999). The economics of involuntary resettlement: Questions and challenges. World Bank Publications. 
Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. (2003). Nurturing collaborative relations Building trust in interorganizational 
collaboration. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 39(1), 5-31. 
Viet Nam Development Report (VDR) 2012. Market Economy for a Middle Income Viet Nam. World Bank Ha Noi. 
Vietnam Development Report (VDR) 2011: Natural Resources Management. World Bank Ha Noi.  
Viet Nam Development Report (VDR) 2010: Modern Institutions. World Bank Ha Noi. 
Vietnam Development Report (VDR) 2007: Vietnam - Aiming high. World Bank Ha Noi.  
324 
 
Vinh, V. K., & Son, H. S. (2009). Phong Ngua Xung Dot Xa Hoi (Social Conflict Prevention). Xa Hoi Hoc (The Sociology 
Review) No 3 (107), 2009 (pp 3-18). Nha XB KHXH (Social Science Publisher)  
Vinh, V. K. (2009). Mot So Van De Mang Tinh Nguyen Tac Cua Nghien Cuu Xung Dot Xa Hoi va Dong Thuan Xa Hoi O 
Phuong Dien Thuc Tien (Some Principal Issues of Social Conflicts and Social Coherence Studies in Practice). (pp 
13-19). Tap chi Nghien cuu Chau Au (The European Studies ) No 6 (105) 2009. 
Vo, D. H.  (2009): Improving Land Acquisition and Voluntary Land Conversion in Vietnam. Policy Note, The World Bank. 
Voets, J., Van Dooren, W., & De Rynck, F. (2008). A framework for assessing the performance of policy 
networks. Public management review, 10(6), 773-790. 
Voets, J. (2008). PhD Thesis:  Intergovernmental Relations in Multi- Level Management: Collaborative Public 
Management in Flanders. Katholieke University of Leuven. 
Voets, J., De Rynck, F., & Van Dooren, W. (2006). Managing and measuring collaborative performance. Paper 
Presented in the Conference “A Performing Public Sector: the Second TransAtlantic Dialogue”. Leuven, 
Belgium. 
Wachhaus, A.  (2008). PhD Dissertation. NETWORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS. The Pennsylvania State University. The Graduate School. School of Public Affairs. 
Wachhaus, A. (2009). Networks in contemporary public administration: A discourse analysis. Administrative Theory & 
Praxis, 31(1), 59-77. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7440/is_200903/ai_n39229451/ 
Walzer, N., & Jacobs, B. D. (Eds.). (1998). Public-private partnerships for local economic development. Greenwood 
Publishing Group. 
Wanek, A. (1996). The State and Its Enemies in Papua New Guinea. Curzon Press or nguon khac la. Routledge.  2013. 
Warhurst, A. (2005). Future roles of business in society: the expanding boundaries of corporate responsibility and a 
compelling case for partnership. Futures, 37(2), 151-168. 
WCD (2000). Participation, Negotiation and Conflict Management in Large Dams Projects. Thematic Review V.5, 
November 2000. RESOLVE Inc and its International Partners. www.dams.org 
Weick, K. E. (1979). The Social Psychology of Organizing 2
nd
 ed. New York. Random House. 
Wells-Dang  A. (2013). Promoting Land Rights in Vietnam: A Multi-Sector Advocacy Coalition Approach. Paper 
prepared for presentation at the “ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY” The World 
Bank - Washington DC, April 8-11, 2013 
Werbner, P. (1991). Taking and Giving: Working Women and Female Bonds in s Pakistani Immigrant Neighborhood. In 
Thompson, G., Frances, J., Levacic, R., & Mitchell, J. (eds) (1991). Markets, Hierarchies and Networks: the 
coordination of social life. London: Sage. 215-226. 
Wilmsen, B., Webber, M., & Duan, Y. (2011). Involuntary Rural Resettlement Resources, Strategies, and Outcomes at 
the Three Gorges Dam, China. The Journal of Environment & Development, 20(4), 355-380. SAGE Publications. 
Windsor, D. (2006). Corporate social responsibility: three key approaches. Journal of management studies, 43(1), 93-
114. Blackwell Publishing. 
Witte, J. M., Streck, C., & Benner, T. (2003). The road from Johannesburg: What future for partnerships in global 
environmental governance? www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Road_from_ Johannesburg_Artic.pdf. 65-84 
Woolcock, M., & Narayan, D. (2000). Social capital: Implications for development theory, research, and policy. The 
world bank research observer, 15(2), 225-249. 
WB (2011): Compulsory Land Acquisition and Voluntary Land Conversion in Viet Nam. WB Ha Noi.  
WB (2000).  Voice of the Poor. The World Bank. 
World Bank Group (1990). Operational Policies (OPs) and Operational Directives (ODs) 4.30. OP 4.01 Environmental 
Assessment and OP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement. Washington D.C Processed. 
 
 
325 
 
Yergin, D. (2004). The Rule of the Game (p. 195-204). In Stern, S., & Seligmann, E. (ed.) 2004. The Partnership 
Principles: New Forms of of Governance in the 21st century. Archetype Publications. London. 
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods (Vol. 5). sage. 
Yin, R. K. (1981). Case Study Crisis: Some Answers. Administrative Science Quarterly 26 (1): 58-65. 
Yin, R. K. (2012). Applications of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Yin, R. K. (2010). Qualitative research from start to finish. Guilford Press. 
Yin, R. K. (1984). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Sage 
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. (2
nd
 edition) Sage 
Ysa, T. (2007). Governance forms in urban public-private partnerships. International Public Management 
Journal, 10(1), 35-57. 
Zhang, Y., & Huxham, C. (2009). Identity construction and trust building in developing international collaborations. The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 45(2), 186-211. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
326 
 
Documentation for review 
1. Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) of NP project 2005 and the Updated versions  
2. NP Global Sustainability 2013 
3. Masan Resources stakeholders analysis 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 
4. NPM Newsletters 2012-2013 
5. Monthly reports of the task force group for complaint resolution  
6. Annual socio- economic report of the Dai Tu district  
7. Annual socio- economic report of the Ha Thuong, Hung Son, Tan Linh and Cat Ne communes  
8. Summary of the stakeholders in the NP project 
9. NPM Community Development Plan (CDP) 2007 
10. PCDP Master plan 2006 
11. Social Audit reports 2011-2012-2013 of the NP project 
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15. Organizational structure of NPM  
16. NPM Annual Reports (2011, 2012, 2013) 
17. NP Gender Program Report 2011 
18. INCO Methodology (2000) 
19. Protocol for fieldwork survey (INCO project 2000) 
20. Reports of the taks force group for complaint resolution 
21. Reports on information disclosure and visitors to the Project information center 2011-2012-2013 
22. PPP in Compulsory land conversion by pictures (100 picture) 
23. Thai Nguyen DONRE Activity Report 2012  
24. Thai Nguyen DOC Activity Report 2012  
25. Timesheet for NPM Allowance for the task force group for Complaint Resolution  
26. Service Contracts between NPM and the District Board of CSR  
27. PCDP assessment survey of the NP project 2010 
28. Report on survey on information disclosure activities on Land Management in Vietnam 2010 
29. Thai Nguyen Provincial socio-economic report 2011 & 2010 
30. Vietnam CPI report 2011 
31. NP project feasible study (2002) 
32. NuiphaoVica Joint Venture Agreement 
33. NPM survey report on How PAPs used compensation payment 2009 
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Appendix 1: Overview of solutions and instruments in IR projects in Vietnam  
 Approach Solution/ instrument Project Status 
Policy making level  
1 
Legislation & 
institution  
The amendment of 
Land Laws and 
respective Decree on 
Resettlement and 
compensation  
5 years of working on 
principles and from 
2003 – official 
implementation of 
about resettlement 
regulation 
Improved, more interest 
for affected people; 
Decentralization at 
provincial levels; 
Responsible institutions for 
resettlement and 
compensation 
2 Legislation  
A Decree on benefit 
sharing for affected 
people in hydropower 
dam projects 
Since 2006- 
preparation and pilot 
phases, ADB  
On going 
3 
Applicability of  
international 
standards 
(ADB, WB) 
More interests for 
affected people 
(including eligible 
status); more 
consultation, 
participation and 
supervision  
Applicable for ODA 
projects; for national 
roads and highways, 
dams and power 
plants 
Good preparation plan 
(RAP, CDP, EIA) but 
problems in 
implementation; 
coordination with local 
authorities  
Implementation level  
1 
Involuntary 
mechanism with 
more attention 
on affected 
people  
Set up business or service 
shops in the same area 
for every affected 
household, who lost 
more than 30% of 
agricultural land 
Recently in Hanoi (from 
2006-2007) 
There is little evidence about 
this approach  
2 
Relocation and 
land solutions  
Providing relocation 
apartments / plots/ 
agricultural land 
Applicable for most of 
big resettlement 
projects, notably in 
Hanoi, Son la Dams; 
Land by land 
compensation proved 
to be ideal but 
unaffordable- there is 
one case found in Bac 
Giang (National 
Shooting Stadium 
project)  
Quality of apartment; place 
of relocation is inappropriate: 
many affected people sold 
out the apartment (HN) or 
felt in depressed livelihoods 
(Sonla ethnic people) 
3  
Livelihoods rehabilitation 
funds: city budget and 
contribution (3-5%) by 
investors;  
HCMC (156 fund) and 
recently in Hanoi. 
Shortage of budget due to 
ignorance of investors and 
poor coordination 
4 
Involuntary 
mechanism on 
the basic of 
agreement and 
Land acquisition planning 
including commercial 
area for affected people 
Successful in Da Nang 
with increase GDP and 
11,56% of growth 
However, Danang takes great 
advantages in land resources 
(extra land is available for 
compensation and extended 
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mutual benefit Relocation in a large scale for commercial center for 
affected people); the city is 
under rapid urbanization; 
there is less tension in land 
acquisition 
5 
Market- oriented 
approach 
Applicability of market 
price for compensation 
through Price Verification 
Institutions;  
HCMC 
More satisfaction from 
affected people 
6 Partnership/  
General Joint-Stock 
Resettlement, 
Rehabilitation and 
Compensation Company  
HCMC, pilot model   
7 
Vocational 
training initiatives 
Through Rehabilitation 
funds and specific effort 
of local authorities and 
mass organization  
Not  
Education, poor awareness of 
affected people in investing 
in education  
8 Employment   
Lack of Education and skills, 
limitation of working ages; 
lack of commitment of the 
investors  
9 
Benefit sharing (in 
cash and in kind)  
 
Not yet found/ a test 
module in Quang Nam 
hydropower dam  
 
10 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility by 
private sector 
(NPV case) 
Public consultation and 
information disclosure/ 
Community Development 
Initiatives/ Economic 
Rehabilitation programs 
in partnership with 
public/ private 
companies; NGOs and 
other investors  
Budget constraint for 
the company; 
awareness  and 
education level of 
affected people; 
economic crisis 
Unclear results but 
recognition by affected 
people and authority; 
affected people demand for 
more negotiation  
The approaches still under consideration 
1 
Joint stock by 
land contribution  
Applied for voluntary 
mechanism  
High trust required 
between investors and 
affected people  
Problems of VN market 
culture/ capability of people 
to join this model  
2 
Privatization of 
resettlement, 
rehabilitation and 
compensation 
service   
 
A pilot module in HCMC 
with positive results 
Problem of legislation for 
various private companies to 
be eligible in providing this 
service  
3 
Enhanced of Price 
verification by 
professional 
institutions  
 
HCMC pilot, make 
compensation price to 
market price 
 
(Based on Hung Vo 2009 and document review) 
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Appendix 2: Fieldwork Protocol 
Qualitative fieldwork 
Basic information about the studied case: the NP project 
Study of documentary sources (project profile, socio-economic conditions, EIA reports, progress reports updated…) 
Stakeholder mapping: Tentative identification of key informants (names, positions, contacts) 
 
 Government Actors Private Actor 
Communities (the third 
party) 
Primary 
stakeholders 
 Provincial level (PPC, functional 
departments, mass organizations) 
District level (DPC, functional 
departments, resettlement executive 
agencies etc) 
Communal level (CPC, mass 
organizations) 
Nui phao company: the 
external department (C 
& R team, and 
community liaison and 
economic restoration 
team) 
Heads of villages 
Vulnerable Groups 
Affected households by 
categorization (location, level 
of being affected by the 
projects, involvement to the 
complaint issues) 
Secondary 
stakeholders 
Other representatives from relevant 
ministries and upper government 
agencies 
Representatives of 
Masan Resources group  
NGOs 
Neighboring Communities 
Mass Organizations and other 
local associations 
 
Preparation for the fieldwork 
Fieldwork guidelines encompassing identification of key informants, methods of data collection and the investigation 
issues 
Logistics arrangement (letter of introduction, appointment, accommodation and facilities) 
Anticipated measures for protecting human subjects (ethical issues) including announcement of research objectives 
and methodology 
 
Basic Outline of Case Study Report 
The context 
- Policy environment 
- Socio-economic baselines 
- Practice of IR and PPPs at national and provincial levels 
Some basic content from the field  
- Description of PPP process defined by the Research Design (Figure 2) 
- Overview about the IR project, stakeholders and progress 
- Description of data collection procedures; list of interviewees, list of group discussion and meetings, 
milestones records, arrays of presenting outcomes and other data, list of relevant readings and document 
review 
Data analysis and findings 
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Fieldwork guidelines 
1. PPP structure process 
Order Content Informants Method Note 
1 
Concept 
PPP in the NP project ( interaction 
patterns, rules and goals) 
Local concepts about PPP, goals and  
key objectives of the collaboration; 
Mapping of the project activities and 
the roles of the actors; 
How often, and in which way the actors 
interact in order to carry out the 
project activities? 
NPM, local 
authorities, 
functional 
departments, 
PAPs  
Interviews 
GD 
Observation  
Introduction about the 
researcher, research 
objectives  
2 
PPP Rules 
Observed content of policies/ 
agreements/contracts; 
Observed institutional arrangements; 
Observed incentive schemes and 
additional arrangements; 
Observed decision making 
mechanisms/ administrative 
procedures 
Are there any problems during 
implementation? What are the root-
causes of the problems? 
Are there any changes or creation of 
rules overtime? 
Senior 
government 
officials; NPM 
managers, local 
authorities and 
executive staff 
Interviews, 
observation, 
Document 
study  
Comparison between 
policies and practice of 
implementation; 
understanding the 
informal norms and 
rules; 
 
3 
Resources dependencies and power  
Explain why PPP is established? Process 
of the establishment: advantages and 
difficulties in the early stage; 
What are (and the impact of) additional 
resources and entitlements of the 
NPM?  
Describe the institution or 
organizational structure in details 
(salary scale, facilities, personnel 
system and salary scale, investment 
capital and  incentive schemes) 
Strength and weakness of each partner 
(resources and capacity); 
Who are decision makers? In which 
situations? How is forcing power used 
in the project? How decisions and 
solutions were made for the resisting 
cases? 
Senior state 
officials and 
functional 
executives, 
NPM staff and 
managers 
Interviews, 
Document 
review, 
Participant 
Observation 
 
Understanding about 
the PAPs and PACs is 
necessary; 
It is required different 
sources of evidences, 
study of specific cases 
of problem solving  
4 
Perceptions/ goals 
The points of view of the actors about 
Public officials 
in different 
positions and at 
Interviews, 
Participant 
Method triangulation 
(interviews, group 
discussion and 
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responsibilities of public and private 
actors in the NP project, about the 
constraints of collaboration, about 
conflicts/ tensions and solutions for the 
conflicts/ tensions; 
Are there any changes of perceptions 
of the actors overtime? Why? 
What are the organizational goals of 
public and private actors? What are 
shared/ common goals?  
The level of importance of certain goals 
and objectives stated by the actors. 
different level; 
NPM staff and 
managers; PAPs  
Observation 
(meetings and 
problem solving 
cases), 
Group 
discussion  
observation), and data 
triangulation (different 
sources of data);  
Accurate interpretation 
of what is “behind 
rather than at 
meetings’ to 
understand the 
perceptions of and 
tensions between 
actors 
5 
PPP added value activities (additional 
policies) 
Identification of the additional 
activities beyond the policy 
requirements in the NP project; 
Why or in which circumstances the 
additional policies were produced? 
The stakeholders’ points of view over 
the added value activities; the changes 
of the added value activities overtime 
and the reasons of changes. 
Senior public 
and private 
representatives. 
The commune 
leaders, PAPs in 
different groups  
Document 
review, 
Interviews, 
observation  
Assessment by different 
stakeholders, who 
should be informed 
about the research 
objectives 
6 
PPP collaboration building activities  
Mapping decision making mechanisms; 
Identification of the lead organizations; 
Understanding the changes of policies 
and agreements and the circumstances 
of changes; 
Evidences about constraints and 
tensions (and the reasons) between 
the actors during  problem solving for 
difficult cases; 
How or in which ways the constraints 
and tensions between the actors could 
be solved? 
How the actors communicate with 
each other? In which way they 
negotiate to achieve their own goals in 
the NP project?  
Which activities enable and strengthen 
the collaboration from time to time? 
Representatives 
of public and 
private actors 
from different 
groups and 
levels; 
Public and 
private involved 
in specific cases 
of problem 
solving 
Document 
review, 
Interviews, 
Participant 
Observation 
(collaboration 
meetings and 
problem solving 
cases), 
Group 
discussion 
Participant observation 
of  various 
collaboration meetings 
is essential; 
Long - lasting 
observation of the 
project history and 
development is 
essential  
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2. PPP results 
Order Content Key Informants Method Remark 
1 
Production results  
What are project results in view of the 
project objectives as well as the 
organizational goals? 
What are the project success and failure in 
view of the different internal and external 
stakeholders? (including the degree of 
satisfaction) 
How much and in which way conflicts have 
been resolved or reduced in the project? 
What are the obstacles to the success of the 
project? Or the reasons of the project 
failures (if any)?  
Comparison of the  results in other 
resettlement projects in the province (in 
certain aspects) 
NPM, public 
actors at 
different level, 
PAPs, external 
stakeholders 
(auditors, 
financial 
donors, 
reporters, 
community 
people) 
Document 
review 
(articles, 
reports and 
TV 
publications) 
Interviews,  
Observation 
of tangible 
project results 
Method 
triangulation 
(interviews, group 
discussion and 
observation), and 
data triangulation 
(different sources 
of data); 
Statistic data is 
essential; 
It is necessary to 
report the 
evaluation of PPP 
results to the 
relevant 
stakeholders 
2 
Democratic results: (Legitimacy / 
accountability  and accordance)  
What types of participation of each actor 
(not only public and private actors but also 
the communities) took place during the 
project implementation? 
How did the affected communities and the 
third parties assess the contribution of each 
public and private actor to the project results 
(especially in conflict resolution)? 
To which extent did the actors and the 
affected communities (not) satisfy with the 
project results and why? 
In particular, the degree of satisfaction in 
terms of economic interest, accountability, 
responsibility and transparency in the project 
NPM, public 
actors at 
different level, 
PAPs, external 
stakeholders 
(auditors, 
financial 
donors, TV and 
newspaper 
reporters, 
community 
people) 
Interviews, 
Group 
discussion, 
documentatio
n analysis, 
observation  
Triangulation is 
required; 
evaluation of the 
third parties 
including the 
communities is 
essential to ensure 
the reliability of the 
evaluation results; 
To disseminate the 
evaluation results 
for further debate 
and adjustment 
(triangulation) 
3 
PPP Regimes 
Has the collaboration between public and 
private actors been improved from time to 
time? In which aspect the collaboration is 
particularly successful?  
What aspects have been changed in public 
and private institutions overtime? (Skills, 
resources, awareness and expectation…) 
In which way the PPP differ from non-
collaboration mode of executing IR by the 
same state actor for other IR projects in the 
district? 
Whether the PPP appears to be more (or 
less) effective and efficient mechanism than 
the traditional mechanism? Why? In which 
aspects? 
Senior public 
and private 
actors, the third 
parties 
(communities, 
reporters, mass 
organizations)  
Interviews, 
observation, 
document 
study  
Triangulation is 
required; 
evaluation of the 
third parties 
including the 
communities is 
essential; 
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3. Conflicts 
Order Content 
Key 
Informants 
Method Note 
1 
What are conflicts or evidence of conflicts 
recognized in the projects?  
What are most critical conflicts and root-causes 
of conflicts in view of different stakeholders? 
How could different forms of conflicts (latent, 
manifest, emerging) in the project be identified 
and classified? 
The relationship between conflicts and project 
activities; 
Public and 
private actors, 
PAPs – 
especially the 
(public) actors 
at the district 
and 
communal 
levels 
Interviews,  
Group 
discussion,  
Observation, 
Document 
reviews  
Different 
sources of 
evidences are 
required; To be 
aware of 
sensitiveness of 
the conflict 
issues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
335 
 
Appendix 3: List of interviewee and group discussion 
Interviews 
1. Bradshaw, Craig – NPM Operations Director (Quotes 14, 69)- 11/3/2012 
2. Cu, Nguyen Van - Member of Dai Tu People Council (Quote 94)- 18/8/2011 
3. Cuong, Nguyen Van – Dai Tu BCSR officer (Quote 7)-10/3/2012 
4. Duong, Nguyen Hai - Chairman of Dai Tu DPC (Quote 60)- 12/3/2012 
5. Dung, Nguyen Thi – Senior officer of Thai Nguyen DONRE (Quote 37)- 9/8/2012 
6. Ha, Doan Van – Senior officer of Thai Nguyen DoC- 9/8/2012 
7. Ha, Le Thi - Community Liaison Officer, in charge of PCDP implementation (Quotes 51, 88) - 10/6/2011 and 
23/8/2012 
8. Hai, Ngo Tuan - Head of Dai Tu Police (Quote 61)- 10/3/2012 
9. Hai, Nguyen Manh – Head of Thai Nguyen Land Development Fund (Quotes 33, 36)- 3/2/2012 
10. Hai, Nguyen Duc – NPM C&R Staff (Quote 62)- 10/6/2011 
11. Hai, Pham Thi Hong (Non PAP) - Agricultural Service Extension Officer, Ha Thuong Commune (Quote 93) 
12. Heaton, Dominic – CEO of Nuiphao Mining (Quote 53)-19/6/2012 
13. Hien, Tran Thi – PAP, Head of the Tailor’s shop (Quote 74)- 22/5/2012 
14. Hong, Nguyen Van - Chairman of Ha Thuong CPC (Quotes 42, 64)- 7/5/2011 and 15/5/2012 
15. Hong, Vu - Deputy General Director of Nui Phao Mining (Quotes 4, 63, 90)- 16/2/2012 and 3/5/2012 
16. Hue, Truong Thi - Head of Thai Nguyen Provincial Delegation of the National Assembly and Former Dai tu 
Chair (Quotes 38, 81)- 15/4/2013 
17. Hung, Pham Van – Head of Dai Tu People Council (Quotes 52)- 18/8/2011 
18. Hung, Dao Viet – NPM C&R staff (Quotes 16, 84)- 10/6/2011 
19. Hung, Ma Dinh - Officer, construction economics  of Thai Nguyen DoC (Quote 28)- 10/3/2012 
20. Hung, Tran Van - Communal Cadastral Officer of Ha Thuong Commune (Quote 80)- 15/5/2012 
21. Huong, Dam Bich - officer of Thai Nguyen DoF, task force group member (Quote 24)- 10/3/2012 
22. Khang, Tran Duy –General secretary of Communist party  of Hung Son commune (Quote 87)- 20/9/2011 
23. Kiem, Truong Manh - Vice Chairman of Dai Tu PC (Quotes 2,47)- 16/2/2012 and 18/8/2011 
24. Kim, Nguyen Van - Deputy Secretary of Thai Nguyen Provincial Communist Party (Quote 55)- 30/11/2011 
25. Khoa, Do Dang - Chairman of Hung Son CPC (Quotes 41,78)- 15/5/2011 
26. Lam, Bach Hong - C&R Staff (Quote 82)- 10/6/2011 
27. Linh, Ma Dieu - NPM Senior Community Liaison Officer (Quotes 17, 71, 85)- 26/2/2012 and 3/3/2013 
28. Loi, Nguyen Van - Vice director of Land Development Center (Dai Tu Board of CSR) (Quotes 6, 40)- 18/8/2011 
and 16/3/2013 
29. Loi, Tac Van - Vice Chairman of Ha Thuong CPC (Quotes 29, 68)- 7/5/2011 and 20/3/2013 
30. Long, Duong Ngoc – Chairman of Thai Nguyen PPC (Quotes 23, 70)- 2/3/2012 and 15/2/2013 
31. Luc, Trieu Dinh -Deputy Head of Dai Tu Police (Quote 50)- 16/2/2012 
32. Mui, Phung Thi – NPM Economic Restoration Officer (Quote 10)- 10/6/2011 
33. Nam, Nguyen Thieu – Member of Masan Resources Board of Management  (Quotes 1, 22)- 6/3/2012 and 
19/6/2012 
34. Nam, Pham Van - Deputy Head of Dai Tu BCSR- 15/5/2011 
35. Nham, Nguyen Van - Secretary General of Dai Tu Communist Party (Quotes 27, 56 and 77)- 19/6/2012 and 
8/3/2013 
36. Ngoan, Dang Xuan – NPM HR Manager (Quotes 67, 92)- 30/12/2012 and 15/4/2013 
37. Ngoc, Nguyen Thi – Dai Tu BCSR officer (40)- 18/8/2011 
38. Phuc, Le Kim - Head of Thai Nguyen Provincial Site Clearance Committee (Quotes 30, 54)- 25/7/2012 
39. Quang, Nguyen Dang – Chairman of Masan Group (Quote 45)- 19/6/2012 
40. Que, Do Xuan - PAP, Nam Song Cong relocation site (Quote 73)- 9/9/2011 
41. Son, Vu Xuan - Superintendent, Resettlement and Compensation department (Quotes 15, 34, 49, 85)- 
16/2/2012 and 10/7/2012 
42. Tâm, Hoang Van – Head of BCSR (Quotes 39, 48)- 18/8/2011 and 15/4/2013 
43. Tam, Nhu Van – Vice Chairman – Thai Nguyen PPC (Quote 32)- 25/7/2012 
44. Tan, Tran Van – Officer of DoF (Quote 35)- 3/8/2011 
45. Thang, Nguyen Van – Member of NPM Board of Management (46)- 19/6/2012 
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46. Thang, Tran Van - Officer of Thai Nguyen DoC, task force group member (Quote 34)- 10/3/2012 
47. Thuan, Nguyen Huu - Vice Chairman - Thai Nguyen PPC (Quotes 3, 20)-  19/6/2012 
48. Thuan, Nguyen Huu - Relocation officer (Quote 66)- 10/3/2012 
49. Tuan, Doan Van - Director of Thai Nguyen DONRE (Quotes 21, 31)- 19/6/2012 and 10/3/2012 
50. Tuat, Chu Van - Former Chairman of Ha Thuong CPC  (Quotes 18, 58)- 16/2/2012 and 8/2/ 2012 
51. Phung Xuan Thi - PAP (Quotes 5, 72)- 7/5/2011 and 24/5/2012 
52. Viet, Hoang Quoc - PAP (Quote 13)- 23/5/2011 
53. Vinh, Phan Van - Vice Chairman of Tan Linh (Quote 57)- 21/1/2013 
54. Vu, Dao Thi – PAP, Nam Song Cong relocation site (Quote 65) – 22/6/2013 
55. Xuyến, Nguyễn Thị – Ha Thuong Vice Chair-woman PC (Quote 86)- 21/8/2011 
56. Duong, Nguyen Van - PAP (Resisting in 37 National Road) (Quote 43)- 18/5/2012 
57. Vui, Nguyen Thi - PAP from hamlet 3 Hung Son (Quote 8) – 15/5/2011 
58. Thom, Nguyen Xuan - PAP from hamlet 2 Hà Thuong (Quote 9) - 7/5/2011 
59. Unknown PAP from 4 Hà Thuong (Quote 11 )- 25/3/2012 
60. Duc, Dao Xuan - PAP from Nam Song Cong (Quote 12) - 15/5/2011 
61. Tuong, Tac Van - PAP Cao lan ethnic, interviewed in 2010 (Quote 59) - 16/7/2010 
62. Vy, Tran Dinh - PAP form Hamlet 13 of Tan Linh commune (Quotes 44) - 23/5/2011 
63. Other unknown PAPs in Commune meetings (5, 5a, 5b, 79, 89, 91) - 23/5/2011,  25/2/2012 and 18/5/2012 
64. Thien, Hoang Thi - PAP, hamlet 4 of Ha Thuong commune (Quote 76)- 7/5/2011 
65. Ha, Do Thanh - PAP, hamlet 10 of Ha Thuong commune (Quote 75)- 16/7/2010 
Group discussion meetings 
Order Date Description 
Number of 
participants 
1 7-May-11 PAPs from Ha Thuong Commune 26 
2 15-May-11 PAPs from Hung Son Commune 25 
3 23-May-11 PAPs from Tan Linh Commune 15 
4 10-Jun-11 NPM community liaison and C & R staff 12 
5 3-Aug-11 DOF official group 4 
6 12-Jul-11 The farmers of the safe tea plantation group in Ha Thuong Commune 18 
7 18-Aug-11 District official group 7 
8 21-Aug-11 Ha Thuong authority and mass organizations 9 
9 24-Aug-11 Hung Son authority and mass organizations 10 
10 27-Aug-11 Young group of PAPs , who seek for jobs in NPM 25 
11 9-Sep-11 Resettled people in the Nam SC relocation site 12 
12 8-Oct-11 Casual workers in NPM 10 
13 6-Mar-12 Ethnic minority group in Ha Thuong Hamlet 5 10 
14 10-Mar-12 The officers in the task force group for complaint resolutions 8 
15 25-Mar-12 A group of complainers in Hung Son commune 5 
16 7-May-2013 Group discussion with Newspaper reporters 6 
 
 
337 
 
Appendix 4: Community meetings in 2012 
No. Date Content/Issues Type of meetings 
No. of 
participants 
1 12-Feb-12 
Meeting with the residents from hamlet 3,4  about 
compensation policies  
Information 
disclosure  
60 
2 18-Feb-12 
Awareness raising workshop for PAP on How to Use 
Compensation Money 
Training  150 
3 15-Feb-12 
Meeting with PAPs and authorities about new 
compensation policies and the application  
Information 
disclosure  
50 
4 24-Feb-12 
NPN Recruitment Policy and Job Opportunities 
Workshop (aimed to maximize PAP employment at 
NPM)  
Information 
disclosure and 
Training  
265 
5 25-Feb-12 
NPN Recruitment Policy and Job Opportunities 
Workshop (aimed to maximize PAP employment at 
NPM)  
Information 
disclosure and 
Training  
40 
6 26-Feb-12 
NPN Recruitment Policy and Job Opportunities 
Workshop (aimed to maximize PAP employment at 
NPM)  
Information 
disclosure and 
Training  
70 
7 12-Mar-12 
Meeting with hamlet 9 residents regarding potential 
impacts of the construction activities and solutions 
Information 
disclosure and 
Training  
20 
8 14-Mar-12 
Meeting with hamlet 6 residents regarding potential 
impacts of the construction activities and solutions 
Information 
disclosure and 
Training  
15 
9 22-Mar-12 Environment workshop 
Information 
disclosure and 
Training  
50 
10 10-May12 
Announce parcels/plots affected by Oil Spill in 
hamlet 9 - Ha Thuong commune 
Information 
disclosure and 
awareness raising  
100 
11 18-May-12 
Clarify concerns & complaints of hamlet 4- Ha 
Thuong commune  residents about water-shortage 
complaint in HT4 field  
Complaint 
resolutions 
25 
12 22-May-12 
C&R Policy training workshops for the hamlet 
leaders and  PAPs from Ha Thuong and Hung Son  
Information 
disclosure and 
Training  
40 
13 24-May-12 
Consultation meeting with PAPs who are interested 
in working for Mushroom Factory in Hung Son 2 
Training  20 
14 1-Jun-12 
Discuss solutions/responses to the 
request/complaint about C & R  
Complaint 
resolutions 
30 
15 17-Jul-12 
Discuss solutions/responses to the 
request/complaint about water-shortage in HT4 field 
and land acquisition policy of government  
Complaint 
resolutions 
24 
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16 26-Jul-12 
Meeting with Ha Thuong CPC leaders and HHs in 
hamlet 9 to discuss about safety measure for people 
who live near the spillway downstream and support 
them to remove outside the area which could be 
affected by project activities. 
Information 
disclosure and 
awareness raising  
18 
17 8-Aug-12 Meeting to discuss about the C & R activities  
Information 
disclosure 
15 
18 11-Aug-12 
Meeting with Hung Son CPC, Famer association, 
woman association, the mushroom company, 
commune people on mushroom plantation in Phu 
Gia factory  
Training  10 
19 20-Aug-12 
Meetings with Ha Thuong CPC leaders, leaders and 
residents of hamlet 4 about potential impacts of 
mining activities and solutions 
Information 
disclosure and 
awareness raising  
30 
20 12-Sep-12 
Workshop on opportunities to provide local services 
for NPMC. 
Information 
disclosure and 
awareness raising  
50 
21 26-Sep-12 
Coordinate with farmer association for training on 
plantation of safe tea 
Training  17 
22 26-Oct-12 
Training on environmental protection and sanitary in 
the Ha Thuong commune 
Training  51 
23 28-Oct-12 
Training on environmental protection and sanitary in 
the schools 
Training  14 
24 30-Oct-12 
Meeting with Tan Linh CPC  and hamlet 13 residents 
about plan for compensation and resettlement to 
people affected by the project in Tan Linh commune 
Information 
disclosure and 
awareness raising  
42 
25 1-Nov-12 Meeting on forestation plantation project  
Consultation and 
information 
disclosure  
42 
26 15-Nov-12 Meeting on forestation plantation project  
Consultation and 
information 
disclosure  
32 
27 22-Nov-12 
Meeting with Hung Son commune authority about 
improvement for the hamlet road for hamlet 16, 
Hung Son 
Consultation and 
information 
disclosure  
9 
28 28-Nov-12 
Meeting with Tan Linh CPC  and representatives 
from hamlet 13 about plan for compensation and 
resettlement to people affected by the project in Tan 
Linh commune 
Consultation and 
information 
disclosure  
9 
29 30-Nov-12 
Meeting with Tan Linh CPC  and hamlet 13 residents 
about plan for compensation and resettlement to 
people affected by the project in Tan Linh commune  
Consultation and 
information 
disclosure  
58 
30 6-Dec-12 Meetings with hamlet 7 about C&R policy  
Information 
disclosure 
45 
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31 6-Dec-12 Meetings with hamlets 8, 9 about C&R policy  
Information 
disclosure 
60 
32 6-Dec-12 Meeting with hamlet 2 about C&R policy 
Information 
disclosure 
30 
33 8-Dec-12 Meetings with hamlets 3 about C&R policy 
Information 
disclosure 
40 
34 8-Dec-12 Meetings with hamlets  4 about C&R policy 
Information 
disclosure 
50 
35 8-Dec-12 
Meeting with Tan Linh CPC and representatives from 
hamlet 13 to discuss about the potential impacts of 
the mine operations 
Information 
disclosure & 
awareness raising  
8 
36 10-Dec-12 
Meeting with Ha Thuong CPC regarding the water 
supply to farming activities in hamlets 7, 8 and 9 of 
Ha Thuong commune. 
Complaint 
resolutions 
7 
37 20-Jul-12 
Workshop on safe tea model and  study visit to the 
safe tea model in Minh Lap & Hoa Binh villages, 
Dong Hy district 
Training  9 
38 31-Jul-12 
Guideline on techniques of safe tea processing for 
Hung Son 1 
Training  19 
39 8-Oct-12 
Meeting on distribution of relocation plots in Nam 
Song Cong relocation site 
Information 
disclosure  
20 
40 
22-Dec-
2012 
Dissemination of compensation, support and 
resettlement policies for the PAPs in new affected 
areas (hamlet 3 and hamlet 4 of Ha Thuong 
commune) 
Information 
disclosure  
80 
41 
26-Nov- 
2012 
Information disclosure about compensation, support 
and resettlement policies for new affected areas 
  
41 31-Dec-12 Workshop on new NPM policies for the PAPs  
Information 
disclosure and 
training  
14 
 (NPM Community Liaison Reports) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
340 
 
Appendix 5: Collaboration meetings 
Order Date Content Participants 
1 8-May-10 
Arrangement for implementation of the new guidance of 
Dai Tu district for the NP Project  
District/ communes/ NPM 
2 28-Sep-10 Outstanding problems about C & R in Hung Son Commune 
District/ Hung Son/ NPM/ 
Province 
3 23-Sep-10 
Implementation of the Decision no 167  for the poor 
households to build their houses  
Provincial/District/Commun
es and NPM  
4 6-Oct-10 
Discussion about compensation of the Doc Dinh Fuel 
Station  
NPM/ Hung Son 
5 25-Oct-10 
Review of the Resettlement, Support and Compensation of 
the NP project  
Province/ District/ 
Communes and NPM 
6 5-Nov-10 
Discussion about the problems of C&R for the households 
along the national road No 37 
District/ NPM/ Hung Son/ 
Ha Thuong Communes 
7 5-Dec-10 
Report on the progress of the NP project and the 
outstanding issues 
Province/ District/ 
Communes and NPM 
8 22-Dec-10 Discussion on relocation of some public work in Hung Son  NPM/ Hung Son/ District  
9 24-Dec-10 
Discussion on the problems of the relocation for the KV3 
(The Army warehouse)  
NPM/ Military Unit of KV3 
10 7-Jul-10 Meeting for activation of the NP project 
NPM/ Province/ distrtict/ 
commune 
11 12-Jul-10 
Meetings with the representatives of the Dai Tu People 
Council 
NPM/  district/ commune 
and people' council/ and 
mass organizations 
13 14-Jul-10 Discussion about C&R problems in the NP projects DONRE and NPM 
14 4-Aug-10 Review of the C&R  implementation  NPM/ Communes/ District 
16 13-Sep-10 Problem solving for the K10 and KV3 (Military warehouse)  
NPM/ District and Military 
unit 
17 16-Sep-10 Establishment of the Environmental Trust Fund DONRE and NPM 
18 6-Oct-10 Relocation of the public works in Hung Son commune NPM/ Hung Son 
19 2-Nov-10 Discussion about new prices for the relocation plots  NPM/ District/ DoF 
20 10-Nov-10 Land transfer procedures to NPM NPM/ District/ Ha Thuong 
21 29-Nov-10 
Ground clearance for the entrance to Nam Song Cong 
relocation site from the national road No 37 
NPM/ District/ Hung Son 
22 7-Dec-10 Meeting for the distribution of the relocation plots  NPM/ District 
23 15-Feb-11 Meeting for the relocation of the electricity wire NPM and Dai Tu BCSR 
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24 28-Mar-11 Problem solving meeting about C&R in the NP project  NPM/ distrtict/ commune 
25 25-Jul-11 Problem solving meeting about C&R in the NP project  NPM/ Province 
26 27-Jul-11 
Discussion about administrative warnings about the 
resisting households and review of the C&R progress of 
the NP project 
NPM/ District/ Communes 
27 23-Aug-11 Discussion about forcing actions NPM / Ha Thuong/ District 
28 25-Aug-11 Problem solving meeting about C&R in the NP project  NPM/ District 
29 30-Aug-11 Problem solving meeting about C & R in the NP project  NPM/ District 
30 13-Sep-14 
Review of the progress of the NP project and profiles for 
forcing actions 
District/ communes/ NPM 
31 20-Sep-11 
Review of C&R projects in Dai Tu district including NP 
project 
District/ NPM/ Hung Son/ 
Ha Thuong Communes 
32 16-Sep-11 Overview of the C&R problems of the NP project NPM/ Communes 
33 7-Nov-11 Problem solving for the PAHs in Ha Thuong  NPM/ Ha Thuong  and PAPs 
34 17-Nov-11 Problem solving for the PAHs in Ha Thuong  NPM/ Ha Thuong  and PAPs 
35 25-Nov-11 
Report on the progress of the NP project and the 
outstanding issues 
NPM/ District/ Communes 
36 16-Dec-11 
Report on the progress of the NP project and the 
outstanding issues 
NPM/District/ Communes 
37 20-Dec-11 
Report on the progress of the NP project and the 
outstanding issues 
NPM/ District/ Communes 
86 3-Feb-12 Outstanding problems about C & R in the NP project  task force group  
87 7-Feb-12 Hand -over of some public work in the relocation site  NPM/ District/ Hung Son  
88 8-Feb-12 
Compensation for the extended project areas in Ha 
Thuong  
NPM / Ha Thuong/ District 
89 15-Feb-12 Relocation land for the religious groups NPM/ Hung Son 
90 16-Feb-12 Complaint resolution meeting 
NPM and the task force 
group  
91 16-Feb-12 
Discussion on the legal status of the 12 PAHs in Phuc Linh 
commune 
NPM and Phuc Linh 
92 16-Feb-12 Discussion on Forcing actions  NPM/ District/ Communes 
94 12-Mar-12 
Discussion on the special cases of C&R which were not 
stated clearly in laws  
NPM/ District/ Communes 
96 9-Apr-12 Problem solving in the Nam Song Cong entrance NPM/ District 
97 23-Apr-12 Distribution of the relocation plots in Nam SC  
NPM/ District/ Communes 
and PAPs 
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98 25-Apr-12 
Policy dissemination for the PAPs in the extended project 
areas 
NPM/ district/ PAPs 
99 8-May-12 Review of C&R for the Phuc Linh religious group 
NPM/ Communes/ Phuc 
linh group 
101 3-May-12 Discussion on some special cases of PAHs NPM/ district/ communes 
102 15-May-12 Discussion on the residence land compensation prices NPM/ district/ Ha Thuong 
103 6-Jun-12 
Discussion about compensation prices for the sector 6 of 
the NP project 
NPM/ District/ Hung Son/ 
Tan Linh  
104 19-Jun-12 
Meeting with the representatives of the Masan group 
about C& R   
NPM/ district/ province 
105 28-Jun-12 
Discussion about the compensation for the entrance of the 
Nam SC relocation site  
NPM/ district 
106 5-Jul-12 
Conclusion on the compensation prices for the sector 6 
(buffer zone) of the project 
NPM/ Hung Son/ District  
107 10-Jul-12 Problem solving for the NP project NPM/ District/ communes 
108 15-Feb-12 Land transfer procedures for Phuc Linh (Catholic) group 
Commune/ district/ Phuc 
Linh groups 
109 19-Jul-12 
Discussion on the land compensation prices, and land 
lease prices and  land fee  
 
NPM/ DoF 
110 23-Jul-12 
Compensation prices for the sector 6 of the project in Tan 
Linh  
NPM/ Tan Linh/ District 
111 25-Jul-12 
Meeting with the leader of TN PPC about C&R activities in 
the NP project 
NPM/ province/ district/ 
communes 
112 31-Jul-12 Distribution of the relocation plots for PAHs  NPM/ District 
113 31-Jul-12 Land acquisition procedures for the PAHs in Khe Voi area NPM/ district/ commune 
114 6-Aug-12 Complaint resolution meetings 
NPM/ district/ communes 
and PAPs 
115 9-Aug-12 
Training on C&R policies and experience of 
implementation  
NPM/ province  
116 6-Aug-12 
Lesson learnt from the study tour from other C&R project 
in Nghe an Province 
NPM/ district  
117 13-Aug-12 
Media responses to some articles with incorrect 
information about C&R activities in the   NP project  
NPM/ district 
118 21-Aug-12 Complaint resolution meetings  NPM/ communes and PAPs 
119 23-Aug-12 Complaint resolution meetings NPM/ district/communes 
120 4-Sep-12 Discussion about C&R activities in Tan Linh communes NPM/ district/ Tan Linh  
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122 4-Sep-12 Problem solving of the resisting PAHs NPM/province/ district 
123 11-Sep-12 
Discussion about compensation plan for Sector 6 of the 
project  
NPM / district/ commune 
124 12-Sep-12 Review of C & R activities in the NP project NPM/ district/ communes 
127 1-Oct-12 
Report on the progress of the relocation for the Phuc Linh  
religious group 
NPM/ district/ Phuc linh 
group  
128 16-Nov-12 Discussion on the extension of the Project areas NPM/ district/ Tan Linh  
130 27-Nov-12 
Discussion about land origins for application of the 
compensation prices  
NPM/ district/ communes 
131 3-Dec-12 Procedures and plan for forcing actions in Ha Thuong 2  
NPM/ province/ district/ Ha 
Thuong  
132 3-Dec-12 
Discussion about land origins for application of the 
compensation prices  
NPM/ Hung Son  
133 5-Dec-12 
Training on C&R policies and experience of 
implementation  
NPM/ district/ communes 
135 13-Dec-12 
Construction of the new Church  for the Phuc Linh religious 
group  
NPM/ district/ Phuc Linh 
group  
38 2-Jan-13 Complaint resolution meetings with PAPs in Hung Son NPM/ Hung Son/ PAPs 
39 5-Jan-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ district/ Hung Son  
40 8-Jan-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ district/ Tan Linh  
41 10-Jan-13 
Problem solving for compensation for installation water 
supply pipelines 
NPM/ district 
42 10-Jan-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ district/ communes  
43 11-Jan-13 Discussion about the construction of Hung Son school  NPM/ Hung Son  
44 21-Jan-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ district/ Tan Linh  
45 8-Jan-13 Comments on draft of revised land laws NPM/ province/ district 
46 29-Jan-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ district/ communes 
47 25-Feb-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ District/ Hung Son  
48 3-Mar-13 
Final Meeting for compensation and relocation of the Phuc 
Linh religious group  
NPM/ district/ Phuc linh 
group  
50 8-Mar-13 Comments on draft of revised land laws NPM/ province/ districts 
51 12-Mar-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ Hung Son  
52 13-Mar-13 Problem solving meeting about C&R in the NP project  NPM/ district/ communes 
53 20-Mar-13 Complaint resolution meetings Task force group  
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54 22-Mar-13 Complaint resolution meetings Task force group  
55 22-Mar-13 Complaint resolution meetings 
Province/ NPM/ Task force 
group 
57 15-Apr-13 Problem solving meeting about C&R in the NP project  NPM/ district 
58 7-May-13 Relocation meeting  NPM/ district 
59 7-May-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ District/ Hung Son  
60 8-May-13 Problem solving meeting about C&R in the NP project  
Province/ NPM/ Task force 
group 
61 4-Jun-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ district/ Tan Linh  
62 21-Jun-13 Progress report on C&R of the NP project  Province/ district/NPM 
63 11-Jul-13 Discussion about special cases of resisting PAHs NPM/ Ha Thuong  
64 22-Jul-13 Overview of the C & R activities in the province  
NPM/ Province and other 
projects 
65 22-Jul-13 
Additional compensation for the PAPs under the impact of 
the flooding 
NPM/ Ha Thuong  
66 12-Aug-13 
Compensation for the re-alignment of the national road 
No 37 
NPM/ district/ DoC 
67 19-Aug-13 
Compensation for the re-alignment of the national road 
No 37 
NPM/ Department of 
transportation  
68 25-Aug-13 Report on Compensation activities for the extended areas NPM/ district  
70 29-Aug-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ district 
72 11-Sep-13 Complaint resolution meeting in Hung Son  NPM/ district/ Hung Son  
74 13-Sep-13 Distribution of relocation plots  NPM/ district 
76 23-Sep-13 Complaint resolution meeting in Hung Son  NPM/ Hung Son  
78 15-Oct-13 Review of C&R profiles  NPM/ Hung Son  
79 25-Oct-13 Problem solving meeting about C&R in the NP project  NPM/ District/ communes 
80 7-Nov-13 Distribution of relocation plots  NPM/ District 
81 25-Nov-13 Meeting for land transfer procedures in Ha Thuong  NPM/ District/ Ha Thuong  
82 5-Dec-13 Dai Tu People Council meeting NPM/ People councils 
 
(Summary of NPM C&R documents and reports) 
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Appendix 6:  NPM Additional Policies  
(the translation version from the Vietnamese version) 
Issued 
date 
Number of 
Letters 
Purpose Summarized supports Issued by 
28-Jul- 
2010 
04-2010/QĐ-
NPMN 
For the bonus and beyond-
national policy entitlements to 
the affected individuals, and 
organizations which had good 
cooperation during 
implementation of 
compensation and site 
clearance for construction 
activities of the Nui Phao 
project  
1. Additionally reward to 
households that hand over 
the land before deadline: of 
VND 1000/m2 for agricultural 
land and VND 10 
million/household.   
2. Additionally reward to 
People's Committees of Ha 
Thuong, Hung Son, and Cat Ne 
Communes that follow the 
Company's schedule.  
Nui Phao 
Mining 
Company  
21-Apr-
2011 
19-2011/QĐ-
NPM 
For the additional payments to 
individuals and families who 
agreed to receive the 
compensation package, 
support and handed over the 
land to Nui Phao Mining 
Company as committed 
1. Support 40% of value of 
compensation package for 
agricultural land (Land 
compensation, economic 
restoration support, and 
allowance for production 
stability) to the PAPs in: 
Section I - Ha Thuong, Section 
I (GD 2) - Hung Son, Section 2 
- Ha Thuong, Resettlement 
area K10/ KV3.      
2. Support 50% of the 
difference between 
compensation value 
stipulated in Compensation - 
Support – Resettlement 
Policies approved by Thai 
Nguyen PPC before the 
Decree 69 (before 2010) and 
that of such land prices of 
2011 (after the Decree 69) 
3. Additional support to the 
households who have land in 
the transport safety corridor 
of High way 37.  
Nui Phao 
Mining 
Company  
6-Feb-2012 
 
107/UBND-
GPMB 
For resolving the 
entanglements in the Nui Phao 
Project during implementing 
the provincial compensation 
policies  
1. Adjustment of support and 
compensation for palm land 
from forest land to that for 
perennial plant land.  
2. Regulations on different 
compensation for residential 
land with Land Use Right 
Certificate and land of 
households under 
management of K10.  
3. Support to poor households 
who married and had houses 
but still sharing the land use 
right certificates (LUCs) with 
Thai Nguyen 
PPC 
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their parents.    
4. Support to assets built on 
the agricultural land that is 
certified for agriculture 
purpose by Commune PC is 
100%. 
5. Support to households that 
were identified as poor at the 
time of assessment and no 
longer at the time of 
approval.  
6. Support to removal and 
move expenses incurred by 
households and individuals 
whose assets were built after 
announcement of the project 
implementation.  
29-May-
2012 
942/UBND-
NC 
For resolving the 
entanglements in the Nui Phao 
Project during implementing 
the provincial compensation 
policies 
 Additional support to 
households whose residence 
area of less than 50m2 
Thai Nguyen 
PPC 
18-Sep-
2012 
2100/QĐ-
UBND 
For additionally adjusting some 
contents in the Decision 
535/QĐ-UBND dated 3/3/2011 
of Thai Nguyen PPC 
1. Support to self- relocation: 
VND 80 million/household.  
2. Support for economic 
upswing of households and 
individuals whose land 
located in Section 6 was taken 
same as that for other 
sections (the Decision QĐ535 
specifies a set for total 
surface equal to 360 m2 or 
more) 
Thai Nguyen 
PPC 
16-Nov-
2012 
2499/UBND-
NC 
For resolving the existing and 
obstacles for Nui Phao Project 
during the implementation of 
land compensation policies  
Compensate and support to 
foundation excavation of 
individual construction works  
Thai Nguyen 
PPC 
(NPM document review) 
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Appendix 7: List of VIP visits to the NP project   
STT Time Content/ Purpose 
1 8-Jan-08 Mr Hoang Trung Hai- Deputy Prime Minister paid a visited to NuiPhao Project  
2 24-Apr-09 Delegation of the Thai Nguyen People's Committee  paid a visited to NuiPhao Project 
3 22-Aug-09 Mr Nguyen Tan Dung - Prime Minister paid a visited to NuiPhao Project 
4 11-Feb-10 Indonesian investors visited to NuiPhao Project 
5 10-Apr-11 
Mr Duong Ngoc Long- Chairman of Thai Nguyen PPC visited and inspects the  Project's 
progress 
6 23/5/2011 Mr Truong Tan Sang- Vice President of the Socialist Republic of VN visits the project 
7 28/4/2011 Mr Nguyen Van Kim- Deputy Provincial Permanent Secretary visits the project 
8 28-Nov-11 
Mr Pham Xuan Duong-  Member of Party Central Committee, Provincial Secretary, 
Chief Parliamentary delegation of Thai Nguyen province leads to inspect the progress of the 
project implementation 
9 11-Jan-12 VN Development Bank visited the project 
10 11-Feb-12 VDB leader and staffs & Ministry of Industry and Trade paid a visited to site 
11 2-Mar-12 Mr Nguyen Sinh Hung-Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam visited the project 
12 17-Feb-12 Mr Vu Huy Hoang- Minister of Industry and Trade visited the project 
13 19-May-12 Mr Hoang Trung Hai- Deputy Prime Minister visited the project 
14 26-Jul-12 
Mr Nguyen Thien Nhan- Deputy Prime Minister of Socialist Republic of VN visited the 
project 
15 25-Sep-12 Environmental Resource News and DONRE visited the project 
16 16-Nov-12 Masan Group and Masan Consumer visited the project 
17 30-Nov-12 
Mr Pham Xuan Duong-  Member of Party Central Committee, Provincial Secretary, 
Chief Parliamentary delegation of Thai Nguyen province leads to inspect the progress of the 
project implementation visited the project 
18 6-Jan-13 Dragon Capital (DC) visited Nam Song Cong Resettlement Site and worked with the Project 
19 11-Aug-13 
Mr Tran Duc Luong-  Former president and his wife visited on the occasion of Thai Nguyen 
Tea Festival 2013 visits the project 
20 1-Sep-13 Sarus- American investors visited the Project 
21 15-Feb-13 
Mr Duong Ngoc Long- Thai Nguyen PPC Chairman visited and encourages NP's staff on the 
occasion of new year visits the project 
22 16-Jan-13 Singaporean investors visited the site 
23 17-Sep-13 Ms Ma Thi Nguyet- Vice Chairman of Thai Nguyen PPC  paid a visit to Nui Phao Plant site 
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24 18-Jan-13 Mr To Huy Rua- Member of the Politburo paid a visit to NP plant site 
25 18-Mar-13 Mr Truong Dinh Hue- Head of the Central Economic Committee paid a visit the site 
26 2-Jul-14 
Mr Nguyen Van Kim- Deputy Provincial Permanent Secretary and provincial delegation 
visited and encourage NP's staff on the occasion of new year.  
(Summary of the headings from newspapers)  
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Appendix 8: Summary of media publications- first half 2012 
No. Date Title Media Agency 
1 1-Dec-12 Tet (New year) For The Poor Thai Nguyen TV 
2 24-Jan-12 NPM - One Year Review  Thai Nguyen TV 
3 23-Jan-12 How Expatriates think about New Year in Vietnam Thai Nguyen TV 
4 1-Apr-12 
About NPM Workshop: How to Effectively Use Compensation 
Money for PAPs 
Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
5 1-Dec-12 NPM Joining in "TET FOR THE POOR" Program  Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
6 19-Jan-12 How Expatriates think about New Year in Vietnam Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
7 2-Jan-12 NPM - One Year Review (re-broadcast)  Thai Nguyen TV 
8 2-Mar-12 
Nguyen Sinh Hung (National Assembly Chairman) Visit to Thai 
Nguyen and NPM Project  
Thai Nguyen TV 
9 17-Feb-12 Vu Huy Hoang (Minister of MoIT) Visit to NPM  Thai Nguyen TV 
10 18-Feb-12 Job Opportunities at NPM for PAP Thai Nguyen TV 
11 2-Mar-12 
Nguyen Sinh Hung (National Assembly Chairman) Visit to NPM 
Project  
Vietnam TV 
12 2-Apr-12 Nguyen Sinh Hung Visit   Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
13 18-Feb-12 Vu Huy Hoang (Minister of MoIT) Visit to NPM  Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
14 22-Feb-12 
Efforts, Responsibilities and Recommendations (NPM 
Recruitment Policies and Job Opportunities for PAPs) 
Vietnam News 
15 3-Jan-12 NPM Maximizing Employment Opportunities for PAPs Thai Nguyen TV 
16 15-Mar-12 Job – Concern of the Labors  Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
17 13-Apr-12 
Support from NPM for construction of cultural house in 
hamlet 6 
Thai Nguyen TV 
18 17-Apr-12 Contribution of NPM to the change of local area Thai Nguyen TV 
19 18-Apr-12 The start of blast activity in NPM  Thai Nguyen TV 
20 23-Apr-12 
NPM employees (Vietnamese employees and expatriate 
working for NPM) donate money to the Red Cross for the 
victims of Phan Me coal mine accidents 
Thai Nguyen TV 
21 28-Apr-12 
NPM and Vinacomin organize the training course on 
metallurgy (the 2
nd
 training) for PAP of NP project. 
Thai Nguyen TV 
22 4-Dec-12 
Support from NPM for construction of cultural house in 
hamlet 6 
Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
23 13-Apr-12 
NPM and Vinacomin college organize the training sessions on 
metallurgy (the 1
nd
 training) for PAP of NP project. 
Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
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24 20-Apr-12 The start of blast activity in NPM Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
25 23-Apr-12 
NPM employees (Vietnamese employees and expatriate 
working for NPM) donate money to the Red Cross for the 
victims of Phan Me coal mine accidents 
Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
26 29-Apr-12 Effort & Results of C&R activities in Nui Phao project Law and Life Newspaper 
27 20-May-12 
Meeting between typical enterprises of Thai Nguyen province 
with Viet Nam’s State President Truong Tan Sang (with the 
participants of NPM representative) 
Thai Nguyen TV 
28 5-Mar-12 
Policy of State of Viet Nam in supporting enterprises with job 
training (applied to the case of the  training course on 
metallurgy of NPM) 
Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
29 16-May-12 Environment protection in NP project. 
Vietnam Agricultural 
Newspaper 
30 5-Aug-12 
Ground readiness for construction activities of Nui Phao 
Project 
Construction Newspaper 
31 6-Jan-12 
NPM leader give gifts to children in the project area on the 
occasion of June 1
st
 – International Children’s Day. 
Thai Nguyen TV 
32 6-May-12 
NPM responses to the International Environmental Day 
through giving PPE to Environmental Sanitation Management 
Board of Dai Tu district     
Thai Nguyen TV 
33 6-Apr-12 
NPM leader give gifts to children in the project area on the 
occasion of June 1
st
 – International Children’s Day. 
Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
34 6-Apr-12 Safety in NPM – the top priority policy in NPM Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
35 6-Jun-12 
NPM responses to the International Environmental Day 
through giving PPE to Environmental sanitation management 
Board of Dai Tu district     
Thai Nguyen Newspaper 
36 26-Jun-12 NPM efforts to become a showcase model in mining sector. Economic News 
(NPM PCDP Report - First Half 2012) 
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Appendix 9: CDP summary 2012-2013 
Infrastructure support  
ORD. ITEMS BENEFICIARIES 
1 
Culture House of Ha Thuong 6 and facilities (kitchen and water closet) of  
Suoi Cat Temple. These items belong to the Culture and Spiritual 
Complex of Ha Thuong 6 - one of the first models at village level within 
Thai Nguyen province. 
Ha Thuong 6 residents and 
adjacent communities  
2 Trung Hoa cemetery access road. 
Trung Hoa residents and 
adjacent communities  
3 
Kitchen of Cat Ne Health Clinic. Improve the hygiene of the clinic to 
meet the national standard required for clinic at commune level. 
Cat Ne Health Clinic and Cat 
Ne residents  
4 
Son Ha or Nam Song Cong Culture House with the purpose of helping 
relocated households at Nam Song Cong Relocation Site having a place 
for village meetings and other common activities 
Households relocated (from 
affected hamlets) at Nam 
Song Cong site  
5 
Praying House at Nam Song Cong Relocation Site. This item is for 
catholic households - who moved from affected hamlets to Nam Song 
Cong - so as they have a spot for Catholic Communities activities. 
The Catholics moved to Nam 
Song Cong Site 
6 Support for building new classrooms for Ha Thuong secondary school. 
Children (of both affected 
and non-affected 
households) enrolling in 
secondary school  
7 Facilities and equipments for Ha Thuong CPC Culture House 
CPC and Ha Thuong 
communities  
8 
Support for building new classrooms (6 classrooms) of Hung Son 2 
Kindergarten 
Hung Son 2 Kindergarten 
9 
Support for building new classrooms (6 classrooms) of Hung Son 1 
Primary School 
Hung Son 1 Primary School 
10 
Support for building new classrooms (8 classrooms) of Hung Son 2 
Primary School 
Hung Son 2 Primary School 
11 Support for building kitchen for Hung Son 2 Primary School Hung Son 2 Primary School 
12 Support to build office building of Hung Son Secondary School Teachers in this school  
13 
Support for building new classrooms (8 classrooms) for Ha Thuong 
Secondary school. 
Ha Thuong secondary school 
14 
Leveling/Earthwork to extend the school yards for schools in Hung Son 
commune 
Schools in Hung Son 
15 
Crushed rocks/stones from mining activities to support to improve some 
of the commune/village access roads in Ha Thuong, Hung Son and Tan 
Linh communes 
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Corporate Social Responsibility activities  
Ord Activities Beneficiaries Notes 
1 
In-kind support (refreshment) for the Elderly 
Association of hamlet 1 - Hung Son.  
50 members (who are 
above 60 years old) of 
the Elderly Association.  
Build relationship with local 
community. 
Gain support (for the project) of 
the Elderly and people in Hung 
Son 1.  
At the request of the Association. 
2 
Support For the Phan Me Coal Mining Accident  
- NPM internal donation (incl. NPM leaders, 
foreign expats and all employees) to support 
victims of the accident.  
- Support for the Search & Rescue Team with 02 
excavators, 01 generator, experts and fuel/gas.   
09 out of 11 families 
affected by the accident 
(not support 02 families 
who resident in other 
places but build houses 
at the site for 
compensation). 
Sharing the difficulty with unlucky 
families/victims. 
Support Phan Me and local 
authorities in search and rescue 
activities.  
3 
Community support on the International’s 
Children Day: 
- Outdoor facilities for kindergartens in Hung Son 
and Ha Thuong communes (merry-go-round & 
ball-house).  
- Candies & biscuits for kids in affected hamlets.  
Children enrolling in 
these kindergartens.  
All children in affected 
hamlets.   
Annual activity to encourage 
children in affected community  
 Support local kindergartens to 
improve their facilities so as to 
meet the national standards.  
4 
Support for the invalids, martyrs and wounded 
families (in four affected communes) who are 
poor or in difficult situations.   
20 poor families of the 
invalids, martyrs and the 
wounded. 
 
5 
Community support on the Moon Festival 
Occasion:  
Candy and Biscuits for children in four affected 
communes. 
Candy and Biscuits for children of Huong Duong 
Group (women from Dai Tu who are infected with 
HIV/AIDS).  
Moon cakes for children of VDB banks staff.  
All children in affected 
hamlets regardless of 
being from affected 
family or not. 
 
6 
In-kind support for the Foundation ceremony of 
Son Ha (Nam Song Cong) Elderly Association.  
  
7 
In-kind support for poor students who gained 
good result in their study in the school year of 
2011-2012. 
36 poor students out of 
150 good/ excellent 
students from different 
communes of Dai Tu. 
 
8 
Tet Gift for poor families  affected communes: 
winter blankets, cookies and candies 
60 poor households 
Annual activity to support poor 
families  
9 Soup Pot for poor patients at Dai Tu hospital  
Poor and difficult 
patients who were 
treated at the hospital  
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10 
Community support on the International’s 
Children Day 
Children in the affected 
communes  
Annual activity to encourage 
children in affected community  
11 
Text books, reference books and kid-stories for 
Ha Thuong Primary School  
Students at Ha Thuong 
Primary School 
Encourage student to develop 
reading skills 
12 
 Support to construct a dilapidated house in Ha 
Thuong 6 
Hoang  Van Thanh – a 
poor elderly with 
disability  
 
13 
Gift for wounded and martyr families from wars 
in the past 
wounded and martyr 
families who are poor or 
in difficult situations in 
four affected communes 
 
14 Community support on the Mid-Moon festival  
Children in the affected 
communes  
Annual activity  
(Community Liaison Reports 2012-2013) 
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Appendix 10: Participant Observation in the NP project   
 
Community meeting  
 
Information disclosure  
 
Mushroom plantation  
 
Interview 
  
Collaboration meeting Site appraisal 
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Quotations 
1. “[...] Particularly, we expect you to monitor the performance of the task force group for complaint resolution, 
pushing up the process of negotiations and agreements with the PAPs as well as enhancing the cooperation 
between the company and the local authorities, and the functional department to maximize the effectiveness 
of the complaint resolution...” (quote 1). 
2. “[...] it was unexpected that the PAPs stopped the project construction... The most important tasks for the 
company and the local authority now are to resolve their complaints and listen to their expectations so we 
can continue with the project activities... I think you can join us to solve the problem as you have experience 
about the project and the people, since we need a comprehensive view to identify the root-cause 
problems...” (quote 2). 
3. It is good to focus on the roles of the private investors in land conversion. Especially in the circumstances of 
the recent land law revision, that resulted in no significant changes in the compulsory land conversion 
mechanism... “(quote 3). 
4. “[...] why do you take your time to do a Ph.D.  which is too challenging and time- consuming... you’d rather 
spend your time on consultation work, and increase your income ... You are allowed to investigate our 
organization but that should be done in an honest and transparent manner, without breaking company 
regulations in terms of information and confidentiality, if applicable” (quote 4). 
5. “it is unfair when we supported the government and the project by accepting the compensation plan and 
resettled in another place, but then the others who resisted by staying until now could benefit by negotiating 
for the better prices or being entitled to the higher compensation prices and more entitlements under the 
revised policies” (quote 5). 
6. “We know that our letters should be solved by the district for reply but the company should be responsible to 
assist us to obtain the response from the district”, (quote 5a) 
7. “It was many time I sent my letter to the district BCSR but we never have received a response from them… 
then we decided to send our complaint letters to higher level…”, (quote 5b) 
8. “[...] the DMS were carried out in 2006 and the final compensation was made in 2011. Apart from the 
changes in compensation rates and entitlements, there were also changes due to in the landscape changes, 
which includes the locations which become more commercialized (commercial land is compensated at a 
higher rate), the changes of the sizes of trees and the crops...) and the households were split into more 
households with more couples of husband and wife etc.” (quote 6). 
9. “The high number of complaints has been partly caused by incorrect calculation of prices, location and 
entitlements. This is due to the large amount of work that we do - we deal with more than 3000 households” 
(quote 7). 
10. “We can self- restore our livelihoods... we need the cash payment as it is entitled in the company policy” 
(quote 8). 
11. “It is safe if we have our money in hand rather than use it economic restoration activities. We only join the 
economic restoration activities if we don’t have to spend our compensation money...” (quote 9). 
12. “[...] they critically asked for recruitment based on their concern that there is no opportunity for them to 
generate income after displacement. Paradoxically, we offer them opportunity to vocational training and 
other income generation activities; they refused and keep asking to be employed by the company... We 
cannot recruit all the PAPs, specially most of them have no skills and no motivation to work, compared to 
other non- PAPs” (quote 10). 
13. “We don’t care if our requests were eligible by the laws or not; but we don’t accept that way ... and we keep 
asking for our own interest...” (quote 11). 
14. “The company takes our land being used for cultivation from generations to generations... and their 
responsibility is to provide us with new income generation opportunities, not just compensation payment” 
(quote 12). 
15. “We have to leave our home, our gardens and we have been paid cheap compensation prices... the tungsten 
mine would bring a great benefit for the investor so this is very unfair...” (quote 13). 
16. “Let’s see if the PAPs resist and refuse to transfer their land... how much we will lose if we keep waiting?” 
(quote 14). 
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17. “It was too much of  overload for us to fulfill all the administration tasks for more than a thousand of 
households during that period of time” (quote 15). 
18. “We do not have to wait for one week for the appraisal of each responsible level of the public agencies as 
regulated by the laws. It can be much faster now... even within a couple of days...” (quote 16). 
19. “We can save a lot of time without the unnecessary administrative procedures ... some documents can be 
sent to the communal authorities without sufficient signatures which can be filled in later... In many cases we 
can call for a meeting without any official invitation letters” (quote 17). 
20. “We appreciate very much NPM’s great effort in the stabilization of the PAPs’ livelihood; but we also 
understand that the company in turn, expects our support, especially in regards to convincing our people to 
hand over their land to the project” (quote 18). 
21. “[...] through compensation, support and resettlement policies, to ensure eligible interests of PAPs; to 
stabilize the livelihoods of the PAPs under sustainable development programs and labour transfer from 
agricultural to non- agricultural activities...” (quote 19). 
22. “We have an annual budget for vocational training and job creation under various national programs, such 
as the national program for job creation and vocational training for young people, the training program for 
farmers (we call as the program 1956), to name a couple. However, we often do not have enough funding for 
the implementation of these programs and since Thai Nguyen is in the transition period of industrialization, 
and there is a great need in vocational training. The number of the PAPs in NP project, needed for the 
vocational training has overloaded our financial and training capability. We are seeking more contribution 
from the companies and training institutions in this regard” (quote 20). 
23. “Our department is responsible for land management issues in the Thai Nguyen province. We have recently 
re-structured our organization in terms of improvement of manpower and expertise in order to effectively 
handle our tasks of land management, compensation and resettlement. We have devoted a great deal of 
manpower to the NP project, such as assigning the vice director of our department to be fully in charge for 
the project. However, we think that there are a variety of other partners involved in the NP project and the 
investor has a strong capability to mobilize resources for their project development. We have done our best 
to fulfill our tasks... In addition, the DONRE has plenty of other tasks to do in the province, not just the NP 
project. (quote 21). 
24. “In order to execute the land conversion process for mining activities in the NP project, we definitely cannot 
rely on the local government to carry out this task on our behalf. This project is too big compared to the 
capabilities of the province and the district on the one hand. We and our stakeholders mostly benefit from 
the project outcomes, thus we should be most responsible, on the other. Our project is subject to the 
compulsory land conversion mechanism, but we should do a great deal more for the PAPs and PACs as this 
mechanism is largely unaccepted. Also the PAPs and PACs should be convinced by the benefits they may gain 
from the project to support our project by transferring their land and resettle in new places. In order to be 
able to do so, we have invested a great amount of financial capital that not all national level investor can 
actually afford” (quote 22). 
25. “NPM is the unique investor in the Thai Nguyen province which considerably invested in economic restoration 
and social safeguards measures for the benefit of the project affected people and communities. It is also the 
investor, who has developed the best additional compensation and resettlement policies in the province - and 
maybe in all of Viet Nam” (quote 23). 
26. “In general, in land conversion, the PAPs have the right to reject compensation and refuse displacement. 
However, when a majority of PAPs have received compensation and transferred their land, then the 
remaining (minority) of PAPs will be forced to displace”- (quote 24). 
27. “We strongly requested you to take a forcing action in regard to this [...] case. The household has received all 
compensation money and was committed to leave their house since 2010 but they re-occupied the land by 
planting banana trees. Now the company needs the land for construction of the national road, no 37, and we 
have the right to use our land. You need to take actions in order to ensure that the laws and the authority of 
the government is respected” (quote 25). 
28. “According to our experience, the case [that you have mentioned] comprises enough evidence of policy 
incompliance of the resisted household. However, we should be careful because there are still many 
administrative procedures to be fulfilled prior to the forcing action... Meanwhile, the resisting people have 
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their own reasons to resist; they are also supported by some lawyers. We still want the investor to continue 
negotiations with the resisting households instead of pursuing a forcing action...” (quote 26). 
29. “Sometimes it is too frustrating for us when NPM approaches the higher level to impose decisions on us and 
guide us to follow the company proposal. They should have known that at our level, we know best how to 
deal with the situation and we can explain the higher levels why the actions should not be taken” (quote 27). 
30. “The provincial government has been given power to plan staffing, recruit, appoint, organize assignments, 
evaluate, inspect and even increase, salaries. The district level of the government can also undertake the 
same management tasks, but only if assigned to do so by the government - meaning that the staffing plan 
must be approved by the TN PPC. Communes are elected by the villagers” (quote 28). 
31. “[...] in compulsory land conversion, without communal support, it is impossible to organize meetings or any 
practical activities in the commune. The people may not have a strong dependence on the local authorities, 
but they normally follow the suggestions of the local authorities...” (quote 29). 
32. “We understand that NPM offered more additional policies, asking for a more open negotiable mechanism 
between the company and the PAPs. We cannot completely accept all these new policies and mechanisms. 
The project is subject to the compulsory land conversion mechanism so that the negotiable mechanism is 
“explicitly” prohibited... The additional policies are very good and beneficial to the PAPs... but we should be 
careful and restrict some key provisions - for example, the compensation prices should be strictly general and 
applicable to all resettlement and compensation projects in the provinces. It would be difficult for the 
province if the PAPs in other compulsory land conversion projects in the province ask for the same conditions 
and provisions in NP project - this would be hardly afforded by the provincial budget” (quote 30). 
33. “Forcing is necessary in compulsory land conversion when the policies are not respected by the stakeholders. 
However, we need to make sure that we strictly follow policy guidelines on forcing procedures. We found 
that we are hardly able to take actions at present because forcing conditions and procedures seem to be 
vague and can be interpreted differently by different people...” (quote 31). 
34. “We should be careful in taking hard measures in compulsory land conversion, which may cause strong 
reactions of the PAPs as witnessed in many other forced displacement projects. This is seen as a ‘hot’ 
problem especially in the public media and the national assembly. We do not want to attract public attention 
by touching this sensitive issue” (quote 32). 
35. “We understand the pressure under which NPM in, and their reasons for speeding up the land conversion 
process; their investment up to date amounts to 3,000 billion VND which, coupled with no profits so far, 
infers that any further delays will cause big losses for the company. As such, NPM should have more 
incentives to encourage PAPs and PACs to move because the compensation prices are fixed to all projects 
and there is a limited government allowance for economic rehabilitation” (quote 33). 
36. “If the project is successful, the authorities, the company as well as the PAPs will be the ones who benefit the 
most... We can have some positive appraisals from our upper levels but these will not much change our 
positions and interests” (quote 34). 
37. “We enjoy working for the NP project as we learn a lot from a project of such a big size; and NPM staffs are 
“professional and dedicated”.... Even though the NP project brought us more obligations rather than 
incentives, we tried our best to support the project by mobilizing our manpower to revise and appraise the 
land conversion packages in a proper manner so that the project progress can be sped up. The main reason 
for our support was based on our long lasting collaboration, and our efforts have been recognized and 
awarded by the company” (quote 35). 
38. “[…] benefit most in terms of enhancement of expertise and experience while working for a big project such 
as NP” (quote 36). 
39. “[…] the functional departments gradually became more embedded to NPM than to their district 
counterparts” (quote 37). 
40. “One of our most important political tasks in recent years is to successfully carry out land conversion in the 
NP project. This is a giant project that involves a broad range of stakeholders. Although the project was 
driven by a close collaboration between the district and the investor, the success would be greatly 
determined by the private investor” (quote 38). 
41. “We cannot commit our manpower to the project. The company should be responsible and they know better 
than us about how to carry out the project in a proper way and in line with the standards set-forth by them. 
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Although we consider land conversion in the NP project to be one of the most important goals it doesn’t 
mean we do not have any other resettlement projects in the district to be implemented” (quote 39). 
42. “We never think that our team should be responsible for the economic restoration activities although it has 
been indicated in the policy framework to be related to our jobs. It should be the responsibility of the 
company or the higher levels. We just include the economic restoration entitlements in the compensation 
packages for the PAPs. We never carry out any economic restoration arrangements and we believe other 
districts are doing the same” (quote 40). 
43. “[...] for us and our people ‘listening a hundred times is less valuable than seeing only once with our eyes’, we 
are willing to support the project if our interests are clearly defined and delivered. For us, commitments and 
promotion campaigns do not make sense if compared to the practical results” (quote 41). 
44. “We are exasperated with our responsibilities in this project over the last years. It has been such a long time 
that our farmers have suffered from the impacts of the project. As the leaders of the commune, we have no 
time to concentrate on our socio-economic development objectives; instead we are fully working for the Nui 
Phao project. We are under high pressure from the district to expedite land conversion, on the one hand, and 
we are highly criticized by our villagers on the other. The company and the district leaders want us to 
mobilize PAPs but the benefits of the company and the benefits of the community should be clearly stated... 
otherwise we have no way to explain to our people” (quote 42). 
45. “The compensation package for my family is too low if compared to other families, and that may not be 
enough for us to resettle in a new place....We understand that in many other private projects, the PAPs can 
have right to negotiate for the compensation prices. The NP project is a private business too...“ (quote 43). 
46. “We know that you are experts and experienced... so that some innovative economic restoration models 
should be recommended to us... We found that the current models are not effective... there should be more 
effective ones...” (quote 44). 
47. “We‘d rather spent our last money to survive rather than die with a full money left in the pocket” (quote 45). 
48. “Without the support of the people and the communal authorities, our company will not be able to carry out 
the project. The support of the PAPs was significant because we were fully aware of their loss while leaving 
their residence and agricultural land. We used to be a foreign company, which was highly committed to 
international norms. I myself was working for the big international donors; we understand that the interests 
and long term development of the affected communities - especially the ethnic and vulnerable group should 
be respected. It was not only the corporate social responsibility but also a condition for us to earn the 
coherence and support from the local authorities and the affected people” (quote 46). 
49. “We have our Oversight Committees and Advisory boards with senior representatives from our political, 
administrative and political systems as well as the NPM and the PAPs to ensure representativeness in the 
land conversion process. We have met every two to three months in the past but we do not meet anymore. 
Some people have their name in the committee but it is just on paper, since they never voice their opinions or 
are rarely present at the meetings. The key members, however, are the leaders of functional departments 
and authorities. Those people work for the project in their daily jobs in their organization, not through the 
Committee (quote 47). 
50. “All new policies, proposals and plans relating to the compensation and resettlement activities in the NP 
project must go through the district or provincial COBs prior to the submission to higher levels for approval. 
However, it is only formality since the decisions are made by only some key persons...” (quote 48). 
51. “We are here to listen to your guidance and expect to have a decision to solve the problem. You come up 
with the conclusion that we should consider the possible consequences... then for what purpose we are here, 
spending hours to explain our situation?  You are invited to this meeting to make decisions, not just listen ...” 
(quote 49). 
52. “District government has their leadership position as they have access to authority but in fact have no 
capability to exercise power and they do not want to take a risk” (quote 50)
.
 
53. “We have a big team of compensation and resettlement staff, categorized into various functional groups. 
Our activities are recorded; our expenses of compensation, support and resettlements are precisely analysed 
and filed, all the compensation calculations and allocations are computerized since our activities and 
expenses are subject to financial and social audits so that everything is clear and transparent” (quote 51). 
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54. “[….] in many cases, the people do not believe our explanations, even though they come from the leaders of 
the authorities. They tend to have more trust in the third party, such as media agencies…. Therefore we 
found that media involvement in the project implementation is necessary” (quote 52). 
55. “NP project is now in the heart of the provincial and national public media, which could be seen as the 
double-edged knife. Because we are living in the time when the public media is allowed to get involved and 
react on all social problems.  The best way for us to be “safe” to media’s criticism is not only by having good 
relationships, but also by our good performance and compliance” (quote 53). 
56. “We must say that the political system now has joined the NP project, in order for the NP project to succeed. 
We have requested various administrative and political organizations to join discussions and meetings for 
problem solving. We have asked our senior officials from the province to come to the project, to organize 
community meetings, and have established the task force group for complaint resolution at a short notice” 
(quote 54). 
57. “If we don’t timely resolve this situation, how else could we attract more investors to our province” (quote 
55). 
58. “At this stage, the issues of the NP project are considered the most important political task in our district” 
(quote 56). 
59. “Our important tasks are to maintain security and stability in the commune. We absolutely disagree with the 
reactions of the PAPs because they may cause violence and bring a bad reputation of our community” (quote 
57). 
60. “We take only actions if there is clear guidance and with the authorization from higher levels. We cannot do 
whatever the NPM wants us to do in our community. The higher levels sometime do not understand the 
pressure here. We have received complaints from our community to agree with the investor to take over their 
land... “ (quote 58). 
61. “We don’t think the resettlement and compensation project will be implemented. They (the investors) just 
keep it for selling at a better price because it requires a huge capital for compensation and resettlement. We 
have been waiting for 4-5 years since the government first announced land acquisition and prohibited further 
development on our resident and agricultural land. Now it is the third investor coming - we don’t think they 
can be able to complete the compensation and resettlement work. Wait and see, they will sell the project 
again (...)” (quote 59). 
62. “The company just pursues their own interest while pushing us... but it is understandable... If it does not 
acquire the land in a timely fashion, the company will not survive. There was clear evidence from the 
previous project owner” (quote 60). 
63. “In many cases we have to plan together, especially when it is related to forcing people or acquiring land 
from the PAPs. For sensitive issues like that, we have to agree about time, methods, personnel and 
responsibilities. The plan should be submitted to higher levels for approval and we should be responsible to 
implement it properly...” (quote 61). 
64. “Sometimes it took a long time to obtain approval from the provincial levels for changes of the plan... It 
seems that the higher level did not understand what happens at the implementation level we always are the 
ones who trigger proposals for problem solving because we are more concerned about what is going on with 
the project and look for solutions” (quote 62). 
65. “In comparison to the initial estimation budget in 2004, the current budget in 2012 for compensation, 
support and resettlement for the NP project has been 2.5 (two and a half) times higher! The reasons for the 
higher expenses are mainly due to the fact that the original project footprint was extended from 450 to 650 
hectares, the revised compensation rates, the increased entitlements due to the changes of policies and, 
especially, due to the additional supporting policies initiated by the NPM” (quote 63). 
66. “We cannot deny that there are many additional supports from the project such as the construction of 
schools, cultural houses, clinics.... However, we expect more than these since the company will much benefit 
from mining operations and our shares are not adequate...” (quote 64).  
67. “They (the Company) said about the corporate social responsibility and the additional contribution to our 
relocation site... we don’t view those works as community supports... and we think they must do so because 
they have to compensate for us instead of giving supports as they said...” (quote 65). 
68. “The high number of complaints has been partly caused by incorrect calculation of prices, location and 
entitlements. This is due to the large amount of work that we do - we deal with nearly 3,000 households. 
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However, some policy provisions were very unclear for the calculators. One such example is about the 
compensation for the houses where the law did not clearly indicate correct compensation for the 
underground house parts and the walls between different rooms. Another example was that the DMS were 
carried out in 2006 and the final compensation was made in 2011 due to the project disruption. Apart from 
the changes in compensation rates and entitlements, there were also changes due to in the landscape 
changes, which includes locations which become more commercialized (commercial land is compensated at a 
higher rate), the changes of the sizes of trees and the crops...) etc. Thus our strategy is to flexibly adapt the 
laws in the way that most benefit the PAPs” (quote 66). 
69. “We offer job priorities to the PAPs who have been severely affected and also to the resisting people, since 
the requests of those cannot be resolved by policy. We often used this strategy to assist the disadvantaged 
PAPs and reduce the tensions due to resistance. In addition, owing to the priority recruitment policies for 
PAP, NP can have more support from the PAPs and their relatives, now being our employees” (quote 67). 
70. “[…] no forcing measures have been used although we were, at times, about  to do so” (quote 68). 
71. “Imagine, one month of delay in land transfer would result in the company to lose billions of VND. The 
experience from the previous investors shows that if failed to speed up the land acquisition, your capital 
would run out due to the blockage” (quote 69). 
72. “Nuiphao Mining Company gave us good lessons about how to generate the employment and vocational 
training for the district. Nui Phao did the things that we actually cannot do in this regard. For instance, they 
changed the awareness and the mindset of the farmers in the production of goods in line to the 
industrialization and modernization. I think, Nui Phao is one of very few companies in the province, even in 
the country to do these things. They are responsible for the PAPs by the supports in construction of 
infrastructure, vocational training and recruitment, the CSRs for the poor, the social policy families and to the 
social and cultural activities in the district and communes....” (quote 70). 
73. “[...] we tried hard to mobilize the budget from the national vocational training program, namely the 1956 
program for farmers, especially for those who are affected by land acquisition. However, they said that NP 
should use their own budget for vocational training for the PAPs since the limited budget should be used for 
other farmers in the district. In fact, we know that our training programs are eligible for the funding from the 
1956 national program” (quote 71). 
74. “Three of our children have been trained and recruited by the company. Our life now in the relocation site is 
quite good since we have job and I myself can open a shop for small business... we don’t expect much from 
the shop at the moment... but we still have some savings ...” (quote 72). 
75. “The project has significantly changed our life. We have never had such big amount of money! We could be 
able to invest in new land and new economic activities that we planned before, but we did not have enough 
money for investment. We have been guided by the project with some new economic models... we will 
consider to do... etc. Now we have to focus on stabilization of our life by building a good house, investing on 
our children education” (quote 73).  
76. “I have received the advanced compensation money of the NP since 2008... We have just transferred our land 
recently to the project. I have used the money for construction of our house in the relocation site and open 
the garment group. We have just extended the group in order to produce uniforms for the company workers 
(quote 74). 
77. “They (the investors) are only interested in the sale of the project, instead of focusing on compensation 
activities. We have been waiting so long, being unstable and cannot concentrate on our production. We are 
not sure whether they will acquire the land as planned or just keep pending for a better sale. Particularly, the 
new investor is a Vietnamese company - we don’t think they can carry out this big project while other foreign 
investors had to withdraw their capital” (quote 75). 
78. “We often go to the NPM information centre - which is located in the company’s headquarters to seek for 
information about job opportunities and the necessary information about economic restoration. The 
communal people committee has nothing to do with this and is not the place where we can find similar 
information” (quote 76). 
79. “The reason that we can co-operate very well is that we understand each other. Our active participation is 
not really based on the company’s requests... we are engaged because we are in the same sailing 
boat...where the destination would open a prospective future to all” (quote 77). 
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80. “The completion of land conversion in the NP project resulted from the continuous effort and cooperation 
between local authorities at all levels and the investors as well as the support of the PAPs and PACs (...)”  
(quote 78). 
81. “This project belongs to the Company... the benefit from the project comes to their pocket... it is not a state-
owned project. The district and province only assist the company to acquire the land...” (quote 79). 
82. “We have spent too much time and efforts for the land conversion activities for the company... The project 
can bring some benefit... but the company benefit most, so that we should be paid for the extra working days 
we worked for the project” (quote 80). 
83. “I think that the collaboration between the authorities at all levels and the investor was quite successful in 
the NP project. We have been working together for a long time and the project has been at the heart of our 
political responsibilities (...). The positive results of the project mark the common efforts between the 
authorities and the company over the last few years” (quote 81). 
84. “[...] We need the support of the authorities... and we have tried our best to build up a good relationship over 
last years... Thus, we have doubt about their dedication to assist the company as much as they can... Because 
we understand the difficult position of the local authorities in this project, so we cannot expect their full 
support to our decisions in some cases...” (quote 82). 
85. “We found what we can do ... and we should do...But a decision from upper levels is needed ... it may take 
too long and it may cause unwanted consequences if the decision is made too late... but we have no choice... 
it is not our fault as we have tried our best...” (quote 83). 
86. “We think it is effective to discuss with local officials during a drink or meal, we can become friends and 
easily share and sympathize with each other. Many important venues have taken place and have been solved 
after working hours between NPM and various levels of state actors” (quote 84). 
87. “Sometimes we have to reconsider our transfer of payment for the community support items such as the 
school construction... The reason is that the commune, while pushing us for the payment never fulfill their 
commitments in regards to issuance of administrative warning letters to some resisted households. They 
want us to be responsive but they themselves always delay in taking actions” (quote 85). 
88. “Implementation was quite smooth and successful” (quote 86). 
89. “NPM is a big company, who concerns about the reputation... We should address their non- commitment to 
the public so that they can seriously consider their decisions... “ (quote 87) 
90. “We understand that the district BCSR should be responsible for replying the complaint issues. However, they 
are so busy with other projects in the district on the one hand… And we should be more responsible to the 
complaints relating to our project, on the other hand. Then we proposed a joint-plan that we can assist the 
district so that we can be able to promptly response to the complaint letters” (quote 88). 
91. “NPM should be responsible to resolve our complaints. They are the one who acquire our land… The district 
and province just assist them with the procedures… Our complaints about compensation and resettlement 
should be addressed to them properly…” (quote 89). 
92. “I have tens of years of experience in supervision of development and urbanization projects for the World 
Bank, particularly in the field of involuntary resettlement. However, this has been much different from my 
past experience as a WB expert and when I started to work for the NP project as a practitioner in a specific 
implementation process. This period to some extent, has changed my own vision about the IR, and enriched 
my awareness about the gap between the policy and practice. Indeed, the practice of the compulsory land 
conversions as I witnessed in the NP project, characterized with high density and variety of participants; and 
the interactions between them were highly complicated. In particularly, what I have learnt in resettlement 
projects is that the investor must be strong in financial resources as well as be able to strategically use the 
resources to enable the local governments to get involved and to support your project… Besides, thanks to 
the intensive cooperation with the government organizations, our team is now better aware of government 
policies, rules and norms in carrying out land conversion in the local conditions. Now we can say that we will 
be much more confident to carry out our forthcoming resettlement project in the neighboring communes” 
(quote 90). 
93. “NPM said a lot in the public about their contributions to the PAPs and the PACs in terms of infrastructure 
improvement and job creation… According to our point of view, it is not their philanthropy or charity… 
Instead, it is their obligation because they have taken our land cheaply and have made big profits from our 
land…” (quote 91). 
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94. “[…] the demand of the PAPs is unlimited and sometime unreasonable… we don’t understand what they 
expect from us. They have received a very high compensation payment. They have been given jobs and a 
good relocation site…. While interviewed, they still badly commented on the project” (quote 92). 
95. “NPM is too rich and can afford to be generous to the PAPs… Many people became rich thanks to huge 
amounts of compensation payments. Before the project, those  people never dreamed of such big houses, 
modern facilities and better living standards as they have now…” (quote 93). 
96. “In discussions about positive aspects of the NP project, some points can be acknowledged. To some extent, 
many people wanted to be PAPs… It is true! In this remote and mountainous area, they cannot sell their land 
to anybody even if they want… now they could sell it to the project… and such enormous amounts of money 
have never been owned by the farmers who never dreamed about such modern facilities and non-farm jobs 
as they have now” (quote 94). 
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Summary  
The point of departure for this study derives from some of the most critical development 
problems in transitional economies, such as the one in Vietnam: involuntary resettlement and 
social conflict. Inspired by the increased role of the private actor in sustainable development, 
especially in the pervasive forms of PPP and CSR, this research focuses on the exploration of the 
PPP function in the field of compulsory land conversion in Vietnam and its possible contributions 
to conflict resolution. 
The leading key question of this research is of “How do (or in which way) PPPs contribute to 
social conflict mitigation in involuntary resettlement (IR) in Vietnam?” In order to answer this 
question, the main focus was placed on addressing the descriptive analysis of the PPP processes 
in IR.  Next, based on the results of the PPP process analysis, the contribution of the PPP to 
conflict resolution has been explored based on the assumption that conflict resolution can be 
considered both as the output (as immediate results of PPP) and the outcomes (indirect results) 
of the PPP. 
This research thus aimed to develop an adequate analytical framework, which would allow 
obtaining a sufficient and holistic overview of the insights on the nature of the PPP. “Which are 
the PPP institutional characteristics, the actors’ characteristics, the PPP activities including the 
collaboration building activities, the PPP results, and particularly the added value that PPP can 
bring to conflict resolution”. To structure the analysis, the analytical framework relied on 
network theory, with supplements from various concepts from other relevant literatures such as 
framework for evaluating the planning and management of PPPs in sustainable development 
and Cross-sector collaboration analytical framework. 
This study is qualitative, single case design based, encompassing qualitative fieldwork and 
participant observation in a resettlement and compensation project for mine operations in the 
North of Vietnam.  
The study shows that the PPP in IR in Viet Nam can take shape in two distinct but closely related 
dimensions: the socialization of public service delivery on the one hand, and  the generation of 
the CSR as benefit sharing of private actor in this field, on the other.  
Given that most of the findings in this study demonstrate a challenge of legitimizing a 
transformation from public bureaucracy to public and private collaboration for policy 
implementation and combating social conflict in IR, PPP approach in IR in Viet Nam appeared to 
be complex and ambiguous. In the conventional model of executives in IR, the relationship 
between public and private actors is managed through the logic of bureaucracy in which their 
actions are deemed legitimate under administrative procedural criteria. As a result, the public 
actors in the studied case seemed to be not well- prepared for the partnership. In contrast, the 
private actor proved to be capable for handling the constraints of collaboration because their 
intension of collaboration is to utilize the public actor authority and expertise to meet their 
business goals.  
As demonstrated by the rich picture of the results in IR, the PPP in the studied case proved to be 
an effective form of governance in comparison to the conventional public service delivery since 
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the objectives of the participant actors were mutually achieved. In this view, the social conflicts 
in IR were resolved directly through immediate benefit sharing, and indirectly through 
competence- and trust generation among the stakeholders.  
By presentings the insight of the collaboration building process, this research shed light the real 
practice of the public administration apparatus in Vietnam, which is in great need of socialization 
for additional resource and expertise especially at local levels. Given that the transitional 
condition towards a market economy significantly characterizes the disparity between policy-
making and the policy implementation in Viet Nam, the efforts of collaboration building were 
constrained by a lack of steady institutional roots (or background) to enable accountability of the 
public service providers as well as to encourage and manage philanthropic contributions of the 
private business actor.   
The results of the qualitative single case research design cannot be extrapolated to other 
applications of PPP in Vietnam. However, as it presents, for the first time, a detailed account of 
the public private collaboration in a contentious policy domain with substantial impact on the 
livelihoods of communities, it provides a unique window on the particulars of PPP in Vietnam. It 
is hoped for that the research findings can be tested in other big sized IR projects as well as 
compared with other applications of PPP 
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